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Foreword
If there are any reservations about the importance of intensified 
cooperation between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, 
this book will speedily dispel them.  The usual reservations are based 
on doubts about economic complementarities and fears that all 
developing countries rely mainly on natural resource endowments 
and are therefore unable to trade with each other.  This book 
shows that there is ample scope for comparative studies and hence 
cooperation in science and technology, and hence innovation for the 
mutual benefit of each.
The book also shows beyond any doubt that the state has a 
crucial role in sponsoring innovation, directly and indirectly, 
thereby leading a process that is often well-supported by the private 
sector.  An essential foundation for innovation is obviously strong 
mathematics and science in schools and universities.  However, state 
institutions are also vital for providing leadership, setting the pace, 
providing incentives, and in many other ways.
The history of state leadership is particularly striking in post-
independence India when Nehru insisted on a modernisation 
programme which has been built on by succeeding leaders, not 
least of whom the current Prime Minister.  Indeed, the chapter on 
India is an inspiring story of the deliberate actions by a government 
in an underdeveloped country striking out to develop science and 
technology to break through the legacy of backwardness.  Would 
that other countries were equally determined and decisive!
The contrast, the chapter on China, is surprising.  China’s 
industrialisation path was initially based on natural resource 
endowments and has only recently pressed forward with innovation 
seriously.  This may be because the Asian Tigers initially adopted the 
policy of last-stage assembly in factories introduced from developed 
countries.  This meant that the relevant research and development 
was denied them for a long time.  It seems that China and others 
first concentrated on the introduction of technology and equipment 
with short-term efficiency objectives.  However, it is obvious that 
they have caught up and are now capable of designing their own 
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innovation systems which are clearly essential to sustain their high 
growth rates.
The case of Brazil is of great interest. In recent decades the 
state has resorted to a variety of institutions to boost science and 
technological development.  Each step reflected a realisation that 
Brazil ought not to depend on the importation of US capabilities. 
The establishment of the National Bank for Social and Economic 
Development (BNDES) is an outstanding example of a country 
seeking an original approach to the harnessing of capital for 
industrial investment.  The results are astounding and the impact on 
GDP growth very significant. 
The story from Russia is less inspiring, though there too big 
advances are underway.  The South African case is perhaps the least 
encouraging, though there has been a significant advance in spending 
on R&D recently.  The problems here are very fundamental, starting 
in the schooling system, and the lack of drive at the universities to 
promote mathematical sciences.  The efforts of the innovative African 
Institute of Mathematical Sciences are embryonic but influential 
because its teaching is based on problem solving, and thereby shows 
what can be done.
The challenge in South Africa is all the greater for the recent 
revelation by Citigroup Global Markets that it has over US$ 2.5 
trillion of non-energy monetary reserves making it the richest nation 
when assessed by the in situ value of its natural resources.  South 
Africa is in the top 15 countries with gold, iron ore, nickel, and 
platinum group metal reserves.  This poses an enormous challenge for 
innovative work to ensure that beneficiation follows on exploration, 
leading to fabrication. 
Fundamental to all this is the financial contribution of the state.  As 
we have now learnt with respect to the international financial crisis, 
the market alone cannot fix a country’s inadequacies.  According to 
Ha-Joon Chang, 40 to 60 per cent of R&D in the United States is 
provided by the state.  It is well-known that their university research 
benefits enormously from their military budget even if the grants 
are often disguised.  However, it is not only the state that has a 
responsibility.  We are informed that in India gross expenditure on 
research and development is 68 per cent from government sources 
and 30 per cent from the business enterprise sector.  Surely others 
can learn from this example.
Foreword y xix
This book raises the platform of discourse on development to 
a higher level.  It escapes from the narrow confines of trade and 
investment policy, and reaches out to the more remote spaces of 
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Preface
This book is the result of a collaborative effort of several people 
and institutions. The contributions presented here consolidate the 
findings of the project ‘Comparative Study of the National Innovation 
Systems of BRICS’ sponsored by the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC). The project is rooted in a larger research 
effort on BRICS national innovation systems being developed in the 
sphere of the Global Research Network for Learning, Innovation 
and Competence Building Systems — Globelics. The Globelics 
initiative on BRICS economies brings together universities and 
other research institutions from Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa. The aim is to strengthen an original and less dependent 
thought, more appropriate to understanding development processes 
in less developed countries.
First and foremost, we would like to thank Professor Bengt-
Ake Lundvall, the coordinator of Globelics, who supported and 
promoted the BRICS project from the outset in 2003 and organised 
the First International Workshop of the BRICS Project in Aalborg, 
Denmark, in 2006. Without his leadership and enthusiasm the 
project could not have taken off. 
We owe special thanks to project researchers and coordinators for 
their engagement in project activities and accessibility to overcome 
difficulties that naturally emerge from the geographical and cultural 
diversity of BRICS. We are also very grateful to those who provided 
the necessary administrative and secretarial support that resulted 
in the good performance of this project, especially Luiza Martins, 
Fabiane da Costa Morais, Tatiane da Costa Morais, and Eliane Alves 
who helped in editing activities and whose support was crucial for 
formatting the manuscript and organising the tables and figures. 
Max dos Santos provided the technical IT support for the research 
network.  
The core ideas analysed in this book were discussed at international 
seminars organised in Brazil (2007), South Africa (2008), India 
(2009), and again in Brazil (2009) under the auspices of the BRICS 
Project, gathering scholars, academics, policy makers, businessmen, 
and civil society representatives. Our understanding of this complex 
theme has evolved considerably thanks to the seminar participants’ 
constructive criticism.   We are grateful to them as well as to all the 
other people not named here who also helped in the implementation 
of the project. 
None of this work would have been possible without financial 
support. The support given by the IDRC was essential for the 
completion of this project. We are very obliged to IDRC and their 
staff for their support. We would especially like to thank Richards 
Isnar, Federico Buroni, Gustavo Crespi, Veena Ravichandran, 
Isabel Bortagaray, and Clara Saavedra. We are also grateful to Bill 
Carman and Michelle Hibber, then IDRC Publishers, for the 
technical assistance provided in the preparatory work that led to this 
publication. 
Supplementary grants were received from various agencies of the 
Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology, especially FINEP, the 
Brazilian Innovation Agency and CNPq, the National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development. In particular, we would 
like to thank the general secretary of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Dr Luiz Antonio Elias, and the president of FINEP, 
Luis Fernandes, who have given enthusiastic support to the BRICS 
project since its inception. 
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Introduction
BRICS National Systems of Innovation
José E. Cassiolato and Maria Clara Couto Soares
Preamble 
The world is experiencing significant transformations in its 
geopolitical and economic constitution. The processes of trans-
formation have accelerated over the last decades. A significant part 
of the growth potential of the world economy nowadays and for the 
coming decades resides in some fast-developing countries. Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) have displayed 
such potential for dynamic change. In a historic rupture with past 
patterns of development, the BRICS countries are now playing a 
major role in alleviating the current global crisis whilst revealing new 
and alternative progressive paradigms. 
Much beyond the emphasis given by international agencies to the 
identification of investment possibilities in the BRICS production 
structures or to the prospects presented by their consumer markets, 
our perspective in analysing the BRICS countries is inspired by 
their significant development opportunities, as well as their several 
common characteristics and challenges, and the learning potential 
they offer for other developing countries. Identifying and analysing 
these opportunities and challenges will help to uncover alternative 
pathways towards fulfilling their socio-political-economic deve-
lopment potential within the constraints of sustainability. 
The central focus of this book series is the National System of 
Innovation (NSI) of the five BRICS countries. Each book deals 
with a key component of the innovation system, providing the 
reader with access to analyses on the role played by the state, the 
financing, direct investment and the small and medium enterprises, 
besides approaching a particularly relevant — though still not 
extensively studied — aspect of the BRICS economies: the challenge 
of inequality and its interrelations with the NSIs of these countries.
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The research endeavour that generated the publication of this 
book series has gathered universities and research centres from all 
the BRICS countries, as well as policy makers invited to discuss 
the outcomes. The research development and the comparative 
analysis of its results are intended to bring to light the challenges 
and opportunities of the BRICS countries’ national innovation 
systems from the points of view of these same countries. Part 
of the effort undertaken was addressed to the construction of a 
shared methodology aimed at advancing the comprehension of the 
specificities of innovation systems in each country. This was done 
in view of the need for improvements in the analytical framework 
used for the analysis of the national innovation systems located in 
countries outside the restricted sphere of developed countries. Special 
attention was paid to the political implications. However, instead of 
searching for generalisable policy recommendations, it was sought 
to identify and analyse bottlenecks that are common to the BRICS 
economies, their complementarities and competition areas, as well 
as other aspects of major importance for supporting decision makers 
and that are able to incite reflection about the subject of innovation 
and development in other less developed countries.
It is worth mentioning that the research consolidated in this 
publication is rooted in a larger research effort on BRICS national 
innovation systems being developed in the spheres of Globelics 
(www.globelics.org, accessed 3 December 2011) and RedeSist (the 
Research Network on Local Production and Innovation Systems) at 
the Economic Institute of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
(www.redesist.ie.ufrj.br, accessed 3 December 2011). Globelics is an 
international academic network which uses the concept of innovation 
systems (IS) as an analytical tool aimed at the comprehension of the 
driving forces that push economic development. It aims to advance 
the use of the IS perspective on a world basis. Established in 2002 
and inspired by renowned scholars from the field of economics of 
innovation such as Christopher Freeman (1987) and Bengt-Äke 
Lundvall (1992), the Globelics network has, among others, the 
purpose of encouraging knowledge exchange between less developed 
countries, thus fostering mutual learning across innovation research 
groups in Latin America, Africa and Asia. With this, it is sought 
to strengthen an original and more autonomous approach to 
understanding the development processes in developing countries. 
On the other hand, the focus put by the Globelics network on the 
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study of innovation systems of BRICS results from the recognition 
that understanding the particular dynamics which connects the 
knowledge base with innovation and economic performance in 
each of the five BRICS countries is, today, a precondition for 
better appreciating the direction that the world economy will be 
following (Lundvall 2009).  It is within such analytical field that the 
contribution offered by this book series is inserted. 
In the following sections we (a) present the broad conceptual 
approach of NSI used as the guiding analytical framework for 
the research gathered under this book series; (b) characterize the 
increasing importance of the BRICS countries in the global scenario; 
and (c) introduce the five-book collection on NSIs in the BRICS 
countries.
NSI and Development — A Broad  
Perspective
One of the most fruitful ways of thinking developed in advanced 
countries in the last 30 years came from a resurrection and updating 
of earlier thinking that emphasised the role of innovation as an 
engine of economic growth and the long-run cyclical character of 
technical change. A seminal paper by Christopher Freeman (1982) 
pointed out the importance that Smith, Marx and Schumpeter 
attached to innovation (ibid.: 1) and accentuated its systemic and 
national character (ibid.: 18). Freeman also stressed the crucial role 
of government policies to cope with the uncertainties associated 
with the upsurge of a new techno-economic paradigm and the 
very limited circumstances under which free trade could promote 
economic development. Since it was formulated in the 1980s, the 
system of innovation (SI) approach has been increasingly used in 
different parts of the world to analyse processes of acquisition, use 
and diffusion of innovations, and to guide policy recommendations.1 
Particularly relevant in the SI perspective is that since the 
beginning of the 1970s, the innovation concept has been widened 
to be understood as a systemic, non-linear process rather than an 
isolated fact. Emphasis was given to its interactive character and to 
the importance of (and complementarities between) incremental and 
radical, technical and organisational innovations and their different 
and simultaneous sources. A corollary of this argument is the context-
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specific and localised character of innovation and knowledge. This 
understanding of innovation as a socially determined process is in 
opposition to the idea of a supposed techno-globalism and implies, 
for instance, that acquisition of technology abroad is not a substitute 
for local efforts. On the contrary, one needs a lot of knowledge to be 
able to interpret information, select, buy (or copy), transform, and 
internalise technology.
Systems of innovation, defined as a set of different institutions 
that contribute to the development of the innovation and learning 
capacity of a country, region, economic sector, or locality, comprise 
a series of elements and relations that relate production, assimilation, 
use, and diffusion of knowledge. In other words, innovative 
performance depends not only on firms and R&D organisations’ 
performance but also on how they interact, among themselves and 
with other agents, as well as all the other forms by which they acquire, 
use and diffuse knowledge. Innovation capacity derives, therefore, 
from the confluence of social, political, institutional, and culture-
specific factors and from the environment in which economic agents 
operate. Different development trajectories contribute to shape 
systems of innovation with quite diverse characteristics requiring 
specific policy support. 
It is this understanding of the systemic nature of innovation that 
allows for two crucial dimensions of the SI approach to be explicitly 
discussed: the emphasis on historical and national trajectories and 
the importance of taking into account the productive, financial, 
social, institutional, and political contexts, as well as micro, meso and 
macro spheres (Freeman 2003; Lastres et al. 2003). Although all of 
these contexts are relevant for a discussion about development, two 
in particular should be singled out that are pertinent to this study. 
One is the financial context, recognised by Schumpeter (1982 [1912]) 
in his TheTheory of Economic Development. For him, entrepreneurs, 
to become the driving force in a process of innovation, must be able 
to convince banks to provide the credit to finance innovation. In this 
sense, any discussion about innovation systems has to include the 
financial dimension.2  The other is the idea that space matters, that 
the analysis of systems of innovation should be done at the national 
(Freeman 1982; Lundvall 1988) and local levels (Cassiolato et al. 
2003).
The national character of SI was introduced by Christopher 
Freeman (1982, 1987) and Bengt-Äke Lundvall (1988) and has been 
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widely used as an analytical tool and as a framework for policy 
analysis in both developed and underdeveloped countries. As a 
result, research and policy activities explicitly focusing on SI can be 
found in most countries and a rapidly growing number of studies of 
specific NSIs have been produced. Although some authors tend to 
focus on the NSI in a narrow sense, with an emphasis on research 
and development efforts and science and technology organisations, 
a broader understanding of NSI (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1988) is 
more appropriate. This approach takes into account not only the 
role of firms, education and research organisations and science 
and technology institution (STI) policies, but includes government 
policies as a whole, financing organisations, and other actors 
and elements that influence the acquisition, use and diffusion 
of innovations. In this case emphasis is also put on the role of 
historical processes — which account for differences in socio-
economic capabilities and for different development trajectories and 
institutional evolution — creating SI with very specific local features 
and dynamics. As a result, a national character of SI is justified.
Figure 1 is an attempt to show both the narrow and the broad 
perspectives on NSI. The broad perspective includes different, 
connecting sub-systems that are influenced by various contexts: 
geopolitical, institutional, macroeconomic, social, cultural, and so 
on. First, there is a production and innovation sub-system which 
contemplates the structure of economic activities, their sectoral 
distribution, degree of informality and spatial and size distribution, 
the level and quality of employment, the type and quality of innovative 
effort. Second, there is a sub-system of science and technology 
which includes education (basic, technical, undergraduate, and 
postgraduate), research, training, and other elements of the scientific 
and technological infrastructure such as information, metrology, 
consulting, and intellectual property. Third, there is a policy, 
promotion, financing, representation, and regulation sub-system 
that encompasses the different forms of public and private policies 
both explicitly geared towards innovation or implicitly, that is, those 
that although not necessarily geared towards it, affect strategies for 
innovation. Finally, there is the role of demand, which most of the 
time is surprisingly absent from most analyses of SI. This dimension 
includes patterns of income distribution, structure of consumption, 
social organisation and social demand (basic infrastructure, health, 
education).
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Figure 1: The Narrow and Broad Perspectives on NSI
Source: Adapted from Cassiolato and Lastres (2008).
This portrayal of the national innovation system framework is a 
corollary of an understanding that
• innovation capacity derives from the confluence of economic, 
social, political, institutional, and culture-specific factors and 
from the environment in which they operate, implying the 
need for an analytical framework broader than that offered by 
traditional economics (Freeman 1982, 1987; Lundvall 1988);
• the number of firms or organisations such as teaching, 
training and research institutes is far less important than the 
habits and practices of such actors with respect to learning, 
linkage formation and investment. These shape the nature 
and extensiveness of their interactions and their propensity to 
innovate (Mytelka 2000; Johnson and Lundvall 2003);
• main elements of knowledge are embodied in minds and 
bodies of agents or embedded in routines of firms and in 
relationships between firms and organisations. Therefore, they 
are localised and not easily transferred from one place/context 
to another, for knowledge is something more than information 
and includes tacit elements (Lundvall 1988);
• the focus on interactive learning and on the localised nature 
of the generation, assimilation and diffusion of innovation 
implies that the acquisition of foreign technology abroad is not 
a substitute for local efforts (Cassiolato and Lastres 1999);
• national framework matters, as development trajectories 
contribute to shape specific systems of innovation. The 
diversity of NSIs is a product of different combinations of 
Introduction y xxix
their main features that characterise their micro, meso and 
macroeconomic levels, as well as the articulations among these 
levels (Freeman 1987; Lastres 1994).
From the specific point of view of less developed countries (LDCs) 
the usefulness of the SI approach resides precisely in the facts that 
(a) its central building blocks allow for their socio-economic and 
political specificities to be taken into account and (b) it does not 
ignore the power relations in discussing innovation and knowledge 
accumulation. As this book argues, these features are particularly 
relevant in the analysis of the BRICS countries’ innovation 
systems. As the analysis of economic phenomena also takes into 
consideration their social, political and historical complexity, 
policy prescriptions are based on the assumption that the process of 
development is influenced by and reflects the particular environment 
of each country, rather than on recommendations derived from the 
reality of advanced countries. A number of development studies 
followed these ideas, arguing that technical change plays a central 
role in explaining the evolution of capitalism and in determining 
the historical process through which hierarchies of regions and 
countries are formed. Furtado (1961), for instance, established an 
express relation between economic development and technological 
change pointing out that the growth of an economy was based on the 
accumulation of knowledge, and understood development within a 
systemic, historically determined, view. Although original, these 
contributions have a close correspondence with Myrdal’s (1968) 
proposition that: (a) contexts and institutions matter; (b) positive 
and negative feedbacks have cumulative causation; (c) cycles may 
be virtuous or vicious, and with Hirschman’s (1958) point that 
interdependencies among different activities are important.
The need to address paradigmatic changes and the problems and 
options deriving from the upsurge of information technologies led to 
the outbreak in Latin America in the 1980s of a series of interconnected 
work from the innovation perspective. Building on Furtado’s work 
on changes associated with the industrial revolution, authors like 
Herrera (1975) and Perez (1983) analysed the opportunities and 
challenges associated with the introduction of these radical changes 
in the region. It was only then that the innovation and development 
literature started to integrate the empirically validated knowledge 
about learning inside firms with the contributions stemming from the 
work of Freeman, Perez, Herrera, and others on new technologies, 
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changes of techno-economic paradigms and systems of innovation. 
What gave special impetus to this direction was the empirical work 
focusing on technological capability building as part of a broader 
national innovation system. The role of government policies in 
orienting the speed and direction of technological changes was also 
highlighted (Freeman and Perez 1988).
Development processes are characterised by deep changes in 
the economic and social structure taking place from (technological 
and/or productive) discontinuities that cause and are caused by 
the productive, social, political, and institutional structure of each 
nation. Development is also seen as a systemic process, given the 
unequal capitalism development in the world. The recognition of 
national specificities of these processes is also fundamental. We 
found the same stress on the national character of development 
processes in List’s work (1841), and on the NSI  idea of Freeman 
(1982) and Lundvall (1988) in Furtado’s (1961) discussion about 
the transformation of national economies where their structural 
complexity is manifested in a diversity of social and economic 
forms. For Furtado, it is in this transformation that the essence of 
development resides: structural changes ‘in the internal relations of 
the economic and social system’ (ibid.: 103) that are triggered by 
capital accumulation and technological innovations. The emphasis 
on diversity, and the recognition that: (a) both theory and policy 
recommendations are highly context dependent, (b) the economy is 
firmly embedded in society, and (c) knowledge and technology are 
context-specific, conform some general identities.
Furtado (1961) established a direct relation between economic 
development and technological innovation pointing out that the 
growth of an advanced economy was based on the accumulation of 
new scientific knowledge and on the application of such knowledge 
to solve practical problems. The Industrial Revolution set into 
motion a process of radical changes based on technical progress that 
has lasted till now and that is at the root of how the world economy 
is conformed. In essence, those changes: (a) rendered endogenous 
the causal factors related to growth into the economic system; (b) 
made possible a closer articulation between capital formation and 
experimental science. Such articulation has become one of the most 
fundamental characteristics of modern civilisation. As pointed out 
by Furtado (ibid.), the beginning of such a process took place in 
the countries that were able to industrialise and create technical 
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progress first, and the quick accumulation made possible in the 
development of this process became the basic engine of the capitalist 
system. For this reason, there is a close interdependency between 
the evolution of the technology in the industrialised countries and 
the historical conditions on the basis of which such development 
was made possible. As the behaviour of the economic variables 
relies on parameters that are defined and evolve into a specific 
historical context, it is quite difficult to isolate the study of economic 
phenomena from its historical frame of reference (Furtado 2002). 
This assertion is more significant when analysing economic, social 
and technological systems that are different from each other, as in 
the underdeveloped economies. In this context, underdevelopment 
may not, and should not, be considered as an anomaly or simply 
a backward state. Underdevelopment may be identified as a 
functioning pattern and specific evolution of some economies. Social 
and economical peripheral structure determines a specific manner 
under which structural change occurs (industrialisation during 
the 1950s and 1960s) and technical progress is introduced. Hence 
different outcomes from those in developed countries are to be 
expected (Furtado 1961; Rodriguez 2001).
The neo-Schumpeterian perspective also argues that economic 
development is considered a systemic phenomenon, generated and 
sustained not only by inter-firm relations, but most significantly 
by a complex inter-institutional network of relations. Innovation 
is eminently a social process. Therefore, development — resulting 
from the introduction and diffusion of new technologies — may 
be considered as the outcome of cumulative trajectories historically 
built up according to institutional specificities and specialisation 
patterns inherent to a determined country, region or sector. Each 
country follows its own development trajectory according to its 
specificities and possibilities, depending fundamentally on their 
hierarchical and power position in the world capitalist system. The 
more distant underdeveloped countries are from the technological 
frontier, the larger will be the barriers to an innovative insertion in 
the new technological paradigm. More serious than technological 
asymmetries are knowledge and learning asymmetries, with the 
implication that access, understanding, absorption, domination, 
use and diffusion of knowledge become impossible. However, 
even when the access to new technologies becomes possible, most 
of the time they are not adequate for the reality of underdeveloped 
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countries and/or these countries do not have a pool of sufficient 
knowledge to make an adequate use of them. This occurs because 
the learning process depends on the existence of innovative and 
productive capabilities that are not always available. On this aspect, 
Arocena and Sutz (2003) argue that there are clearly learning divides 
between North and South that are perhaps the main problem of 
underdevelopment nowadays. 
The Increasing Relevance of the  
BRICS Countries
The BRICS denomination was originally used to connect the dynamic 
emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
as continental countries bearing a strategic position in the continents 
of the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The BRICS are also joined 
by their large geographical and demographic dimensions. Collectively, 
they were home to 42.2 per cent of the world population as of 2010 
representing nothing less than 2.9 billion people. In addition, the five 
countries account for approximately 30 per cent of the earth’s surface, 
holding significant reserves of natural resources such as energy and 
mineral resources, water and fertile lands. As well, BRICS countries 
have 24.3 per cent of world biodiversity; Brazil alone embracing 9.3 
per cent of the total (GEF 2008).
Moreover, it is the recent performance of these economies and 
their macroeconomic indicators that make them more and more 
the focus of surveillance and analysis. In fact, the BRICS countries 
display a growing economic importance.  In 2000, the five countries 
accounted for 17.1 per cent of the world GDP in public–private 
partnership (PPP). Their share increased to 25.7 per cent in 2010, 
with China and India accounting for 13.6 per cent and 5.5 per cent 
respectively, followed by Russia (3 per cent), Brazil (2.9 per cent) 
and South Africa (0.7 per cent) (IMF 2011). 
The participation of the BRICS countries in world GDP is expected 
to rise sharply in the years to come. The impact of the financial crisis 
and global recession on developed world economy over the last three 
years has only lent support to this expectation, beyond attracting 
attention to the BRICS economies’ capacity to remain immune or 
quickly recover from the crisis. Large domestic markets, pro-active 
investment policies, monetary and tax policies with anti-cyclic 
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capacity, presence of major public banks, and high level of reserves 
are elements increasingly recognised as having helped at least some 
BRICS economies to be less affected by the crisis. 
While growth slowed in all major regions, China and India 
continued to grow rapidly in 2009 and 2010 (Table 1). In other 
BRICS countries the crisis rebounded fast.  In Brazil, the GDP fell 
0.2 per cent in 2009, but the economy surpassed pre-crisis growth 
rates in 2010 (7.5 per cent). South Africa showed a GDP decrease by 
1.8 per cent in 2009 and had a 2.8 per cent increase in 2010. In Russia, 
heavily dependent on commodities like oil and gas, the economy has 
been hit more severely by the global crisis. It experienced shrinking 
of almost 8 per cent in 2009 but the GDP growth recovered to 3.7 
per cent in 2010, beating the developed economies’ growth rates. 
Prospects for 2015 show the five economies representing 29.5 per 
cent of the world economy.   
The economic performance of the BRICS countries has, however, 
varied widely during the last decades as shown in Table 1. China has 
maintained its position as the fastest growing economy worldwide. 
India has also grown significantly and regularly. Brazil has had 
an irregular performance, well below its potential, but showed an 
enhancement in the second half of the 2000s. Russia, after the severe 
1990s crisis that resulted in a decline of 40 per cent in its real GDP, 
has recovered and South Africa has had a small improvement in its 
economic performance that remains below its potential. 
These different performances were accompanied by significant 
changes in the productive structure of the five countries, which 
reflect dissimilar development strategies.
The competitiveness of China’s industrial sector is the main 
source of the country’s impressive economic growth. The share of 
industry in the composition of China’s GDP is unusual and growing: 
it was around 40 per cent in 1990 and reached 48 per cent in 2009. 
In contrast, in 2008, 56.1 per cent of the Chinese labour force still 
remained in rural areas. The relative share of the agricultural sector, 
which accounted for 30.2 per cent in 1980, is constantly falling, to 11 
per cent of GDP in 2009. The share of services grew from 21.6 per 
cent in 1980 to 41 per cent in 2009.
Really impressive is the mounting share of China’s manufacturing 
sector in world manufacturing GDP (Figure 2). In 1990, it represented 
3.1 per cent of global manufacturing GDP, achieving 21.2 per cent 
in 2009. 
Table 1: BRICS: Average Rates of Growth of Real GDP, 1980–2015 (percentage)
1980–1990 1990–2000 2001–2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015*
Brazil 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.7 5.7 5.1 -0.2 7.5 4.1
Russia - -4.7 6.2 7.4 8.1 5.6 -7.9 3.7 5.0
India 5.8 6.0 6.9 9.8 9.3 7.3 6.5 9.7 8.1
China 10.3 10.4 9.6 11.6 13.0 9.0 8.7 10.3 9.5
South 
Africa
1.6 2.1 4.0 5.4 5.1 3.1 -1.8 2.8 2.8
Developed 
Countries
3.1 2.8 1.9 2.8 2.5 0.8 -3.2 3.0 2.3
Source: UNCTAD (2010) for the period 1980–2008 and IMF (2011) for 2009–2015 data. See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/
ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (accessed 15 March 2011). 
Note: * Estimate.
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Figure 2: Manufacturing Sector: BRICS’ Share in World GDP, 1970–2009
Source: UNCTAD (2009). See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/report 
Folders.aspx (accessed 15 March 2011).
China has diversified its industrial system to a significant degree 
during the last 25 years and the share of technologically intensive 
sectors in industrial output in 2009 reached 42 per cent of the total 
value added by the manufacturing sector. In the other four countries 
this share is around 15 per cent.3 In addition, some major differences 
in the characteristics of the BRICS countries’ manufacturing sectors 
should be noticed. 
Brazil has gone through a structural transformation since the late 
1980s, with a significant reduction of the share of industry in total 
GDP (declining from 41.7 per cent in 1980 to 25.4 per cent  in 2009) 
and a high growth of services (from 50 per cent to 68.5 per cent in 
the same period). It is worth emphasising that agricultural goods 
that have had an important role in the country’s trade surplus were 
responsible for only 6.1 per cent of GDP in 2009, showing a fall 
from 9.0 per cent in 1980. In Brazil, as in Russia and South Africa, 
the products based on natural resources and commodities have a 
relatively greater share of national GDP than in China and India.
Russia’s economic development is heavily dependent on energy 
and raw material resources. As in Brazil, the contribution of 
manufacturing sector to GDP in Russia has declined since the 1980s, 
decreasing from 44.6 per cent in 1983 to 32.9 per cent in 2009. The 
share of defence-related industrial complex in manufacturing is 
significant, together with the strong production base in non-electric 
machines and equipment. The oil and gas industry alone accounts 
for more than 10 per cent of the gross value added. The share of 
services in total GDP has grown in the last two decades achieving 
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62.4 per cent in 2009 while agriculture has decreased its participation 
accounting for only 4.7 per cent in 2009.  
The Indian economy is essentially service-led. Skills in the 
manufacturing sector are relatively modest and concentrated in 
non-durable consumer goods and in the chemical-pharmaceutical 
complex. However, some manufacturing segments in the automobile 
complex and in certain basic industries have been developing rapidly 
in recent years. Since the mid-1980s, the contribution of industry 
to India’s GDP has been almost constant and around 26 per cent, 
but from 2004 to 2009 it increased to 28.3 per cent. India’s capacity 
in the area of services is significant, particularly those linked to 
information and communication technology (ICT). The share of 
services in GDP has grown from 39 per cent in 1980 to 54.6 per 
cent in 2009. Although the agricultural sector is declining in India’s 
GDP, it still represented 17.1 per cent in 2009 (compared to 36.8 per 
cent in 1980) and constitutes an important determinant of the overall 
economic growth. 
The services sector has also been playing a more important role 
in the South African economy. The share of this sector in GDP 
was 45.4 per cent in 1980 and increased to 65.8 per cent in 2009. 
The development of the financial sector and the growth of tourism 
have contributed to this growth. Finance, real estate and business 
services are expanding their share with regard to government 
services.  South Africa’s industrial sector is heavily based on natural 
resources, mainly steel and non-ferrous metals, with some increases 
in capacity occurring in non-durable consumer goods and the 
automobile sector. The share of industry-added value in total GDP 
value decreased from 48.4 per cent in 1980 to 31.4 per cent in 2009. 
The metal and engineering sectors dominate the manufacturing 
sector. Although agriculture is responsible for a small share of South 
Africa’s GDP (3 per cent in 2009), it still represents an important 
source of employment. The minerals and mining sector remains 
important also with respect to both employment and foreign trade.
The changes observed in the participation of BRICS countries in 
international trade were even more significant (Table 2). Their share 
in merchandise trade value more than doubled in the short period of 
2000–2010, exports rising from 7.5 to 16.4 per cent and imports from 
6.2 to 14.9 per cent. However, the contribution of the five countries 
varied significantly. The most notable fact is the well-known growth 
of China in the merchandise trade value: its exports mounted from 
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3.9 per cent to 10.4 per cent of world exports reaching US$ 1.58 
trillion in 2010, and imports increased from 3.4 per cent to 9.1 per 
cent in the same period.  
Table 2: BRICS: Merchandise Trade Value (in billion of current US$) and 
Share in World Total, 2000–2010 (percentage)
2000 2005 2010
Exports Value % Value % Value %
World 6,448.57 100.00 10,495.70 100.00 15,174.44 100.00
Brazil 55.12 0.85 118.53 1.13 201.915 1.33
China 249.20 3.86 761.95 7.26 1,578.270 10.40
India 42.38 0.66 99.62 0.95 221.406 1.46
Russia 105.57 1.64 243.80 2.32 400.424 2.64
South 
Africa
31.95 0.50 56.26 0.54 85.700 0.56
2000 2005 2010
Imports Value % Value % Value %
World 6,662.89 100.00 10,800.15 100.00 15,353.26 100.00
Brazil 58.64 0.88 77.63 0.72 191.46 1.25
China 225.02 3.38 660.21 6.11 1,396.20 9.09
India 51.52 0.77 142.84 1.32 328.36 2.14
Russia 49.13 0.74 137.98 1.28 273.61 1.78
South 
Africa
30.22 0.45 64.19 0.59 96.25 0.63
Source: UNCTAD (2010).
India also experienced a sharp increase of exports, reaching 1.46 per 
cent of the world total in 2010. Fostered by Chinese growth and 
commodities boom, the share of Brazil and Russia in world exports 
grew rapidly from 2000 to 2010, increasing almost four times. South 
Africa is the only BRICS country that still shows less than 1 per cent 
of world exports. On the import side, India and Russia increased 
their share in world imports more than fivefold. Except India and 
South Africa, the other BRICS countries managed to keep a surplus 
in their merchandise trade in 2010. In India inflows on account 
of invisibles have been helpful in financing the growing deficit in 
merchandise trade.
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The BRICS economies have significantly increased their openness 
to international trade in the last decades.  They have raised their 
exports and imports both in volume terms as a share of GDP, but the 
level of trade openness has varied quite a lot (Table 3). The greater 
changes occurred in China and India, particularly since the 1990s 
when they speeded up their international trade flows. Currently, 
China, South Africa and Russia are the BRICS economies with 
the higher levels of openness. The Brazilian economy, despite the 
liberalisation process in the 1990s, remains the most closed amongst 
the BRICS countries.
Table 3: BRICS: Foreign Trade (in million of current US$) and 
Share of GDP (percentage)
Exports + Imports
Countries 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Brazil 8,719 25,412 61,212 113,762 393,379
China 4,833 38,919 114,71 474,227 2.972.960
India 4,792 28,839 51,144 93,941 540,489
Russia      – – 349,249 136,973 627,323
South 
Africa
8,352 50,411 48,6 56,782 161,953
(Exports + Imports) GDP
Countries 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Brazil 13.0% 10.3% 14.0% 17.6% 18.8%
China 5.3% 12.9% 29.9% 39.6% 50.6
India 7.9% 15.7% 15.8% 20.4 31.3
Russia  - - 36.1% 52.7 42.4
South 
Africa
45.7% 61.2% 43.4% 42.7 44.5
Source: United Nations (2010); World Bank (2011).  
The bilateral trade flows between BRICS countries have been 
relatively restricted. However, since the first half of the 2000s there 
was a widespread increase of exports and imports flows between the 
five economies, but particularly a stronger presence of China as an 
important trade pole for the other four countries (Baumann 2009). In 
2009, China surpassed the US as the main trade partner of Brazil and 
also emerged as the second main trade partner of India and Russia. 
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The converse does not however hold, as these four economies don’t 
match their respective rankings insofar as they are neither the top 
import suppliers nor export destinations for China. China exports 
to Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa at a more intense pace 
than it imports from them. In addition, the latter are concentrated 
on a few primary goods intensive in natural resources while China’s 
exports are much more diversified and led by manufactured goods. 
Therefore, despite the fact that intra-BRICS trade has increased in 
recent years, the flows are still restricted in size and unbalanced 
in terms of the different rhythms and compositions of the BRICS 
bilateral commercial transactions. 
In the last decades, the BRICS countries have been the recipients 
of significant amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). Brazil 
received the greatest share of FDI of all BRICS economies until the 
first half of the 1980s. Although China has surpassed Brazil since 
1985, Brazil continued to be a major destination for FDI during the 
1990s, most notably during the process of privatisation that took 
place during that decade. Since the 2000s Russia and India have been 
strengthening their relevance as FDI inflow destinations.  In 2010, 
the BRICS countries received 17.6 per cent of global FDI inflows. 
Especially since 2005, there was a sharp increase of BRICS’ FDI 
outflows. With the exception of South Africa, BRICS countries 
more than tripled their FDI outflows from 2005 to 2010, raising 
their participation in the world total from 3.6 per cent to 11.1 per 
cent in the period. 
Table 4: BRICS: Foreign Direct Investment, Inflows and Outflows Share in 





1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Brazil 2.94 4.53 3.53 2.54 0.48 1.29 2.34 1.53 3.90
China na na 0.11 3.50 1.68 10.96 2.90 7.37 8.50
India 0.34 0.32 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.63 0.26 0.78 1.98
Russian 
Federation
na na na na na 0.60 0.19 1.31 3.31
South 
Africa




Brazil 0.01 0.38 0.71 0.13 0.26 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.87
China na na na 1.01 0.34 0.55 0.07 1.39 5.14
India 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.34 1.11
Russian 
Federation
na na na na na 0.17 0.26 1.45 3.91
South 
Africa
0.12 0.44 1.46 0.08 0.01 0.69 0.02 0.11 0.03
Source: UNCTAD (2010).
BRICS countries also followed different development strategies 
regarding FDI. Particularly remarkable has been the Chinese policy 
to attract multinational companies since the beginning of the 1990s. 
Inserted in a broader strategy aiming to expand its technological 
knowledge and later to strengthen the domestic industries and 
enterprises, China imposed conditions — such as the establishment of 
joint ventures and that R&D be carried out locally — that had to be met 
before the subsidiaries were to operate in China or sell in its markets. 
Brazil, Russia and South Africa — countries that liberalised their 
economies with few restrictions — got more portfolio investment, 
but most of the investment received by the manufacturing sector was 
used to buy up local companies. In China and India, where the capital 
account was not liberalised, FDI seems to have been concentrated in 
new investments in production and innovation. 
Other relevant macroeconomic indicators could be added — 
such as the impressive share of BRICS in international monetary 
reserves (about 40 per cent of the total) — but the interest in these 
five emerging economies goes beyond this area. Together with their 
expanding economic relevance, these countries are claiming a rising 
geopolitical influence. They have been important players in their 
geographic areas of influence. However, they are pushing to have 
an increasing voice in the international high-level decision-making 
institutions, particularly through reforms in the UN system and in 
the Bretton Woods organisations. New dialogue spaces bringing 
together BRICS countries, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil and South 
Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 
and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) signal concrete 
steps to move forward the cooperation and coordination within and 




Their growing leverage in international relations together with 
other emerging countries is associated with a repositioning of the 
balance of power on the world stage, which was intensified by the 
recent world crisis. BRICS countries want to see these changes 
reflected in the institutions of global governance. Since their 
economies will probably continue to account for a sizeable portion 
of the increase in global GDP in the near future, it is expected over 
time that BRICS will exert increasing financial and political influence, 
even if limited by their considerable differences and constraints to 
form a coherent political bloc anytime soon.5 
The increased influence of these countries took place during 
a period marked by intense transformations in the global society. 
One of these remarkable changes is the integration in the economy 
of a significant portion of previously marginalised segments of the 
BRICS population. The highly populated China and India led this 
process in terms of world shares, but Brazil also had an important 
participation (Soares and Podcameni forthcoming). The present 
and potential dimension of BRICS domestic markets as well as 
the policies adopted by some BRICS countries aiming to reduce 
their dependence on developed countries’ consumer markets has 
been drawing increasing attention in the last years. According to 
one estimate, two billion people from BRICS will join the global 
‘middle class’ by 2030 (Wilson and Dragusanu 2008) representing a 
huge impact on the demand profile with expected reflexes on global 
investments as well as on innovation. 
Simultaneously, several hurdles remain for the BRICS to 
overcome. One of them is the growing social gap caused by 
the unequal distribution of recent economic growth. While the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line has decreased 
over the past 30 years in most of the BRICS countries, inequality is 
still a major issue for these economies. In fact, the BRICS countries, 
except Brazil, show a trend of increasing income inequality that 
— particularly since the 1990s — has been following the rapid 
economic growth. Moreover, despite the improvements in recent 
years, Brazil is still among the countries with the worst distribution 
of income, together with South Africa that found itself in an even 
worse situation.6 In addition, India and Russia are among those with 
the largest percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line.7 Furthermore, beyond the income dimension, inequality has a 
multi-dimensional character in the BRICS countries.  This challenge 
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is exacerbated by race, gender, ethnic, and geographic dimensions 
and therefore demands more integrated solutions (Soares et al. forth-
coming).
One of the problems associated with the high poverty levels and 
the perverse distribution of income is the limited access to quality 
public services — education, health, housing and infrastructure, 
safety and security, etc. These problems are common to the five 
countries, where a significant portion of the population lacks 
access to essential goods and services, and demand urgent redress. 
This situation is reflected in poor  human development indices in 
the BRICS countries. Other undeniable challenges faced by BRICS 
are unemployment, poor quality employment and increasing 
informality.
Another evident challenge in all five countries is the huge regional 
disparity in human and economic development. There is also a large 
gap between the rural and urban population. In general, the wealthier 
regions are those that are more industrialised. Practically 60 per cent 
of the total GDP of Brazil originates in the states of the southeast. The 
Chinese economic development model favours the coastal provinces, 
while other provinces in the interior are much less developed. In 
South Africa, economic activity is concentrated in Gauteng province 
and in the western part of Cape Town. The industrial development 
of Russia occurred principally around cities such as Moscow, St 
Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and Ekaterinburg. India also shows 
significant inequalities between the rich regions to the south and the 
northern regions of the country as well as between the rural and 
urban populations. Therefore, regional redistribution of income and 
access to essential goods and services is another significant challenge 
that these five countries have in common (Soares et al. forthcoming).
The negative environmental impact of recent growth is another 
huge challenge to be faced by BRICS countries. According to 
CDIAC-UN data for 2008, the BRICS countries are responsible for 
emitting 35.3 per cent of the world’s total CO2.8 China is ranked as 
the world’s largest emitter, accounting for 21.9 per cent followed by 
the United States (17.7 per cent), India (5.4 per cent) and Russia (5.3 
per cent). South Africa and Brazil are responsible for 1.4 per cent and 
1.2 per cent of global emissions respectively, and occupy the 13th 
and 17th positions internationally. If we take the example of China, 
we observe that fossil-fuel CO2 emissions in the country have more 
than doubled in the 2000 decade alone. Energy efficiency is a big 
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problem in China and energy consumption per product is about 40 
per cent higher than in the developed world. Other environmental 
problems are also critical. For instance, 40 per cent of river and 75 
per cent of lake water is polluted leaving 360 million rural people 
without clean water. As in China, the environmental impacts in 
other BRICS countries are also mounting.
Other than extending the existing problems in BRICS countries, 
one general and common issue should be emphasised. This relates 
to the sustainability of its current growth trajectory. This is true 
in terms of growing inequality, increasing environmental impacts, 
as well as regional and other imbalances. However, there are some 
recent changes that may open better future prospects.
All the BRICS countries have an important role to play in 
shaping the future of the world economy, but China will probably 
have a more prominent role in this respect. The Chinese system of 
innovation has been undergoing some changes in order to address 
two new proclaimed goals: the building of a ‘harmonious growth’ 
and the development of ‘indigenous innovations’.9 The harmonious 
growth aims at reducing the growing social and environmental 
imbalances. China’s emerging ‘high-growth with low-carbon’ 
strategy has been emphasised by recent policy decisions, together 
with measures directed to reduce rural–urban social gaps. The 
indigenous innovation goal refers to the efforts to make China less 
reliant on foreign technology through the building of a new kind of 
relationship between national and foreign players in the process of 
developing and using new technologies.10 China is pursuing these 
goals especially by linking innovation to domestic needs and by 
giving increased priority to domestic consumption.11
For Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa, Chinese success may 
lead to strategies towards strengthening domestic technological 
capabilities and fostering clean technologies. Nevertheless, the 
differentiated role of the BRICS countries in the configuration of 
global power and the global economy will in some way constrain the 
evolution of BRICS national systems for innovation. In addition, 
their NSIs are highly dependent on their historical development and 
on how the different domestic actors interpret global developments 
as well as how they position themselves in the national and 
international economies. Yet, more flexibility for setting up new 
industrial and technological policies may be expected. 
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Introduction to Books 1–5 
This book series attempts to cover five themes that are crucial to 
an understanding of the National System of Innovation of BRICS. 
The first book The Role of the State, edited by Mario Scerri 
(South Africa) and Helena M. M. Lastres (Brazil) aims at exploring 
the relationship between the state and the national systems of 
innovation in BRICS countries.  An evolutionary approach has been 
adopted in order to capture the nature of the state in the respective 
countries and thus understand the historical and ideological basis 
for its role in the evolution of the NSI in the five countries.  As a 
background, it is argued that debates on the role of the state in the 
development process, especially since the 1980s, have often focused 
on the apparent dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven 
development. This is a rather wasteful diversion, since it should 
be accepted as a starting premise that the state is essential to the 
structural transformation that is required for development.  
The second book addresses an aspect of the NSI that is normally 
absent from the discussion: the relation between innovation and 
inequality. The objectives of the book Inequality and Development 
Challenges, edited by Maria Clara Couto Soares (Brazil), Mario 
Scerri and Rasigan Maharajh (South Africa) were to trace the 
trends in interpersonal and inter-regional inequality within BRICS 
in an evolutionary perspective and to analyse the co-evolution of 
inequality and the innovation system to highlight how the various 
elements of innovation and the production system and inequality 
mutually reinforce. 
The book is driven to improving our understanding of this 
issue. The inequality concept is considered in its multi-dimensional 
character, embracing a phenomenon that goes beyond the mere 
income dimension and is manifested through forms increasingly 
complex, including, among others, assets, access to basic services, 
infrastructure, knowledge, as well as race, gender, ethnic, and 
geographic dimensions. The book adopts the broad approach of 
the national system of innovation to analyse the relations between 
BRICS innovation systems and inequality, departing from a 
co-evolutionary view.  
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As shown in the book chapters, innovation can affect inequalities 
in different ways and through distinct trails that are influenced by 
national conditions, and shaped by public policy interventions. 
Although innovation does not constitute the main factor of 
influence on inequality, it is suggested that distinct strategies for 
technological change may lead to different outcomes in distributive 
terms, thus either aggravating or mitigating inequality. Based on 
this understanding, the book corroborates the hypothesis that 
inequalities need to be explicitly taken into account in development 
strategies since the benefits of science, technology and innovation 
are not automatically distributed equally. Therefore, advancing the 
comprehension of inter-relations between innovation and inequality 
may be helpful to find ways to shape the national innovation systems 
so that they reduce rather than increase inequalities. 
 The third book aims at analysing the contribution of small- 
and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) in the national system of 
innovation. The objective of the book The Promise of Small and 
Medium Enterprises, edited by Ana Arroio (Brazil) and Mario Scerri 
(South Africa) is to explore three main research goals. In the first 
place, to provide an overview of the main characteristics of micro, 
small and medium firms in the Brazilian, Russian, Indian, Chinese and 
South African national systems of innovation as a basis to examine 
the contribution of SMEs to the economy of each country. A second 
goal is to bring to the forefront crucial issues in the discussion of 
industrial and technological policies for small firms, including the 
recent evolution and future trends of policies and instruments, 
their applicability and coordination, as well as a discussion of the 
macro-economic, legal and regulatory environment. A final research 
objective is to draw out initiatives to promote innovation in SMEs 
that address common bottlenecks in BRICS countries and that can 
contribute to policy design and implementation by these and other 
countries.
The fourth book discusses the relationship between transnational 
corporations and the national system of innovation of BRICS 
countries. In the book Transnational Corporations and Local 
Innovation, edited by José E. Cassiolato (Brazil), Graziela Zucoloto 
(Brazil), Dinesh Abrol (India), and Liu Xielin (China) the thesis 
of technological globalisation is taken with some caution, refuting 
the idea that R&D activities would be inexorably internationalised. 
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In fact, technological innovative activities in TNCs have been 
transformed, in relation with the financialisation of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), as evidenced by the rise of their intangible 
assets (which includes R&D, patents, and trademarks) and a 
reorientation of R&D expenditures towards non-scientific activities 
and very downstream development.
The book chapters present a detailed presentation of the relation 
of the position and evolution of TNC in the country. Subsequently, 
there is a discussion on the local factors affecting innovation by 
TNCs and local firms in the country. Government policy towards 
TNCs has been important but as the Chinese experience shows, 
access to local buoyant markets has also been vital. Other issues 
discussed refer to how the government protects local companies 
from the competition of TNCs. Spillovers of TNCs to local BRICS 
enterprises have also been analysed and the immediate conclusion 
is that there is hardly any convincing evidence regarding either the 
existence or non-existence of spillovers.  An in-depth analysis of 
outward FDI has also been conducted.
Finally, the fifth book deals with finance and funding in the 
national system of innovation. The objective was to analyse 
institutional character and support instruments for the innovation 
financing process in BRICS, focusing on institutional structure 
and innovation policy. This book, Financing Innovation, edited by 
Michael Kahn (South Africa) and Luiz Martins de Melo (Brazil) 
contributes to understanding the varied approaches to the financing 
of innovation. It draws on the experience of five diverse countries 
each of which has undergone dramatic structural adjustment in the 
last two to three decades. The experience of the BRICS countries 
presents a unique set of case studies of the transition from largely 
closed centrally planned and state-driven economic and science 
policy to a more open and market-led situation. The contributing 
authors examine the varying approaches to the provision of support 
to the full range of activities that contribute to innovation ranging 
from scholarship support to doctoral students, to R&D tax incentives 
and the provision of seed capital.
The significance of financing investments in innovation has been 
pointed out as an important structural bottleneck that is yet to be 
solved by the private financial institutions. If, on the one hand, 
the internationalisation, deregulation and globalisation of financial 
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markets signals the possibility of resources at lower costs, on the 
other, the characteristics of investments in innovation such as the 
length of time needed for development, the uncertainty and the risk, 
point to the need of setting national institutional arrangements.
ª
Notes
 1. This is also true in Latin American countries, where it is being applied 
and understood in close connection with the basic conceptual ideas 
of the structuralism approach developed in the region since the 1950s 
under the influence of the Economic Commission of Latin America 
and Caribbean. In fact, since the mid-1990s, the work of RedeSist — 
the Research Network on Local Productive and Innovative Systems 
— based at the Economics Institute of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has been 
using such a dual frame of reference.
 2. See, for instance, Mytelka and Farinelli (2003); Freeman (2003); Chesnais 
and Sauviat (2003).
 3. The following data on BRICS countries’ value added by sector (per 
cent of GDP), 1980–2009 is based on the UNCTAD Handbook of 
Statistics (2010).
 4. The IBSA Dialogue Forum was established in June 2003 in Brasilia, 
Brazil.
  BRIC was formally constituted in June 2009 at a summit of the four 
countries in Yekaterinburg, Russia. In 2011, South Africa joined the 
group, which changed its denomination to BRICS.
  BASIC of the G4 was formed during the international climate change 
negotiations in December 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark.
 5. There are several economic and geopolitical factors that restrict a 
greater convergence of interests among BRICS countries in multilateral 
negotiations. The analysis of these constraints goes beyond the limited 
scope of this concept note, but we could cite the aforementioned 
relatively low degree of trade complementarities between BRICS as an 
important one. 
 6. In 2008, Gini indexes were respectively 0.54 and 0.67 according to 
Brazilian and South African national institutes of statistics.
 7. According to World Bank statistics, the population below poverty line 
was 28.6 per cent in India and 30.9 per cent in Russia in the mid-2000s. 
 8. It is important to mention that CDIAC-UN data considers only 
global carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuel, but 
not emissions from deforestation or other greenhouse gases, including 
methane.
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 9. See the AeA research team’s ‘China’s Fifteen-year Science and 
Technology Plan’, in Competitiveness Series, American Electronics’ 
Association, Vol. 14, April 2007, p. 2.
 10. The US Information Technology Office in Beijing refers to indigenous 
innovation as a term combining three distinct elements: yuanshi 
(original, or genuinely new); jicheng (integrated, or combining 
existing technologies in new ways); and yinjin (assimilated, or making 
improvements to imported technologies). See http://www.usito.org/ 
(accessed 8 January 2013).   
 11. In November 2008, China launched a US$ 584 billion anti-cyclical 
package. According to the HSBC report on climate change (Robins 
2009) almost 40 per cent of the total package resources were allocated 
to ‘green’ themes. Among others, it combined the search for a lower 
carbon pattern with the offering of better transport conditions for 
lower income people placed in rural areas, fostering a niche for the 
development of innovations capable of attending to the specificities of 
this domestic market segment. 
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The State and the Architecture 
of National Systems of 
Innovation
Mario Scerri and Helena M. M. Lastres
The series of global financial and economic crises which have been 
escalating since 2008 have caused shock waves not only in the global 
economy but also in the stance of economic orthodoxy regarding the 
ideal relationship between the state and the economy. What is now 
seen as a singular crisis is very much a product of a particular variety 
of global capitalism, which is historic in its unprecedented closeness 
to a neoliberal ideal of the minimal state, both at the global and at 
the national level. At the very least the crisis is now generally seen 
as a failure of the global regulatory framework vis-á-vis financial 
markets, and even in this very limited sense the economic role of the 
state is now being questioned anew by economists, politicians and 
global civil society. In the case of evolutionary economics and that 
branch of it which looks at systems of innovation theory, the role of 
the state as a shaper and mobiliser of systems has consistently been 
one of the prominent areas of study.  
This book provides a comparative analysis of the relationship 
between the state and the National Systems of Innovation (NSI) 
of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and 
this chapter seeks to address four issues which we see as germane 
to this study. The first, and conceptually the most challenging, 
deals with the very rationale for placing the role of the state in 
the development of the NSI as a legitimate object of analysis. In 
the process of arguing for this rationale, we hope to show that the 
whole discussion of the location of the state in systems of innovation 
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discourse is quite complex and analytically rich. The second issue 
concerns the particular varieties of the NSI concept which have 
been adopted in the individual chapters. Although these five studies 
in this book generally fall within a broad definition of systems of 
innovation which goes considerably beyond the sphere of science 
and technology, there are nonetheless differences of emphasis in 
the application of this concept to individual cases. The third section 
provides a succinct comparative treatment of the five country cases. 
Finally, we outline the basis of future research in the area, arguing 
that the emergence of the BRICS grouping may have possibly laid 
the foundation for a new discursive formation in studies on the NSI.
There are several cogent reasons for engaging in the analysis of 
the relationship between the state and the NSI. Primary among 
these is the fact that if the fabric of the NSI is an institutional 
web, it is the Weberian (Mannheim 1947) state with its monopoly 
on violence and legitimate coercion which sets the foundation of 
rules and regulations, explicitly as sets of legislation, from which 
this institutional web emerges. It is this foundation of rules and 
regulations which shapes the evolution of the various institutional 
sub-systems which constitute the NSI. On this basis, it is therefore 
legitimate to claim for the nation state the theoretical position of the 
defining agent of the NSI. The rationale for the assignment of this 
primacy to the state in the study of NSI stems at least as strongly 
from the development of thought in the area of the economics of 
innovation as it does from empirical observation of the role played 
by governments in the development of systems of innovation. 
We must, however, at the outset introduce a sense of misgiving 
about the very wording of the title of this book, an articulation 
which was inescapable but which opens up the discourse in this area 
to what we feel is a mistaken dichotomy between an entity labelled 
as the state and another as the NSI. This is a dichotomy which is all-
pervasive in economics, whatever the ideological stance towards the 
state, and which pervades a wide range of development approaches. 
Whether the role of the state is seen to be circumscribed solely by 
the need to address the presence of public goods and externalities, 
as in neoclassical economics, or as formed as the agency of the 
capitalist mode of production, as in most Marxist literature, or as a 
Foucauldian account of power exercised through governmentality 
and biopolitics, or as the possible launch pad of development as in 
most of development literature, the implicit underlying assumption 
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is that of an organic separation of the body politic from the body 
economic.1  This dichotomy has run throughout most of the 
economic literature on innovation, as it has through mainstream 
economics, but this was not a necessary outcome of the body of 
economic theory which came to be loosely defined under the rubric 
of innovation. This theoretical objection to the separation of the 
state and the economy echoes a similar disquiet in state theory at the 
separation of theories of the state from social theory.2   
The systemic approach to innovation and to the economy 
in general, which has been adopted in the heterodox economic 
literature on innovation, contains the basis for a novel integrated 
study of innovation systems which has to be understood by looking 
at the various dimensions of economic systems. This perception 
allows crucial dimensions of the system of innovation approach 
to be explicitly discussed: the emphasis on historical and national 
trajectories and the importance of taking into account the production, 
financial, social, institutional and political contexts, as well as micro, 
meso and macro spheres.3 
There are numerous reasons why innovation theory has yet to 
provide an alternative general theory of economics, not the least of 
which is its relatively short history combined with the overwhelming 
hegemony of neoclassical economic theory. In addition, and as 
argued by a number of authors, a new framework of thought 
capable of orienting the analyses of development problems related 
to knowledge, innovation and learning is also fundamental.4  In this 
line it could be argued that the attention the performance of BRICS 
has attracted in the beginning of the millennium — given not only 
their share of the world product and trade, their reserves of natural 
resources and of financial capital, the size of their domestic markets, 
but also their various challenges — can contribute to reinvigorate 
the interest in development issues and in the comprehension of 
how knowledge is acquired and diffused, thus enlarging theoretical 
contributions and the options for policy prescriptions. In addition, 
the huge task of reducing imbalances in countries of continental 
dimensions makes tackling regional and social development a core 
priority of the policy agenda. There are also opportunities for the 
development of new policy models which foster sustainable and 
coordinated development at national, regional and local levels. 
For those institutions which design and implement policies, the 
pressure for the elaboration and use of concepts, indicators and 
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models which help to reduce the imbalances, instead of reinforcing 
them, and which bind economic and social development within a 
long-term perspective become extremely relevant. This reinforces 
the need to develop new ways of looking at development issues. 
Policies emerging from this approach would include players, as well 
as production and innovation activities with different dynamics and 
paths, varying from the most intensive in terms of knowledge to 
those that use indigenous and traditional knowledge, as well as with 
different sizes and functions, deriving from the primary, secondary 
and tertiary sectors, operating locally, nationally or internationally. 
In other words, what is required is the development of new and 
broader forms of knowledge capable of contemplating the reality 
of all sorts of economies and societies. The theoretical base of this 
approach enables a fuller understanding of developing countries 
with the complexity of their ecosystems, biodiversity and mainly 
their social communities — including ethnic and cultural formations 
— and their own forms of interaction with nature and culture. 
There is one fundamental tenet which provides the initial 
departure of the approach adopted here from economic orthodoxy 
and this is the introduction of ideology in this particular economics 
discourse. We start from the proposition that theories and concepts 
are not ideologically neutral and that they are, often implicitly, 
value-laden. They derive from and reflect specific conditions and 
points of view. Most available concepts and theories are still limited 
to a restricted group of activities as the set of legitimate objects of 
economic analysis, and the actors and regions of concern are mainly 
located within the contexts of developed economies. This makes a 
number of activities, actors and regions invisible to both theoretical 
and analytical lenses. This invisibility is implicit in the exclusion of 
these agents and dimensions from the policy agenda. This exclusion 
highlights the importance of fostering the capacity to develop and use 
contextualised concepts, indicators and analytical and policy models 
capable of addressing the challenges and opportunities of each context 
given their geopolitical, institutional, scientific, technological, 
economic, financial, social, cultural, and environmental dimensions. 
The development of this capacity should simultaneously enable 
the association and articulation of these dimensions in an inclusive 
way. Of course, this is not an easy task. The main challenges 
involved still relate to the difficulty in working with new concepts, 
particularly those aiming at capturing and evaluating the creation, use 
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and diffusion of innovation and production capabilities in situations 
of high levels of inequality and informality. However, as knowledge 
results from interactive learning processes and pragmatic use has an 
important learning dimension, we also expect that the analysis of the 
BRICS innovation systems will shed new light not only on these five 
countries, but also on this concept itself, contributing to its further 
development.
Another reason why innovation theory has yet to provide an 
alternative general theory of economics is the wide span of the 
definitions of the NSI. These can range from a narrow focus on 
a network of formal science and technology institutions, at one 
end, to an incorporation of the whole spectrum of formal and 
informal institutions which come together in partially planned, but 
mostly unplanned, networks to provide the setting for innovation. 
Innovation itself may even be defined in its broadest sense to 
cover any alteration in economic relationships which is seen to be 
preferable to what is displaced. Within the context of such a broad 
approach to the understanding of the evolution and performance of 
economic systems there is a theoretical scope for the elimination of 
the false dichotomy between the state and the economy. This scope 
is allowed by the assumption of specificity and the role of history 
in determining the shape of innovation systems. The propensity 
to generalise about any group of agents, be it the state, the private 
sector, civil society, organised labour, etc., is therefore significantly 
reduced in an approach which holds contextual specificities to be 
significant non-trivial determinants of the shape and performance of 
systems of innovation.  
Of course, one could argue that an excessive reliance on specificity 
as the source of understanding of particular systems also holds the 
danger that each specific NSI as an object of study is treated sui 
generis, bearing little or no relationship whether of similarity or of 
categorical difference with the studies of other systems. This would 
obviously eliminate the legitimacy of comparative analysis and 
eventually of theory. However, except for extreme approaches of 
this type, the introduction of specificity into analysis does provide 
the theoretical space for reconceptualising the nature of the concept 
of the state in relation to that of the NSI. On the other hand, 
and in line with the argument developed here, it could be argued 
that all knowledge is contextual. It could also be claimed that the 
novel understanding of innovation as a systemic social, political 
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and economic process not only requires advances in theory, but 
also implies the need to develop a whole new set of indicators and 
categories to analyse and compare experiences.
Since the introduction of the term, the definition of the NSI 
concept has varied considerably with often radically different 
implications for analysis and for policy.5 Generally, these definitions 
differ on the basis of two elements of the underlying concept. The 
first is the definition of innovation. This may range from frontier 
and radical technological innovations at one end, to one which 
includes any alteration in economic activity which represents a 
real or perceived ‘better practice’ within a specific context, at the 
other. There is obviously room for a large range of variations 
in-between these two extremes. The other element is the definition 
and choice of institutions which may be considered as part of the 
NSI. The inclusion of formal institutions would range from those 
strictly concerned with the promotion of science and technology at 
one extreme to all those institutions that govern all aspects of the 
economy at the other. These two elements are often interrelated 
where an increasingly broad definition of innovation implies a 
widening inclusion of institutions which are considered relevant to 
the NSI and to innovation policy. We should not see the possible 
variations of the definition of the NSI as lying across a continuum. 
At some point the degree of exclusion/inclusion that is adopted 
results in two fundamentally different concepts, with radically 
different implications for policy. As the definition of the NSI tends 
towards the system of science and technology, we have to admit 
the possibility of the non-existence of the NSI and the imperative 
to create one in the interest of promoting economic growth and 
development. If, on the other hand, the definition tends towards the 
all-inclusive one, the NSI exists whether planned or not, simply by 
virtue of the binding legal identity of the sovereign state. In this case 
the possibility of the non-existence of the NSI arises only where the 
state is under threat due to foreign aggression or civil war. Within 
the broad definition, the role of policy is not to create but to shape 
the evolution of the NSI along a path that is more appropriate to 
the sustainable improvement of the quality of life of the general 
public. Within the broader definition of the NSI, state policies 
outside the ambits of science and technology policy may still be seen 
by the analyst as innovation policies. Thus trade, industrial, labour, 
education and basic services policies may become a legitimate object 
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of the analysis of the relationship between state and the NSI, even if 
such policies are not explicitly defined as innovation-related by their 
designers.
It is also important to bear in mind that the question of whether 
or not to create an NSI becomes less legitimate as we move from the 
narrow to the broad definition of the concept. It is more relevant 
to sub-systems but the broader context and the web of informal 
institutions which comprise the system exist regardless the nature 
and extent of planning. More relevant is the discussion of what type 
of NSI to shape through planning and policy and it is here that, in 
some cases, policy choice is contaminated by the observation of the 
structure and dynamics of a specific context. Resulting knowledge 
is formed (and deformed) by this experience. When applied to a 
different environment this knowledge ends up frequently inducing 
the reproduction of behaviours and other elements which, while 
possibly working well in a specific system, prove to be inappropriate 
for the local conditions and potentialities of another. The main point 
here is that context matters both in terms of understanding and 
promoting innovation. History and specific territorial conditions are 
essential to explain how production and innovation capabilities are 
acquired, used and further developed. Analytical models, taxonomies 
and policy prescriptions that disregard these parameters put their 
usefulness seriously at risk (Lastres and Cassiolato 2005). In other 
words, ‘general history (social, political and cultural) economic 
history and industrial history are not only indispensable, but 
really the most important contributors to the understanding of our 
problem. All other materials and methods statistical and theoretical 
are only subservient to them and worthless without them’ (Freeman 
1982: 8, quoting Schumpeter 1939). In a similar line Lundvall (2006) 
has argued that to develop a general theory of innovation systems 
that abstracts from time and space would undermine the utility of 
the concept both as an analytical tool and as a policy tool. One main 
conclusion here is that by adding new knowledge derived from the 
observation of new innovation dynamics and contexts, this book can 
represent a significant analytical and theoretical contribution with 
even more fundamental policy implications.
In spite of the width of the range of possible variations in the 
definition of the systems of innovation concept, the central role of 
the state in the formation of the NSI is always prominent. Even so, 
however, the various possible combinations that these definitional 
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options offer open up the possibility of variation in the assessment 
of the role of the state in the development of the NSI. There is also 
a strong possibility of a divergence between the analyst’s definition 
of the NSI and its definition by the state. This adds yet another 
dimension to the analysis of the relationship between the state and 
the various conceptualisations of the NSI. For the purposes of this 
study, the broader definition of the NSI is adopted. This definition, 
which goes beyond the analysis of activities that directly determine 
technological innovation, captures the overall economic framework 
which sets the context for innovation. Furthermore, the definition 
of the economic framework itself is expanded beyond the normal 
ambit of economic orthodoxy to include all aspects of human capital 
formation as economic strategy variables. This broad approach is 
particularly relevant to developing economies where fundamental 
changes in the underlying institutional infrastructure often form the 
national development policy strategy framework.  
Theoretically, the system of innovation approach with its focus 
on institutions, formal and informal, provides the broader context 
within which development economics should properly be based. 
In this case we have a strong possibility of a convergence between 
science, technology and innovation (STI) policy and development 
policy, especially if the broader definition of innovation as any novel 
and demonstrably superior manner (relative to a specified context) of 
reallocating resources is adopted. The other two areas of convergence 
between development economics and innovation theory are the 
issues of regional disparities and income distribution. In the case 
of the former, the study of sub-national systems of innovation may 
enable us to understand the process of regional convergence. In the 
case of income distribution, we have implications for the process of 
human capital formation which lies at the core of the evolution of the 
NSI. The basic assumption of development economics is that of the 
fundamental inadequacy of economic structures to attain specified 
development and growth objectives. Consequently, development 
policy should be designed to engineer the radical structural 
transformation of the economy in pursuit of the goal. From this 
perspective, broadly articulated NSI theory with its focus on the 
institutional foundations of economies provides a comprehensive 
framework for a coherent approach to development policy.
Even if we accept this argument, we still need to ask about the role 
played by the state, however defined, in the study of the evolution 
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of systems of innovation. After all, it is widely acknowledged that 
it is firms which produce, diffuse, adopt, adapt, and even deploy 
innovation. Firms, however, normally tend to act within a context, 
determined by market structures, established practices and routines, 
as well as formal regulatory frameworks. They rarely, except in 
the most exceptional of cases, act consciously and in a coordinated 
manner to alter the context in which they operate. This context 
is, to varying degrees, the product of the ‘extra-market’ policies, 
rules and regulations laid down by the state, by regional (supra-
national) bodies and global protocols. Again, it is in the context of 
developing economies where there is a recognised need for structural 
transformation that the role of the state in the development of the NSI 
becomes paramount. This role should generally be more pronounced 
than in the case of mature, developed industrial economies where we 
should be able to assume (at least prior to the current global financial 
crisis) the underlying institutional framework to be stable, under 
healthy public regulation and appropriate for growth, stability and 
international competitiveness.  
We can therefore comfortably say that, at least at the national 
level, the state is fundamental in the promotion and shaping of the 
development path of the NSI, however that is defined. It is the state 
which usually lays down the formal institutional underpinning of 
economic activity, including innovation. The broader the definition 
of the system of innovation and the further it departs from a science 
and technology system, the more pervasive and complex is the 
role of the state. In a fundamental sense we can say that the state 
is ever present in the articulation and enforcement of the “rules 
of the game” which govern the way in which innovation occurs, 
the roles of the various agents who interact in the production of 
innovation, as well as the effects which emanate from innovations of 
various forms. The rules of the game introduced by the state often 
tend to be explicit but they can also be implicit in, for example, 
unspecified tender grant and procurement policies, labour market 
practices, environmental considerations, macroeconomic policies, 
etc.6   Explicit rules, established through laws and declared practices 
thus also eventually permeate down to the layer of amorphous sets 
of routines and practices which are probably a stronger long-term 
determinant of behaviour than explicit rules. Even the most minimal 
state imaginable, within an extreme form of neoliberal ideology, still 
sets the ‘rules of the game’, by virtue of its absence.  
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The definition of the NSI adopted in this book is generally 
broad enough to, at least implicitly, allow for some resolution of 
the fallacious separation of the state and the system of innovation, 
or even of the economy. This definition extends significantly 
beyond the system of science and technology to incorporate a wide 
gamut of institutions, formal and informal, which affect all aspects 
of innovation. This certainly covers most functions of the modern 
state, ranging from those specifically concerned with science and 
technology, to broader concerns of economic policy, to those areas 
of state involvement which are often assigned to ‘social policy’ but 
which directly affect various aspects of human capital formation. In 
this sense the ‘state’ which is considered in relation to the innovation 
system covers almost the entirety of the state and its sphere of 
governmentality.  
The inclusiveness of this approach is certainly firmly within the 
essence of the systems of innovation approach which highlights the 
specificities of the institutional interactions within particular systems 
as crucial to their analysis. It is here that the nature of particular states 
and their evolution over time has to be brought in as part of the core 
of the approach adopted in this book. The introduction of history 
then opens up to a rich and highly diverse treatment of the five 
NSIs which form the object of this body of analysis. The common 
structure of the chapters on the one hand belies the rich variety of 
the form of the state within and without the national systems which 
they shaped and which in turn shaped them. On the other hand, 
without a common structure it would have been extremely difficult 
to come out with a coherent analytical framework for the analysis of 
this complex relationship within these very different contexts. This 
commonality may actually bring to the fore the specificity of these 
five studies which have been brought together in this book.
The case studies of the five national systems of innovation 
presented are, by virtue of the core nature of the state within a 
context of structural transformation, closely concerned with policy, 
with its intentionality, its consequences, intended or otherwise, and 
with the various political, economic and historical determinants of 
policy. In this regard we need to discuss the relationship between 
innovation policy and other spheres of policy which lie within the 
specifically delineated terrain of state power. Again, this relationship 
depends critically on the definition of the NSI which is adopted since 
the extent of the domain of innovation policy is positively correlated 
The State and National Systems of Innovation y 11
with the breadth of the definition of the NSI. The various studies 
presented here allude to the degree of integration of policies but 
again this treatment holds nuances regarding whether we are talking 
about integration between innovation policy and other policies 
(macroeconomic, investment, trade, labour, and social policies, to 
name the immediately obvious) and integration within a definition of 
innovation policy increasingly broadened to incorporate at the limit 
all other policy spheres. The significance of these nuances depends 
both on the analyst’s theoretical base and on the official explicit or 
implicit formulation of innovation policy by the principals of the 
state. In the specific case of the five systems examined here, all of 
which are undergoing a rapid process of structural transformation, 
it is important to assess the relationship between innovation policy 
and development policy, its convergence or dissonance, and even 
more fundamentally, the degree of differentiation between the two. 
The conceptual foundation of this book thus requires that 
historical analysis permeates all of the case studies and that specific 
periodisations are adopted in every case. This periodisation is applied 
both to the evolution of the role of the state and to the history of the 
political economy of each country. Again, the degree of convergence 
of the two areas, the extent to which the evolutionary path of the 
political economy was affected by the changing role of the state and 
the degree of convergence, and even possibly the identification, of 
the two evolutionary paths, differ in each case. This, we feel, makes 
for a particularly rich comparative analysis of these five very distinct 
innovation systems.
Certainly, the historical and structural differences of the five 
economies which are the subject of this book are deep enough to 
raise the question of the rationale for their grouping within the 
same body of work. This rationale is loosely based on a number of 
factors whose peculiar heterogeneity may itself prove to be a valid 
reason for this grouping of case studies. The immediately obvious 
rationale is that all five countries have had histories where the very 
nature of the state has been challenged and altered, often violently, a 
process which has radically altered the very foundations of the NSI. 
Second, there is the placement of these five economies on the global 
political economy topography. Each one of them, in its own right, 
is particularly influential within a region and as a consequence, its 
fortunes carry implications at a global level. India and China are 
now rightly seen as the two emerging economic giants, which, in 
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spite of their significant structural differences, are destined to alter 
dramatically the very foundations of the world economic order. 
The sheer size of the Brazilian economy and the diversity of its base 
place it at the epicentre of the Latin American development thrust 
and indeed at the forefront of the sustained countervailing centre of 
development economics over the past four odd decades. The Russian 
system of innovation emerging as it has from the total repudiation 
of the Soviet system of innovation constitutes the most dramatic 
experiment of the radical destruction of the foundations of one of 
the two most powerful systems of innovation, globally, until the 
late 1980s. South Africa is not only unique in its emergence from 
a particular legislated form of racial capitalism but its NSI stands 
as possibly the regional economic catalyst for the possibility of the 
development leap of sub-Saharan Africa. It is also worth pointing 
out that in three of these cases an important dimension was the 
influence of colonialism in the formation of the nation states and 
their very birth. These diverse histories also affect the placement 
of the respective analyses contained in this book within the broad 
definition of the NSI especially when it comes to the focus on 
specific policy areas.   
Several correspondences exist among the innovation systems 
analysed in this volume. In terms of ruptures and continuities, 
South Africa and Russia both went through a sudden and radical 
transformation of their political systems, with the demise of apartheid 
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union at around the same time. 
The effects of those political transformations on the respective NSIs, 
however, may from a normative perspective be seen as diametrically 
opposite. In the case of South Africa there is a growing body of 
literature which sees no significant structural rupture with the 
previous system of innovation accompanying the radical change in 
the legal basis of the state. This continuity in the evolution of the NSI 
is now widely seen as one of the main obstacles to the transformation 
of the South African political economy to an effective, as distinct 
from the legal, democracy. In the case of Russia, the opposite is often 
claimed to be true, that the change in the political order brought in 
too radical a rupture with the previous system of innovation with 
the rapid emergence of an extreme form of predatory capitalism. The 
abruptness of this rupture poses one of the major obstacles to the 
development of a viable NSI. The evolution of the Chinese and the 
Russian systems of innovation stand in stark contrast in terms of the 
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ruptures and continuities engendered by the respective changes in 
their ideological underpinning. Other correspondences exist. Thus 
India and China are both seen as the emerging economic world 
powers, through a combination of the size of their economies and 
liberalisation of their economic policies. The 20th century histories 
of these two systems, and the radically different structures which 
emerged from those histories, again lay the basis for a comparison 
of the implications of policy and ideology for the evolution of NSIs. 
The thematic organisation of this and accompanying books in 
this series is aimed at providing a comparative analysis across the 
five systems of innovation and in that light there is a loosely defined 
common structure across the five chapters. Each chapter looks at the 
nature of the state within the specific NSI and presents an overview 
of the evolutionary path which led to the current relation between 
the state and the economic system. In the process of this depiction, 
ruptures and continuities are identified and the relevant periods of 
analysis delineated. From this general overview of the evolution of 
the state, each chapter then focuses on the evolution of institutions 
and policy frameworks directly concerned with innovation policy, 
with a particular reference to the relationship between innovation 
policy and broader economic policy. This analysis requires that the 
specificities of the particular NSI with its particular national, regional 
and local production and innovation structures are examined. In 
the process, the main constraints on the viability of the systems of 
innovation, in terms of their capacity for reproduction, growth and 
evolution, are identified.7   
The chapters follow with a description of explicit and implicit state 
policy on science, technology and innovation, with a classification of 
such policies into supply-push and demand-pull categories. Explicit 
policies are defined as those directly designed to affect innovative 
activity, specifically related to technological innovations and the 
deployment of innovation in production. Implicit policies are those 
which affect sectors which appear peripheral to innovation but which 
nonetheless form the institutional context within which innovation 
occurs and which governs its impact on the overall economy.  
As mentioned earlier, the particular structures of the five cases 
determine the specific emphasis on the choice of the relevant policy 
sets in each case. Thus in the case of India, a mixed economy from 
its post-colonial inception, with the outward expansion after the 
liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s and with a recent 
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reversal of the brain and skills drain, the chosen focus is on STI and 
industrial policies. In the case of Russia — one of the two former 
main superpowers (militarily, politically, economic, scientific) — 
the rapid deterioration of the innovation base with the disintegration 
of the Union of Soviet Social Republics (USSR) and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) has created probably 
the most dramatic transformation of an NSI in recent history. In 
the Russian case, with a heritage of a broad human capital base the 
main innovation strategy is to restore and retool the scientific base 
to attain international competitiveness and the focus of that chapter 
is on the re-orientation of STI policy to achieve that goal. China’s 
opening up to its particular variety of capitalism is creating a novel 
model of export-oriented industrial growth which is built on a rapid 
and radical transformation of its NSI and its policy focus is broad as 
it seeks to leverage the sheer size of the economy for a development 
leap in the new world order. Brazil, since the beginning of the 2000s, 
has struggled to recover its capacity to implement and articulate 
economic and STI policies, after 15 years of liberalisation that has 
both impoverished the capacity to design and implement policies and 
resulted in the destruction of industrial and technological capabilities 
in sectors such as information and telecommunications and auto 
parts. In the case of South Africa, the impact of the apartheid legacy 
is most evident in its systematically impoverished human capital base 
and the main focus of the South African chapter is on the extent to 
which post-apartheid economic policy and innovation policy have 
been congruent and suited for development.  
Within this policy framework, the national integration of the 
innovation system is assessed in terms of the forms of the relationships 
and interactions of policy between the national and sub-national 
levels of government. This analysis seeks to identify coordination 
mechanisms and impediments to coherent coordination mechanisms 
among the various levels. One particular area of concern in the 
assessment of the viability of systems of innovation is the development 
of human capital (or human capabilities). As the definition of the 
NSI broadens away from that of a system of science and technology, 
so does that of the relevant human capital base. The centrality 
assigned to this particular component of the system of innovation 
rests on the core role which technological capabilities play in the 
evolution of systems. The long-term investment and appropriability 
characteristics of human capital development have a particular 
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relevance to the role of the state in shaping the evolutionary path of 
the system of innovation. Policies in this area, especially when we 
adopt a broad definition of the constituents of human capital and 
move it away from an instrumentalist neoclassical definition, could 
be enhanced if they advanced from the traditional supply-push and 
demand-pull approach to an effective systemic approach. Finally, 
each chapter ends with an assessment of the effects of state policy 
on the respective NSI. Given the complex nature of the relationship 
between the state and the NSI, this can only be, at best, a tentative 
assessment taking some specific policy targets as the reference point. 
On the basis of this assessment, a brief listing of recommendations 
for the future of state policy in this regard is provided.
At this relatively initial stage of the research on the role of the 
state and the NSI, as reported in this book, we have five independent 
chapters for each of the BRICS countries. This constitutes the first 
assessment of this topic for the five cases but it is as yet only a stage 
towards a full comparative analysis of the theme across the five 
systems. At this stage the outlines of such a comparative analysis can 
only be sketched in this introductory chapter through a summation 
of the main findings for each country’s system of innovation.  
At a global level, innovation policy, as distinct from science and 
technology policy, and the NSI policy framework only entered 
into the lexicon of national policy makers in the early 1990s and the 
history of innovation surveys date from that period. Thus, in this 
sense, innovation policy set within the NSI theoretical framework is 
generally young. In this book we consider a different measure of age 
— that of the current form of the systems of innovation themselves, 
while taking into account those global and regional changes which 
define the context within which the global economy evolves. In the 
assessment of the age of a specific form of a system of innovation we 
have to identify ruptures in its evolution and we have to judge the 
extent to which a particular rupture represents such a dramatic break 
that an entirely new phase emerges. The most obvious cause of such 
radical ruptures is an overthrowing of an established political order 
which brings about a new legal definition of the nation state and of 
the NSI. Other, less radical ruptures originate from a paradigmatic 
change in the ideological base of the political system. Such assessments 
are obviously inevitably highly contestable but the very fact that 
they are so makes them a rich ground for research. In terms of this 
measure of age, therefore, the present form of the Indian system of 
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innovation dates from its independence in 1947. In Brazil it could 
be said that the only real rupture was colonisation, which started in 
1500. All subsequent transformations — independence in 1822 and 
the inauguration of the republic in 1889 — could be characterised 
as soft changes, most of them aiming to allow the maintenance of 
the status quo since they do not entail the radical politico-legal 
redefinition of the nation state base of the system of innovation. Thus 
the ruptures, particularly in the case of Brazil but also of China, are 
relatively ‘softer’ since they do not entail the radical politico-legal 
redefinition of the nation state base of the system of innovation. In 
the case of China, the progressive shifts in economic policy since 
the late 1970s, culminating in its relatively recent massive emergence 
on the global markets, dramatic as it may have been, still occurred 
within the context of a generally stable politico-legal structure. 
Russia and South Africa possibly constitute the youngest systems 
whose current structure and form dates from the radical political 
change of the early 1990s. In the case of Russia the dismantling of 
the communist state also resulted in the fragmentation of the USSR 
and of its wider political economic domain within the COMECON 
region. The total redefinition, not only of the governance system but 
of the political and geographic terrain of the nation state certainly 
resulted in the emergence of a new NSI. In the case of South Africa 
the rift was marked by the demise of apartheid and the creation of 
the first South African democratic state; there is however a strong 
sense of reservation, expressed in the chapter on South Africa, about 
the degree to which the political rupture was accompanied by an 
equivalent shift in the evolutionary path of the system of innovation. 
However, and as stressed earlier, one cannot ever ignore the time 
span of history and the very fact that the old forms which mark these 
systems’ inheritance profoundly affect the shape of the subsequent 
new forms of systems. The chapters of South Africa and Russia 
serve as exemplary cases in this sense. They both identify problems 
which have their origin in the old forms of their respective systems 
of innovation as main challenges to the development of the current 
new forms of their systems.
The periodisation discussed in the five chapters also provides the 
reader with another dimension of age, that of innovation policy. 
The chapter on Brazil identifies three main enduring deficiencies of 
innovation policy. These are the excessive focus on technological 
innovations, the exclusive targeting of the partnership between 
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enterprises and science and technology institutions as the vehicle for 
innovation and the adoption of the linear model of innovation as the 
informing vision for innovation policy. It is worth pointing out the 
aim of consolidating the Brazilian system of innovation, as well as of 
linking STI, industrial, social, and other policies as main objectives of 
the policy discourse adopted since 2007, even if it is not yet possible 
to perceive any effective systemic vision put into practice. In the case 
of the Russian system of innovation the turmoil of the breakdown of 
the USSR and the initial swing to a laissez faire capitalism retarded 
the adoption of innovation policy at pace with other industrial 
countries. The adoption of a comprehensive innovation policy 
and its integration with other economic policies only started in the 
mid-2000s. The chapter on Russia identifies a number of current 
obstacles to the implementation of an effective innovation policy. 
Generally, these obstacles are due to the relegation of innovation 
policy as secondary to broader economic policy currently dealing 
with the impact of the global financial crisis. This has set back the 
integration of innovation policy into the broader development 
policy framework. Specifically, the single most significant obstacle 
to the development of the Russian system of innovation is identified 
as the low demand for innovation by private sector enterprises, itself 
perhaps a testimonial to the effects of the unplanned transition to a 
market economy from the central planning model of the USSR. In 
the case of India, the overall policy of self-reliance adopted since 
independence until the liberalisation move in the early 1990s strongly 
promoted supply-side explicit science and technology policies but 
the absorption of innovation is also considered to have been retarded 
by a demand-side failure. Innovation policies are still fragmented 
and persistent low R&D ratios and low rate of human capital 
development still pose significant obstacles to the development of the 
Indian system of innovation. In the three decades since the political 
shift in the late 1970s, China, starting from a low innovation base has 
seen progressive shifts transferring science and technology functions 
from state institutions to enterprises, deepening the indigenous 
innovation base and moving innovation progressively from cost-
reducing to product innovations. The identified constraints to the 
development of a viable NSI are mainly due to the ongoing process 
of transition to a market-oriented economy within the context of a 
single-party socialist governance structure. The main constraints are 
the lack of integration of the science and technology sector with other 
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sections of the economy and a low human capital base. In the case of 
post-apartheid South Africa, the first innovation policy articulation 
was explicitly based on the NSI theoretical framework. However, 
the overall neoliberal macroeconomic planning framework which 
was simultaneously implemented, and the policy context which it 
produced, has prevented the integration of innovation policy with 
other economic policies. As such, therefore, there is still an absence 
of a comprehensive innovation policy. The failure to address the 
crippling human capital deficit inherited from apartheid is probably 
the single most significant impediment to the attainment of a 
viable system of innovation in South Africa. Though there is now 
recognition of this policy failure and a determination to address it 
in a comprehensive approach, it is still too recent a shift to enable 
a proper assessment of the significance in practice of this shift. The 
policy recommendations which are provided in each case flow 
directly from the respective assessments of the major fault lines in 
each of the BRICS countries’ system of innovation. It is interesting 
to note the similarities in the recommended policy measures among 
these disparate political economies which still exhibit a striking 
number of common features in their national systems of innovation. 
Finally, we need to come back to the initial issue of the theoretical 
validity of the study of the systems of innovation of the BRICS 
economies. We will have to interrogate the degree to which this 
study constitutes, along with the other books in this series, the basis 
for the emergence of a new discursive formation which may provide 
the scope for an ensuing and expanding distinct field of enquiry.8 
This interrogation will have to proceed in a cascade from general 
theory to specific application.  The general theory in this case is that 
which underlies the concept of systems of innovation. We can start 
from the assumption that this body of work already constitutes an 
established discursive formation which now offers the possibility for 
the emergence of an alternative theory of economics. The next level 
will be to enquire whether the grouping of the systems of innovation 
of the BRICS constitutes an identifiable and uniquely distinct space 
for the development of the possibility for a distinct body of emerging 
knowledge. This possibility stems from the combination of three 
factors — the commonalities in the characteristics of the BRICS 
systems of innovation, the commonalities of the presence of the 
BRICS economies in the global economy and their ability to form a 
new significant economic power bloc of the ‘south’, the conditions 
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for the possibility that the commonalities among the BRICS systems 
of innovation constitute a new empirical, but more importantly a 
theoretical, specificity in systems of innovation theory.  The last 
condition is possibly the most crucial one, given the basis for the 
inductive origin of the bulk of innovation theory as we know it.  
Unlike neoclassical economics, innovation theory, starting from 
the massive case studies project initiated by the Science Policy 
Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University, and its particular 
articulation as a system of innovation theory, is decidedly evidence-
based theorising. It emerged from a growing sense of disquiet 
at the failure to explain the residual in growth accounting and 
gradually grew as its own discursive formation from the growing 
body of observations in the field. There is consequently always the 
possibility that a new body of empirical evidence may alter theory 
and in the process provide the basis for the emergence of a new 
discursive formation. In a rapidly changing global political economy, 
the conglomeration of the BRICS systems of innovation as an area 
of study may well prove to be a case which goes beyond a simple 
application of an existing body of theory to new empirical terrain. It 
may affect how we conceive of the theory of innovation systems and 
open up new theoretical explorations. We hope that this book, and 
the others in this series, will provide a step in that direction.
ª
Notes
 1. One important exception is the work of the so-called Latin American 
Structuralist School. See, for instance, Furtado (1964).
 2. ‘Theorizing the state is further complicated because, despite recurrent 
tendencies to reify it as standing outside and above society, there can 
be no adequate theory of the state without a theory of society’ (Jessop 
2008: 1).
 3. For details, see Freeman (2003); Lastres et al. (2003); Lundvall (2006).
 4. See, for instance, Arocena and Sutz (2003).
 5. ‘[T]he network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies’ (Freeman 1987).
  ‘[T]he elements and relationships which interact in the production, 
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge ... and 
are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state’ 
(Lundvall 2010: 2).
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  ‘[A] set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance ... of national firms’ (Nelson 1993).
  ‘[T]he national institutions, their incentive structures and their 
competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological 
learning (or the volume and composition of change generating activities) 
in a country’ (Patel and Pavitt 1994).
  ‘[T]hat set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually 
contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and 
which provides the framework within which governments form and 
implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is 
a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer 
the knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies.’ 
(Metcalfe 1995).
 6. The literature on technology and development has stressed that 
economic conditions, in general, and macroeconomic policies, in 
particular, are important elements shaping microeconomic behaviour 
and dynamics as far as innovation and technology are concerned. It 
has been also argued that these so-called implicit policies can assume 
greater importance than specific technology policies in terms of 
orienting firms’ strategies (Herrera 1975).
 7. ‘Reproduction is essential for the survival of a system, while (steady 
state) growth implies that the current shape of a specific system of 
innovation is well suited to its broader environment. There are various 
measures that may be used to estimate these two dynamic processes, 
depending of the breadth of the definition of systems of innovation. 
They may range from those pertaining specifically to systems of 
science, technology and innovation to those which reflect the wider 
political economy. The evolution of systems takes two forms. The 
first is essentially reactive in the sense that the mutation of the system 
responds to a changing environment. To use the biological analogy, 
this type of evolution is Darwinian. The other type, drawing on a 
Lamarckian analogy, is a conscious mutation, based on feedback 
effects, which alters the environment within which the system is set; it 
is initiative rather than reactive.’ (Scerri 2009: 37).
 8. Variava (1989: 50) describes the conditions for a discursive formation as 
follows:
  ‘[A] discourse can be seen as a system of possibility which allows 
statements to be made which will either be true or false. This makes 
possible a field of knowledge. The rules of discourse … provide the 
preconditions for the formation of statements. Foucault formulates 
four hypotheses in terms of which he attempts to identify and to isolate 
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a discursive formation:
	 •	 a discursive formation is identifiable if the statements in it refer to the 
same object;
	 •	 a discursive formation has a regular “style”, a common way in which 
statements are made;
	 •	 a discursive formation is identifiable if the concepts in the statements 
have a constancy; 
	 •	 a discursive formation exists if all the statements support a common 
theme, or what Foucault calls in his later books a “strategy”, a 
common institutional or political pattern.’
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Priscila Koeller and José Luis Gordon
The adoption of the broad concept of a national system of 
innovation leads to the discussion on the connection between 
innovation policy and development policy. Once the political-
institutional and geopolitical sub-systems, the sub-systems of 
policies and representations and the sub-systems of social and 
economic demand are all comprised in the definition of the national 
innovation system, it becomes essential to consider the social 
disparities and heterogeneities in the analyses of innovation policy, 
in addition to the productive/innovative sub-system.
This connection is even more relevant in a context of 
underdevelopment, marked by structural (productive and social) 
heterogeneity. In this case, development policies should determine 
the strategies that permeate other economic policies. Development 
policies will necessarily impact the others because if they exist they 
will manage these structural heterogeneities, and consequently 
will affect the other policies, and if they are absent, they leave the 
treatment of these heterogeneities to other policies.  
It is worth noting that the concept of development used here 
emerges from the requisite to overcome the historical conditions 
of Latin American countries. According to Cassiolato and Lastres 
(2008), three main characteristics can describe the development 
process. First, the process is characterised by changes in the social 
and economic structure. Second, development is a systemic process 
(this characteristic of development implies the importance of 
interactions between parts of the national innovation system [NSI] 
along the learning process). The third attribute of development 
is the country’s specificities in this process, which means that the 
development process is unique to each country. The Latin American 
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structuralist school — particularly its main contributors, Celso 
Furtado and Raúl Prebisch — emphasises that the heterogeneity 
of the social and economic structures in Latin American societies 
must be considered in the formulation of their development policies. 
Without this perception, both the structures and the logic that 
reproduce underdevelopment would persist. These authors identify 
underdevelopment as an autonomous process, with its intrinsic 
logic, and not as a stage in a path towards development. Therefore, 
the development process is not seen as a convergent movement of 
underdeveloped economies to developed ones. Underdevelopment 
is considered an autonomous and historical process in a country. 
The elaboration of specific policies, aimed at breaking the logic that 
reproduces underdevelopment, constitutes the main role of the state. 
The requirement of thinking of innovation policy as integrated to 
development policy, once innovation is recognised as the motor of 
economic growth, is related to the fact that such growth will not 
automatically imply development. In order to reach development, 
the innovation policy must be integrated to the development policy, 
which should be specific to the context of underdevelopment and, 
therefore, distinct from the prescriptions provided by developed 
countries.  
Several neo-Schumpeterian authors — particularly Albuquerque, 
Cassiolato, Lastres, and Viotti, among others in Latin America — 
have been contributing in recent years to an approach that combines 
the structuralist and the Schumpeterian schools. This approach makes 
it possible to include the social issue in the debates on innovation and 
to start discussing policies that are appropriate for underdeveloped 
countries. Since 1996, Freeman has claimed that the only way to 
guarantee that underdeveloped countries will ‘reach’ those which 
are developed, in terms of standards of living, is by satisfying two 
essential conditions: the innovation system should respond to social 
and economic demands; and the economy should respond to both 
institutional changes and social policies (Freeman 1996: 34). 
In connection with heterogeneities in the social structure, there 
is also the issue of regional heterogeneity. Particularly in Brazil, 
regional inequalities are marked by the concentration of productive, 
scientific and technological structures, as well as of income. 
Internally, such regions reproduce the social inequalities (of income) 
and the disparities of the productive structure of the country. 
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The analysis of innovation policy in Brazil should, therefore, 
consider the context of underdevelopment and the asymmetries 
related to it in its productive, social and regional structures. Even 
when dealing with an explicit innovation policy, with respect to 
the innovative and productive sub-system, other dimensions of the 
policy must be considered, especially the social one.   
This chapter is structured in five parts. In the first of these, the 
historical evolution of the innovation policy is presented, with 
emphasis on the relations and on the dichotomies between state and 
market, delimiting the period of analysis of innovation policy in 
Brazil to the post-2006 period.1  The second part presents a synthesis 
of the main institutions, programmes and mechanisms of the explicit 
innovation policy in the ambit of the federal government. The 
third part discusses the limits and the difficulties in the structure 
of the national system of innovation in Brazil, considering mainly 
the implicit policies in the country. The explicit innovation policy 
is presented in the fourth part, where the implicit policies are also 
highlighted as well as the difficulty of articulating these with the 
explicit policy — particularly the policy of education. In the fifth 
part, we discuss the goals proposed in the scope of the federal 
government’s innovation policy for the period under analysis.
Evolution of the Current Form of State
After World War II — in the 1950s — Brazil experienced a phase 
where the state guided the development policy based on an indus-
trialisation model that, at first, prescribed the establishment of state 
enterprises financed by international funds.
This role of the state, which contributed to promote industrialisa-
tion, was based on the idea that it was necessary to establish the scientific 
and technological infrastructure and the industrial foundations 
in the country. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the state 
sought to create an organisational infrastructure for R&D restricted 
mainly to the agricultural and biomedical areas. After this phase, the 
main concern was establishing sectoral R&D within organisations. 
Examples of these organisations were Petrobrás (the Brazilian Oil 
Company created in 1953 as a state-owned enterprise with the main 
objective of exploring Brazilian oil and which nowadays is the fifth 
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most important oil company in the world), the Aerospace Technical 
Centre (Centro Técnico Aeroespacial, CTA, established in 1954) 
and the National Institute for Space Research (Instituto Nacional de 
Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE, founded in 1961). 
Between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, 
in spite of structuralist arguments, this model was supplanted by a 
new one based on the attraction of foreign capital enterprises with 
the purpose of importing industrial technology emerging from the 
‘second industrial revolution’ — the objective, then, was ‘skipping 
development stages’. In order to finance the industrialisation process, 
the so-called (and well-known) model of imports substitution was 
adopted.
At that moment, the state employed an innovation policy based 
on the idea that it would be possible to ‘skip stages’ for reaching 
development, relying very much on foreign capital and technology.2  
Such an idea was opposed at that time by the nationalist vision 
of the structuralist school, which emphasised the importance of 
embedding technology in the productive structure, and considered 
underdevelopment as an autonomous process rather than a stage 
towards development.
On the assumption that the state must lead the innovation 
policy, the federal government decided to set up another important 
organisation in order to promote research and development within 
a strategic field for the country — agriculture. In 1972, based on 
the experience of the country in this field since the end of the 
19th century, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(EMBRAPA) was created. This enterprise was very important for 
the development of technologies suited to tropical agribusiness and 
enabled Brazilian producers to be among the most productive ones 
in terms of international parameters.
The model of imports substitution industrialisation, in spite of 
its relative success (once it effectively promoted the industrialisation 
of the country) and the expressive rates of growth in the gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Table 2.1), has subsequently been the 
target of many criticisms. The main downside comes from the fact 
that the country remained ‘closed’ for too long,  with its enterprises 
protected against international competition, which resulted in a 
relative technological backwardness and, consequently, loss of 
international competitiveness.
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1950 6.80 1960 9.40 1970 10.40
1951 4.30 1961 8.60 1971 11.34
1952 7.30 1962 6.60 1972 11.94
1953 4.70 1963 0.60 1973 13.97
1954 7.80 1964 3.40 1974 8.15
1955 8.80 1965 2.40 1975 5.17
1956 2.90 1966 6.70 1976 10.26
1957 7.70 1967 4.20 1977 4.93
1958 10.80 1968 9.80 1978 4.97
1959 9.80 1969 9.50 1979 6.76
Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/cnt/default.asp?z=t&o=15&i=P (accessed 19 October 
2011). Authors’ elaboration.
One of the main targets of this criticism was the information 
technology policy adopted in the 1980s which, rather differently in 
relation to other segments of economic activity, had its development 
based on firms of domestic capital. The model has been criticised 
because it was unable to produce internationally competitive 
‘information technology’, as the domestic production was considered 
relatively ‘obsolete’. However, the critics neglected the building up 
of human resource capabilities that resulted from this process, as 
well as the constitution of enterprises that turned the country into a 
leader in some technologies, such as bank automation. 
As a consequence of such criticisms, in the 1990s the market 
took the leadership of the accumulation process and the state 
withdrew substantively from the economic environment. From 
this moment on, neoliberal ideas started ruling the policies of the 
federal government, also following the global tendency to embrace 
neoliberalism. In the face of this new logic, measures began to be 
taken aiming at the reduction of the role of the state in the economy. 
Privatisation, trade liberalisation and financial liberalisation, among 
other measures, were implemented throughout this decade. Measures 
such as the quick withdrawal of non-tariff barriers and suppression 
of trade tariffs were adopted, without the creation, at least not 
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immediately, of any filter or policy for protecting the enterprises 
and the economic activities developed in the country.3 The logic 
underlying all this was that market failures are less significant than 
the failures of state intervention.  
The consequence of these market-led policies was what became 
known as the ‘two lost decades’ — the decades of the 1980s and 
1990s — because of their relatively low or even decreasing GDP 
growth rates, which may be seen in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Real Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Inflation Rate (IPCA), 1980–1990
Period GDP–Real Growth Rate (% p.a.)
IPCA–Extended Consumer Price 






















Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/cnt/default.asp?z=t&o=15&i=P (accessed 19 October 
2011). Authors’ elaboration.
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Furthermore, this policy became known as the ‘stop and go’ policy, 
characterised by an environment of high monetary instability 
and high inflation rates. Thus, whenever the growth rates became 
positive and exceeded 5 per cent and inflation rates accelerated, plans 
for stabilisation were adopted for slowing down the GDP growth. 
In the 1990s, following the ‘Real Plan’ (Plano Real) of 1994 (Plan 
for Economic Stabilisation), a regime of inflation targeting was 
adopted with its main instruments being restrictive monetary and 
fiscal policies, and its unique objective of holding back the inflation 
rate. We can see in Table 2.2 that the Real Plan succeeded, because 
after 1995 the inflation rate fell to a new level, although this was 
accompanied by a low growth of GDP.
In spite of the mediocre growth rates of the economy and a big 
deficit in the trade balance that accompanied it, the market continued 
to lead both the accumulation process and the industrial and 
innovation policy, which continued to be neglected by the federal 
government until the end of the 1990s. 
The federal government returned to the inclusion of innovation in 
the policy agenda in 1999, although it was restricted to the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MS&T). In 1999, sectoral funds were 
created aimed primarily to finance partnerships between the 
production sector and the institutions of science and technology. 
These funds were conceived following the diagnosis that Brazil 
had attained the consolidation of a wide and competent scientific 
and technological infrastructure, but was unable to establish an 
innovative production sector. In order to change this situation, it 
would be necessary to foster the links between the two segments 
of the national innovation system. Many analyses show, however, 
that by the end of 2006 the merit of the sectoral funds was limited to 
re-establish the budget of the MS&T back to the amounts available 
in 1995.4
With the creation of the sectoral funds, the MS&T started the 
formulation of the National Policy of Science, Technology and 
Innovation. The latter has instituted, or designed, mechanisms and 
instruments that were first implemented in the period 1999–2006. The 
most important among them, in addition to the sectoral funds, were 
the mechanisms for equalisation of interest rates and for economic 
subvention to firms. At the end of 2003, the new federal government 
of President Lula also launched the Industrial, Technological and 
Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE — Política Industrial, Tecnológica e 
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de Comércio Exterior). For the first time in two decades the federal 
government was able, again, to make use of the term ‘industrial 
policy’. 
In this period, the state again took the lead in innovation policy 
making, by creating new instruments aiming at affecting innovation 
strategies of firms and positively influencing economic activity. 
Nevertheless, we may say that the intervention of the federal 
government was reticent, since it constituted a modest participation 
of the state in economic decisions and in defining priorities. Indeed, 
the PITCE did not set specific mechanisms and instruments for its 
implementation, which was based on those established by the Policy 
of Science, Technology and Innovation.
The Policy for Production Development (PDP) launched in 
the second term of President Lula, on the other hand, aimed at 
avoiding the problems of coordination shown by PITCE, by 
creating a structure of governance that was specially concerned with 
articulating the actions of the various ministries — particularly the 
Ministries of Science and Technology and of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade. 
From a neo-Schumpeterian perspective of innovation policy, the 
launch of PITCE and PDP by the federal government can be deemed 
an advance, since it allows a clear reference to a necessary integration 
between the industrial policy and the scientific and technological 
policy. Although the National Policy of Science, Technology and 
Innovation was launched in the period 1999–2002, its political agenda 
remained restricted to the Ministry of Science and Technology in 
view of the resistance within the Ministry of Economy towards 
an industrial policy. This led to some delays in the creation and 
implementation of instruments that were devised in that period — 
for instance, the economic subvention.  
Although they are seen as advancements, PITCE and PDP still do 
not incorporate the debate on integration of the remaining policies 
that comprise other NSI sub-systems as, for instance, educational, 
macroeconomic and social development policies. These three lines 
of implicit policies have, in the Brazilian case, significant impacts on 
the innovation system.   
Failing to integrate innovation into these policies makes evident 
the division that prevails in the ambit of the federal government 
between the discussions on innovation policy and on development 
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policy. Such a lack of connections leads to missed opportunities with 
respect to the reduction of structural heterogeneities. 
The extent of the academic debate and the advances in innovation 
policies bring evidence to the relevance of an integrated perspective of 
NSI, as the aim of the innovation policy is to effectively impact such 
a system and not only isolated agents. To face this, the integration 
of the innovation policy to other policies is required, together with 
actions which take into account the relevance of a development 
vision that will set the strategic guidelines for such integration. It is 
not a matter of reproducing an ‘old-fashioned’ way of policy making, 
but rather of devising a new way that is appropriate to the local 
specificities as, indeed, the neo-Schumpeterian school recommends.  
Periodisation and analysis of institutions and policies 
of the state concerned with innovation
The periodisation, starting in the 1990s, established for the innovation 
policy in the ambit of the federal government, points to the govern-
ment’s choice for policies of a neoliberal character. Within this policy 
trend, innovation policy as such was not even tolerated (1994–1998) 
and, when the government decided to adopt one, it seemed inspired 
by the narrow concept of a national innovation system (practically 
limited to university–industry relations). In consequence, the 
innovation policy was restricted to the MS&T without connections 
to other government policies.
The genealogy of the innovation policy reflects such a neoliberal 
option by the government which fails to incorporate the advance-
ments of both the academic debate on the innovative process and of 
policies implemented by other countries. This analysis also reflects 
the disconnection between the innovation policy and other implicit 
policies such as education and development, since, during the period 
studied, no integration was observed. The federal budget shows 
that only a few ministries have made significant expenditures aimed 
explicitly at innovation policy.5  
The present analysis of policies and actions implemented in the 
ambit of the federal government is restricted to the performance  of 
three institutions — the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, MCT); the Ministry of Develop-
ment, Industry and Foreign Trade (Ministério do Desenvolvimento, 
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Indústria e Comércio Exterior, MDIC); and the Brazilian Federal 
Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education 
(Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, 
CAPES), subordinate to the Ministry of Education (MEC) —which 
present the highest expenditures and which hold policies and strategic 
guidelines that explicitly acknowledge the importance of innovation. 
The analysis of these departments also comprises their subordinate 
agencies which played a fundamental role in the implementation of 
the innovation policy. These institutions — Studies and Projects 
Funding Agency (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos, FINEP), 
National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 
(Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, 
CNPq), both linked to MCT, and the National Bank of Economic 
and Social Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social, BNDES), linked to MDIC — are primarily 
related to the provision of funds and to the promotion of innovation.
The period of analysis extends from 2006 to 2010.6 The objective 
is to understand and critically analyse the main measures adopted as 
well as the evolution and trends of resource allocation throughout 
the period in question. In order to do so, the institutions and 
organisations under analysis will be presented according to their 
chronology of creation. There is a sequence of main trends in terms 
of the establishment of the innovation policy: in short, first the 
importance of science and technology policy (in the 1950s), second, 
of industrial policy (in the 1960s) and third, of innovation policy in a 
broad sense (from 2000 onwards). Two important ministries will be 
presented, the MS&T and the Ministry of Industry; and also CAPES, 
the agency subordinate to the Ministry of Education. The following 
descriptions will only highlight the programmes and agencies related 
to innovation policy.
The Ministry of Science and Technology
The Ministry of Science and Technology was created in 1985, 
in recognition of the relevance of this issue for the country. It is 
currently the main department of the federal government responsible 
for implementation of the explicit innovation policy. In 1999, 
following a long period without an explicit policy on innovation, 
a new policy was instituted with the creation of the sectoral funds 
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— resource funds that would allow the ministry to restore budget 
resources and to set up the new policy.7
In addition, the ministry has a significant participation in the 
industrial policies, PITCE and PDP, which comprise the explicit 
innovation policies in the ambit of the federal government.8 
From 2003 on, the ministry managed to successfully submit a 
number of Acts to the Congress — for instance, Lei do Bem (Law 
of the Goods) and Lei da Inovação (Law of Innovation) — with 
the purpose of establishing new mechanisms for funding innovation 
activities, such as economic subventions and interest equalisation, as 
well as restructuring fiscal incentives for R&D and for innovation. 
Such mechanisms, although they had been created during the former 
government, were only implemented as of 2003. They allowed the 
innovation policy that was designed in the period 1999–2002 to 
be implemented, based on three main cornerstones:9 incentives to 
technological development and to innovation within enterprises; 
incentives to the creation of technological infrastructure; and 
incentives to the emergence of new technology-based enterprises. 
The credit for both these laws and the initiative of implementing the 
innovation policy belongs to the current government. Table A2.4 
(see Annexure) summarises the main legal acts and programmes that 
allowed the implementation of the innovation policy. 
The Law of the Goods is a mechanism for boosting innovation, 
which seeks to benefit, by means of fiscal incentives, those firms that 
perform R&D activities.10 As already emphasised, the main criticism 
to the concession of fiscal incentives is related to the inadequacy of 
such a mechanism for changing the long-term strategies of the agents 
in the production sector, comprising merely a secondary element in 
the incentive to innovation. In other words, beneficiary enterprises 
would invest in innovation even without fiscal incentives, once 
innovation is part of their long-term strategies. In addition, according 
to Koeller (2007), such incentives are specifically aimed at firms that 
perform R&D, thus carrying a restricted concept of innovation. 
The Innovation Law (Law no. 10.973) was sanctioned in 2004 
and had further regulation in October of 2005 through Decree 
no. 5563. The new law was built upon three cornerstones: the 
constitution of an environment appropriate to the establishment of 
partnership relations between universities, technology institutes and 
enterprises; the incentive to the participation of institutes of science 
and technology in the innovation process; and the direct incentive to 
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innovation within the firms (Arruda et al. 2006). The innovation law 
has been further improved by incorporating elements related to the 
promotion of innovation within enterprises. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology consolidated in this 
period as the main agent in the ambit of the federal government for 
the design and implementation of the explicit innovation policy. Two 
agencies subordinate to the MCT are part of this strategy of policy 
implementation — the Council of Scientific and Technological 
Development, responsible for the concession of scholarships, and the 
Studies and Projects Funding Agency, responsible for the concession 
of financing to research, development and innovation projects. 
In terms of results, it can be said that, despite the existence of tax 
incentives over 10 years, the number of beneficiaries is inexpressive, 
reaching only about 1,500 enterprises from 1993 through 2009, in a 
total of 300,000 industrial companies in the country.
Council of Scientific and Technological Development 
The Council of Scientific and Technological Development was 
created in 1951, as the National Research Council, and its mission 
was related to the promotion of scientific research. For many years, 
CNPq played the role of coordinator of the National System of 
Science and Technology, until the creation of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology in 1985.
Now, CNPq is one of the agencies subordinate to MCT, being 
responsible for supporting research and providing graduate education 
aimed at consolidating and expanding both the number of graduate 
professionals and research in the country. The main instrument 
used by CNPq for accomplishing its objectives is the concession of 
research scholarships. These are later allocated according to different 
modes and directed to various levels of education, from secondary 
school and college to graduate and postdoctoral studies. Scholarships 
are divided into two main categories: individual scholarships for 
studies within the country or abroad, and quota scholarships. 
Among the scholarships granted by CNPq, some are aimed to 
stricto sensu masters and doctoral programmes, but there are also 
some aimed specifically to the advancement of technology. The 
budget assigned to doctoral studies has presented a growing trend 
during the period under analysis and it constitutes one of the main 
expenditures of the agency. 
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Two programmes — Human Resources for Strategic Activities-
Innovation (RHAE-Inovação) and Stimulus to Retention of 
Human Resources of Interest to Sectoral Funds (PROSET) — grant 
scholarships to professionals who develop R&D projects within 
enterprises, aiming at settling masters and Ph.D.s in the enterprises, 
in accordance with the logic established by the explicit innovation 
policy.  
Furthermore, in the scope of individual scholarships for scientific 
development, some mechanisms of promotion are worth empha-
sising. One of them is the Regional Scientific and Technological 
Development, which aims at establishing human resources with 
qualifications in science, technology and innovation in regions in 
need of expanding the number of qualified professionals. This pro-
gramme is also concerned with the matter of competitiveness of 
enterprises.
 This modality of support incorporates, then, two fundamental 
issues from the point of view of the innovation policy: the question 
of overcoming regional inequalities and the question of integrating 
graduate professionals to the business area. A negative aspect 
of this scheme to promote innovation is the linear approach to 
the process, which associates innovation to basic research. This 
perspective permeates the procedures of granting this modality of 
scholarship, requiring professional qualification at graduate level 
and restricting the concession of ‘scholarships for retaining graduate 
professionals’ to the firms that develop, are applying, or have been 
granted research projects. Such requirements a priori rule out a wide 
group of professionals and firms that do not hold the mandatory 
qualifications and are not involved with scientific research, although 
it does not mean that they are less innovative or less able to produce 
innovations. 
Also noteworthy is the Industrial and Technological Development 
(Desenvolvimento Tecnológico e Industrial, DTI) scholarships 
programme. This kind of scholarship is granted to professionals who 
participate in R&D projects carried out within enterprises.
On the other hand, the Scholarship for Internship/Training in 
the country is part of the programme Individual Scholarships for 
Technological Advancement. This is a very important programme 
for the preparation of professionals in firms that seek to enhance 
quality. However, as can be seen later in Table 2.3, resources available 
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for this modality of scholarship were gradually reducing and finally 
ran out in 2007. 
Both scholarship programmes — Industrial and Technological 
Development and Internship/Training — follow the same logic of 
DTI, binding the concession of grants to the participation of the 
professional in a research project. It is therefore assumed that the 
innovation process is necessarily related to research and the fact 
that a big deal of innovations and technological advancements occur 
outside research laboratories is neglected. The restriction of these 
qualification grants to research projects limits the role that this 
mechanism could play in a firm. 
The analysis of criteria for qualification of candidates corroborates 
the criticism that these scholarship programmes carry a linear vision 
of the innovation process in their essence. In the case of DTI, the 
criterion always requires experience in research, development or 
innovation activities. Tacit knowledge, which is highly important for 
innovation within companies, is neglected in this form of granting 
scholarships.   
The priority of the agency is still put on the preparation of 
researchers, which is reflected in the resources allocated for the 
concession of the several modalities of scholarships — the major 
amounts of resources are allocated to doctoral and masters scholar-
ships.11
 Finally, one problem faced by CNPq related to its scholarship 
policy is the instability of budget resources. The variation of these 
resources along time is not always positive, which hinders the 
decision-making, design and implementation of a continued policy, 
able to produce changes in the strategies of the agents that comprise 
the Brazilian innovation system. 
Studies and Projects Funding Agency 
The Studies and Projects Funding Agency was created in 1965 and 
is subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology. The 
institution is responsible for financing activities aimed at innovation 
and at scientific and technological advancement, by means of granting 
both reimbursable and non-reimbursable funds to companies, 
universities and public or private research centres.
This organisation has a number of programmes for financial 
support. These are divided into four main categories: (a) support 
to innovation within companies; (b) support to scientific and 
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technological institutions (STIs); (c) support to cooperation 
between companies and STIs; (d) support to activities in science and 
technology (S&T) aimed at social development. Each one of these 
categories comprises a group of programmes targeting different 
areas aimed at boosting innovation and scientific and technological 
development.
Most of these programmes are financed with resources from the 
sectoral funds and are implemented mainly by means of public bids 
and calls for proposals. The first sectoral funds were created in 1999 
and there are currently 16 such funds whose resources are allocated 
for financing innovation and S&T development.12 
 One may observe an overlapping of financing priorities — 
programmes are created for supporting various sectors concurrently. 
This, in fact, indicates the lack of a strategy for the innovation policy. 
The projects that have been approved apparently do not follow 
a coherent policy, spreading over a wide range of areas. Thus, in 
addition to the problems inherent to the operation of such a wide 
and varied range of programmes, there is the risk of disconnection of 
supported projects from the guidelines established by the innovation 
policy. 
One of the principles of the sectoral funds is to promote 
cooperation and to establish partnerships between companies and 
scientific and technological institutions (universities, institutes, 
etc.). The resources are released for the STIs and not directly to the 
companies, as a form of promoting cooperation between different 
agents of the Brazilian innovation system. All programmes financed 
with resources of the sectoral funds can only be implemented 
according to this methodology. As noted by Cassiolato: 
[A] minority of firms is involved in university-industry relations; 
the studies suggest that, whereas many of the firms maybe do not 
need to establish cooperation with universities and R&D centres, 
many [others] do not have the required capabilities, particularly 
human resources, for establishing the cooperation. Kristensen and 
Madsen (2003) propose a labour division in the innovation system, 
in which the large companies specialize in relations with educational 
and research institutions, while the SMEs exploit the synergies with 
partners within the value chain (2003: 8).
The existence of qualified human resource in the companies, able 
to dialogue with the research institutions, is crucial for the success 
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of the cooperation. Small and medium enterprises may have no 
qualified professionals able to establish partnership relations with 
researchers, while large companies generally have their own R&D 
laboratories, and thus cooperation may end up occurring only 
occasionally. Furthermore, this mechanism of cooperation between 
the enterprises and the universities and research institutions bears 
an implicit linear vision of the innovation process, once it both 
emphasises the importance of research to the detriment of other 
processes that are significant for innovation, and neglects the 
participation of other agents of the national innovation system, who 
may assume a fundamental role in certain innovative processes.
In addition to these programmes, FINEP has another one, quite 
important for the accomplishment of activities concerning innovation 
funding. Economic subvention is one of the main mechanisms used 
by this institution. The resources available through this mechanism 
are not reimbursable and are granted through public bids. Economic 
subvention was launched in 2006 and is granted directly to the 
company. Each year a new bid is launched aiming at supporting a 
number of enterprises that have interest in investing in innovation 
projects. 
The objective of the subvention can be summarised as follows: 
‘to significantly enhance the innovation activities and to increase 
competitiveness of both the companies and the country’s economy’.13 
The idea behind this mechanism is to strengthen the enterprises that 
aim at innovating, by means of granting non-reimbursable funding 
to those firms that submit innovation projects and that meet the 
selection criteria of the bid. Although it was designed in 2002, the 
subvention was implemented by FINEP in 2006. In that year, the 
resources allocated to this programme were 300 million Reais (0.013 
per cent of the 2006 GDP) and 145 companies had their projects 
approved. In 2008, 450 million Reais were allocated (0.016 per 
cent of 2008 GDP) to the programme and 206 companies had their 
projects approved. The analysis of the beneficiary companies and 
their respective projects demonstrates that the criteria for selection 
of the projects are not connected to the strategic guidelines set by the 
innovation policy, particularly in the bids of 2006 and 2007. Most 
selected projects were classified by FINEP as projects on ‘general 
subjects’. The 2008 bid was the first to detail the kind of project 
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and the policy guidelines for selecting projects, leaving less room for 
‘general subjects’ projects.
In December of 2009, 261 new projects (and 560 million Reais) 
were approved in this programme, for the three strategic areas of 
information and communication technology (ICT), health and 
defence. In the other three priority areas — biotechnology, energy 
and social areas — submitted projects were not recommended for 
implementation. However, only 229 million Reais (0.007 per cent of 
2009 GDP) were spent, and this expenditure was not for these new 
projects, it was for projects approved in previous years.
Similarly, the resources expended in 2010 in this programme were 
related to projects approved in other years and corresponded to 526 
million Reais (0.014 per cent of the 2010 GDP). Another bid was 
launched in 2010, but because of the Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU), 
which was examining the compliance with existing regulations about 
the legality of the participation of private non-profit organisations 
and cooperatives in the process of subvention, dissemination of the 
bid’s results were suspended.
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
In the government of the period 2003–2006, MDIC gained room 
as a promoter of national development. Policies for industry, 
technology and foreign trade acquired an excellent position as 
conditions necessary for development. The ministry is one of the 
main agents in the implementation of these policies. Some actions 
and programmes among those implemented by MDIC are directly 
addressed to innovation. Furthermore, MDIC is the main manager 
of the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (2003–
2007) and the Policy for Production Development (2007–2010). 
First, it is possible to highlight the actions/programmes of the 
Ministry of Development that are more directly related to the 
innovation process. Table A2.1 (see Annexure) shows some of 
the actions that the ministry is implementing in the scope of its 
contribution to the innovation policy. The programmes presented 
unfold into more specific actions. These involve a range of activities 
from tax matters to fiscal incentives aimed at small and medium 
enterprises. These programmes are varied and seek to embrace 
different niches of the domestic economy.  
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One of them is the programme for Incentive to Innovation 
in the Enterprise which has as its major objective, according to 
MDIC, to provide Brazilian entrepreneurs with an online service 
for reference regarding the search for solutions of difficulties 
related to the development of technological innovations. The 
programme comprises various initiatives that lead to different ways 
of implementing the policy, as can be seen in Table A2.1.
The main instrument of the programme is the concession of 
fiscal incentives and its main problem is the fact that it is restricted 
to larger enterprises.14  Many authors, like Rothwell (1983), Ergas 
(1987), Guimarães (2006), and Arundel (2006) emphasise that, 
although fiscal incentives are used by most countries (except for 
United Kingdom), the efficacy of such incentives suggests that they 
are, at best, a secondary element in public support to innovation. 
The authors affirm that most beneficiary enterprises would have 
made the investments in R&D irrespective of the concession of the 
benefit.  
On the other hand, the programme Cooperation Enterprise/
Technological Institution is based on a model where the enterprises 
search public R&D organisations aiming at establishing partnerships. 
This model is based on the assumption that small-sized enterprises 
are aware of the importance of innovation and interaction with 
universities and that they have enough capability for establishing 
cooperative relations. Some problems arise from this assumption. 
First, many small-sized enterprises do not hold a clear image about 
the role that universities and research laboratories may play for the 
growth of the firm. Second, the enterprises that hold this vision 
hardly have R&D facilities nor are they able to establish partnership 
relations with R&D institutions. In addition to these findings, one 
may observe a component of the old linear vision that innovation 
would result from basic research.   
These programmes, although being pointed out by MDIC as 
initiatives directly aimed at innovation, have no budget resources 
associated to them, nor any specific tools for their implementation; 
this makes it difficult to implement effective actions. 
The Programme of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, created 
in 2007, is inserted in the objectives of PDP, suggesting that small 
enterprises are highly important for the development of national 
production. The ministry’s outlays aimed at development of micro, 
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small and medium enterprises have been made since at least 2004, a 
period that precedes the PDP. Similar to other programmes, there 
is a high instability of budget resources that vary significantly along 
the considered years. Such instabilities make both the decision-
making and the implementation of continued actions by policy 
makers difficult.  
The policy of Local Productive Arrangements/Systems (Arranjos 
Produtivos Locais, APL), according to the ministry, has the objective 
of ‘guiding and coordinating the governmental efforts in the 
induction of local development, looking for, in accordance with the 
government’s strategic guidelines, the generation of employment and 
income and the stimulus to exports’.15 This would be another form 
of incentive to small and medium enterprises. Despite the creation 
of the programme, its implementation faced huge difficulties, 
given the scarcity of resources and the problems for coordinating 
the actions with other governmental departments, as well as with 
banks’ and supporting agencies. According to the budget of MDIC, 
the resources for the APLs were almost nil in the latter years. Thus, 
although highlighting the importance of these arrangements for 
national development, and particularly for regional development, 
the programme has not been effectively implemented.   
This programme would target not only the enterprises, but the 
development of the region around the arrangements. The government 
claims that: ‘The strategic option for operations within APLs results, 
fundamentally, from the acknowledgement that the policies for 
boosting small and medium enterprises are more effective when 
directed to groups of firms and not to isolated firms.’ Such a claim, 
however, seems contradictory to other programmes instituted by 
the ministry, which have action lines addressed to individual firms, 
such as the programme of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, 
making it difficult to prioritise resource allocation and to implement 
effective actions. 
The relevance of the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade for the explicit innovation policy has unquestionably 
grown following the implementation of the Policy for Production 
Development, which was instituted in May 2008. The reason is that 
the ministry has been appointed for coordinating the policy, having 
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as executive secretariat the National Bank of Social and Economic 
Development (BNDES), a public enterprise linked to the ministry 
that undertakes major responsibilities in the implementation of the 
policy.  
The National Bank for Social and Economic Development 
The National Bank for Social and Economic Development is one of 
the major institutions in Latin America for financing investment in 
production. According to the bank innovation is seen as a strategic 
issue for the concession of financing: The support to innovation 
is a strategic priority for BNDES. The aim is contributing to the 
expansion of innovation activities in the country and to their 
systematic fulfilment.  
There are some lines of support to innovation, as seen in Table 
A2.2 (see Annexure), that unfold into lines of direct support to 
innovation and financing lines aimed at the industry, that would 
indirectly incorporate innovation. The programmes of BNDES 
present different formats. The Innovative Capital has its focus on the 
enterprises with the capability for performing innovative activities. 
The financing is related to the strategy of the enterprise and this 
is the only programme that imposes this relevant condition. The 
idea behind this condition is that financing projects of research and 
development that are not related to a broad strategy of innovation by 
the firm brings an implicit risk that the project may be discontinued 
due to crisis or failures. On the contrary, financing an innovative 
strategy would tend to change the perspectives and strategies of 
long-term investment of the firms. 
The programme of Technological Innovation has its focus on new 
technologies, at least for the domestic market, and seems to follow 
the pattern instituted by the programmes of the Studies and Projects 
Funding Agency presented eralier. Another programme is the 
Technological Fund (FUNTEC) that presents, according to BNDES, 
the following premise: to support projects of research, development 
and innovation in areas of clear relevance for the country. The 
priority sectors are: health, renewable energies and environment. 
These are relevant topics for the Brazilian innovation system, since 
Brazil is a large country with great capacity for expanding the use of 
renewable energies (solar, wind power, biofuel, etc.), with one of the 
greatest biodiversities of the planet, and with sensitive deficiencies 
regarding tropical diseases among others.
Brazil y 43
The programmes offer interest rates lower than those applied 
in the market, but conversely to the programmes of FINEP, their 
financing lines are reimbursable. Technological Innovation shows 
interest rates of 4.5 per cent per year and Innovative Capital presents 
an interest rate comprising financial cost, basic remuneration set by 
BNDES and credit risk rate. It is important to note that there are no 
budget resources associated to the programmes, which makes their 
implementation difficult.
The programmes cited earlier were related to innovation and there 
are other ones associated to industry. The Programme of Support to 
Implementation of the Brazilian System of Terrestrial Digital TV 
(PROTVD) is the programme that aims to develop the domestic 
industry, based on technologies of digital TV, thus including various 
sectors, such as, for instance, software and the equipment for radio 
broadcasting. However, the procedures for releasing the financing 
to interested enterprises are not established yet; furthermore, no 
measures have been announced about any specific policy aimed 
at the creation of Brazilian enterprises that could develop such 
technologies in the case that no firm manifests an interest.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the Programme of Support to the 
Development of the Health Industrial Complex (PROFARMA). 
This programme is also one of the lines of BNDES for health. 
The objectives of the programme are: to expand significantly the 
participation of national enterprises in the domestic market; to 
promote the growth of their exports; to strengthen the process of 
R&D and innovation in the sector; to boost the improvement in 
quality and the certification of products and processes associated 
to the sector; to promote the growth and internationalisation of 
national enterprises of the sector; to promote consolidation of the 
sector; to promote the dissemination and the growing use of national 
software both in Brazil and internationally; to strengthen the national 
operations of multinational software and IT services companies that 
develop technology in Brazil and/or use the country as  a platform 
for exporting.
Table 2.3 shows the number of projects and resources invested 
in by BNDES through its innovation funding programmes, in 
2007 and 2008. It is possible to note that, during these two years, 
the programmes did not show a large scale, neither in terms of 
the number of supported projects, nor in terms of the volume of 
resources.
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Innovative Capital - - 2,049,600 1
Innovation R,D&I 105,653,488 7 17,858,400 3
Production Innovation 280,420,966 11 41,814,898 9
Automotive Engineering - - 172,320,400 2
Innovation Profarma: 
Support for the 
Development of 
Industrial Health 
30,341,802 5 13,055,000 3
Business Prosoft: 
Development of Software 
Industry and Services 
Information Technology
372,796,686 12 321,802,382 9
Supplier Protvd: Support 
the Implementation of the 
Brazilian Digital TV
- - 8,400,909 1
Others: Technological 
Development
5,873,750 6 44,437,586 5
Total 795,086,692 41 621,739,174 33
Source: Vermulm and Hollanda (2009).
Note: Current values in dollars PPP. 
Only information on the total funds invested in these programmes is 
available for 2009 and 2010, respectively, $788 million (current values 
in dollars PPP) and $1,924 million (current values in dollars PPP). 
This means that, at least in terms of resources invested (considered as 
a percentage of GDP; 0.017 per cent of the 2009 GDP and 0.037 per 
cent of the 2010 GDP), these programmes are advancing.
Brazilian Federal Agency for the Support and Evaluation of 
Graduate Education,  Ministry of Education
The Brazilian Federal Agency for the Support and Evaluation 
of Graduate Education was created in 1951, initially in the ambit 
of the National Campaign for Improving Higher Education. Its 
Brazil y 45
main purpose was guaranteeing the existence of specialised human 
resources, aiming at fulfilling both public and private needs for 
facing the challenge of development. 
CAPES is currently subordinate to the Ministry of Education and 
one of its roles is to grant scholarships for human resources education 
at graduate level. Indeed, CAPES, in conjunction with CNPq, has 
been responsible for the consolidation of the graduate education 
system in the country and for the preparation and qualification of 
higher education teaching personnel. As a result, the country has also 
been improving its position in the ranking of scientific publications, 
published by the National Science Indicators (NSI), having risen 
from the 15th position in 2007 to the 13th in 2008, maintaining the 
same position in 2009. 
The merit of CAPES in human resources training and in the 
consolidation of the educational and research system, along with 
CNPq, is fully acknowledged. However, there still persists a poor and 
fragile coordination between this policy and the explicit innovation 
policy, the absorption of qualified graduate professionals by the 
production sector being still relatively weak, as already mentioned. 
Specificities of the System of Innovation in the 
Country and its Relationship with the State
The evolution of the Brazilian production structure
By the end of the 1940s, the Brazilian production structure was 
almost exclusively based on the primary sector. It was only after 
World War II that the country started its industrialisation process, 
which was based, then, on the idea of import substitution. It focused, 
at first, on the establishment of an industry of non-durable consumer 
goods, in order to meet the demand of an urban working class that 
was beginning to be formed in the country. After this first period, 
which lasted until the middle of the 1950s, the productive structure 
began to become more diverse, with the entry of capital goods in the 
production of national manufacturers. At the same time, the service 
sector also started to appear, tending to increase its share in GDP 
throughout the period. Figure 2.1 presents the share of services, 
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industry and agriculture as a percentage of GDP for the period from 
1947 to 2010. 
Figure 2.1: Brazil: Share of Services, Industry and Agriculture in GDP, 
1947–2010 (percentage)
Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/cnt/default.asp?z=t&o=15&i=P (accessed 19 October 
2011). Authors’ elaboration.
The limited participation of industry in GDP observed in the 
period 1947–1955, is due to the collapse of the import substitution 
of non-durable consumer goods in the process of industrialisation. 
After 1955 until the early 1980s, the process of import substitution 
began a new phase, including durable consumer goods and capital 
goods, which marked the growing involvement of industry in GDP, 
as shown in Figure 2.1. This phase was related to the attraction of 
foreign-owned enterprises, with the purpose of importing industrial 
technology.
Based on this policy, in the late 1970s, the country attained a 
complex and relatively complete production structure, in terms of 
the sectors that comprise it. Industry was producing petrochemicals, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, fertilisers, paper and pulp and 
capital goods. Moreover, the country could establish an efficient 
infrastructure of energy, communications and transport (Cassiolato 
1992).
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This successful phase ended in 1980, with the Mexican crisis (Ferraz 
et al. 2003). The 1980s and 1990s represented reduction in capacity 
for the Brazilian industry in several sectors, with increased industrial 
concentration in some of them. Moreover, during this period many 
Brazilian companies were acquired by foreign capital, and several 
mergers and acquisitions took place, including those resulting from 
the privatisation process sponsored by the government.
Table 2.4 presents the composition of the industrial output 
of general industry for the period from 1996 through 2007.16  The 
main observation is that the sectors intensive in natural resources, 
such as oil refining (16.5 per cent), beverages and food (16 per 
cent) and metallurgy (7.9 per cent), augmented their participation 
in the total industrial production during these years. The sectors 
intensive in technology such as machinery and equipment for offices 
and informatics goods; electronic devices and communication 
equipment; other equipments (that includes the aeronautics sector) 
either decreased or maintained their low participation in the total 
industrial production for the same period.








General Industry 100 100 100 100 100.0 Difference in %
Extractive 
Industries
2.2 3.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 1.8 0.6
Manufacturing 
Industries
97.8 96.6 95.8 95.9 96.0 –1.8 -0.6
Beverages and 
Food
17.2 15.4 15.8 16.0 15.1 –1.3 0.5
Tobacco 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 –0.4 0.0
Textiles 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 –1.3 –0.2




2.2 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.5 –0.7 -0.4
Wood Products 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.2 –0.3
Pulp and Paper 
Industry










4.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 –2.0 –0.1
Oil Refining 7.0 14.0 16.3 16.5 15.5 9.5 2.5
Chemicals 12.7 11.0 10.2 9.9 10.2 –2.8 –1.1
Rubber and Plastic 
Goods
4.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 –0.7 0.0
Non-metallic 
Products
3.4 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.1 –0.2 –0.1
Metallurgy 5.4 9.2 8.1 7.9 7.9 2.5 –1.3
Metallic Products 3.8 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.6 -0.6 0.1
Machinery and 
Equipment






0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.1
Devices and 
Machines





3.5 2.3 2.0 2.1 1.7 –1.5 –0.2
Hospital and 
Medical Devices





8.1 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.6 –0.2 0.1
Other Equipments 0.8 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.0 –0.1
Furniture and 
Other Industries
2.2 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 –0.7 0.0
Recycling 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.




In summary, the last two decades have not been favourable, to 
say the least, for industry and agriculture, which have been losing 
their share in GDP. For industry the situation was even worse, 
since the sectors most intensive in technology lost share in relation 
to commodities. Only from 2005 to 2010 (with the exception of 
2009, when the Brazilian industry suffered the impacts of the global 
financial crisis that hit the world in 2008) a small, timid recovery in 
the share of industry in GDP can be observed, which reflects the 
reversal in governmental policy, with the reintroduction of industrial 
policy as the subject, as noted earlier.
The main specificities and heterogeneities of the 
Brazilian innovation system
The main specificities of the Brazilian innovation system are its 
structural (and innovative) heterogeneities, which are also reflected in 
the outstanding regional disparities. The policy for industrialisation 
adopted until the 1970s could be considered successful once the 
country got to forge a complex and complete industrial structure in 
terms of economic activities and size of enterprises.
This infrastructure, however, is largely concentrated in the south-
eastern and southern regions of the country. Table 2.5 presents the 
participation by region in the gross added value, which represents 
the differences in the production structure of the regions.
Table 2.5: Participation by Region in the Brazilian Gross Value Added at 
Basic Prices
Year North Northeast Centre-West Southeast South
2002 4.82 13.25 9.06 55.73 17.14
2003 4.88 13.03 9.21 54.90 17.97
2004 4.90 12.70 9.10 55.80 17.40
2005 5.00 13.10 8.90 56.50 16.60
2006 5.10 13.10 8.70 56.80 16.30
2007 5.00 13.10 8.90 56.40 16.60
2008 5.10 13.10 9.20 56.00 16.60
Source:  IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/cnt/default.asp?z=t&o=15&i=P (accessed 25 October 
2011). Authors’ elaboration.
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Table 2.6 presents the structure of income distribution in the 
country, marked by considerable disparities that characterise the 
socio-regional heterogeneity.
Table 2.6: Per Capita Income by Region
Regions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Centre-
West
6,590 8,770 8,930 9,350 9,200  9,230 10,210 10,550 
North 3,910 4,190 4,220 4,510 4,560  4,740  5,230 5,290 
Northeast 2,970 3,230 3,180 3,310 3,470 3,580 3,860 3,880 
South 7,640 7,980 8,350 8,560 8,320 8,400 9,480 9,450 
Southeast 8,480 9,250 9,070 9,460 9,750 10,040 11,030 10,960 
Source: Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEADATA) website, http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br. (accessed 1 November 2011). Unit: R$ 2000.
Note: The per capita household income is defined as the ratio between the sum of 
monthly income of all family members living in the house and the number of 
family members. It is deflated by the INPC index. 
Besides unveiling outstanding social inequalities, the information 
shows a strong concentration in both the income and production 
structure in the southern and south-eastern regions. These differences 
in the production and social structure of the country that distinguish 
the Brazilian innovation system, somehow determine the path of 
reproduction, growth and evolution of this system. 
Another important specificity is related to the educational 
system. In the scope of the public system in Brazil, elementary 
education is mostly under the responsibility of municipalities; states 
account primarily for secondary education; and higher education is 
mainly provided by the federal government. The education system is 
complemented by private schools and universities.
According to the Law of the National Education Guidelines 
(Lei de diretrizes e Bases da educação, LDB), in force since 1966, 
‘it is the responsibility of the federal government to regulate and 
monitor higher education institutions, including private ones, and 
furthermore to promote the distribution of material and financial 
resources to states and municipalities for them to invest in their 
secondary and elementary schools’ (Dantas 2008: 1).
The major concern of the educational policy during recent 
decades has been the ‘universalisation’ of elementary education, a 
goal that was achieved, with a significant growth in the number of 
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enrolments. The current concern is put on the quality of education, 
which has proved to be low according to a number of indicators.17  
Figure 2.2 clearly shows the yearly evolution in the number of 
enrolled students. A significant increase is observed from 1970 to 
1997. Subsequently, the beginning of a low decrease in the number 
of enrolments is observed. However, if this evolution is compared in 
relation to the Brazilian population in the years 1970 and 1997, the 
percentage growth is low (respectively 17 per cent and 22 per cent, 
according to Dantas [2008]). 
Figure 2.2: Evolution in the Number of Enrolments in Elementary 
Education
Source: IPEA (2006) in Dantas (2008: 6).
In addition, the rate of conclusion for elementary, secondary and 
higher education is quite low:  ‘Only 84% out of practically 100% 
children at school starting age enrolled in the 1st grade of elementary 
education get to complete the 4th grade; 57% complete elementary 
school and only 37% complete secondary education’ (IPEA 2006: 
129 sic passim in Dantas 2008).
The access to quality education also reflects the income 
concentration prevailing in the country, with private schools, whose 
students comprise the higher income ranges, being better ranked in 
the tests that assess quality of education. Differences regarding the 
education of youngsters according to income ranges are expressive. 
In the first age range (0–6 years), the access to education by the 
highest income ranges (50.6 per cent) is very much higher than that 
of the lowest income ranges (28.9 per cent). In the age range of 7 to 
14, quantitative differences decrease. As for the last age range (18–
24 years) disparities are again remarkable, with the highest income 
youths showing greater access to education than those with the 
lowest income. Such inequality in the access to education in Brazil 
aggravates existing differences, contrarily to what should happen.
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Another fact that reflects the education policy in Brazil is the 
difference in investment across the education levels — elementary, 
secondary and higher education. Table 2.7 shows that expenditure 
per student for public elementary education is much lower than 
expenditures for higher education. Such disparity, added to the fact 
that most of the students that access the university pertain to the 5th 
highest income quintile, as seen later in Table 2.11, emphasises the 
aggravation of inequality. Dantas (2008:9) claims that: ‘Brazil is the 
country, in the whole world, with the highest investment per student, 
in relative terms, for public higher education: no other country 
spends, per student enrolled in higher education (including graduate 
courses) a sum not even close to the equivalent of per capita GDP.’ 
The expenditure on public higher education is crucial; however, 
restricted access to this educational level is a major problem to be 
faced by the public policy. 


























2000 2051 1707 1953 1680 1714 1628 18872
2001 2157 1799 1792 1687 1897 1883 18952
2002 2250 1862 1763 2058 1911 1385 18778
2003 2188 1838 1971 1936 1840 1544 15981
2004 2355 1935 2068 2047 2069 1415 15926
2005 2380 2016 1922 2250 2142 1406 15908
Source: IPEA (2006) in Dantas (2008).
Note: Current values in dollars PPP. 
Concurrently, the production sector undergoes a lack of qualified 
personnel, as shown, for instance, in researches conducted by 
RedeSist (Research Network on Local Innovative Production 
Arrangements and Systems) and as signaled by the Survey on 
Technological Innovation (PINTEC 2005). 
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In PINTEC 2008, interviewed enterprises indicated either high 
or medium importance to the lack of qualified personnel as one 
of the problems and obstacles to the development of innovative 
activities. In the frequency ranking of mentioned problems, the lack 
of qualified personnel stands at the third position (57.8 per cent) for 
industrial companies, behind the problems of economic character 
(costs of innovation and economic risks). For the enterprises in 
the segment of services, such a problem has been identified as still 
more serious: for selected services (publishing, telecommunications, 
information technology) companies (70.4 per cent), it was the first 
in the ranking; and for the R&D enterprises (46.7 per cent), this 
problem stood in the fourth position (it is important to underline 
that in 2005, it was ranked in sixth position). Although it has not 
appeared in all economic activities as the main problem or obstacle 
to innovation, the participation of the enterprises that indicated the 
lack of qualified personnel as being of high or medium relevance is 
quite significant (from 46.7 per cent for R&D enterprises to 70.4 per 
cent for selected services enterprises).
Explicit and Implicit State Policy towards 
Science, Technology and Innovation
The government of the period 2003–2006 began in a context 
characterised by inflation acceleration, in spite of the regime of 
inflation targets that implied the raise of interest rates and a restrictive 
fiscal policy. In this domestic scenario, the macroeconomic policy 
for 2003 remained unchanged and tied to the regime of inflation 
targets, using restrictive fiscal and monetary policies as instruments 
for reaching the ‘target’ — in spite of the historical promises of 
changing the economic policy by the Workers’ Party, the winner 
in the elections. This policy meant the rise of interest rates, rise of 
economic surplus with reduction of federal outlays, particularly 
investments, and appreciated exchange rates.    
In spite of a negative domestic scenario, there was a favourable 
context from the international point of view, with increasing demand 
for commodities boosted by the growth of China and that of the 
main global economies.
The characterisation of explicit and implicit innovation policies 
is based on the concept of a broad national system of innovation 
adopted in this study, as already noted. As implicit policies, which 
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in the case of Brazil have a significant impact, we will consider the 
macroeconomic policy as well as social development and educational 
policies. The analysis of the policies, both explicit and implicit, will 
focus on the period 2003–2010, with emphasis on the period 2007–
2009.
Explicit policies
Although retaining the macroeconomic policy of the former 
administration, in November of 2003 the federal government 
launched the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy, 
taking a favourable stand towards an industrial policy. The objectives 
of PITCE were: 
The Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy seeks, in 
the short run, to reduce the country’s external restrictions and, 
in the medium and long run, to equate the development of key-
activities, so that to generate capabilities that allow Brazil to raise its 
competitiveness in the international scenario (BRASIL 2003: 9–10).
Thus, the government sought to implement a policy that could 
provide support to the domestic production sector by means of the 
strategies presented earlier in this chapter. Many criticisms can be 
raised against this policy. However, the merit of the government 
in restoring the importance of the innovation policy is undeniable. 
Furthermore, such a policy spans several federal institutions, not 
restricting the issue to the Ministry of Science and Technology, as 
the former government had done. 
Some of the criticisms of the implementation of this policy, as 
observed by Koeller (2007), concern the difficulties faced in defining 
its guidelines, besides the problems of coordination that hindered 
its implementation. Laplane and Sarti (2006:  284) raise further 
criticisms: ‘Until the end of 2005, this process resulted in a quite 
comprehensive set of initiatives, at very different stages of planning 
and implementation. There was a huge prevalence of horizontal 
actions.’ 
The actions of PITCE were structured according to three axes: 
(a) Horizontal action lines
 (i) Innovation and technological development 
 (ii) International insertion
 (iii) Industrial modernisation
 (iv) Production capacity and scale
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(b) Strategic options 
 (i)  Semiconductors 
 (ii) Software 
 (iii) Capital goods 
 (iv) Pharmaceuticals and medicines 
(c) Activities with future perspectives 
 (i) Biotechnology 
 (ii) Nanotechnology 
 (iii) Biomass/renewable energies 
In spite of the establishment of action lines and the choice of 
strategic sectors and activities that bear future perspectives and that 
may contribute to the restructuring of the Brazilian production 
sector, PITCE did not set a governance structure or specific mecha-
nisms for its own operation. Its implementation was through the 
mechanisms created by MCT for operating the National Policy of 
Science, Technology and Innovation, particularly the public bids of 
the sectoral funds and the economic subvention. The overlapping 
of policies and the fact that these mechanisms were under the 
coordination of other institutions, not the MDIC, and thus also 
answered to other political priorities, hindered the implementation, 
the analysis and the monitoring of PITCE. 
Thus, the government of the period 2007–2010 instituted, in 
May 2008, the Policy for Production Development,  for facing the 
following challenges: to expand the supply capacity; to keep the 
robustness of the balance of payments; to enhance the innovation 
capacity; and to strengthen the micro and small enterprises (MSEs). 
For this purpose, the policy proposed four macro-goals:
Expansion of fixed investment: INVESTMENT/GDP — Goal 
for 2010: 21 per cent (R$ 620 billion). Situation in 2007: 17.6 per cent 
or R$ 450 billion. Average annual growth of 11.3 per cent between 
2008 and 2010.
Rise in private expenditures on R&D: PRIVATE R&D/GDP 
— Goal for 2010: 0.65 per cent (R$ 18.2 billion). Situation in 2005: 
0.51 per cent or R$ 11.9 billion. Average annual growth of 9.8 per 
cent between 2007 and 2010.
Expansion of exports: PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL 
EXPORTS —  Goal for 2010: 1.25 per cent (US$ 208.8 billion). 
Situation in 2007: 1.18 per cent or US$ 160.6 billion. Average annual 
growth of 9.1 per cent  between 2008 and 2010.
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Stimulation of MSEs: NUMBER OF EXPORTER MSEs — 
Goal for 2010: increase by 10 per cent in the number of exporter 
MSEs. Situation in 2006: 11,792 enterprises.
For doing this, the government defined 25 priority sectors that 
would be focused on in this policy. These economic sectors are 
divided into three main areas: programmes for advancing strategic 
areas; programmes for strengthening competitiveness; programmes 
for consolidating and enhancing leadership.
For each of these areas, the policy mechanisms available have 
been identified, and sorted out according to four types:
 (a) Incentive mechanisms: credit and financing, venture capital 
and fiscal incentives; 
 (b) Governmental purchasing power:    purchases by the 
government and by state companies; 
 (c) Regulatory mechanisms: technical, public health, economic, 
and competition regulation; 
 (d) Technical support: certification and metrology, trade 
promotion, management of intellectual property, business 
and human resources capacity building, intra-governmental 
coordination and liaison with the private sector. 
Most of these mechanisms of support to innovation already 
existed. The policy sought to organise such mechanisms according 
to the areas and sectors set as priorities, aiming at informing the 
enterprises, sharing responsibilities among the various institutions 
and coordinating the various instruments in support of those 
primary sectors and areas.
Furthermore, indicators for measuring the policy progress in 
each priority sector or area were identified and goals were set. This 
represents an advance regarding PITCE which did not establish 
goals. However, a more meticulous analysis of goals and challenges 
raises some doubts regarding the criteria that guided their definition: 
whether they were based on international parameters; whether 
the background of priority sectors and areas was considered (and, 
in this case, since a long time there were no specific policies, if 
adjustments were made accordingly to expected impacts by means 
of a coordinated use of policy instruments); whether analyses were 
carried out about the needs and the impacts of the advancement of 
these sectors and areas on the national innovation system; or whether 
the country’s development strategy was considered. No information 
was obtained during the elaboration of the present study that could 
allow the analysis of the criteria used for setting goals and priorities. 
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The implementation of the PDP began in May of 2008. Therefore, 
it is still too soon to evaluate its results. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to highlight some positive aspects, as well as some issues of concern. 
Among the positive aspects, we may cite the attention on the 
governance of the policy and on ‘sharing responsibilities’ among the 
various institutions responsible for its implementation.  
As for the issues of concern, two of them stand out: the first one 
regarding the high number of sectors and areas considered, besides 
the possibility of including new segments, as indicated by the policy 
statement itself. 
In terms of official documents, the policy proposal is based on a 
systemic vision of the production system, as it is clearly stated in the 
following guideline expressed in the PDP: Systemic Actions — with 
focus on factors that generate positive externalities for the whole 
production structure. That is, the idea that the actions undertaken 
have an impact on other areas of the production structure, besides 
being dependent, for their accomplishment, on many governmental 
agencies.
The policy formulation took into account the dialogue with 
other policy proposals available in ministries, as well as in some 
organisations of the civil society, such as: the Programme for the 
Acceleration of Growth (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, 
PAC), promoted by the federal government with the objective 
of overcoming the ‘bottlenecks’ of infrastructure; PACTI, the 
Action Plan for Science, Technology and Innovation launched by 
the Ministry of Science and Technology aiming at enabling the 
implementation of the National Policy of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, and that takes responsibility for coordinating some 
priority sectors and areas defined by the PDP; and policies of the 
Ministries of Labour and Employment (Ministério do Trabalho a 
Emprego,  MTE), the Ministry of Health (Ministério da Saúde, MS) 
and the Ministry of Education (Ministério da Educação, MEC); 
besides the attempt of liaising with the National Confederation of 
Industry (Confederação Nacional da Indústria, CNI), an institution 
of the civil society. 
In spite of the discourse, the excess of priorities, besides bringing 
risks of failure due to problems of operationalisation, seems to not 
ascribe much importance to the systemic character of the innovation 
process that would imply the choice for segments and economic 
activities capable of generating changes in the productive and 
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social structure of the country. The innovation policy must reflect, 
according to Gadelha (2001: 152), the ‘systemic character of the 
entrepreneurial environment and the specificity and diversity of the 
evolution patterns of industrial structures’.
The second matter of concern regards the mechanisms of the 
policy, that are the same as those created in former years. In this 
case, the worries refer not so much to the old instruments, but rather 
to the way in which they will be implemented, since many problems 
with implementation have already been identified in previous years. 
The liaison with other policies seems to be advancing insofar these 
are explicitly aimed at innovation. In other words, the connection 
of the PDP with PACTI seems to be working, since this policy 
has innovation as one of its objectives. However, in respect to the 
remaining policies, the liaison is apparently unsuccessful, as for 
instance with the Education Policy, coordinated by the Ministry of 
Education, through the Plan for Development of Education (PDE).
The Action Plan for Science, Technology and Innovation for 
National Development was designed by the MCT with the purpose 
of both consolidating the national system of science, technology and 
innovation (S, T & I) and expanding innovation within enterprises. 
The plan was formulated for the years 2007–2010 and has the 
following as its strategic priorities: expansion and consolidation 
of the National System of S, T & I; promotion of technological 
innovation in the enterprises; R, D & I in strategic areas; S, T & I for 
social development.
The priorities of the ministry are mainly focused on strengthening 
the national scientific infrastructure and on technological innovation, 
being based on the legal framework comprised by the already 
mentioned Law of the Goods and Law of Innovations. 
The main goals presented by PACTI for 2010 were the following:
Investment in R, D & I: 1.5  per cent GDP in R, D & I (1.02 per 
cent in 2006); 0.64 per cent federal government and 0.21 per cent 
state governments.
Innovation in the enterprises: 0.65  per cent of investments in R, 
D & I made by the private sector (0.51 per cent in 2006).
Training of human resources: 95,000 scholarships by CNPq; 
68,000 in 2006, with focus on engineering and other areas related to 
PITCE plus 65,000 scholarships by CAPES.
S & T for social development: 400 Vocational Technical Centres 
(Centros Vocacionais Tecnológicos); 600 new telecentros (community 
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centres for Internet access); OBMEP: 24 million students and 10,000 
scholarships.18
PACTI selected 13 strategic sectors which gain special attention 
within the policy regarding the development of R, D & I.19 However, 
conversely to the PDP, it does not set specific objectives, goals and 
mechanisms for each sector, showing the horizontal character of the 
policy. The chosen sectors also make part of PDP (although this 
latter has been formulated subsequently to PACTI), which expresses 
the beginning of integration between the various governmental 
departments explicitly related to the innovation policy. 
Similarly to PDP, the mechanisms and the legal framework used 
by PACTI for implementing its guidelines are: non-reimbursable 
resources (sectoral funds), financings, venture capital, economic 
subvention, fiscal incentives (Law of the Goods), human resources 
training and capacity building, law of innovation. Again, the criticism 
directed to these instruments is related rather to the way they are 
implemented and to the lack of coordination between them, than to 
the mechanisms themselves.
Implicit policies
In the Brazilian case, the social and economic contexts and the 
policies designed for these two domains of NSI assume a significant 
relevance either as obstacles or as opportunities for the development 
and the evolution of the NSI. 
As already discussed, the macroeconomic policy that characterised 
the Brazilian economic environment during the period under analysis 
— and the beginning of the 2003–2006 and 2007–2010 governments 
— became an obstacle to the implementation of the innovation 
policy, once it assumed the characteristics of what Coutinho (2005) 
called a pernicious macroeconomic regime.
This macroeconomic policy, characterised by the regime of 
inflation targets — whose current target is 4.5 per cent with a possible 
variation of two percentage points — adopted as its main instruments 
the interest rates, which were kept high during the whole period of 
analysis, and a regime of fluctuating exchange rates and restrictive 
fiscal policies, with strict goals fixed for primary surplus. 
In this context, Laplane and Sarti highlight (2006: 273) that: ‘As of 
2003, Lula Government has, on the one hand, effectively withdrawn 
the prevailing veto to an industrial policy, by implementing the 
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Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE); but, 
on the other hand, it kept the same regime of economic policy.’
What is emphasised by Laplane and Sarti is exactly the fact 
that Brazil was able to propose an industrial policy after two 
decades of banning, which, for being inserted within a pernicious 
macroeconomic regime, can hardly reach favourable results. The 
reason is that the high interest rates discourage investments, imposing 
negative effects also on the investments in innovation activities.
Furthermore, the regime of fluctuating exchange rates has 
occasionally over-appreciated exchange rates, stimulating imports 
to the detriment of the domestic production sector. This movement 
creates a vicious circle insofar as the lack of investments in innovative 
activities leads to losing competitiveness, thus increasing the stimulus 
to imports, particularly of goods with greater value added and of 
more intensive technology. Consequently, it leaves to the domestic 
production sector the production of commodities and of goods and 
services of lesser value added and less intensive in technology. In 
brief, it jeopardises the production restructuring required for social 
and economic development. 
The restrictive fiscal policy has significantly reduced investments 
by the federal government, thus hindering investments with 
infrastructure which became bottlenecks to production. This policy 
reduced the budget available to ministries for policy implementation, 
by allocating the resources as contingency reserves, thus affecting 
also the budgets aimed at the innovation policy.
Such a policy resulted in a slowdown of GDP real growth rates, 
with a reduction in GDP real growth rate, from 2.7 per cent in 2002, 
to 1.10 per cent in 2003; returning to growth in 2004, with a rate 
of 5.70 per cent, fostered especially by a favourable international 
context, as we may see in Table 2.8.
In the Brazilian case, the macroeconomic policy, seen as an 
implicit policy, became one of the main obstacles to the evolution 
and growth of the national innovation system. Thus, conditions were 
placed for the reproduction of an asymmetric system that hampers 
the integration of the innovation policy with the other policies. 
The reason was the choice in favour of a restrictive macroeconomic 
policy as of 1994, which has as its main adjustment variables the 
interest rates and the exchange rates.  
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The option for this macroeconomic policy, which subsumes a 
neoliberal perspective, prevented the adoption of a development 
policy and hindered the adoption and implementation of a broad 
innovation policy — that is, one that would embody the advances of 
the systemic vision. Therefore, it restricted this policy to a narrow 
vision about the NSI — defined as explicit innovation policy.
Table 2.8: Real Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Inflation 
Rate (IPCA), Interest Rates, 2001–2008
Period
GDP: Real Growth 
Rate (% p.a.)
IPCA: Extended 
Consumer Price Index 
Growth Rate (% p.a.)
Interest Rate  
(TJLP % p.a.)
2001 1.30 7.67 9.5
2002 2.70 12.53 9.9
2003 1.10 9.30 11.5
2004 5.70 7.60 9.8
2005 3.16 5.69 9.8
2006 3.97 3.14 7.9
2007 6.09 4.46 6.2
2008 5.16 5.90 6.1
2009 –0.64 4.31 6.0
2010 7.49 5.91 5.9
Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) website, http://www.
sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/cnt/default.asp?z=t&o=15&i=P (accessed 25 October 
2011). Authors’ elaboration; and BNDES website, http://www.bndes.gov.
br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt. (accessed 1 November 2011). Authors’ 
elaboration.
Note: References for GDP values: for 1995–2006, National Accounts System 
Reference 2000 (IBGE/SCN 2000 Anual); for 2009 and 2010, preliminary 
results estimated from Quarterly National Accounts Reference 2000.
From 2003 on, with particular emphasis on 2004 and 2005, the 
domestic market began to get stronger, mainly because of the social 
development policy established by the government, whose main 
programme was the Bolsa Familia (Poor Family Support Pension). 
The establishment of ‘Bolsa Família’ was specifically addressed to 
the Brazilian social context, characterised by deep income inequalities, 
which also reflect the significant regional and intra-regional 
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disparities. In 2009, Brazil presented a GDP of US$ 1,998,985 billion 
(in dollars PPP) and a per capita GDP of US$ 10,344.22 (in dollars 
PPP). Even so, there were 39.6 million poor people and 13.4 million 
indigents in 2009 in Brazil.20 The heterogeneous social structure, 
with strong income concentration, affects the patterns of demand 
and consumption. Existing regional differences and disparities of 
purchasing power result in a broad heterogeneity in the national 
pattern of demand, thus affecting the production structure. 
The production structure often presents, within the same plant, 
distinct production methods, in order to comply with different 
consumption patterns. In order to break up these differences that 
allow reproduction of the underdevelopment process, it will be 
necessary to set policies, among which should be those of income 
transfer, aiming at including population into the market.   
These policies can be regarded as opportunities for producing the 
required changes in the productive structure, if they are integrated 
to a policy of social and economic development. They should have 
innovation as one of their main guidelines, being therefore integrated 
also to the innovation policy. As for this latter, it should not be 
restricted to technological innovation, but rather should also consider 
other kinds of innovations such as organisational, in processes, etc., 
thus incorporating the systemic vision of the innovation policy.  
‘Bolsa Família’,  the federal government’s programme aimed at 
income transfer, assumes a key role for the enhancement of domestic 
demand. According to the Ministry of Social Development and 
Food Security: 
Family Pension Programme (FPP) is a programme for direct transfer 
of income with conditionalities that benefit families in situation of 
poverty (monthly per capita income between R$ 60.01 and R$ 120.00) 
and in situation of extreme poverty (monthly per capita income below 
R$ 60.00), in conformity with Law 10836, of 9 January, 2004 and the 
Act no. 5209 of 17 December, 2004.21 
The programme establishes the following conditions for families 
to access the benefits: Families with monthly per capita income of 
up to R$ 137.00 appropriately registered in the Unified Register 
of Social Programmes (CadÚnico) are entitled to benefit from the 
Family Pension Programme.22
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Table 2.9: Evolution of Benefits of RGPS, BPC and ‘Bolsa Família’ (Poor 
Families Pension), 2000–2007 (Million Benefits/ Families)
























- - - 3.6 6.6 8.7 10.9 11.0 10.5 12.3 12.8
Source: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management website, http://www.
planejamento.gov.br (accessed 1 November 2011). Ministry of Social 
Development and Fight against Hunger website, http://www.mds.gov.br 
(accessed 1 November 2011). Ministry of Social Security website, http://
www.mpas.gov.br (accessed 1 November 2011). Authors’ elaboration.
Note: More than 60 per cent of these benefits had values equal to one minimum 
wage.
 (1) Issued benefit.
 (2) Does not include Life Monthly Pension (Renda Mensal Vitalícia, RMV).
 (3) Family supported.
The programme has been effectively improving the purchasing/
consumption power of lower income families, thus impacting even 
the country’s structure of income distribution. The Gini Index for 
Brazil, of 0.54 in 2009, has presented a positive, although slow, 
evolution towards income de-concentration.
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Thus, policies for social inclusion play a very important role in 
the formation of the Brazilian system of innovation. Social policies 
are not restricted to income transfer; health and education policies, 
for instance, are also important for the formation of the NIS.
The NIS also comprises the sub-system of capacity building, 
which integrates the scientific, technological and educational 
perspectives. This sub-system is fundamental for the NSI, being 
included both by the broad definition of NSI and by its strict 
concept. The capacity and capabilities of the agents in the economy 
depend to a large extent on their education level. The assimilation, 
learning and use of knowledge as input to innovation depend on 
these characteristics of the agents. When the agents present better 
qualifications, at the levels of both basic and higher education, the 
learning process becomes easier in view of their enhanced capacity 
for assimilating and disseminating new knowledge.    
Based on this diagnosis, the federal government, through the 
Ministry of Education, developed the Plan for Development of 
Education (PDE). The programme can be organised according 
to four main lines: basic education, higher education, vocational 
education, and literacy.   
PDE was formulated based on a systemic concept, where the 
various territorial and social dimensions are taken into account for 
the implementation of the programme. Therefore, the territorial 
and the educational matters are interconnected through the notion 
of educational arrangement. It can be said that the programme is 
founded on the following assumptions: (a) systemic vision of 
education, (b) territoriality, (c) development, (d) collaborative 
regime, (e) accountability and (f) social mobilisation.  
These assumptions are meant to support the elaboration of 
a programme that seeks to reduce educational disparities in the 
country and, thus, intends to reduce social and territorial inequalities. 
The idea of a systemic model is helpful insofar as it does not isolate 
the various education levels. Furthermore, it connects education to 
territorial and development matters and highlights its potentiality 
to contribute to social matters and equity in the country. Thus, 
it is sought to build an education system that is connected to the 
multiplicities prevailing in the country.
Despite the appropriate discourse to meet the country needs, the 
PDE is still very recent for evaluating its results. The programme was 
launched in 2007, and its implementation was gradual throughout the 
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country and was only completed, according to the original schedule, 
at the end of 2010.
Nevertheless, the main indicator available for monitoring the 
PDE is the Index of the Basic Education Development (Índice de 
Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica, IDEB) — which is based on 
two major national assessments — School Census and Evaluation 
System of Basic Education (SAEB). This indicator is biannual and 
the latest available data, for 2009, demonstrate compliance with the 
targets set for this year.
Outcomes of State Policy and State 
Institutions on the NSI
There is a great deal of difficulty for assessing the outcomes resulting 
from the innovation policy and the efforts by federal government 
institutions responsible for its implementation in the period 2003–
10. Such difficulty stems from the complexity in identifying and 
detaching the causality relation between innovative advances in the 
production sector and explicit and implicit policies.
Still, the impact of implicit policies, especially the macroeconomic 
policy, on the NSI is evident. This policy reflected on an economic 
environment unfavourable to investments, because of high interest 
rates and overestimated exchange rates that were adopted in this 
period. 
On the other hand, the analysis of the goals of explicit policies 
becomes restricted to the goals of the government policies in the 
period 2006–2010, since the governmental policies of 2003–2006 
— the PITCE and the National Policy of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (PNCTI) — did not define goals and indicators for 
evaluation. This means that the goals and indicators set for the PDP 
specially its macro objectives and PACTI will be considered.  
Before analysing the compliance with the goals in 2010 — the 
target date of the policies — it is worth highlighting that almost 
all of them are input goals. That is, they refer to expenditures in 
R&D, investments, infrastructure building or scholarship grants, 
except for the goals related to exports that refer to outcomes such 
as participation in global exports. Specifically regarding  innovation, 
the main goal refers to both rise in participation of R&D private 
investments and rise in investments in R&D in relation to the GDP. 
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The systemic vision of the innovative process is neglected, once 
innovation is associated exclusively to R&D and the policy fails to 
recognise that the learning process, the main tool of innovation, 
may occur through varied forms. Besides the systemic vision, the 
characteristics of the national production system and of the social 
structure also seem to be ignored. The existing heterogeneity, distinct 
characteristics of consumption, income concentration, and regional 
disparities that would lead to further measures, to other kinds of 
‘efforts’ and, consequently, goals, were not taken into account.
Thus, the Action Plan is limited to a small sphere of action 
possibilities. In no moment was it sought to strengthen the learning 
process and knowledge building in enterprises, so that they would 
be able to improve their innovative capacity. The intangible factors 
of the enterprises gain no prominence in the policy of the ministry. 
In a society where tacit knowledge is relevant for innovation, 
policy should contain mechanisms and tools aimed at its main 
input (knowledge). Furthermore, in restricting innovation to the 
technological feature it reduces the possibilities of action a great deal. 
Although the arguments point to the lack of indicators able to 
provide responses to the systemic vision, and this is why the goals 
are still linked to traditional indicators, the counter-argument is that, 
in fact, the proposed measures are still based on a linear vision of 
the innovation process and the goals and indicators only reflect this 
reality.
As to the progress towards goals, the current situation of 
indicators proposed by the two policies PACTI and PDP which 
together represent the explicit innovation policy in force, can be 
summarised as follows:
Action Plan on Science, Technology and Innovation for 
National Development — PACTI23
• Investment in R, D & I/GDP (%): 1.5 per cent GDP on R, D 
& I in relation to GDP (1.02 per cent in 2006),  0.64 per cent 
federal   governments and 0.21 per cent state governments — 
according to the Ministry of Science and Technology, in 2010 
the indicator was 1.16  per cent (preliminary data).
• Innovation in firms: 0.65 per cent of investment in R, D & I 
made by the private sector (0.51 per cent in 2006) — according 
to the Ministry of Science and Technology, in 2010 the 
indicator was 0.55 per cent (preliminary data).
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• Formation  of  human  resources:  95,000 scholarships by CNPq; 
68,000 in 2006, focus on engineering and other areas related to 
PITCE, and 65,000 by CAPES — according to the Ministry 
of Science and Technology, the indicator for 2009 was 70,601.
Policy for Production Development — PDP24
• Expansion of fixed Investment: INVESTMENT/GDP — 
Goal for 2010: 21 per cent. Situation in 2007: 17.6 per cent 
— According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics, the indicator was 18.4 per cent in 2010.
• Rise of the private expenditures in R&D: PRIVATE R&D /
GDP — Goal for 2010: 0.65 per cent (R$ 18.2 billion). Situation 
in 2005: 0.51 per cent or R$ 11.9 billion — according to the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, in 2010 the indicator was 
0.55 per cent (preliminary data).
• Expansion of exports: Participation in Global Exports — 
Goal for 2010: 1.25 per cent. Situation in 2007: 1.18 per cent. 
According to the Brazilian Central Bank it was 1.36 per cent in 
2010.
As already emphasised, there are 25 sectors that should be served 
by the PDP. The aim is to establish a policy for strengthening these 
sectors, by means of a horizontal policy. Thus, these macro objectives 
permeate such sectors, which gain special attention in order for the 
goals to be reached. The instruments applied in the implementation 
of these macro objectives, as detailed earlier, are: accelerated 
depreciation, funds for emerging enterprises, FINEP resources (R$ 
6 billion between 2008 and 2010 — under responsibility of BNDES). 
The data indicate that the goals of investments in R&D were not 
reached as much considering expenditures in the country as a whole, 
as taking into consideration only the expenditures by the enterprises. 
In spite of a growing trend of these indicators, such growth proved 
to be slow. The proposed investment goals also presented a growing 
trend and the exports goal was reached. It is worth stressing that 
exports had a significant increment due to increases in of both 
demand and prices of commodities in the global market. It does not 
necessarily mean that such increment resulted from the PDP. The 
two indicators, as well as the indicators of investments in R&D, are 
subject to international conditions, which have been unfavourable 
since 2008 (particularly following the second half of the year). 
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Conclusions and Recommendations Targeting 
Improvements in the NSI with Specific 
Emphasis on the Role of the State  
The role of the state in the Brazilian innovation system was crucial 
for the formation of a scientific and technological infrastructure 
as well as for the industrialisation of the country. In recent years, 
particularly from 1999 on, the federal government has assumed a 
pro-innovation stand by designing and implementing a specific 
policy for promoting innovation.
As discussed in this study, the explicit innovation policy adopted 
in the period 1999–2002 was still restricted to the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, and was opposed to the macroeconomic policy 
then in force. Only after 2003 has this policy been incorporated 
by other ministries, particularly by the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign Trade. Even so, as it was discussed here, the 
general guidelines remain the same in both periods. 
Although this policy has targeted the enterprises, its evaluation 
suggests that the mechanisms and instruments created for promoting 
innovation within enterprises have some characteristics that hinder 
the advance of NSI. Among them, some stand out:
 (a) a bias towards technological innovation, prioritising the 
mechanisms for support to research and development, to the 
detriment of other important innovative activities — thus 
ignoring (or neglecting) the heterogeneity of the production 
structure, which entails distinct levels of capacity.
 (b) a focus on partnership relations between enterprises and 
scientific and technological institutions, which makes the 
integration of the other agents participating in the innovation 
process difficult.
 (c) implementation forms still based on a linear model of 
innovation. 
In 2007 and 2008, further changes were made in the policy: 
new guidelines were designed and priority sectors and areas were 
selected. The governance structure of the policy was modified, but, 
at the same time, there was the maintenance of old instruments 
and mechanisms, although proposing a connection between them. 
The already discussed establishment of goals for this new policy 
indicates a progress, since in the former policy there were practically 
no short-term goals. Even so, these goals raised concerns regarding 
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the implementation of such instruments and mechanisms, since 
they were expressing a linear vision about the innovation process. 
They possibly only were reflecting the lack of more appropriate 
indicators, pointing out the need for investments by the policy in 
the formulation of new indicators. However, a concern remained as 
to whether the goals would only be expressing the lack of audacity 
by the explicit policy of innovation.  
From the perspective of the implicit innovation policy, the 
conclusion is that the linear vision hinders the liaison between the 
explicit policy and the other policies. Particularly in the Brazilian 
case, three implicit policies are noteworthy: the macroeconomic, 
the educational and that of social development. The analysis 
demonstrates that the need for integration surpasses the matter of 
‘taking advantage of opportunities’. Non-integration became an 
obstacle to the explicit policy of innovation, preventing or hindering 
the accomplishment of outcomes. Moreover, the evaluation 
indicates that integration between policies is crucial for the social 
and economic development of the country.
On 2 August 2011 the ‘Plano Brasil Maior’ (Brazilian Major Plan) 
was launched, establishing industrial policy, technology, services, 
and foreign trade of the federal government for the period 2011–2014. 
The new policy sets out some changes in the legal framework for 
innovation among which are public procurement and the protection 
of domestic industry. Despite these changes, it is too early to assess 
the implementation and results of this policy.
ª
Notes
 1. The period before 2006, particularly 1995 to 2006, was the subject of 
the first report of the BRICS Project. 
 2. The model of industrialisation adopted had the structuralist approach 
as its fundamental framework, with special emphasis on the ideas of 
the Brazilian economist Celso Furtado who proposed by that time the 
idea of ‘embedded technology’ (or technical base) in the production 
structure. In the debate of the 1960s the Latin America structuralist 
school pointed out the need to adapt technologies, which would later 
be called internalisation of technical advance.    
 3. After the first impact of economic liberalisation, ad hoc regimes 
were adopted protecting those segments with major weight — either 
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economic or political — for example, the automotive regime, which 
protected the automobile industry, and the protection to the textile 
sector.  
 4. See, for instance, Pereira (2005).
 5. In considering expenditures with research, development and innovation 
by ministry, the study opted for ministries that are not sectoral, given 
the difficulties for identifying such expenses in sectoral ministries. 
Furthermore, previous data surveys have shown that in most sectoral 
ministries such expenditures were not significant.  
 6. The analysis was based on information available on the websites of the 
ministries and related departments. In these sources, we looked for 
identifying programmes, actions and instruments that made explicit 
reference to the innovation policy. In addition, information on budget 
execution was organised for these ministries and departments, in some 
cases for specific programmes, for the whole period of the analysis, 
including the estimates for 2009. Again, it is worth recalling that the 
former period (1995–2005) makes up part of the first report of BRICS 
Project.
 7. As mentioned before, the innovation policy of the period 1995–2006 
was discussed in the previous report of BRICS Project.
 8. According to the concept of innovation policy used in this study. 
 9. See ‘Uma Visão Geral’, Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, Secretaria 
de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico. Brasília, 2006 and ‘Relatório 
de atividades 1999, Diretrizes para 2000’, Ministério da Ciência e 
Tecnologia, Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Tecnológico. Brasília, 
dezembro 1999; and ‘A Política Brasileira para a Inovação na Década 
dos 1990s’, mimeo.
 10. According to MCT, the Law of Goods (Law no. 11.196, of 21 Novem-
ber 2005), in its Section III, automatically authorises the use of fiscal 
incentives by the juristic persons that accomplish technological 
research and development of technological innovation. Among 
these incentives, it’s possible to highlight income tax deductions for 
expenditures with R&D activities, which may reach a value of up to 
twice the expenditures of the firm. The other incentives are: income 
tax deduction, reduction of tax on industrialised products, accelerated 
depreciation of equipments, accelerated repayment, credit of income 
tax withheld at source on money remittance to other countries for 
payment of royalties; reduction to zero of the rate of income tax 
withheld at source in money remittances to other countries. All these 
incentives are bound to the implementation of R&D activities. 
 11. The masters’ and doctorate education is very important for a country. 
Policies for preparing researchers should not be discontinued. 
However, this should not be the only way for implementing a policy 
for scholarship granting if the aim of the policy is to induce innovation 
in the production sector.
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 12. See Table C in the Annexure. 
 13. FINEP’s website http://www.finep.gov.br/pagina.asp?pag=30.80.30 
(accessed 15 May 2009).
 14. In the Brazilian legislation, fiscal incentives are granted only to firms 
that declare actual rather than projected profits for purposes of 
corporate income tax.
 15. MDIC’s website http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/
interna.php?area=2&menu=300 (accessed 12 May 2009).
 16. There was a structural break in series between 2007 and 2008 due to 
change in the National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) 
which was launched in the version 2.0 following the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) 
rev. 4. Therefore, it is not recommended to compare for the whole 
period since 1996.
 17. Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA), created by 
OECD; The System for Assessment of Basic Education (Sistema de 
Avaliação da Educação Básica, SAEB) of MEC; among others.
 18. Brazilian Mathematics Olympiad of Public Schools.
 19. Areas bearing future possibilities: biotechnology and nanotechnology, 
information and communication technologies, health products, 
biofuels,  electricity, hydrogen and renewable energies, petroleum, 
gas and mineral coal, agribusiness, biodiversity and natural resources, 
Amazonia and semi-arid,  meteorology and climate changes, spatial 
programme, nuclear programme, national defence and public security.
 20. The lines of extreme poverty or indigence shown on Ipeadata are 
estimated based on a methodology developed by the commission 
IBGE-IPEA-CEPAL that defined a list of basic needs foods which 
satisfy the nutrition requirements for each Brazilian region. From the 
information about the total amount of calories per day, the amount 
consumed and the unit price, the expenditure was calculated for each 
product and its sum, resulting in the line of extreme poverty per person. 
The line of poverty is defined as twice the line of extreme poverty. 
(Ipeadata, http://www.ipeadata.gov.br. The Ipeadata site is provided 
and managed by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea), 
Brazil. According to the site Ipeadata, it is committed to providing high 
quality information from reliable data sources).
 21. See the website of the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against 
Hunger, http://www.mds.gov.br/ (accessed 29 October 2009).
 22. The family income is calculated by adding the monthly incomes of all 
individuals of the household (such as wages and retirement pensions). 
This value must be divided by the number of people who live in the 
household, thus resulting in the per capita income of the family. 
 23. The other indicators are not available yet.
 24. The other indicators are not available yet.
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Annexure
Table A2.1: MDIC Programmes Related to Innovation
Programme Action/Instrument  Methods of Operation 
Incentive to 
innovation within firm
Related to computing of net 
profit, actual profit and tax on the 
net profit
Tax incentives Tax on industrialized products 
— IPI
Accelerated depreciation
Income tax withheld at source














Centre-west, north and northeast 
Incentives for 
industries of 
hardware  and 
automation
Other regions of the country




Project in cooperation 

















Source: MDIC website, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio (accessed 1 
November 2011). Authors’ elaboration.
Table A2.2: BNDES Programmes Aimed at Innovation
Innovation
Innovative Capital  Line
Technological Innovation  Line
Technological Fund — FUNTEC
CRIATEC Programme
Industry
Programme for Support to the Implementation of the Brazilian System of 
Terrestrial Digital TV — PROTVD
Programme for Financing to Enterprises from the Brazilian Aeronautical 
Production Chain — PRO-AERONÁUTICA
Programme for Support to the Development of the Health Industrial Complex — 
PROFARMA
Programme for the Development of Software and Information Technology 
Services Industry — PROSOFT
Source: BNDES website, http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt 
(accessed 1 November 2011). Authors’ elaboration.
(Cont.)
Table A2.3: Brazil: Legal Framework of Innovation Policy
Laws Main Objective
1993 — Law 8.661 Created tax incentives to foster enhancement of 
the technological capacity of manufacturing and 
agricultural enterprises taking part in one of the 
programmes: Programme for Industry Technological 
Development (PDTI) and Programme for 
Agricultural Technological Development (PDTA).
1997 — Law 9.532 Reduced the tax incentives established by Law 
8.661/93, by approximately 50%.
2000 — Law 10.168 Created a tax: Tax on Intervention in the Economic 
Field,  Contribuição de Intervenção do Domínio 
Econômico (CIDE), to finance the programme 
Programa de Estímulo à Interação Universidade-
Empresa para o Apoio à Inovação. 
2001 — Law 10.332 Re-established the tax incentives created by Law 
8.661/93. Also instituted the grant for enterprises 
taking part in the PDTI or PDTA, and mechanisms 
for subsidising interest rates. 
During the period 
1999–2002, 12 sectoral 
funds were created 
Provided support for the development of R&D 
projects in partnership between scientific and 
technological institutions and enterprises. The 
funds related to the following sectors: petroleum 
and natural gas, energy, water resources, transport, 
mineral resources, aerospace, telecommunications, 
information technology, health, aeronautics, 
biotechnology and agribusiness. There were also the 
Verde-Amarelo funds, Amazon Fund, and funds for 
infrastructure.
2004 — Law of 
Innovation Law 10.973
Aimed at promoting interaction between scientific 
and technological institutions of the federal 
government and enterprises. This law also created 
new tax incentives for the innovative process within 
firms, establishing a grant for enterprises taking 
part in a project under the Fundo Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (FNDCT).
2004 creation of two 
further sectoral funds
Related to the naval and coastal sector and to 
the Amazonian area; aimed at developing new 
technologies and stimulating the innovative process.
2005 — Lei do Bem — 
Law 11.196
Also related to tax incentives for technological 
innovation. This law replaced Law No 10.637 
(2002) and its main instruments are: tax exemption, 
accelerated depreciation and the possibility of grants
(Cont.)
Laws Main Objective
for researchers and graduates (masters and doctors). 
The difference between this new law and the former 
is that the mechanisms for tax incentives became 
automatic; previously, it was necessary to participate 
in the PDTI or the PDTA.
Source: Presidência da República website, http://www4.planalto.gov.br/legislacao/
legislacao-1/leis-ordinarias (accessed 1 November 2011). Authors’ elaboration.
Table A2.4: Brazil: Total Scholarships in the Country and Abroad Granted 
by Federal Agencies 1997–2008
In the Country Abroad









1997 37.4 34.9 13.3 21.6 2.480 1.1 1.4
1998 35.0 32.9 11.7 21.1 2.140 791 1.3
1999 32.9 31.0 11.2 19.8 1.855 596 1.3
2000 32.0 30.3 11.5 18.7 1.772 562 1.2
2001 37.2 34.4 12.0 22.4 2.794 716 2.1
2002 38.1 35.1 11.8 23.3 2.955 744 2.2
2003 39.7 36.8 12.3 24.5 2.859 460 2.4
2004 41.9 38.9 13.6 25.3 3.003 499 2.5
2005 44.2 40.9 14.8 26.1 3.297 403 2.9
2006 48.6 45.0 16.1 28.9 3.578 347 3.2
2007 52.1 48.4 16.8 31.5 3.740 487 3.2
2008 62.6 58.9 17.9 41.0 3.740 526 3.2
Source: MCT (Ministry of Science and Technology) website, http://www.mct.
gov.br/index.php/content/view/2050/_b__i_Bolsas_de_formacao_e_
pesquisa_b__i_.html  (accessed 1 November 2011). Authors’ elaboration.
(Cont.)




Russian history is full of contradictions in the evolution of its 
innovation system, its state policy and its position in the world.1 
Russia as a successor of the USSR is known for its contribution to 
global science and technology (S&T). During its long history the 
basic elements of science and an innovation system were put in place 
under political and economic objectives which led to the acceleration 
of S&T to serve military requirements and industrialisation. 
Intensive investment was made in R&D facilities and equipment, 
and it became possible to carry out research in the most important 
scientific areas. As a result, the very specific — but at the global 
cutting edge — S&T sector and national system of innovation (NSI) 
were created (Gokhberg 2003). 
In the USSR the government was spending about 4 per cent of the 
country’s budget on R&D. In certain years total R&D expenditures 
amounted to 3 per cent of the GDP. According to official statistics, 
even in 1990 (the last and not the best year in the history of the 
USSR) 2 per cent of the GDP was allocated to support the R&D 
sector. ‘Science and related services’ employed about 4 million people 
(including almost 1 million researchers); the share of researchers in 
the economically active population was one of the highest in the 
world — more than 200 R&D personnel per 10,000 employed.2 
Though R&D potential during that period was mainly concentrated 
in a few major R&D centres, an active regional policy was pursued. 
All large regions (the Soviet republics) had academies of science, 
universities, big R&D centres, informational centres, etc. 
Advanced research, cutting-edge technologies, innovations have 
radically changed the way of life the world over, and continue to do 
so. Many experts agree that losing the pace of S&T development was 
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one of the main reasons leading to the collapse of the USSR. Here 
we refer specifically to the relationship between science, the NSI 
as a whole and the state. This covers the organisation, management 
and the support for S&T development. It concerns the efficiency of 
mechanisms for the reproduction and use of R&D potential and the 
application of R&D results in the economy. 
Against the background of the overall stagnation of the Soviet 
economy, its painful inability to adopt and implement R&D 
results and new technologies, the opportunities to mobilise 
additional resources required to sustain a high S&T level began to 
shrink. One might think that in a planned economy it should not 
be a problem to create optimal conditions for regulating the S&T 
and innovation activities sphere but this was not the case. Due to 
predominating centralised management, the conditions for pursuing 
an S&T and innovation policy were extremely adverse. In reality 
nothing except direct government intervention into the activities of 
specific research institutes or enterprises encouraged S&T progress. 
Indirect motivation and promotion of S&T and innovation activities 
practically haven’t been used at all. 
Immediately after the collapse of the USSR the S&T complex 
faced a systems crisis, and some of its consequences still haven’t 
been overcome yet. According to official statistics, gross domestic 
R&D expenditures (GERD) just in 1990–1995 dropped by four 
times (in constant prices); federal budget allocations (FBA) on R&D 
dropped five times; the number of R&D personnel two times.3  
Despite the subsequent improvement, by 2009 GERD had increased 
to just 75 per cent of the 1991 level (and to just half of the 1990 
figures). R&D expenditures as a share of GDP in 2009 amounted 
to 1.24 per cent (2005–2006 — 1.07, 2007 — 1.12, 2008 — 1.04 per 
cent); expenditures per researcher were $40.1 thousand (several 
times less than in many developed countries).4 The S&T potential 
is still unevenly distributed across the country’s territory (in certain 
respects the situation became even worse). In 2009, 21 per cent of all 
R&D organisations were located in the city of Moscow (and almost 
28 per cent of them in Moscow together with the Moscow region), 
with a further 10 per cent in St Petersburg. 
Practically until the disintegration of the USSR and even a few 
years afterwards, its system of innovation existed in narrow scientific-
technological space. Scientific results and innovations were created 
and introduced (as a rule) on the basis of the centralised decisions of 
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the government, and in the areas connected to the state’s interests. 
Note that the term ‘national system of innovation’ was never used in 
the USSR, and the actual NSI was not considered worthy of research 
or of a special government policy.5 Only during the last years of the 
painful transformations of the economy, the state and society, has a 
comprehension of a key role of innovations, and the necessities of a 
wider understanding of NSI as a system of national institutes been 
emerging. 
The wide understanding of innovation and the new approach to 
NSI have been fixed in key documents of a state policy only in the 
beginning of the current century. Most of them were adopted by the 
government of the Russian Federation. Among them were  the basic 
direction of the Russian Federation’s policy on S&T development 
until 2010 and subsequent period (2002), R&D and Innovation 
Development Strategy in the Russian Federation until 2015 (2006) 
and the Ministry of Education and Science  (MES) basic report ‘The 
Development of Innovation System of Russian Federation’ (2008) 
documents. 
The position detailed in these documents are consolidated and 
widened in the main official initiative at the current stage (2008) — 
‘Conception of a Long-Term Development until 2020’ (CLTD 2020).6  
This document reflects the world trend connected with increased 
importance of long-term socio-economic and S&T development 
priorities, affected both by global trends and limitations and national 
specificities and potential. International experience suggests that 
understanding these trends and taking them into account when 
developing national policies is necessary to select adequate policy 
tools which would allow the implementation of national concepts 
and priorities in the environment of open economy and international 
competition. The importance of speeding up the country’s ‘leap’ 
becomes even more apparent against the background of the global 
financial crisis and its manifestation in the Russian Federation. 
All segments of the NSI and all economic actors feel an urgent need 
for a systematic representation of the country’s R&D and innovation 
system, as well as an improvement of appropriate government 
policies. This is due to the fact that all of them feel the pressure of a 
whole host of legal, administrative, financial, and other limitations 
and barriers which hinder their efficient operation and hamper the 
economy’s transition to innovation-driven development, which, in 
turn, are the strategic objectives of the country’s development policy. 
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A major result of the CLTD (including the long-term forecast 
of socio-economic and S&T development prepared in the course of 
this work) and other documents is the consensus arrived at by the 
society and economic community regarding the unquestionable need 
to shift the national economy from heavy reliance on raw material 
exports to innovation-driven, socially oriented development. 
Note also another aspect important in the context of the study. 
In effect for the first time in Russia, the Concept documents use the 
modern definition of NSI which comprises the following: 
 (a) interlinked structures engaged in production and/or 
commercial exploitation of knowledge and technologies 
and; 
 (b) a set of legal, financial and social institutes which ensure 
interaction of educational, R&D, entrepreneurial and non-
profit organisations in all spheres of the economy and social 
sector. 
For example, CLTD 2020 is based on three main elements: 
• Policy framework — the conception brings together the key 
policy directions and establishes connections between NSI 
development policies and other spheres: education system 
development, progress of high-tech sectors, environment 
protection strategies, health system development, regional 
development strategies, etc. 
• ‘Roadmap’ for reforms — this component of the CLTD 2020 
sets out the structure of each direction as well as a basic plan 
of action. For NSI it is represented by six initiatives including 
development of human resources for innovation, infrastructure 
support, stimulation of demand for innovation, and others. 
For the first time in the history of Russia this document 
confirms the invariance of its transition to an innovative model 
of development and submits the restrictions, opportunities and 
directions of this transition so much in detail. 
• Target indicators — a statistical tool for tracking the main 
macro effects to monitor the progress of the reforms. There are 
several indicators proposed to refer to the NSI development 
goal: GERD-to-GDP ratio, labour productivity, share and 
other indicators for the high-tech industries, etc. Some of them 
can be seen in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: The Key CLTD Target Indicators for NSI Development
(%) 2007 2020
GERD to GDP ratio 1.12 2.7
Labour productivity growth rates 6–7 9–10
Share of high-tech sectors in value added 10.9 17–19
Share of high-tech products exports in the world’s total 0.3 2.0
Share of innovative products in total sales 5.5 25–35
Share of industrial enterprises engaged in technological 
innovation
13.3 40–50
VA of innovation sector to GDP 10–11 17–20
 Source: GRF (2008a).  
In spite of the inevitable adjustment of the indicators presented in 
the table — and of the other target CLTD 2020 indicators — due 
to the effects of the global financial and economic crisis, in the long 
term the suggested ways and means to ensure sustainable increase of 
the population’s standard of life, improve national security, achieve 
dynamic growth of the national economy, secure a better position 
on the global arena should remain valid and develop further. 
Russia’s political leaders repeatedly made statements to this effect, 
speaking about plans to sustain the level of support to R&D and 
high-technology sectors. 
Evaluation of the Current Form of State and 
Its Position in Relation to NSI
In the USSR (and in Czarist Russia before 1917) R&D was developed 
as a government sub-system, and concentrated in government-
owned structures such as institutes and universities. In terms of 
the scale of the S&T complex, the USSR was quite comparable 
with the USA but its development was accompanied by numerous 
ambiguous and controversial phenomena which ultimately eroded 
that positioning. In 1989 the Soviet R&D sector comprised more 
than 4.6 thousand organisations including research institutes, design 
bureaus, higher education institutions, and enterprises. It employed 
over 4 million people, or almost 4 per cent of the national workforce. 
Fourteen out of every thousand workers were researchers (Centre 
for Science Research and Statistics 1992). 
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During that time the scientific community and the society 
generally became convinced that universal, comprehensive 
government support (funding, planning, supervision, etc.) was 
natural and necessary. Until about the late 1970s scientists and 
university teachers received sufficiently high (by Soviet standards) 
salaries and their professions enjoyed a high prestige in society. 
Then the situation deteriorated dramatically. 
The combination of two key factors — reliance on permanent 
patronage by the government and gradual worsening of the majority 
of the researchers’ material situation — partially explains why a 
proportion of the scientific community, a rather appreciable one, 
did not accept the liberal market reforms of the early 1990s. Up to a 
point this attitude is still there. For example, a study of researchers’ 
opinions regarding the current state of the R&D sphere and efficiency 
of various government policies suggests that about 50 per cent of the 
scientists still remain quite sceptical about the prospects of a national 
system of science and those of their own career development. Among 
the least appreciated government initiatives are those on privatisation 
and incorporation of R&D organisations, the limitation of their 
business activities (as part of downsizing and restructuring of the 
public R&D sector) and other institutional changes.7 
In any country society’s needs are met, economic potential grows 
and national security is achieved through development of the S&T 
sphere. During the 1980s, when the efficiency of the Soviet S&T 
complex was obviously declining, according to the then president 
of the USSR Academy of Science, G. Marchuk, in 40 per cent of the 
400 priority S&T development areas Soviet scientists were either the 
leaders or on par with the top world level. In other areas the lag was 
apparent. In 1980–1988 the share of R&D results which were better 
than the top world level dropped from 9 to 4 per cent, and of those 
on par with it from 34 to 22 per cent (Avdulov and Kulkin 1996; 
Scientific–Technical Progress in the USSR 1990). 
After the disintegration of the USSR when wide ranging reforms 
including privatisation and market liberalisation were being 
undertaken, the Russian economy and the Russian state changed 
dramatically. The state became more democratic; market institutes, 
elements of a civil society (which are not always accepted ‘canonical’ 
forms) gradually began to develop. All this occurred in a background 
of economic crisis — deep contraction of output with GDP as well as 
industry output declining by roughly 50 per cent (1990–1995). The 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transition to a market economy 
radically affected the inherited national S&T system. 
However, the reforms of the S&T system and other sectors of the 
Russian economy were much different in terms of speed and depth, 
in favour of the latter. 
These developments prompted the government to turn to 
international experience. Modern mechanisms for supporting the 
S&T and innovation sphere attracted a lot of attention, though not 
per se but rather in the context of an open (or not so open) contest 
of the two systems — socialist and capitalist. The Soviet leaders had 
to admit that some of the Western countries had more advanced 
S&T potential, developed more efficient mechanisms for application 
of R&D results to production, and that their governments were 
more successful in encouraging research and innovation activities. 
Analysis of international experience revealed not just factors due 
to the differences between the economic systems but also certain 
significant socially neutral elements of S&T organisation, a sensible 
combination of direct and indirect management and promotion 
techniques.8 Attempts to develop and implement similar components 
under the ‘brand name’ of ‘self-financing R&D sector’ were made in 
the USSR and then in Russia after the mid-1980s. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the situation in the S&T sphere 
started to develop along a worst-case scenario. The share of internal 
R&D expenditures dropped to 0.7–0.8 per cent of the GDP, and 
then for several years remained under 1 per cent — a typical level 
for countries which practically do not develop (or do not have at all) 
their own S&T potential. The radical transition to market economy 
affected all sectors of the economy and all spheres of social life, and 
the effects had profoundly different scales and sometimes different 
directions as well. Due to a very large number of reasons (identified 
in the course of this study), the R&D sector was among those which 
have been largely negatively affected by the market reforms and 
their consequences. 
If market reforms of the overall Russian economy were generally 
implemented during the 1990s, in the R&D sphere this process still 
remains unfinished. Accordingly, if in the overall economy in the 
2000s only 3.3 per cent of organisations and enterprises were publicly 
owned, the appropriate figure for the R&D sector was over 70 per 
cent (Rosstat 2008: 349; HSE 2011a: 28). As owner of the major 
share of the R&D sector’s property and in effect the only solvent 
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customer of R&D products, the state (on behalf of the government) 
could have implemented a tough ‘top down’ reform in this sphere at 
the very beginning of the market reforms period. That was the case 
in almost all Eastern European and Baltic countries. However, due 
to various reasons a different way was chosen — allowing the R&D 
sphere to self-adapt to the new environment.
Table 3.2: R&D Institutions by Ownership (percentage)* 
2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total = 100% 4099 3906 3656 3566 3622 3957 3666 3537
Public 71.6 72.1 73.2 73.8 73.2 71.3 74.1 75.1
Federal 67.2 67.7 69.0 69.6 69.2 67.0 69.9 70.8
Voluntary Associations 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7
Private 9.5 11.7 11.5 11.8 13.9 16.1 13.9 13.4
Joint**  15.5 13.5 12.8 11.8 10.3 9.7 9.4 8.8
Private and Joint, Total 25.5 25.2 24.3 23.6 24.2 25.8 23.3 22.2
Joint*** 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.57 1.1 1.1
Source: HSE (2009a); HSE (2011a).
Note: * Municipally-owned and cooperative organisations are not listed due to 
their very small number (in 2009 there were 14 and three such organisations, 
respectively).
 ** Without foreign participation.
 *** With Russian and foreign participation.
Analysis of the data in Table 3.2 makes the failure of this strategy 
quite evident. The data clearly shows that during practically the 
whole period of reforms privately owned R&D organisations did 
not have opportunities, motivation or prospects for successful 
development. Rare examples of corporate science’s success rather 
confirm than refute this argument. The non-profit private R&D 
sector in Russia is even weaker. About 1 per cent organisations 
brand themselves as private non-profit institutions in this sector. As 
a rule most of them are financial mediators, which are not engaged 
in research in practice. 
The S&T system which developed under the Soviet ‘rules’ had 
three special characteristics: it was very large, centrally directed 
and government-financed (Kiseleva et al. 1991; Kuznetsova 1992). 
These features were ill-suited to a market economy and it was not 
surprising that the system of S&T underwent a system crisis and 
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posterior deep stagnation. In principle, the same could be said about 
a wider sphere than the S&T complex — the NSI. 
The period of 1999 to the middle of 2008 may be considered as 
a period of stability and socio-economic recovery. However, this 
growth was not based on real labour productivity or innovation. 
The Russian science sector and the NSI are still mostly inefficient. 
There is a striking imbalance between resources devoted to research 
activities (carried out mostly in government institutions outside 
of the higher education sector and industry) and the innovation 
performance. 
A specific feature of the Russian situation is the fact that the 
government’s influence over R&D and the NSI was predominant 
under both the ‘totalitarian Soviet regime’ and in democratic Russia, 
as well as during various crises and periods of economic growth. In 
the early stages of the reform it was believed that restructuring the 
R&D sector would be impossible without overcoming the negative 
heritage of the USSR — namely the highly militarised, government-
controlled nature of this sphere, weak links with the international 
scientific community, and insufficient connections with innovation, 
industry and education. The result of the 20-year period of reform is 
paradoxical — a lot of good things inherited from the Soviet era were 
abandoned and rejected while the ‘Soviet’ R&D model’s features 
that the reformers were set to transform still largely remain in place. 
Here are three examples to illustrate the point: 
 (a) Shares of R&D organisations controlled by various 
government agencies (including state academies of science) 
have changed, but the approach to the management of 
science is still based on the same government supervision 
principle. Government agencies provide more than 50 per 
cent of R&D funding — just like they did 15–20 years 
ago. Approximately 13 per cent of all R&D spending was 
provided for the basic support of the Russian Academy of 
Science’s institutes. 
   The share of funding allocated through tenders is growing 
slowly. For example,  only 15–16 per cent of total R&D 
expenditures were allocated through target programmes. 
This figure includes the inflow from public R&D 
foundations also.9 In total these foundations allocate about 7 
per cent of civil R&D expenditures. About 2 per cent more 
came in grants (to support young and outstanding scientists, 
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scientific schools, etc.). Of course, in the federal budget the 
share of funding allocated through tenders is much higher, 
at about 37 per cent. 
   Furthermore, this approach is quite likely to become even 
more pronounced.10  The evidence of that is the invariably 
high share of public funds in the R&D expenditures (65.5 per 
cent in 2009); the predominant share of research institutes 
among the R&D (53.1 per cent), and of academic institutes 
in the public R&D sector (almost 70 per cent). Another 
proof is the results of modernisation of the academic sector 
(more truly — the absence of evident results) and creation 
of large government-owned S&T corporations (see later). 
Public administration’s efforts to coordinate initiatives in 
the S&T and innovation sphere in most cases amount to just 
‘declarations of intent’. 
 (b) The R&D sphere in the USSR was indeed highly militarised, 
and the reasons of that are well-known. Before the collapse 
of the USSR domestic science began to lag behind other 
countries in many civilian areas which determine the modern 
S&T ‘image’ of the world. However, drastic reduction 
of government military orders in the 1990s can hardly be 
seen as a good solution to the problem. Damage was done 
not just to the military but to civilian R&D as well as to all 
innovation and technological chains and networks. Some of 
the enterprises which were vital for the country’s economic 
and geopolitical interests have been closed down. Moreover, 
military products and technologies happened to be one of 
the few things Russia could ‘boast’ of in the international 
markets. 
   Today Russia remains a country with a high military 
potential, and, obviously, to support it, it should develop 
military R&D. Despite the substantial losses suffered by the 
sector the chances of its future expansion remain rather high. 
 (c) Despite substantial efforts to promote innovation activities 
(see later), real changes are very slow to materialise. At first 
(in the beginning of 1990) the progress was hindered by 
objective factors — the long period of recession and low 
demand for locally produced innovations from industry. 
Today the situation is gradually changing. Enterprises, R&D 
organisations, research centres, higher education institutes 
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all feel the need for joint innovation activities. However, 
the laws on the promotion and support of S&T and the 
innovation sphere are incomplete, insufficiently thorough, 
or are poorly enforced. 
Accordingly, only a small share of Russian enterprises 
• are engaged in innovation activities (near 3,000 or 9.4 per cent 
from the total in 2009); 
• produce innovation products (appropriate output amounts to 
just 5.5 per cent of the total output of industrial enterprises 
engaged in innovation activities); 
• participate in networks and cooperation. The share of 
industrial enterprises participating in joint R&D projects (on 
a regular basis) in the total number of enterprises engaged 
in technological innovations is 33.2 per cent; the share of 
enterprises which are buying new technologies is 37 per cent; 
transferring new technologies, 3 per cent; using feedback 
information from consumers of their products, 11 per cent. 
Twenty-seven per cent of technological innovations conducted 
by industrial enterprises are based on R&D; 7.2 per cent are achieved 
through industrial design, and less than 1.5 per cent through 
acquisition of new technologies. A major share of total expenditures 
on technology (51.2 per cent) is spent on the acquisition of machinery 
and equipment. 
Public R&D organisations and higher education institutes still 
have problems with setting up small enterprises to transfer their 
R&D results and technologies to the real economy, with securing 
and exploiting intellectual property rights, and undertaking joint 
projects with industrial enterprises. Lots of small enterprises have 
to go through the same ‘sieve’ of tax returns and tax inspections as 
large companies (which can afford to hire numerous accountants, 
financiers and planners). However, the tax regime for them is 
extremely volatile.
Succession between the USSR and Russia in the S&T sphere and 
the NSI on the one hand increased the stability of the new ‘object’ 
— the Russian S&T sector — even in the situation of the very hard 
transition crisis of the 1990s. On the other hand, conservation of the 
archaic organisation and support system had significantly hindered 
the reform of the S&T sector to suit the needs of market economy. 
Today the Russian S&T sector is structured mostly in the same way 
as it was 20 or 30 years ago. In effect we’re talking about the same 
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segments of the S&T network — academic research institutes, higher 
education institutions and their associated R&D organisations, R&D 
divisions of industrial enterprises. The difference is that in today’s 
Russia they operate in a market environment, and include a small 
number of newly emerged privately owned organisations. 
It can be argued that today the fate of Russian R&D and NSI still 
remains in the hands of the government. In recent years this position 
was considered unfashionable and absolutely irrelevant by a lot of 
Russian liberal experts and officials. However, it is reflected in many 
government decisions, in the orders (instructions) of the president 
of the Russian Federation to the Russian government, ministries 
and various agencies. In particular these orders concern creation 
of large national (public) research centres and research universities; 
adoption of joint funding and cooperation mechanisms between 
public and private sectors to finance innovation projects; creation 
of a favourable tax environment for R&D and innovation activities; 
development of the ‘territories’ favourable for innovation, etc. 
In spite of the necessary (and inevitably promoted by the very 
‘rules’ of a market economy) trend towards reduced government 
participation in various spheres of socio-economic activities, in reality 
the role of the state is still very high in any country. The innovation 
activities of business being supported by the state, is a key factor of 
the country’s competitiveness and sustainable economic growth. In 
today’s Russia the government has sufficient resources (as well as 
adequate power) to sustain and develop the S&T potential, and to 
increase its contribution to achieving national objectives. 
Periodisation and analysis of institutions and policies 
of the state concerned with innovation 
The evolution of Russian S&T and innovation policies post-USSR 
can be divided into four main stages for convenience. 
The first one was a period of ‘marker romanticism’ in the early 
1990s, driven by the vain hopes of reformers for quick and automatic 
transfer to a market economy. However, these high initial plans 
were not met. Multiple mistakes in planning the market reforms and 
corresponding actions resulted in a deep systemic crisis within the 
Russian NSI — the dramatic funding fall, the shedding of human 
resources, the disbanding of scientific organisations during the first 
wave of privatisation. The consequences of this crisis have not been 
overcome even now. 
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In the next stage (‘market formalism’, the middle and end of 
1990s) the S&T sphere fell into deep stagnation. Formally, it was 
subjected to the same market transformation as all other sectors of 
the economy, but the real shifts here were lagging far behind the 
overall economic reforms. Government initiatives were reduced to 
urgent measures to slow down the definitive disintegration of the 
S&T complex. 
In the early 2000s, during the third period (the stage of ‘market 
pragmatism’) important strategic decisions were outlined for the 
future or were just started. Practical actions were planned and 
carried out mainly based on the criteria of economic expediency and 
budgetary savings. However, the strategy of postponing decisions 
for national science and NSI resulted in serious risks and narrow 
focus on the short and medium-term programmes and projects at the 
expense of long-term ones. 
The fourth stage, lasting from the mid-2000s to the present 
day, is characterised by a complex set of measures adopted by the 
government. Their key aim is the transition towards an innovative 
model of national economy. All measures of the current period 
can be divided into three groups. The first one is the creation of a 
structured NSI policy framework. The second is the implementation 
of the policy mechanisms for efficient regulation in the main 
areas of government activity: national priorities, performance-
based budgeting, restructuring the government R&D sector, 
human resources and infrastructure development, etc. During that 
period yet another cycle of programme development actions took 
place, producing documents describing a platform and the main 
development areas — for the medium and long (10 years) terms. The 
last one is a complex period of anti-crisis and post-crisis activities.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide some quantitative data describing 
Russia’s development during these periods, based on official 
statistics. They show that during the period of reforms the Russian 
R&D sphere became one of the areas negatively affected by the 
market transformation of the economy. The evidence is well-known 
— the unprecedented decline of funding and of the number of 
R&D personnel (until the mid-1990s), worsening of the ‘scientific 
climate’ and environment in which R&D organisations operated, 
deterioration of material basis and the country’s position in 
international high-technology markets.
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Development trends of an economy in transition are quite 
different from the laws of a developed market. In any country going 
through a transitional period the government must increase targeted 
impact in certain areas, take over some medium- and long-term 
obligations. In that sense the Russian situation in the 1990s can hardly 
be considered unique. Since the level of government interference 
was traditionally quite large in this country, transformation of the 
science and education sphere would probably have been painful 
even without the crisis. The ‘revision’ of the traditional national 
priorities, the government’s refusal to carry on with many of its 
previous obligations led to corrosion of the previous motivation 
factors (the defence interests, prestige, etc.). In effect, at the initial 
stage of the reform period science and innovation have been excluded 
from the list of strategic priorities, which later on has been judged 
the reformers’ very grave error. Consequences of these decisions are 
still being felt in Russia (Kuznetsova and Kitova 2003). 
Table 3.3: Main Development Indicators of the S&T Complex, 1990–1999 
(The First and Second Periods)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1* 10.9 7.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.9
2 2.0 1.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
3  25.8** 11.2** 9.9** 6.3** 5.03** 4.3** 6.02** 1.8 1.9
4  – 1.85** 0.94** 0.91** 0.66** 0.24** 0.6** 0.8** 0.24 0.24
5 258 227 213 186 162 160 150 144 134 136
6  –  –  – 32.2 23.1 22.2 23.2 20.0 21.4 24.7
7  –  –  – 27.8 40.3 31.6 33.6 46.0 23.8 19.52
8  –  –  –  –  –  –  –  – –19.9 – 283.2
9 4646 4564 4555 4269 3968 4059 4122 4137 4019 4089
10 449 400 340 299 276 325 342 299 240 289
Source: HSE (2007);  HSE (2009a). 
Note: * 1: Gross Domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) at constant 1989 prices 
(billion roubles); 2: GERD as a percentage of GDP; 3: Federal Budget 
Appropriations (FBA) on civil S&T at constant 1991 prices (million 
roubles); 4: FBA on civil S&T as a percentage of GDP; 5: R&D personnel 
per 10,000 employment; 6: patent applications by resident applicants in 
Russia (thousands); 7: patents granted (thousands); 8: technology balance 
of payments (million US dollars); 9: R&D institutions; 10: among them 
industrial enterprises. 
** Total Federal Budget Appropriations on S&T at constant 1991 prices (million 
roubles) as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 3.4: Main Development Indicators of the S&T Complex, 2000–2006 
(The Third and Fourth Periods) 
2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
1*  3.3 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.6 5.5 6.1
2  1.05 1.18 1.25 1.07 1.08 1.12 1.04 1.24
3 2.0 2.35 2.65 4.16 4.54 5.5 5.7 7.5
4 0.23 0.26 0,28 0.36 0.36 0.4 0.6 0.5
5 138 136 133 122 122 135 128 126
6 28.7 30.0 29.2 32.3 37.7 39.4 41.9 38.6
7 17.6 16.3 18.1 23.4 23.3 23.0 28.8 34.8
8 20.6 –153.8 –361.0 –564.8 –595.0 –796.0 –1254.0 –1001.0
9 4099 4037 3906 3566 3622 3957 3666 3536
10 284 288 255 231 255 265 255 265
Source: HSE (2009a); HSE (2011a).
Note: * 1: GERD at constant 1989 prices (billion roubles); 2: GERD as a percentage of 
GDP; 3: FBA on civil S&T at constant 1991 prices (billion roubles); 4: FBA on 
civil S&T as a percentage of GDP; 5: R&D personnel per 10,000 employment; 
6: patent applications with the indication of Russia in Russia (thousands); 7: 
patents granted (thousands); 8: technology balance of payments (million US 
dollars); 9: R&D institutions; 10: among them industrial enterprises. 
During the first and second stages the development of the R&D 
sphere was irregular and controversial, mostly due to problems 
with public funding. The allocated resources and the reaction of the 
sphere in general didn’t match the declared objectives. At the same 
time reduction even of the small amount of funding promised by the 
government became common practice. 
Despite the crisis, important documents have been developed 
during that period, summarising the experience of the first years 
of reforms and defining key principles and approaches to the 
management of science. These include The Doctrine of Russian 
Science Development (1996), the federal law ‘On Science and the 
State S&T Policy’ (1996), The Concept of Reforming Russian Science 
in 1998–2000 (1998). A large amount of work was undertaken to 
implement previously non-existent forms, mechanisms and relations 
determining the model of science adequate for a market economy.11  
All this has been done in a uniquely short space of time. For the 
first time in Russian history documents were published to define 
objectives and areas of the national S&T policy; a legal framework 
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for international S&T cooperation was developed; attempts to 
restructure academies of science were made. 
By the mid-1990s the management model for the Russian R&D 
sphere started to look similar to the models used by other developed 
countries (formally, in terms of principles and approaches adopted). 
However, its practical implementation was inconsequential and 
contradictory. Accordingly, the actual effect of even the most 
progressive ideas did not match the expectations and the S&T 
sector’s contribution to the nation’s development in terms of 
the emergence of a modern NSI seemed incomparable to its true 
potential. The R&D sphere’s social rating dropped, and the public 
perception of its role in the country’s development became more 
sceptical. The public image of ‘science falling to pieces’ in itself was a 
serious barrier hindering implementation of the reforms (Shuvalova 
2007). The stratification of the academic community became more 
pronounced, the level of their social and political activity dropped. 
In effect it amounted to the lobbying of interests of specific groups, 
projects, programmes representing group or personal interests. 
After 2000 Russian government policy became more oriented 
towards promoting innovation and sustainable economic develop-
ment. The favourable market situation and macroeconomic and 
political stability allowed the development and implementation 
of a wide range of measures to put together a modern NSI and 
support high-technology sectors of the economy. The ultimate 
goal of these steps was defined as technological modernisation of 
industry, exploitation of national competitive advantages (including 
the R&D potential) to increase the population’s standard of life, 
competitiveness and national security. 
It is not easy to identify the precise boundaries of this period due 
to the  beginning of the world crisis (in the end of 2008) and the real 
perspective of its continuation (the second wave). Thus the start of 
the fifth period for Russian R&D is more than uncertain. 
Specificities of the system of innovation in the 
country and its relationship with the state 
Despite the high rate of economic growth achieved in the 2000s 
— regarding many indicators reflecting development levels and 
prospects — Russia is not catching up with the world leaders (see 
Table 3.5). Low (compared with other developed countries) levels 
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of such indicators as R&D expenditure calculated as share of GDP, 
scientists’ publication activity, innovation activities of enterprises, 
remained practically unchanged throughout the period of market 
reforms, including the years of economic growth. Due to a host 
of objective reasons (very often external to R&D, innovation and 
even production spheres) companies still are not really interested 
in the intellectual component of the innovation process. Within 
the structure of technological expenditures the accent is placed on 
acquisition of machinery and equipment, in most cases foreign-
made. Successful R&D organisations have to work increasingly for 
foreign companies and international organisations. Higher education 
institutes are still regarded as non-serious players in the innovation 
sphere.
Table 3.5: Parameters of Productivity: Loss of Competitive Positions 
(International Comparisons)* 
Indicators Russia vs. Some Other Countries
Publication in world scientific journals 
(publication activity)
Russia: 1.8, 16th position in the world 
(1995 – 7, 1980 – 3)
 China: 15.1, 2nd position (1995 – 1.6, 14 
position)
Technology export Russia: 0.6 bln $, Austria: 7.3 bln $, 
USA: 89.1 bln $
Patents applications by resident 
applicant
Russia is lagging behind Japan 9 times, 
USA 11, Korea 4 times
Share in the world hi-tech market Russia: 0.3%
Singapore, Korea, Taiwan: 4–8%
Innovative activity of enterprises Russia: 9.4%
 EU: from 24% (Latvia) to 80% 
(Germany)
Share of innovative products in total 
sales of industrial products
Russia: 1.93%
Germany: 2.18, Finland: 2.76, Sweden: 
3.18%
Share of innovative products (new to 
the market or new to an enterprise) in 
total products of industry 
Russia: 2.5% 
Germany: 25.5, Finland: 23.7, France: 
20.7%
Source: HSE (2011a); HSE (2011b); HSE (2011c).
Note: * Russia: 2009; other countries: 2007–2009. 
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Most of the Russian industries remain technologically obsolete 
while the overall economy still has a serious structural misbalance — 
which makes its position in the international markets very vulnerable 
and unstable. The national economy is largely based on mining, 
processing and exporting fuel, and a few traditional manufacturing 
sectors (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6: Certain Characteristics of the Russian Economy 





Mining Whole sale 
and Retail 
Trade
Share in the total num-
ber of enterprises and 
organisations (%)
4.0 (-) 8.3 (-) 0.4 (+) 37.1 (-)
Share in the total turn-
over of all enterprises 
and organisations (%)
1.5 21.7 7.1 42.0
Industrial production 
index 
88.7 111.8 108.2 104.5
Share in the total  
output (%)
4.2 24.6 7.1 15.8
Share in the total added 
value (%)
4.4 14.5 8.9 18.1
Productivity growth  89.3 109.0 101.3 98.5
Share in total exports 2.3 (+)* 5.7 (+)** 68.8*** (-) -
Share in total imports 15.9 (-) 44.5 (-) 2.6 (-) -
Source: Rosstat (2011:  38,  313, 315, 345, 346, 354, 371, 411, 511, 713, 766).
Note: «+» –  Growth in the last 2–3 years; «–» – decline in the last 4–5 years 
 *  Food stuffs and agricultural materials 
 ** Machinery, equipment and vehicles 
 ***  Only minerals 
So far there are no major technological breakthroughs achieved 
by Russian industry, nor significant implementation of R&D 
results which are typical to any innovative economy. Innovations 
hardly affect Russian economy. At the same time innovation 
activities are hindered by various barriers engendered by the overall 
macroeconomic context and the institutional environment. The 
low level of the latter is evident in all industries, and in all kinds of 
innovation activities — technological, organisational and marketing 
innovations. 
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The potential to achieve dynamic, sustainable and innovative 
economic growth is limited, on the one hand, by the very weak 
interest the Russian business sector displays in technological and 
non-technological innovations alike, and on the other by insufficient 
productivity of Russian science, lack of a critical mass of innovative 
projects attractive to investors. Factors such as an insufficiently 
developed competitive environment and lack of motivation for 
enterprises to develop and implement new technologies, should 
certainly be taken into account too. 
Some data in support of these conclusions has been included 
in Table 3.5. For a deeper understanding of Russia’s ‘innovation 
paradox’, we provide a few additional estimates:12  
• In 1995–2009, the number of organisations engaged in 
technological innovations has doubled (from 1,363 to 
2,761), but in the last two–three years it remained practically 
unchanged. In 2009 the number of organisations engaged 
in all types of innovation activities in industry was 2,682, in 
manufacturing 2,256 and in the service sector, 644.13 
• Innovation activities are different in various industries. On the 
aggregate level, minimum innovation activities (for all types 
of innovations) are registered in mining (approximately 7 per 
cent) and maximum in manufacturing (12–13 per cent). 
• It is a well-known fact that innovation activities largely 
depend on the specialty and technological level of production. 
In Russian high-technology industries, the overall level of 
innovation activity amounts to about 30 per cent, in medium-
technology industries to 13–20 per cent and in low-tech 
industries to 2–11 per cent. 
• In high-tech service sectors (communications, ICT) this figure 
reaches 10–15 per cent, but the overall innovation activity level 
in the service sectors remains low. 
• A vast majority of innovative enterprises and organisations 
(86.5 per cent) belong to the manufacturing industry, in 
particular, production of food, machinery and equipment, 
electrical equipment, medical equipment and instrumentation, 
radio, TV and communication equipment, etc. 
• Large, economically sound organisations with sufficient 
financial, human and intellectual resources are the most active 
in the innovations field. Half of the industrial enterprises 
engaged in technological innovations employ a staff of more 
than 500. 
Russia y 99
• The share of small enterprises engaged in technological 
innovations varies around 4 per cent. The most active are 
small enterprises manufacturing medical equipment and 
instrumentation, pharmaceuticals and computer hardware. 
The current S&T development in Russia is still affected by 
rather conflicting trends. On the one hand, the government R&D 
funding is growing (FBA on civilian R&D in 2004–2009 grew by 
2.45 times in real prices). About 34.6 per cent of the government 
funds are allocated to support basic research. Financial support of 
R&D through contracts, programmes and tenders has also grown. 
The number of researchers (369,000, 49 per cent of R&D personnel 
in 2009) has nearly stabilised: the rate of its reduction was within 
1 per cent from 2003. The number of people employed by private 
research institutions is increasing (29 per cent increase since 2000). 
However, the level of government support still lags behind the 
world’s economic leaders. Evidence of that is provided by certain 
financial indicators given in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
Table 3.7: The Role of the State in R&D (Some Statistical Indicators) 
Funding Organisations Personnel and Fixed 
Assets
FBA on civil R&D: 
2.23% of federal budget 
expenditures (2009)
FBA on civil R&D: 
0.56% of GDP (2009)
Government 
contribution as source of 
R&D funding: 66.5%
75.1% of R&D 
organisations are owned 
and established by federal 
and regional governments
GERD by ownership of 
R&D institutions (public 
ownership): 74.3%
 78.9% of R&D personnel 
work in government 
organisations (federal and 
regional)
86.9% of R&D fixed 
assets are public
Source: HSE (2011a). 
On the other hand the stagnation in the S&T sector is evident. It 
stems from both insufficient demand for and underdeveloped 
supply of R&D and technologies. Private business does not show 
much interest in innovation. Since 2000 the innovation activity has 
remained at the level of 9–10 per cent.14  The EU economies’ figures 
are significantly higher. Investment in innovation is considered 
by private businesses to be more risky and less profitable than 
investment in mining and quarrying activities. Demand for R&D 
comes mostly from the government, and the federal budget remains 
the key source of R&D funding (in 1998–2007 it grew threefold in 
real prices). 
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As it has already been mentioned, on the national economy level, 
the overall effect of R&D and innovation activities is almost invisible. 
Only high-technology sectors show progress. Unfortunately, their 
success — relatively higher levels of innovation activity and effe-
ctiveness — so far has been unable to change the ‘state of affairs’ 
of innovation in the Russian economy, and this effect is limited 
by the number of working enterprises, number of staff and the 
actual output. Advanced tools to support and encourage R&D and 
innovation activities, create innovative infrastructure, upgrade and 
adjust development institutions, are not used to their full potential in 
Russia; their conceptual, methodological, organisational, legislative, 
and law enforcement support is fragmentary, incomplete and 
occasionally even controversial in nature. 
Table 3.8: Expenditures: A Little to Invest, a Little to Receive? 
(R&D Funding in Russia) 
Positive Trends
Increase of GERD 1998–2009 — more than 19 times 




Russia*: 23 bln $ (2009) Far from USA (7 times 
lower), but very close 
to Germany and Japan; 
more than in France and 
in Great Britain
Negative Trends
Russia Other Countries 
(2007–2009)
GERD as a Per cent of 
GDP
Russia: 1.07% (2006), 
1.12% (2007), 1.04% 
(2008), 1.24% (2009)
Israel: 4.77%; Japan: 
3.44%; USA: 2.79%; 
China: 1.54%
GERD (PPP) Russia: 23.0 bln $ (2009) 15 times lower than in 
USA; 6 than in Japan; 5 
than in China; 1.5 than in 
Britain
Source: HSE (2011a); HSE (2011b); HSE (2011c).
Note: Russia: Civil R&D. 
Due to the fact that the organisation and management of R&D and 
innovation activities (including reliance on government support) still 
retain a number of specific features, there are the following short- 
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and medium-term risks: 
• further reduction of entrepreneurs’ demand for R&D products; 
weakening of cooperative interdisciplinary links throughout 
the whole R&D and innovation cycle; 
• limitations hampering efficient development of knowledge-
generation environment may remain in place (regarding 
all kinds of resources and periods of time); the range and 
development level of scientific results may deteriorate; 
• reduced level (quality) of staff training and retraining for 
innovation-driven economy (science, education, high-
technology sectors); 
• reduced appeal of the NSI for international contacts and 
cooperation; 
• reduced quality and effectiveness of R&D, lower novelty level 
of Russian innovation; 
• further slowdown of innovation activities; 
• reduced range (and shares) of non-government funding 
sources, increased pressure on the federal budget. 
Analysis of the latest science and innovation policy documents 
creates an impression of structural wholeness and completeness, on 
par with the best international practices. The wording of their general 
provisions and principles corresponds with the approaches adopted in 
developed countries. However, the progress regarding their further, 
more detailed development (objectives, techniques, mechanisms) is 
quite slow. Many support measures still and inevitably include an 
excessively large element of direct financial support (mostly from 
the federal budget). Measures to promote research and innovation, 
develop infrastructure, modernise development institutions are not 
fully implemented. 
It is obvious that S&T and innovation in Russia as well as in other 
developed countries are based on a rather complex relationship 
between those who provide knowledge, those who control and 
regulate this process, and those who apply the results. Taking 
account of negative factors hampering innovation activities in Russia, 
the primary fields for government S&T and innovation intervention 
may be listed as follows: 
 (a) promotion of technology transfer (protection of intellectual 
property rights, building innovation infrastructure, organi-
sational innovation, etc.); 
 (b) creating a favourable environment for S&T and innovation 
activities, direct support to S&T; 
102 y tatiana KuznetSova
 (c) development of public–private partnership (PPP) (cooperat-
ion), motivating of private business to co-fund and 
participate in projects initiated by the government; 
 (d) promotion of innovation activity and improvement of 
innovation climate (support to efficient innovators, creation 
of a competitive environment, improving legislation); 
 (e) increasing level of professional education, for example, in 
the field of innovation management; 
 (f) ensuring the prospects of the long-term sustainable 
technological development. 
The practices of developed countries prove that all efforts to 
create these as well as other frameworks to work out relevant 
transformation schemes and procedures (including the fundamental 
reforms of the government S&T sector) appear to be even more 
effective than direct budget subsidies to S&T activities. In any case 
this effectiveness depends on adequacy of goals, real substance and 
the scale of the government’s initiatives. 
For example, we can examine the appearance in Russia of the 
system of various foundations for S&T support that were created 
in the middle of the 1990s. On the one hand, these (rather new for 
Russian practice) institutional initiatives in fact are based on the 
government (direct or indirect) subsidies. On the other hand, the 
spreading in Russia of the idea of competitive support to scientific 
teams has already played a noticeable role in promoting scientific 
activities. 
The practical measures provided by the government on 
reorganisation of national science and NSI during the last 15 years 
did not always have a positive effect. They had not resulted in deep 
science integration into market economy and increasing impact on 
the social and economical progress. As a result, many parts of NSI 
nowadays still retain the features left from the centralised economy, 
while relevant and efficient policies are lacking. Changes in the 
situation will strongly depend on the success of measures aimed 
at improving the overall business environment, the stability of the 
economy, and the rule of law. 
Today, we can assert that in Russia some success can be observed 
mostly within the groups of policy agenda mentioned earlier under 
(a) and (b). Some positive shifts exist within integration of science 
and education, creation of research universities, introduction of 
courses for the training of skilled managers for high-tech sectors etc. 
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(group of policy actions under [e]). For the other mentioned issues 
the Russian government does not so far demonstrate a deep interest 
in a real improvement of the innovation process. The modest success 
of S&T and innovation policy (and even the collapse of some parts 
of it) is to a certain extent determined by the lack of coordination 
between different elements of such policy, between government 
bodies dealing with S&T and innovation issues, etc. 
In general, specific actions in the areas described in groups (c)–(f) are 
planned as part of the CLTD 2020 strategy (as well as other strategic 
documents mentioned earlier). Their implementation started in 2009 
and is continuing at present. Implementation of government policies 
described in the Long-Term Development Concept will ultimately 
allow dealing with the main systems problem of the Russian S&T 
complex — inefficient use of resources allocated to the R&D sector 
combined with insufficient demand for innovations by businesses. 
This should lead to increased quality and supply of domestic R&D 
products and technologies, and increased demand by the real sector 
of the economy for technologies and innovations. 
Explicit and implicit state policy towards science, 
technology and innovation 
Effectiveness of the Russian S&T and innovation government policy 
is largely determined by the fact that Russia needs to deal with a 
whole host of problems immediately — those connected with the 
generation of new ideas, their transformation into high technologies 
and finally, production of actual goods and services. Constraints 
hindering acceleration of these processes take place at both ends: 
among customers and suppliers of R&D products (Gokhberg and 
Kuznetsova 2010a; Gokhberg and Kuznetsova 2010b). 
In the USSR the national S&T policy was shaped under very strict 
ideological control, and in the situation of an appreciably closed 
S&T sphere. Creative freedom was allowed and even encouraged 
(especially in natural sciences, engineering and technology), but 
the opportunities for research, exchange of ideas and results were 
either a priori limited or could be made so at any time due to some 
ideological consideration or an official’s whim. Academic mobility 
of scientists was almost not encouraged at all, though as early as the 
1970s it was accepted the world over as a major factor and a sign of 
innovation-based economies. 
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After the collapse of the USSR the ideological limits and the closed 
nature of the S&T sector were overcome quite easily, maybe even 
too easily, from the point of view of sustaining the S&T complex and 
the national security. Abandoning the management and behavioural 
stereotypes which affected the country’s social, economic and 
political development and life of its citizens, had turned out to be 
much more difficult. In effect the S&T sphere in Russia was (and 
still is) incorporated into the non-manufacturing sector and funded 
out of the state budget, mainly according to the leftover (‘residual’) 
principle and the ‘achieved level’ of appropriations. Thus, in the 
years of prosperity, rather significant public funds are channelled 
into this sphere, in effect without any analysis of these expenditures’ 
efficiency. In the periods of crisis or stagnation the S&T sector is 
the first candidate for reduced government support. Usually the 
cuts are applied equally to all relevant budget articles, again without 
analysing the efficiency of appropriate recipients and the results they 
produce. 
A negative effect of such an approach is the risk that the S&T 
potential’s structure might deteriorate. The larger, traditional areas 
(and established R&D structures) get increasingly bigger government 
appropriations while many of the new, breakthrough S&T areas do 
not receive adequate funding. In this section we’ll show how the 
Russian government is trying to deal with these negative effects. 
However, advancing in the right direction is turning out to be very 
difficult to achieve. 
Overcoming the industrial approach to management of the R&D 
sphere also appears to be hard. The lengthy period of extensive 
development of the Soviet R&D sector allowed many of the ministries 
and government agencies to set up and maintain their own networks 
of R&D organisations, funded out of the government budget but 
working mostly to satisfy the needs of specific appropriate industries. 
Departmental approach as a management principle cannot be good 
or bad per se. However, its domination in the overall system of 
organisation, planning and funding of R&D activities resulted in 
fragmentation of R&D organisations and structures,  which in turn 
led to the dissipation of resources, duplication of work, monopolistic 
practices, expenditures-based and extensive development of the 
R&D sphere, and an inability to deal with  interdisciplinary and 
inter-industry tasks in sufficiently quick and flexible ways. As 
was already noted, the drawbacks of this approach have not been 
Russia y 105
overcome in Russia yet. Furthermore, now they are manifesting in 
new ways — unlike anything seen in the USSR. In particular, goals 
and objectives of the national S&T and innovation policy (developed 
primarily by the MES) quite often clash with valid laws regulating 
the economic activities, and with the general civil legislation which 
defines the overall environment for R&D organisations (i.e., where 
this policy is implemented), which are developed primarily by the 
ministries of finance, economy and industry. The loser is always the 
S&T sphere and the NSI in particular. 
Even further, in the course of modernisation of the budgeting 
process (see later for more) a quite decentralised (between mini-
stries and government departments) scheme for planning R&D 
appropriations and distributing responsibilities for the sector’s 
advancement has developed. Basic research is the responsibility of 
the state academies of science; the S&T sector as a whole and the 
development of appropriate legislation is the responsibility of MES; 
state S&T programmes are developed and implemented by the 
Federal Agency for Science and Innovation (at present abolished); 
R&D components of major goal-oriented programmes are the 
responsibility of the Ministry for Economic Development (MED); 
certain expenditures not related with programmes are administered 
by the Ministry of Finance. Technology implementation zones, 
venture funds, development of breakthrough (critical) technologies 
are responsibilities of MED and MES; Ministry of Information 
Technologies and Communication and MES are responsible for 
creation of technoparks; property of federal R&D organisations is 
managed by the Agency for Public Property Management; regional 
and local authorities allocate land to build innovative facilities, etc. 
These inter-departmental barriers hinder complex, efficient 
restructuring of the S&T sphere, implementation of integrated R&D 
and the innovation cycle, development of common understanding 
among government officials regarding how much resources the 
state should allocate to advancement of science, and exactly how 
these resources should be spent. Nevertheless, the contemporary 
economic potential of the Russian economy is high enough to 
launch the NSI reforms and complete the transition of the S&T and 
innovation sector. 
As was noted in the report ‘Innovation-Driven Development as 
the Basis for Modernisation of the Russian Economy’ (HSE 2008) 
prepared with the participation of Institute for Statistical Studies and 
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Economics of Knowledge (ISSEK) experts, there are two approaches 
to development and evaluation of national S&T and innovation 
policy: 
 (a) narrow approach which only takes into account a set of 
decisions affecting (directly and indirectly) R&D and 
innovation processes; 
 (b) and a wider approach, when decisions are evaluated taking 
into account the whole range of national goals (including 
technological modernisation, development of human capital, 
adjustment of development institutions, positioning of the 
country as a global power). 
In the first case, recommendations and suggestions should cover 
traditional policy areas: government funding of organisations, 
enterprises, programmes, and projects (including promotion of 
cooperation and networking of innovation actors); legal framework, 
development of infrastructure and appropriate linkages. Certain 
progress has been made in Russia in this area during the years of 
reform. Now the accent should be placed on extending the range of 
available tools and mechanisms. 
In the second case there’s the need to discuss and adjust 
approaches to developing a better understanding of the role science 
and innovations play in the economy, and the S&T and innovation 
policy plays in the public administration system. It was noted earlier 
that inefficient government policy became a significant obstacle 
hindering development of R&D and NSI in Russia. However, the 
opposite is also true — the state of R&D and innovation activities 
largely determines available options for policy development and for 
increasing its efficiency. 
By now the main directions of S&T and innovation policy in 
Russia, the reforms of science and NSI are the following: 
National Priorities Setting 
In Russia the efforts to select S&T priorities were first launched 
at the federal level in the middle of the 1990s, and have since been 
continued on a regular basis. National S&T priorities are formulated 
in two lists — priority S&T areas and critical technologies.15  The 
list of priority S&T areas for the Russian Federation sets the 
general trends of the country’s S&T development and represents 
the S&T areas deemed to provide new technologies and facilities 
to contribute to the development of national economy and society. 
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They are specified in the List of Critical Technologies of the Russian 
Federation, which serves as a background for making decisions on 
concentrating public resources in the most important areas of science, 
technology and innovation and on implementing the available S&T 
potential. 
The first list of eight priority areas was approved by the 
Government Commission on Scientific and Technological Policies in 
1996. In 1999 it was submitted to a large-scale examination by more 
than 1,000 leading experts. That analysis revealed an urgent need to 
reconsider the system of priorities, concentrating on ‘breakthrough’ 
directions. In 2000–2001 new lists of nine S&T priority areas and 52 
critical technologies were developed; in 2006, eight (34); in 2010, six 
(26). The aim of their formulation consisted in the optimisation of 
the number of priority areas, so as to concentrate resources in the 
most important fields of innovation. 
As already mentioned, in 2002 the Russian president approved 
the basic directions of the Russian Federation’s policy in S&T 
development. This document has become an important element 
of Russia’s social and economic development strategy, with its 
goals of innovation-based economic development, creating of 
an effective national innovation system and making science and 
technology one of Russia’s key priorities. The S&T priorities and 
critical technologies approved within that document resulted in the 
list of research areas that was still too broad to become real targets 
for selecting technologies for priority government support and for 
private investment. That was the reason for Russia’s MES to organise 
the revision and correction of the lists immediately. This was done 
in 2003–2004, and then in 2007–2008. The revision of S&T priorities 
was carried out during a period of sustained economic growth 
and great improvement of the state government system. Within 
the process officials and experts modified the list of priority areas 
considerably. They took into consideration that it should cover the 
current international technological development priorities, on the 
one hand, and the innovation development potential defining the 
formation of new global markets on the other. 
This is particularly true for information technologies, the 
nanosystems industry and new materials and living systems, national 
security, etc. Efficient use of available S&T potential and practical 
implementation of R&D results already achieved in these areas 
will increase Russian enterprises’ competitiveness in domestic and 
international markets in the medium term. 
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International experience shows that long-term sustainable 
development is achievable only through high entrepreneurial 
and innovation activities both in production and service sectors, 
diversification of production and a greater share of sophisticated 
and hi-tech products. So concentrating resources in the areas where 
Russia’s competitive advantages can be exploited helps to accelerate 
innovation based on latest research outcomes and technologies, 
which is now a key factor determining the competitiveness of a 
national economy. This is particularly important for Russia because 
of its present strong dependence on the international markets for fuel 
and mineral resources. 
The S&T priorities (as well as the critical technologies set) are 
a powerful tool for innovation policies and especially resources 
distribution. All NSI development instruments and initiatives 
(including policies discussed later) are based on the national priorities 
system. Target-based budgeting and performance evaluation are the 
mechanisms most closely related with them. 
Restructuring Government R&D Institutions
Domination of the government-owned budget-funded institutions 
in the S&T sector remains one of the most painful problems facing 
Russian science. Various types of commercial and non-profit 
organisations were allowed during the transition period of the 
Russian economy, but there was a minimal change at the level of the 
state R&D organisations. As it was mentioned earlier, over 70 per 
cent of all R&D organisations in Russia are public-owned and 39 
per cent belong to the state sector (though many R&D institutions 
de facto belong to the state sector being formally placed by statistics 
services in the business sector). After federal executive agencies got 
the right to establish new institutions at the beginning of the 1990s, 
their number even grew by 1.5 times. 
Russia has a huge system of state academies, a legacy of the 
former USSR. The most unusual feature of their legal status is their 
‘mixed’ nature, which combines elements of government institution, 
public association and some other forms (e.g., corporation and 
alliance). Another specific feature is the fact that academies act 
as holdings, ‘owning’ non-profit organisations. Therefore, as 
government institutions, academies have control over a number of 
various organisations and enterprises. The creation of an institution 
(academy) consisting of many other institutions (research institutes) 
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causes property conflicts and is not in fact allowed by Russian civil 
laws. However, under the Federal Law ‘On Science and the State S&T 
Policy’ (1996), state academies are an exception, organised exactly in 
this way. Finally, an important feature of state academies’ status is 
that they operate as government institutions. Academies receive and 
manage government funding provided by the state to support their 
research institutes. They can manage and control institutions, create 
and close them. 
This ‘mix’ of various organisational, legal and administrative forms 
has no precedent in other countries, and remains a big problem for 
the Russian government. The most worrying issue is the mismatch 
between performance and economic results in the R&D carried out 
by the academies and the amount of their public funding. There are 
other problems as well: inefficient monitoring of the use of federal 
property and public funds, along with insufficient transparency in 
the allocation and use of financial resources. One should mark that 
in general at least 26 per cent of all public funds allocated for civil 
S&T go to state academies. 
In 2005 the special programme for modernisation of the structure, 
functions and funding mechanisms in the academic R&D sector 
was adopted. The aim was to streamline the network of academic 
organisations and to introduce some new organisational forms for 
R&D. It was supposed to be implemented by 2008, but it did not 
happen in full. The resistance of the academy’s top management was 
strong enough to preserve the academy’s autonomy (operational and 
budgetary). Therefore, the plans for more radical changes are still far 
from final realisation. The longer academies resist innovation, the 
more negative the consequences are for the academic system collapse. 
The large number (and proportion) of government-owned R&D 
institutions makes Russia very different from other industrially 
developed countries. State R&D institutions funded by the 
government have to keep budget limitations. They have almost none 
of the rights (or responsibilities) needed for adequate economic 
operations. While claiming large amounts of public money, they 
cannot guarantee that these resources will be used efficiently. In such 
conditions the performance of the entire government S&T sector is 
affected. A similar situation is found in the other social sectors of the 
Russian economy (education, culture, health care, etc.), showing the 
need to design and implement new, more flexible, autonomous and 
independent organisational forms. 
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To meet this challenge, it was decided to create a new kind of 
government institutions to operate in the social sphere. The new 
flexible model is known as ‘autonomous institution’ which is 
adopted by the federal law ‘On Autonomous Institutions’ (2006a). 
Unlike existing budget-funded institutions, the new structures 
will not be funded through fixed budgetary institutional grants; 
but they will receive funding from various sources (including the 
government). This would increase their responsibility for the 
expected results. At the same time they will remain government-
owned entities. Autonomous institutions will have certain autonomy 
and independence in attracting (and spending) funds from non-
government sources, including credits and investments. It will give 
them new development opportunities, not available for ‘traditional’ 
budget-funded institutions. 
The prospects for transition of the government-owned R&D 
organisations into the new form are outlined in ‘R&D and Innovation 
Development Strategy in the Russian Federation until 2015’ (2006b). 
At least 250 R&D institutions and higher education institutions 
(HEIs) should move to the new status over a fairly short period of 
time. Taking into account the period planned for this institutional 
transformation, the task looks quite complicated. 
Large national R&D centres are also expected to operate this way. 
CLTD 2020 includes creation of several such centres whose objective 
will be to provide S&T support to high technology sectors of the 
Russian economy. Another aspect of institutional reforms is related 
to the integration of science and education. To this end, a special 
law on integration can be mentioned as well as initiatives stimulating 
R&D activities in HEIs. The new federal law ‘On Changes to the 
Selected Legal Statements of the Russian Federation Concerning 
the Integration of Education and Science’ (2007a) was adopted to 
boost S&T and innovation activities at universities and to establish 
closer linkages between HEIs and research institutions. The new law 
legalises existing models for such integration and provides a scope 
of efficient measures including a subset of necessary regulations. 
These regulations should help to eliminate the existing institutional 
barriers for fruitful integration. 
Unfortunately the adopted law can be characterised as a sort of 
compromise between the government, the university community 
and the research institutes. As a result, it does not fully satisfy any 
of these entities. It just solves some evident problems of integration. 
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Further amendments are required to make the interaction between 
science and education not only possible, but also efficient. 
Another part of the integration policy is support for the best 
‘innovative HEIs’ and ‘research universities’. The National Priority 
Project ‘Education’ contains specific policy measures to this end. 
An important component of this scheme is the government of the 
Russian Federation’s statement entitled ‘Support Measures for 
Higher Education Institutions Implementing Innovative Education 
Programmes’ (2006c). It is devoted to the distribution of competitive 
grants for developing university innovation (including human 
resource development, unique R&D and innovation projects, 
improvement of innovation infrastructure, acquisition of research 
equipment, etc.). There were 57 winners in 2006–2007. Each of 
them received funding in the range of US$ 6–30 million for two 
years depending on the scale of projects. The average annual R&D 
expenditure of the grant-recipients was a little bit more than US$ 
4,000 per member of R&D and teaching staff but the difference 
between minimum and maximum amounts was very high. This 
means that only some winning universities are actually able to 
develop large-scale innovation projects. 
However, the scheme marks the first government experiment 
with the earmarked support for research universities as centres of 
excellence. The main challenge for today is to continue this practice 
on a regular basis. 
In addition, in 2007–2010 within the framework of integration 
seven large national universities were established by presidential 
decrees and 29 leading higher education institutes transformed into 
research universities. 
Evaluation of the Performance of R&D Units
The efficient restructuring as well as current operation of the state-
funded R&D institutions also requires a set of comprehensive tools 
for performance evaluation. Such mechanisms are widely present in 
many countries and show positive effects. During the post-Soviet 
period, state funding of the state R&D entities was not based on 
the estimates of their efficiency and the results of their activity. 
As a result, positive dynamics of expenditure on R&D from the 
budgetary sources was followed constantly by negative dynamics of 
the output indicators. 
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To improve the situation the Russian government adopted the 
statement ‘On the System of Civil R&D Organisations Performance 
Evaluation’ (2009). The main goals of this system are comprehensive 
planning and funding for the R&D projects, optimisation of the 
network of R&D organisations and benchmarking for non-public 
R&D organisations. The plan is to organise regular surveys (every 
five years) and support the database containing statistical information 
about R&D institutions. So-called evaluation commissions are 
represented by involved interest groups — such as state executive 
bodies, business, academies, scientific community, NGOs, etc. 
The key evaluation criteria are put together in order to show the 
relationship between resources (inputs) and results (outputs). 
Output is measured by:
• R&D results (publication activity, project results, etc.); 
• commercialisation and application of the results (patents, start-
ups, etc.); 
• scientific involvement (international contacts, joint projects, 
etc.). 
The further criteria relate to human capital (quality and structure 
of personnel, salaries, etc.), tangible and intangible resources 
(equipment, facilities, etc.) and financial sustainability (incomes and 
expenditures structure, debts, etc.). The final criterion shows the 
potential for further development. A typical report by an evaluation 
commission consists of a conclusion on the performance against 
the key criteria and recommendations. Every R&D organisation 
should be assigned to one of three groups by performance — from 
‘outsiders’ to ‘leaders’. The recommendations therefore can vary 
from closure (for ‘outsiders’) to special support (for ‘leaders’) 
respectively. The evaluation system will apply not only to the 
state-funded R&D institutions but also to other NSI components 
including the innovation infrastructure institutions. 
Innovation Infrastructure
There are many different forms of innovation infrastructure in 
Russia. In the state policy context we’ll stop on the presentation of 
three important elements — technoparks, science cities and special 
economic zones (SEZs). Technoparks are micro-level instruments 
for technology transfer, while science cities and SEZs are macro-
level mechanisms for balancing the responsibilities of local and 
federal authorities in the knowledge transfer (and support) activities. 
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There are several tens of technoparks in Russia, although only 
some have official licenses. Technopark policies are full of hidden 
problems. First of all, multiple ‘white spots’ in the legislation 
dramatically weaken the commercialisation capability of universities 
and R&D institutions.16 State universities or government R&D 
institutions are limited in creating and directing supporting of SMEs. 
A state university can create a start-up, but cannot provide any 
funding or facilities for it. That is why Russian technoparks do not 
operate independently but only as a part of the ‘host organisation’s’ 
structure. They lack performance monitoring and mechanisms for 
the diffusion of best practices. They also suffer from underdeveloped 
business consulting mechanisms. 
The response to these negative factors is ‘industry and manu-
facturing special economic zones’ (see later). This makes it possible 
to significantly reduce tax pressure and attract investors. There also 
exist other solutions such as business incubators and mechanisms 
to provide financial support for start-ups; providing conversion 
and commercialisation mechanisms for defence ‘dual-purpose’ 
technologies, etc. Other initiatives are connected with new legal 
mechanisms. One should mention three main directions —provision 
of federal lands for technoparks on a competitive basis (both for 
ownership and for long leasing); direct investments in technopark 
infrastructure by government bodies; creation of favourable 
conditions for technoparks investment (construction sites, transport 
and housing infrastructure funding) sharing expenditures between 
federal and regional authorities.  
An important instrument of the interaction between federal 
and local authorities takes the form of so-called ‘science cities’ 
or technopolises.17  Russian science cities are the ‘oldest’ secret 
communities created in the 1930–1970s in the USSR in order to solve 
major state defence problems by R&D and new technologies. About 
70 cities, settlements and outlying districts were ranked as science 
cities in previous years. Twenty-nine of them were located within 
the Moscow Region. About 40 per cent of national S&T potential is 
still concentrated in the science cities today. 
These cities are populated mainly by researchers and their 
families. ‘Mono-orientation’ towards scientific activity and specific 
tasks explains the lack of ‘traditional’ infrastructure elements, such 
as industry (in some cities) and the agricultural complex. Therefore, 
after a dramatic decrease in state support in the 1990s these cities 
faced extremely difficult economic and social problems. 
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To improve the situation it was decided to ‘re-inventory’ all 
former Soviet science cities. The science city concept and special state 
support mechanisms are regulated by the federal law ‘On the Status 
of Science City in the Russian Federation’ (1999). According to the 
text of this document, the science city is a municipal entity of the 
Russian Federation with a particular urban science and production 
complex. This complex consists of institutions carrying out research, 
development and innovation activities, and training of personnel in 
accordance with the national priorities in science and technology. 
The science city status is confirmed by the president of the 
Russian Federation for a period of 25 years. The president approves 
the priorities determined by the government for the science city 
as well as the state programme for science development which 
specifies the form of federal support for science cities in accordance 
with their specialisation. Science city funding, along with logistical 
and maintenance support, is provided from the federal budget, the 
regional and local authorities budgets, and other funding sources in 
accordance with the constituting instrument. 
Obninsk and Dubna were the first to obtain the official science 
city status in the Russian Federation (2001–2003). They are famous 
for the world’s first nuclear power station and the Joint Institute 
for Nuclear Research (both founded in 1950s). The successful 
science cities are located in the most populated regions. Today there 
exist another 12 settlements (officially recognised in this respect in 
Russia after 2003). Among them are the world renowned Zjukovski 
(scientific support of aircraft manufacturing), Koltsevo (bio-
tech), Korolyov (scientific support of spacecraft manufacturing), 
Michurinsk (bio-tech, agriculture), etc. Nine of them are located in 
the Moscow region. 
Since 1999, the issue of state support for science cities has 
been much discussed. Problems for discussion include the state’s 
responsibilities, efficient infrastructure creation and use, mechanisms 
for transition to autonomous grant-free development, etc. The 
creation of incentives and favourable conditions for transforming of 
these regions into centres of high technology and advanced R&D is 
considered to be a major task for the science city policies. The law on 
the status of science cities regards investments tax credit as the main 
support measure. For example, it was planned that the Obninsk 
administration should have the right to spend at least 50 per cent of 
tax revenues on the innovation infrastructure development during 
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the first five years. However, this mechanism was later rejected. 
The reason for this rejection was related to the total absence of 
industrial activity in a number of cities. There was no industry, so no 
considerable tax revenues were spent on innovation development. 
Finally it was decided to use internal resources of research 
organisations for the intensive production of R&D. Science city 
status presumes additional federal funding targeted specifically for 
the implementation (on a competitive basis) of innovation projects. 
The main problems today are lack of mechanisms to transfer federal 
funding to specific scientific projects and regulation potential (legal 
rights) of local authorities. 
In general, science cities are supposed to attract considerable 
investment as venture business centres and as hubs of science, 
education, technological excellence, and integration. 
There also exist special mechanisms to promote the development 
of industry-oriented science cities and innovation-active regions. 
One is the ‘special economic zone’. This instrument was introduced 
in Russia in 2005 by the special federal law, ‘On Special Economic 
Zones in the Russian Federation’. Special zones are the Russian 
Federation territories defined by the government, where a special 
regime for entrepreneurial activity applies. They are intended to 
promote high-technology industries. 
There are three types of such zones — industrial (special tax 
preferences, favourable investment regime); technology and 
innovation (out of the customs zone, favourable for imports/
exports) and recreational zones (special conditions for tourism). 
Special economic areas can be created on land owned by the 
government and/or municipalities. However, official initiatives 
aimed for innovation infrastructure development (as well as other 
mechanisms discussed earlier) do not guarantee growth in demand 
for and/or supply of innovation. 
Particular NSI elements created directly to compensate missing 
actors providing demand for (and investment in) innovation are the 
Russian Venture Company (RVC) and several state corporations. 
They act as intermediaries, guarantors and sponsors in the public–
private partnership mechanisms. 
The Public–Private Partnership Mechanisms 
The Russian high-tech sector is still unable to absorb enough 
investment and to find demand for innovation as well. To solve the 
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problem the Russian government established the Russian venture 
company (RVC) in 2006. Another part of resources should be 
mobilised by state corporations. Seven state corporations (such 
as Russian Corporation for Nanotechnology, State Corporation 
for Nuclear Energy, etc.), were founded in 2007–2008 to support 
hi-tech sectors. 
The role of RVC is to promote venture investment and financial 
support for S&T throughout the country. The resources for RVC 
capitalisation are allocated from the Investment Fund of the Russian 
Federation. In 2008 the authorised capital stock amounted to 28.2 
billion roubles (about 775 million Euro). RVC invests in regional 
and industry venture companies (in the form of so-called closed 
end investment funds established under the Russian legislation and 
regulated by the Federal Service on Financial Markets). A special 
management company manages each fund. These companies compete 
for the right to sell fund investment shares to RVC. Funding can 
be provided only for the projects corresponding with the critical 
technologies. 
Once the venture fund has acquired all its funding, the fund 
management company can start investment activities: launch 
innovation companies in the areas of microelectronics, information 
technologies, telecommunication technologies, biotechnologies, 
medical technologies, environment-friendly energy, and nano-
technologies. The management company team of each fund can 
finance from 10 to 15 innovation companies for several years. Thus, 
the output can be up to 15 venture funds and up to 150 innovation 
companies. 
State corporations act as financial instruments to insure con-
centration and distribution of resources in the areas in line with the 
state interests and priorities. The need to create such a corporation 
was expressed in 2007 by the Russian president in his annual message 
to the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russian 
Federation. As a rule, they are founded by special federal laws 
proclaiming the legislative basis, organisation principles, creation 
and activity goals of state corporations. 
For example, the Russian Corporation for Nanotechnology 
(Rosnano, the Federal Law ‘On the Russian Corporation for 
Nanotechnology’ 2007b) addresses the growing challenge arising 
from the rapid development of new technologies on the nanoscale 
and enjoying direct budgetary support. Three key directions of 
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Rosnano activity are related to assistance to the state policies in 
the sphere of nanotechnology, development of the innovative 
infrastructure for nanotechnologies and achievement of projects 
aimed at creating innovative nanotechnologies and nano-industries. 
In order to achieve its goals, three main functions are carried 
out: R&D, nanotechnology education and financial support for 
innovative projects. The first two functions are provided by financial 
support of the R&D and nanotechnology education projects. The 
third function includes support of the entire innovation cycle, from 
project evaluation, financing and provision for commercialisation 
and production. 
At the starting point its five-year budget it had more than 130 
billion roubles (about 3.7 billion Euro). Due to its special status, 
the corporation is not government property and has outside control 
from executive bodies. The director is appointed by the Russian 
president only. Operational and stable support for the projects 
should considerably boost their efficiency. However, such ‘freedom’ 
may also lead to an unforeseen abuse. In the opinion of many Russian 
experts, this fact could lower expected effects from the activity of 
the company. Their arguments were acknowledged as completely 
serious, and Rosnano was transformed into another commercial 
company (a joint stock company with government share). 
Another problem already faced by Rosnano is the lack of human 
resources in this field. That is why education activities there are 
closely tied with R&D. However, the whole NSI requires constant 
reproduction and development of human resources (see later). 
From 2010 Russia shows visible progress within  two more 
directions of R&D and innovation policy — creation of technological 
platforms (23 have been organised already) and innovation 
programmes of  big public companies (the government has bound 
them to develop such programmes). 
Human Resources for S&T and Innovation
Relatively high levels of human capital development, high education 
and skills parameters of the labour force are among the important 
competitive advantages of the Russian economy (Gokhberg et 
al. 2009). The need to sustain and increase them is declared in all 
key documents on the national policy of the Russian Federation 
(including the long-term CLTD concept, see earlier). Important 
practical steps in this area have already been taken by the government 
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(The Federal Programme ‘Science and Education Manpower for 
Innovation Russia’, 2008). This promising programme should 
improve and develop human potential for R&D and innovation 
activity in HEIs and R&D institutions. It is designed for the period 
2009–2013. Its proclaimed aim is to provide institutional support of 
the development of efficient human resources in the S&T, education 
and innovation sphere. In order to achieve this goal, it is proposed 
to attract and involve young talent and highly skilled professionals 
in S&T and innovation projects and to consolidate excellent and 
competitive scholars in the best universities and R&D institutes. 
To this end, the programme includes a number of actions and 
instruments: centres of excellence for science and education, system 
of grants for young promising scientists and teachers, special schemes 
to attract young promising scientists and teachers from abroad, grants 
for innovation infrastructure development, etc. All these initiatives are 
going to be implemented in spite of the current financial crisis. The 
programme budget amounts to 90.5 billion roubles, or about 2.6 billion 
Euro (88.9 per cent will come from the federal budget). The share of 
R&D funding is expected to be 73.6 per cent. The programme includes 
three main directions and 20 tasks. 
The programme calls for significant shifts in the S&T human 
capital sub-system. Among them — annual support of up to 450 
centres of excellence; decrease of the average researcher’s age by 34 
years by 2013; increase in the number of top-level researchers by 
2–3 per cent; increase in the number of top-level university teaching 
staff by 4–6 per cent; increase in Russia’s share in world scientific 
publications by 1–1.5 per cent. One of the goals of the programme 
is to stimulate and develop non-government funding of supported 
projects. Therefore projects attracting support from the business 
sector and NCOs should have an advantage. 
Sustainable development of the S&T complex and strengthening 
of its innovative orientation should be based on an efficient 
regulation system, including direct funding and indirect motivation. 
Indirect motivation techniques include tax breaks, discounts and 
special procedures for property depreciation. 
In the conclusion of this section we’ll discuss two more items 
characterising mainly the external conditions of scientific and 
innovative activity, namely budgetary and tax reforms. 
Budgetary Reforms
Most of the industrially developed countries are trying to find more 
efficient mechanisms and forms of government support for R&D. 
Russia y 119
The complexity of the problem is explained by the obvious need 
for such support and by strictly limited resources. The solution 
found by the Russian government in the current situation looks 
quite realistic. It is based on a more efficient budgetary resources 
allocation together with institutional reforms in R&D and the 
innovation sphere. 
Today the federal budget for civil S&T is almost equally distributed 
between direct and competitive funding. The main portion of 
the competitive funding stream goes to the federal goal-oriented 
programmes. Almost a half of the civil S&T budget is still allocated 
in government R&D institutions under academies of science and 
under state ministries and agencies. This funding stream is not based 
on S&T priorities or on performance of R&D institutions. This is 
the sphere where new mechanisms for evaluation and institutional 
reform are to be implemented. 
The appropriate budgetary legislation was developed in Russia 
throughout the whole reforming period. The Budgetary Code of the 
Russian Federation was adopted in 1998, though the country put in 
place a framework for ‘normal’ regulation of budgetary relationships. 
However, the restructuring of the budgeting process did not start 
for six years. Only in 2004 was the concept of budgetary process 
restructuring approved. It was based on four key principles: 
• separation of existing and newly approved expenditures; 
• limiting approved expenditures to objectives clearly defined in 
advance, according to government policy priorities; 
• targeting and programming planning techniques application; 
• developing a system of real and target indicators to evaluate 
performance of government agencies. 
Russia has also entered into a new stage of public funds 
management — mid-term performance-oriented budgeting. All 
its principles were applied in the 2006 budget, when a prospective 
three-year financial plan was developed alongside the traditional 
one-year budgeting projections. 
Under the new classification, R&D expenditure is divided into 
basic and applied parts, which in turn are split into sections. Basic 
research expenditure comes under the ‘general issues’ section. 
Applied research expenditure is mostly accounted for under all 
other sections of expenditure functional classification — in order to 
support R&D for education, economy, defence, etc. One of the most 
important elements of the development of the  budgeting process was 
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the restructuring of budget classification and accounting. Under the 
‘Concept of Budgetary Process Restructuring’, the new classification 
was brought in line with the main functions of government agencies 
and with international standards for accounting and public finance 
statistics. The streamlining of the general budgeting process  should 
encourage development of a flexible and dynamic NSI as one of 
the top national priorities. It should be noted that the potential for 
streamlining the budgeting process in the R&D sector exists at all 
its stages — budget expenditures planning, shaping the budget and 
adjusting appropriation (allocation of funds to recipients), funding 
of R&D organisations (financial management techniques), legal 
framework, etc. 
During 2010–2011 the process of deep revising was started again. 
As long as the state remains the largest R&D ‘sponsor’ as it will 
be for the foreseeable future, the Russian government is planning to 
continue reforms in three directions: 
• more concentration on the national priorities; 
• optimisation of the funding structure; 
• new principles of the budgetary funding. 
Concentration on the national priorities requires that direct 
government support of applied research and technologies should be 
reduced to a certain minimum, supporting those most relevant to 
the national priorities only. Foresight is considered to be the most 
useful tool for national priorities setting. It is a highly discussed 
topic among Russian scientists and officials. The first project for 
practical implementation of foresight technology in Russia was 
launched in 2006–2008 (the second was finished in 2010; the third 
has just begun). 
Optimisation of the funding structure is an important measure 
both when the total GERD is growing, as well as when it is falling (for 
example, due to the negative effects of the world crisis). A dramatic 
change in the structure of the government expenditures is expected. 
Funding should be re-allocated in favour of target programmes 
and state R&D foundations. However, a large-scale reallocation is 
impossible before the reform of the R&D sector. 
A crucial principle of the forthcoming restructuring of R&D 
funding is a transition from subsidies towards credits, while moving 
along the innovation ‘chain’ (basic research — applied research — 
development — implementation of innovations — consumption of 
innovation products). 
Russia y 121
New principles for budgetary funding can be defined as liberal 
funding and competition. The share of so-called basic funding in the 
R&D budget (funds allocated to particular organisations for specific 
purposes regardless of their performance) should be decreased. 
However, each government-owned R&D organisation having 
survived after the restructuring of the government R&D sector 
should receive enough public money to meet its actual needs. The 
so-called package funding practice known in many countries is also 
being considered in Russia. It would provide a certain freedom of 
financial management and increase the operation flexibility of R&D 
institutions (Gokhberg 2003). 
Streamlining the mechanisms of joint innovation programmes and 
project funding is an important element of the budgeting process. 
Improvement in this area requires creation and development of 
legal instruments regulating cooperative agreements in the R&D 
sector and NSI, grant support and long-term government orders 
for R&D, technologies and innovation. These forms are used to 
establish public and private sector partnerships and apply the R&D 
potential efficiently in all developed countries. Using such tools and 
mechanisms, developing standards and frameworks for independent 
expert evaluation would improve the whole system of government 
funding in general, promote a practical shift towards projects and 
programme funding, increase financial transparency and streamline 
procedures for making and spending profits, as well as sharing the 
risks of R&D and innovation activity. 
In the context of the current debate, the federal budget can be said 
to have four main functions: 
• Ideological (as a programme providing financial support for 
S&T and innovation reforms) including evaluation of the 
prospects of this sphere in Russia, the role of the government 
in its preserving and developing (i.e., as it is declared in CLTD 
2020). Ideological function in our context means that the 
budget reflects the structure and ‘ranking’ of national targets 
and the attitude of the state and its leaders to national science. 
• Political (as a strategy and a set of measures to mobilise 
and allocate financial resources). It is based on the creation 
integration of a hierarchical system of national objectives. This 
function involves the: (a) coupling of designations, (b) specific 
decisions of the authorities, (c) quantitative parameters of 
budget obligations for the ‘science block’, etc. 
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• Economic (as a financial plan to support sectors of the economy). 
This is concerned with the preservation and development of 
S&T and innovation by increasing effective demand for and 
commercialisation of R&D products and technologies. 
• Management (as a procedure to establish objectives, structure, 
techniques and mechanisms for managing financial flows, 
monitoring and evaluating results). It includes coordination, 
succession and transparency of budgeting process stages, 
realistic nature of obligations.
Despite all the changes, budgets have not yet become an effective 
government policy tool, and do not fully carry out functions crucial 
for developing Russia’s R&D and innovation sector. The fourth 
function is implemented most widely (perhaps even too strictly; the 
third one is implemented partially while there is still little evidence 
of the first and the second. To improve this situation the reform 
should extend outside the budgetary sphere, taking the form of 
broad institutional reforms. 
Some Other Examples of Implicit Measures
Currently Russian S&T and innovation policy is being shaped in 
an incomplete legal framework for R&D and innovation activity. 
Taxation laws still do not include provisions that would make an 
efficient system of tax breaks and benefits, similar to those existing 
in all developed countries. Inconsistency of legal reforms, lack of 
continuity of legal provisions brought about a situation where 
many of the previous norms of tax legislation that have proved their 
efficiency did not find a place in the Tax Code of Russian Federation 
(1998, with subsequent amendments). That, in turn, caused problems 
hindering radical growth of innovation activity and efficient use 
of the country’s intellectual and economic potential. For example, 
according to the current tax code, R&D expenditures are subtracted 
from revenues when the tax base is calculated, which encourages 
organisations to make them. At the same time tax legislation in effect 
does not encourage activity of R&D organisations participating 
in practical implementation of knowledge and technologies, or 
organisations funding R&D and innovation projects. 
The work on developing taxation rules for S&T and the inno-
vation sphere in Russia started in the mid-1990s, and was completed 
in general in 2007 — with the adoption of a number of laws and 
regulations aimed at reducing the tax burden for innovative 
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enterprises. In 2008 tax breaks provided by the latest amendments 
to the Tax Code became valid. The most important of them are new 
rules for calculation of VAT, profits tax and overall simplification of 
the taxation. For example: 
• Profits generated via sales of intellectual property rights 
(inventions, utility models, etc.) have been exempted from VAT, 
as well as earning generated by licensing intellectual property. 
A list of tax-exempted services supporting development of 
new/improved products was also approved. 
• Regarding profits tax, the number of R&D foundations whose 
money does not have to be included in calculation of the tax 
base has been increased. 
• Other improvements included more favourable accelerated 
depreciation conditions, additional breaks for organisations 
contributing to the Russian Technological Development fund, 
as well as to industrial and inter-sector R&D foundations. 
• The list of expenditures not to be included into taxpayers’ 
taxable income under the simplified taxation system includes 
expenditures on acquisition of exclusive intellectual property 
rights, patenting and R&D. 
• As already noted, more breaks are provided for residents of 
special economic zones and companies oriented towards 
exporting information and communication technologies. 
It should be noted that compared with the legislation regulating 
taxation of innovation activities in developed foreign countries, 
the Russian tax system even after adoption remains insufficiently 
wholesome and coordinated. The mentioned taxation innovations 
will contribute to creating a more favourable innovation climate, 
but they won’t play a crucial role in changing private businesses’ 
investment strategies regarding R&D and innovation activities. 
The new tax breaks are just not big enough (in the context of the 
overall economy and the S&T and innovation sphere). Problems 
with property and land taxes for R&D organisations remain 
unsolved (appropriate tax breaks have been cancelled in the new Tax 
Code). The lack of such breaks is particularly painful to large R&D 
organisations engaged in applied research and development. 
The new round of tax legislation development began in 2009, 
although it was slowed down due to problems created by the global 
financial crisis. Now this process still continues. Its focus is on 
innovation and innovation-friendly taxation instruments which will 
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help to create a more favourable innovative climate. For example, the 
government introduced tax benefits for entities investing in R&D 
and priority S&T areas, such as bio- and nanotechnology, nuclear 
energy and new types of transport systems; easier conditions for 
compulsory social security payments for employees of companies 
whose main economic activities are ICT development, engineering 
and R&D, etc. (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova 2010a).
Outcomes and Impact of State Policy and 
State Institutions on the NSI 
The preceding analysis of statistical data and various government 
policies clearly shows that traditional troubles of the Russian S&T 
and innovations sphere have not been dealt with yet, which makes 
the ‘innovation shift’ envisaged in the long-term CLTD 2020 
strategy (and other strategy documents) even more complex and 
important. That is true for development of target indicators as well 
as designing the overall government S&T and innovation policy. 
Note that in the process of that shift government agencies have to 
deal with an increasingly large ‘management object’ — the growing 
S&T and innovation activities sphere, which makes decision-making 
significantly harder and requirements to the quality of such decisions 
more strict (see Table 3.9). 
Relevant government policy should be developed keeping in 
mind the following objectives: 
• to eliminate/temper the existing negative trends. 
• to deal with the tasks typical to catch up with leading 
development models. As experience of foreign countries 
shows, approaches, tools and mechanisms used for such 
purposes don’t always match. 
• to ensure breakthroughs in the sectors of the Russian economy 
which determine the country’s role in the global economy 
— mainly low- or medium-low research-intensive, with an 
obsolete technological basis. Mining and energy industries, other 
basic sectors need a deep modernisation and radical increase of 
their technological level. Equally important is ensuring major 
progress in restructuring of the R&D sector  itself. 
• to develop a new social model, radical restructuring of the 
institutional environment and legal regulations aimed at 
promoting R&D and innovation, entrepreneurship, private 
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investment. The actual Russian experience shows that change 
is slow to come in these areas, doesn’t happen in a systematic 
way and faces serious opposition at the middle and lower levels 
of the management hierarchy.
Table 3.9: Scope of S&T and Innovations Sphere and Amount of Financial 
Support it Received in 2009
Indicator Value Change Compared with 1995
R&D institutions 3536 Reduced by 11 times




Increased  by 1.17 times 
(compared with 1999)
Increased by 1.01 times 
(compared with 1999)
R&D personnel (head-count, 
thousands) 
742.4 Reduced by  1.4 times
R&D fixed assets, bln roubles 705.0 (in 
constant prices 
– 43.3)
Reduced by almost 2 times
Industrial enterprises engaged 
in technological innovation*




38.6 Increased by 1.7 times
GDER, bln roubles 485.8 
(in constant 
prices – 6.1)
Increased by 10 times 
(compared with 1999)
Increased by 2.1 times 
(compared with 1999)
FBA on civil R&D, bln 
roubles
219.1 Increased by 19 times 
(compared with 1999)
at constant prices 7.51 Increased by 3.9 times 
(compared with 1999)
FBA on higher education, bln 
roubles**





327.9 Increased by 7.6 times
– from  government budget About 14 bln 
roubles
na
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Indicator Value Change Compared with 1995





payment of the Government), 
bln roubles
130 na
Volume of “nanoproducts”, 
bln. roubles
112
Source: HSE (2011a: 24, 36, 69–71, 233, 274); HSE (2011b: 9–11, 37, 39); HSE (2010: 
68, 350–51); HSE estimates.
 Note: * Mining, manufacturing industries, power generation and distribution, gas 
and water supply, communications, etc. 
 ** Consolidated budget of Russian Federation and public non-budgetary 
foundations. 
The following issues are crucially important for increasing efficiency 
of the Russian government S&T and innovation policy: 
• variety and integrated nature of management and development 
tools; 
• coordination and harmonisation of various policy tools and 
areas across the levels of the hierarchy;
• targeted design of laws, programmes, strategies to deal with 
specific (global and national) challenges; 
• ensuring optimal balance of direct supervision and control 
on the one hand and promotion and motivation of R&D and 
innovation activities on the other; 
• regular monitoring and assessment of government policy’s 
efficiency, to adjust the management and decision-making 
process accordingly. 
Conclusions and Recommendations Targeting 
Improvements in the NSI with Specific 
Emphasis on the Role of the State 
This chapter has represented an overview of the Russian S&T and 
innovation sphere, emphasising the most recent trends and policies. 
Russian history is full of contradictions as well as the evolution of 
its science, innovation system, the state’s policy and positions in 
the world. In the USSR the innovation system existed in a narrow 
(Cont.)
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scientific-technological space. Scientific results and innovations 
were created and introduced on the basis of the centralised decisions 
of the government, and in the areas connected to the main interests 
of the state. The term ‘national system of innovation’ was never 
used in the USSR, and the actual NSI wasn’t considered worthy 
of research or special government policy. It is only in the last few 
years during painful transformations of economy, state and society 
in Russia that a comprehension of a key role of innovations and 
the necessity of wider understanding NSI as a system of national 
institutes has emerged. The wide understanding of innovation and 
the new approach to NSI have been fixed in key documents of the 
state’s policy. 
The analysis in this study allows us to make several important (in 
our opinion) conclusions regarding possible ways to improve the 
domestic S&T and innovation system (with specific emphasis on the 
role of the state): 
 (a) After the disintegration of the USSR when wide-ranging 
reforms including privatisation and market liberalisation 
were being undertaken, the Russian economy and the 
Russian state changed dramatically. The state became more 
democratic; market institutes, elements of a civil society 
(which are not always accepted ‘canonical’ forms) gradually 
began to develop. Within that process the Russian S&T and 
innovation sphere reached a turning point in the arduous 
transformation from a centrally controlled and administered 
structure to a flexible system operating in the free-market 
environment. Unfortunately the reforms of S&T and NSI 
were lagging behind the transformation in other sectors of 
economy. 
   Though the transition towards a demand and supply 
balanced system is not complete, the demand for R&D 
has already shifted and the institutions meeting it are 
themselves going through changes towards more efficient 
and accountable forms. Initiatives aimed for stimulation of 
demand for R&D and innovations, and for PPP development 
will have a temporary effect. In the long run institutions — 
such as Rosnano or RVC — will not be able to replace the 
traditional market actors that ensure the demand for R&D 
and innovation. At the same time Russia still lacks high 
quality supply from R&D institutions. One of the reasons 
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for this is that institutional reforms in the Russian R&D 
sector are incomplete too. 
 (b) Many experts believe that the current state of Russian 
R&D and NSI, the barriers and limitations hindering their 
rapid restructuring and successful development which 
remained intact for many years, are in a way the end result 
of inefficient, illogical, inconsequential, and uncoordinated 
initiatives pursued by various government branches, lack 
of coordination between ministries, agencies, various 
legislation, etc. The accumulated negative impulses constitute 
a serious obstacle not just for practical implementation but 
even for the theoretical design of an efficient policy including 
appropriate institutions and mechanisms. 
   However, the opposite is also true: the current state of the 
science and innovation sphere creates objective limitations 
on development and implementation of an efficient policy. 
 (c) It is shown that the Russian S&T and innovation policies 
transition can be divided into four main stages. The fourth 
(the current) stage lasting from the middle 2000s to now 
is characterised by complex activities of the government 
aimed at the transition towards an innovative model of 
national economy. One can easily imagine two main 
dimensions of the policy making activities. The first one 
is creation of a structured NSI policy framework. The 
second is the implementation of the policy mechanisms for 
efficient regulation in the main areas of government activity: 
the national priorities, performance-based budgeting, 
restructuring the government R&D sector, human resources 
and infrastructure development, etc. 
   This stage of rather stable recovery of NSI was interrupted 
in 2008 by the painful economical and financial crisis. The 
consequences of this crisis in Russia have not yet been 
overcome and are not entirely obvious. What is obvious is 
that further research in this area is required.
 (d) The history of reforms of S&T and NSI in Russia shows 
that they cannot wait for a full economic transition. Inno-
vation activities themselves can contribute to the restru-
cturing of enterprises and industrial change, as well as to 
the improvement of education, science, health care, and 
environment. It is crucial to speed up all these reforms in the 
complex. 
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   Future policy actions in this field will be coordinated 
with a complex framework including three key components: 
the development of the S&T sector (and the supply of 
innovation); increasing demand for innovation; and human 
capital development. Simultaneously the future of the 
Russian NSI certainly depends on the reform of the entire 
economic system and the overall macroeconomic situation. 
It is evident that an economy based solely on oil and 
natural gas export is unable to follow an innovation growth 
trajectory. Accordingly, enterprises can be encouraged 
to compete and play a central role in directing R&D and 
innovation only after broad structural shifts in the economy. 
   In addition, it is obvious today that the important and 
vital reforms of S&T and NSI cannot wait for a new era of 
prosperity (after the crisis period). It is critical for Russia (as 
well as for other counties) to make the following choice — 
to invest in the future, for example, to continue its efforts 
in supporting science and innovation activities, or to stop 
them. The second scenario means a serious risk to worsen the 
position in the world science and technology development 
coming out of the current crisis. The leaders of the world 
economy understand this dichotomy, and demonstrate 
rather good examples of the first approach. 
   There is a lot still to do to encourage the contributions 
of science and innovation, especially in the fields of public 
policy and reorganisation of the R&D sector. The S&T and 
innovation policies should be driven by complete priority of 
complex and dynamic reforms, aimed at efficient innovation 
and support to the best performers. 
 (e) Progress in the field of S&T and innovations achieved 
in developed countries is based on a complex system of 
interaction between all major actors: (i) generating various 
kinds of knowledge (R&D and educational organisations, 
large companies, small and medium firms, etc.); (ii) 
monitoring (controlling) the flows of this knowledge 
(and flows of resources) and (iii) ensuring their practical 
implementation. Efficiency of the whole process in each 
country is determined by the specific way these actors 
interact as components of the collective knowledge-
generation and utilisation system. 
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   Analysis of domestic and international experience sug-
gests that the government’s role in this process amounts to 
creating conditions for the following: 
• enterprises and R&D actors (including science and higher 
education institutions) are motivated to participate in 
innovation activities (emergence of efficient proprietors, 
competitive environment for producers and consumers 
of knowledge, development of cooperative relations 
between them);
• increased education level of management and easier 
access to information required for R&D and innovation 
activities; 
• transfer of technologies (including creation of enterprises 
utilising new  technologies); 
• organisation of the very process of knowledge creation and 
dissemination based on advanced forms and mechanisms 
including cooperation between private and public sector 
organisations (PPP) in the R&D and innovations area, 
etc. 
 (f) Effectiveness of Russian S&T and innovation policy is 
largely determined by the fact that Russia needs to deal with 
a whole host of problems immediately — those connected 
with the generation of new ideas, their transformation into 
high technologies and finally, production of actual goods 
and services. Constraints hindering acceleration of these 
processes take place at both ends: among customers and 
suppliers of R&D products. Nevertheless, the contemporary 
economic potential of the Russian economy is high enough 
to launch the NSI reforms and complete the transition of the 
S&T and innovation sector. 
 (g) The development of the Russian S&T and innovation policy 
should be ultimately aimed at dealing with the key problem 
of the country’s NSI — inefficient use of resources allocated 
to the R&D sector combined with insufficient demand for 
innovations by businesses. 
   Relevance of this problem increases even further in the 
situation of the global economic crisis and the changes it 
brings about. Note that government initiatives to support 
and promote demand and supply in the S&T and innovations 
sphere should be accompanied by a serious effort to widen 
Russia y 131
the range and increase efficiency of tools and mechanisms 
used, including various forms of partnership between the 
state, business and science. This would certainly help to 
put together a system of long-term S&T development goals 
and map the ways of accomplishing them (as it has been 
already done in frameworks of CLTD and other strategic 
documents). 
 (h) To increase the real sector’s demand for R&D products 
and technology in the situation of financial crisis and 
post-crisis recovery, a sensible combination of targeted 
government policy to promote innovation activities and 
an overall improvement of instructional environment for 
entrepreneurship plays a very important role. So far this 
environment is by no means perfect: administrative, legal 
and other barriers hindering emergence and functioning of 
modern market institutions and competitive climate still 
remain in place in Russia, and occasionally even grow. 
   Accordingly, measures planned or already on line seem to 
be particularly important to the country. Among them: 
• the promotion of a national network of development 
institutes (social, financial, etc.). These should provide 
funding and other support to innovation projects at all 
stages, as well as to innovation infrastructure and to small 
and medium companies engaged in technology (and 
other R&D products) transfer, production of innovative 
products/services; 
• the modernisation of technological apparatus (basis); 
development of new technical management (technical 
regulation) tools; 
• the improvement of the situation with enforcement 
of new regulations in the area of intellectual property 
protection and use; 
• the development of the preferential credits system, 
government guarantees and other forms of risk sharing 
between the state and the business. This is especially 
relevant to high technology companies (including small 
and medium firms) exporting high-tech products/
services; 
• the creation of new opportunities to implement results 
of the national technological foresight analysis (this work 
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was launched on a full scale in Russia in 2007) in public 
administration, including development of target federal 
programmes, initiating long-term projects, etc.
 (i) As to improving the quality and increasing supply of R&D 
results available to the real sector of the economy, measures 
which have been implemented during several recent years 
still remain crucial in Russia. These are aimed at completing 
the restructuring of the public R&D sector and increasing its 
efficiency. 
  The following priority steps are envisaged to achieve 
significant progress in this area: 
• to create a centre of excellence network (based on the 
existing or new components of the Russian NSI — 
large R&D organisations and universities), on national, 
industrial, regional and inter-regional levels; provide 
special government support to them; promote their 
networking and cooperation; 
• to carry on with measures aimed at improving conditions 
for integration of science, higher education and business, 
regardless of organisational structures and operational 
modes of the participants; 
• to implement and actively use in public administration a 
system for assessing efficiency and effectiveness of R&D 
organisations (the system for evaluation of R&D units’ 
performance); to improve implementation of appropriate 
procedures, indicators, criteria, etc.; 
• to increase opportunities for R&D organisations and 
universities to participate in commercial (entrepreneurial) 
activities, including establishment of small innovation 
firms and partnerships; 
• to work on improving institutional structure of R&D 
network, by increasing the share of autonomous (public 
and non-profit) organisations, etc. 
 (j) To widen the range and increase efficiency of government 
policy tools, efforts are envisaged to increase efficiency of 
the public–private sector partnership mechanisms. Since in 
Russia this policy area remains to a certain extent exotic, 
accent should be placed mainly on using various ways 
to motivate and encourage potential participants of such 
partnerships established to prepare and implement large-
scale innovative projects. 
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   The following must be done in this area, and as quickly as 
possible: 
• eliminate the remaining limitations on investment 
of public funds in authorised capital of innovative 
companies. In a wider context, fund-raising mechanisms 
to finance innovation projects from all possible sources 
must be improved (including government budgets, non-
budgetary funds, venture capital, foreign investments, 
etc.). Such mechanisms are necessary to create large-scale 
and mass supply of new technologies and innovations in 
Russia; 
• increase the amount of government-backed credit to 
organisations implementing innovation projects; 
• make government procurement more innovation-
oriented; 
• improve the quality of expert evaluation and tender 
procedures; 
• provide financial support to patenting by Russian 
inventors (both in Russia and abroad), and a number of 
other initiatives. 
 (k) Government policy is a major factor and an impulse 
promoting development of the Russian NSI model which 
would ensure efficient use of the country’s R&D and 
innovation potential to speed up economic growth and 
improve the quality of life. However, Russian experience 
sometimes provides examples when government initiatives 
turn into serious barriers. The economic crisis has already 
made ‘inefficient zones’ in the Russian R&D and NSI 
spheres more evident. One would like to hope that dealing 
with the existing problems won’t be postponed ‘until better 
times’ yet again, like it was done 20 years ago. 
   Accordingly, incorporation into various international S&T 
initiatives (projects, programmes, alliances, foundations) 
becomes increasingly important to Russia. In the modern 
global economy participation in international coalitions 
and networks (in particular, in the framework of the BRICS 
project) not only opens access to modern management 
techniques, practical experience accumulated during 
design and implementation of crisis management measures, 
advanced ideas for development and implementation of 
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government policies, but also enables countries to protect 
their own interests in a more efficient way, develop joint 
approaches, identify niches for S&T cooperation and 
expansion on the international markets.
ª 
Notes
 1. The chapter was prepared with the use of the results of the National 
Research University ‘Higher School of Economics’ (HSE) Basic 
Research Programme.
 2. According to the industrial classification adopted in the USSR 
(Scientific–Technical Progress in the USSR: Statistical Abstracts 1990). 
 3. GERD 1990 is 5 times larger compared with GERD 1995 (in constant 
prices). Sources (here and after, except specially stipulated cases): the 
statistical data books published by HSE.   
 4. For example, expenditures per researcher in Germany amount to about 
$ 238,000, in the USA, $ 233,000, in Korea, $ 173,000. Sources: HSE 
(2005); HSE (2007); HSE (2009a); HSE (2009b); HSE (2010); HSE 
(2011a); HSE (2011b); HSE (2011c). For figures for foreign countries, 
data for 2007–2009, or the nearest available, is given.
 5. The most current (but not adopted) documents are ‘Innovative Russia 
— 2020’ (Ministry of Economics 2011); ‘Strategy 2020: New Model of 
Economic Growth — New Social Policy (prepared by expert groups, 
2011).  
 6. In the USSR this lack of usage occurred not only among governments, 
but among the majority of experts and in the scientific community too. 
However, it needs to be pointed out that the dissolution of the USSR 
came about just as the NSI concept was entering the language of policy 
makers worldwide.  
 7. Survey of about 3,000 Russian scientists ‘Assessment of Scientists’ 
Working Conditions and Appeal of a Career in Science’, conducted by 
the HSE in 2007 (Kuznetsova 2008; Gokhberget al.  2010). 
 8. There was no question of implementing any major changes in the 
USSR, nor could anybody raise such an issue.  
 9. Russian Foundation for Basic Research, Russian Foundation for 
Support of Small Enterprises in R&D Sector, Russian Foundation for 
Research in Humanities. 
 10. Especially in the period of crisis.  
 11. In particular, foundations to support R&D and small innovative 
enterprises were created; decisions such as to privatise and commercialise 
certain segments of the S&T sector taken and partially implemented; 
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contract-based system adopted; a number of measures to protect and 
commercialise intellectual property undertaken, etc.
 12. See Gokhberg and Kuznetsova (2009: 30, 32); HSE (2011c).
 13. Communication, activities involving the use of computers and ICT, 
wholesale trade — these industries are subjected to ongoing monitoring 
by Russian innovation statistics. 
 14. Measured by a ratio of the number of enterprises engaged in 
technological or other innovation to the total number of enterprises.
 15. Priority S&T areas are deemed to be subject areas of S&T with potential 
for making a major contribution towards providing the country’s 
security, faster economic growth, greater competitive capacity of 
Russian companies through development of the technological found-
ations of the national economy and R&D-intensive production 
facilities. Critical technologies are considered as sets of technological 
solutions that create potential for further development of various 
technological areas, possess a broad range of innovative applications 
in various sectors of economy and as a whole make the greatest 
contribution to the resolving of the major problems of implementing 
scientific and technological priorities.
 16. These are relations that are not regulated or are poorly governed by 
current legislation. 
 17. A typical science city is a large up-to-date research and industrial 
complex, including HEIs, research institutions, as well as residential area 
provided with cultural and recreation infrastructure. The international 
concept of science cities is to concentrate the scientific potential in 
advanced and pioneer fields, using a favourable environment for 
creative R&D activities. 
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India is now counted among the leading emerging economies of 
the world with a vast network of science and technology (S&T) 
and research and development (R&D) institutional structure. It is 
among the top ten nations of the world for Science Citation Index 
(SCI)–based scientific publications for the decade 1996–2006 and 
second among BRICS countries. The total number of papers almost 
doubled from 20,514 in 1996 to 40,062 in 2006. India spent around 
1.13 per cent of GDP for R&D as a whole in 2007. India’s national 
aggregate gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) 
was about INR 413 billion (US$ 29.5 billion) in 2007–2008. A 
dominant proportion of GERD, around 68 per cent, is met by the 
government sources and 30 per cent from the business enterprise 
sector. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms it works out to be 
about INR 1,660 billion. India ranks higher as compared to countries 
such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa but is behind China which 
spent US$ 110 billion in R&D in PPP terms in 2006, and the United 
States at almost US$ 291 billion in 2006.
India has been experiencing a high growth rate of GDP which 
was 9 and 9.2 per cent for the two years 2005–2006 and 2006–2007, 
respectively, with an average of 6.9 per cent for the seven-year 
period from 2000–2001 to 2006–2007. Much of India’s recent 
growth is driven by innovations in high technology manufacturing 
in drugs and pharmaceuticals, in skill-intensive services in software, 
telecommunications, engineering, automotive, gems and jewellery 
sectors, and to a lesser extent in medical services. Science and 
technology developments in space technology with capabilities 
to launch commercial satellites and un-manned missions to the 
moon, nuclear technology, pharma research capabilities in drug 
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discovery and commercialisation, information and communications 
technology (ICT) software, biotechnology in health and agriculture, 
and the emerging capabilities in automotive research and 
telecommunications have contributed to the country’s emergence as 
an important ‘knowledge power’ from Asia. 
India’s national system of innovation (NSI) is constituted by: (a) 
public research system of national laboratories under major science 
agencies and in-house laboratories in public sector enterprises; 
(b) institutions of higher learning and universities; (c) business 
enterprises both local and foreign; (d) civil society agencies and 
bodies; and (e) institutions and policies of government which 
formulate and implement social, economic, monetary and science, 
technology and innovation policies among others.
The current structure of India’s NSI as we see it today has evolved 
from the post-independence period after 1947. State mediation and 
the role of government support in the development of science, 
technology and higher education has been a crucial aspect of India’s 
current NSI. It has its roots in the 1950s when political leadership led 
by Jawaharlal Nehru had given top priority to science and technology 
institution building. The Scientific Policy Resolution (SPR) of 
1958, India’s first S&T Plan of 1974; and Science and Technology 
Policy Statements in 1983 and 2003 recurrently emphasised building 
national and local capacities in science and technology and attaining 
self-reliance in some crucial sectors of the economy. 
This chapter on the role of the state in the evolution of India’s 
NSI is specifically conceptualised and structured from a historical 
perspective covering three different phases from 1947 to the current 
era. In approaching the role of the state in the evolution of NSI in 
India, the theoretical framework outlined here selectively draws 
on three sets of literature, namely, on NSI, S&T policies and those 
that specifically deal with state mediation through S&T policies. As 
noted, this chapter on the role of the state in the evolution of NSI in 
India adopts a historical perspective. Since India underwent a long 
period of British colonialism, much of modern India’s policy of 
state mediation in science and technology for industrialisation and 
development is shaped from the roots of its colonial struggle for not 
only political independence but technological independence. For 
this reason, we begin looking into the role of state mediation from 
this perspective in the upcoming section.
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Role of State and NSI: Evolution in  
Three Phases1
Establishing a Sanskrit School under Hindu pundits . . . can only 
be expected to load the minds of youth with grammatical niceties 
and metaphysical distinction of little or no practical use . . . But 
as the improvement of the native population is the object of the 
government, it will consequently promote a more liberal and 
enlightened system of instruction, embracing Mathematics, Natural 
Philosophy, Chemistry, Anatomy, with other useful sciences, which 
may be accomplished with the sum proposed by employing a few 
gentlemen of talent and learning, educated in Europe, and providing 
a college furnished with necessary books, instruments and other 
apparatus (Raja Rammohan Roy’s Letter to the Governor General, 
1823).
Indians are incapable of any original work in natural science . . . If 
indeed it exists as yet in this variety of human race . . . so let us exercise 
a little discretion with our weaker brethren and not expect them to 
run before they can walk (H. B. Medlicott, Head, Geological Survey 
of India, 1880).
The role played by the state in the evolution of science, 
technology and innovation policies and institution building is 
intimately connected with the colonial context. As is well-known, 
India was under colonial rule for over three centuries. British 
colonialism is generally seen by Indian historians to have impacted 
on Indian politics, economy and society in both constructive as 
well as destructive or dysfunctional ways and manifestations. In the 
domain of language and teaching of science and technology, Indian 
intellectual elite argued for modern science and technology courses 
to be introduced in colleges with an emphasis on English rather than 
Indian classical languages as argued by Raja Rammohan Roy from 
as early as the 1830s (see earlier quote). In several ways Indians were 
successful in higher education and in the introduction of science and 
technology courses. 
The first modern universities in India which introduced English 
language teaching were established as early as 1857 in Madras, 
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Calcutta and Bombay. In the domain of science and industry, whilst 
the British created over a dozen colonial scientific enterprises such 
as railways, geology, trigonometry, surveys, public works, botanical 
gardens, among other sectors, the structure and functions of these 
scientific enterprises came to be defined in terms of ‘colonial 
science’. There was a division of labour between centre (Britain) 
and periphery (colony). While the former was assigned the role of 
scientific synthesis, the latter was relegated more towards survey 
research and data gathering rather than professionalisation of science 
and technology. Above all, there was considerable discrimination in 
the organisation and recruitment of scientists to high positions as 
the quote of H. B. Medlicott, head of the Geological Survey in the 
1880s reflects.
As argued elsewhere, the period from the late 19th century 
marks a break with colonial science (Krishna 1997a). This period 
is associated with the creation of a series of support structures in 
science and technology. Parallel to colonial science, there emerged a 
stream of early science policy efforts and its role in nation-building 
in the form of ‘national science’ during the 1880s and 1940s. This 
was a phase where elite Indian scientists such as M. N. Saha, P. C. 
Ray, J. C. Bose, Mahenderlal Sircar, among others, forged a close 
alliance with political elite (Jawaharlal Nehru and M. K. Gandhi, etc.) 
towards formulating science policies for nation-building, creating a 
local national science and technology institutional base including 
educational institutions in parallel to colonial science enterprises. A 
number of basic research–oriented science institutions and academic 
groups in universities and colleges, which were established outside 
colonial science enterprises, gave an identity to Indian science in the 
international scientific domain during the 1920s and 1940s. The most 
significant were the two Nobel Prizes given to Indians in literature 
and physics by the 1930s.  
National or independence movements against colonial powers have 
taken root in various other Latin American and African countries. 
However, the specificity of the Indian case is that the intellectual 
struggle against colonial science policies led to the creation of a 
local and national base in science institutions that worked towards 
the formation of an Indian science community which became an 
integral part of the political struggle as well (Krishna 1997a). Thus 
even before independence in 1947, the struggle against colonialism 
and colonial science led to a number of conceptual frameworks and 
views such as the role of science and technology in nation-building, 
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self-reliance in science and technology, and above all, the importance 
of modern science and technology institutions in the development 
of the country.2 All these views and frameworks on science policy 
for development, which were the result of the pre-independence 
struggle, came to play a central part in the state policies which made 
science and technology important factors for development led by 
Jawaharlal Nehru — India’s first Prime Minister — in 1947 (Krishna 
1997a).
We will explore the role of the state in the evolution of the NIS in 
three phases. The first phase is conceptualised to begin with India’s 
independence in 1947 lasting up to 1970. The second phase began 
in the early 1970s and lasted until the late 1980s. The third begins 
with new economic reforms and the liberalisation era in 1991 and 
continues into the 21st century.
1947–1970: Policy for the sciences and self-reliance 
This is the phase in which the role of Nehru and his initiatives in 
science policies dominated and has left a lasting impression on 
the development of science and technology in the country, which 
even reverberates currently in its various manifestations. From the 
perspective of a science policy framework, this period reflects a 
phase of ‘policy for the sciences’ during which the main emphasis 
was on creating a basic infrastructure for science and technology 
in the country including the expansion of the university sector 
for the supply of required S&T human resources. Nehru’s views 
and a framework on science policy with its roots in the pre-
independence period resonated unbounded optimism over science 
and development and assigned a major role for state mediation 
even before independence which is evident from two important 
observations cited here. Speaking at the Indian Science Congress in 
1938 he stressed (Krishna 1997a: 237):
It is science alone that could solve these problems of hunger and 
poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening 
custom and tradition, of vast resources running waste of a rich country 
inhabited by starving people.
The Congress Party’s manifesto which was issued for the first 
national government declared in 1945 underlined the prime role of 
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the state in science and the development of the country (Krishna 
1997a: 237): 
Science in its instrumental fields of activity has played an ever 
increasing part in influencing and moulding human life . . . Industrial, 
agricultural and cultural advance, as well as national defence depend 
on it. Scientific research is, therefore, a basic and essential activity of 
the State and should be organised and encouraged on the widest scale.
While Nehru obtained the party’s legitimation for assigning 
an important role of state mediation and governance of science 
and technology development, the government led by him after 
1947 further legitimised the role of the state as it accepted the 
recommendations of the A. V. Hill Committee Report submitted in 
1944. According to this report and the model of science advocated, 
all science and technology institutions and science agencies including 
national laboratories were to be placed under the overall control of 
a government body or ministry.3 Nehru created the Ministry of 
Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs in 1948 and took on the 
portfolio himself. The building of S&T infrastructure with new 
universities, science agencies and national laboratories came under 
the control of this ministry. Towards establishing infrastructure and 
building institutions in S&T, Nehru deemed it very important to 
bring scientific elite and science leadership closer to the government. 
He used his annual full-day attendance at the Indian Science 
Congress every year after 1947 to strengthen his association with the 
scientific elite and science community where he issued major science 
and technology policy statements and intentions of the government.4 
As early as 1948, addressing the annual Indian Science Congress, he 
called upon scientists by observing that, ‘in India there is a growing 
realisation of this fact that the politician and the scientist should 
work in close cooperation’.
In contrast to Gandhi’s religious and rural focus on development, 
Nehru’s modern, liberal image and his explicit support and orientation 
towards modern science and technology development made him a 
‘messiah’ of Indian science and the science community right from 
the beginning. The Gandhian model did have some influence in 
this phase but could not gain legitimacy as an alternative. This close 
‘alliance between science and politics’, inaugurated by Nehru, which 
is in a large measure relevant even today, played an important part in 
building science and technology institutions. Nehru’s close alliance 
with the science elite extended to S. S. Bhatnagar in industrial 
research, Homi Bhabha in atomic energy establishment, P. C. 
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Mahalanobis in the Planning Commission and D. S. Kothari in the 
defence establishment.
The period between 1948 and the 1960s, during the development 
phase of a policy for the sciences, witnessed rapid expansion of major 
science agencies such as the Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) which has a network of 38 national laboratories 
currently in physical, biological, mechanical, and chemical sciences.5 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Defence Research and 
Development Organisation (DRDO), Indian Council of Agriculture 
Research (ICAR), and Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) 
are some of the other major science agencies created during this 
phase. In the higher education sector, from 30 universities in the late 
1940s, about 95 universities including specialised institutions such 
as the five Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were established 
in this phase.
Table 4.1: Growth of Major S&T Institutions in Terms of Funding and 
Manpower in India








1965–66 1972–73 1958–59 1969–70 1972–
73
1970
DAE 16.3 42.1 33.5 1067 7441 7910 4
CSIR 10.7 29.7 32.8 3512 9515 8979 34
DRDO 3.1 20.4 33.8 1500 7003 9691 37
ICAR 7.8 13.4 39.8 1500 8400 5023 24
ICMR 1.07 2.2 3.2 1001 1585 1021 8
Space
(DoS)
- - 24.3 - - 3694
Subtotal 38.97 107.8 1257.2 8580 33944 36318 107
Source: Rahman et al. (1973: 44, 116–17); Department of Science and Technology 
(1975: 5).
Note: DAE: Department of Atomic Energy; CSIR: Council of Scientific 
and Industrial Research; DRDO: Defence Research and Development 
Organisation; ICAR: India Council of Agriculture Research; ICMR: Indian 
Council of Medical Research; and DoS: Department of Space. 
Compared to the main locus of Indian science in the academic 
settings during the 1920–1940s, the expansion and locus of science 
in the post-independence period shifted to these mission-oriented 
science agencies under government control. The post-war ‘science 
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push’ or innovation chain model triggered considerable optimism 
in the organisation of science under the leadership of Nehru and 
closely associated elite scientists like Homi Bhabha, S. S. Bhatnagar, 
Mahalanobis, J. C. Ghosh, among others. The spirit of policy for 
the sciences perspective was clearly reflected in the Scientific Policy 
Resolution (SPR) passed in the Parliament in 1958 which in fact 
provided legitimation for the expansion of public sciences in India for 
the next three decades or so. The aims of the scientific policy were:6
• to foster, promote, and sustain, by all appropriate means, the 
cultivation of science, and scientific research in all its aspects — 
pure, applied and educational; 
• to ensure an adequate supply, within the country, of research 
scientists of the highest quality, and to recognise their work as 
an important component of the strength of the nation; 
• to encourage, and initiate, with all possible speed, programmes 
for the training of scientific and technical personnel, on a scale 
adequate to fulfil the country’s needs in science and education, 
agriculture and industry, and defence; 
• to ensure that the creative talent of men and women is 
encouraged and finds full scope in scientific activity; 
• to encourage individual initiative for the acquisition and 
dissemination of knowledge, and for the discovery of new 
knowledge, in an atmosphere of academic freedom; and, 
• in general, to secure for the people of the country all the 
benefits that can accrue from the acquisition and application of 
scientific knowledge.
The SPR clearly reflected the perspective of the policy for the 
sciences. Implicit in it was the view that once the infrastructure 
for modern S&T and congenial conditions for R&D are created, 
personnel trained and institutionalisation of science is completed, 
the S&T system will feed into solving the developmental problems 
of India and tackling poverty. What was also stressed was the need 
to develop indigenous technological capabilities. As the explanatory 
note of SPR drew attention, building science and technology 
infrastructure can make up for shortages in raw materials by 
technology-based alternatives and by providing skills which can 
generate revenues in exports. The vision contained in the SPR clearly 
pointed out that a country of India’s dimensions aspiring to become 
industrialised will have to pay a heavy price for importing science 
and technology in the form of plant and machinery, professional 
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personnel and technical consultants. Hence, the SPR argued for 
building infrastructure in S&T which can greatly reduce the drain 
on outward capital flow during the early and critical stages of 
industrialisation. The perspective of self-reliance resonated quite 
forcefully in the Third and Fourth Five Year Plans stretching from 
1961–1966 and 1967–1974, respectively:
a basic objective in the strategy of development is to create the 
conditions in which dependence on external assistance will disappear 
as early as possible (and) replacement of imports is essentially a 
question of developing the necessary capacity for production within 
the country (Planning Commission 1961: 26–27).
the (Fourth Plan) seeks to enlarge the area of self-reliance in terms of 
financial resources and technological inputs (Planning Commission 
1972: vi–vii).
In all its ramifications, the policy for the sciences, which mainly 
focused on building infrastructure and strengthening state control, 
existed in relative isolation to economic and industrial policies in this 
phase up to 1970. These policies mainly emphasised a thrust towards 
self-reliance and import-substitution and highly regulated controls 
on import of technology and private foreign investment. The 1962 
conflict with China and subsequent conflicts in 1965 and 1971 with 
Pakistan further reinforced the state commitment towards self-
reliance in technology, and the state’s aversion of import dependence 
basically meant a further thrust to import-substitution in industry as 
well as its technological requirements. The Fourth Five Year Plan, 
referred to earlier, had specific directions for the expansion of public 
sector enterprises:
[T]he public sector should increasingly base itself on domestic know-
how. The public and private sector have both been ready to look for 
foreign collaboration and not only for financial but for technological 
resources. We should rely more and more on our own machinery and 
technical know-how even though it may entail some initial risks and 
difficulties.
Self-reliance in the technological sense implies the existence 
and effective functioning of indigenous organization for design, 
construction and engineering projects as well as capability for 
design and development of machinery, equipment and instruments 
indigenously manufactured (Government of India 1972: vi–vii  
and 48).
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The command public sector enterprises in railways, fertilisers, steel, 
pharmaceuticals, among other industries, followed these import-
substitution and self-reliance policies and made efforts to develop 
technology through promoting in-house R&D units. India had to 
depend on technology transfer from abroad for a range of industrial 
sectors in the 1940s and 1950s but by the mid-1960s onwards 
the policies turned towards tightening import of technology in 
favour of developing indigenous technological capabilities in these 
sectors. Almost all these sectors established in-house R&D units or 
laboratories towards this end but India did not evolve any national 
science and technology plan until the early 1970s and only in the 
early 1980s did India issue her first technology policy statement. 
Arguably, these two documents also reiterated India’s commitment 
to the long-standing ‘inward looking’ policies of import-
substitution and self-reliance. In large measure, these economic and 
industrial policies de-emphasised export promotion and the liberal 
import of technology. The government created the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) in 1969 and the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973 to control foreign inflow 
of firms and liberal financing. Banks were nationalised in 1969 
which were directed by the state to focus on and support small-scale 
industry; within a short period of 10 years from the 1960s to 1970s 
items reserved for small firms increased from 51 to 147 (Sridharan 
1995). Among the various policy measures introduced in this phase, 
the most significant one, which was designed to strengthen India’s 
technological capabilities while fostering import-substitution and 
self-reliance, was the 1970 Patent Act. It was amended in 1970 
which then reduced the duration of patents from 16 to 14 years, 
and seven years for food- and drug-related patents. For over three-
and-a-half decades, India was able to increase her pharmaceutical 
technological base and capabilities through reverse engineering in 
drug development and commercialisation.
1970s to 1990s:  Science and technology in policy 
and redefining self-reliance
The efforts invested in building infrastructure in science and 
technology institutions and higher education continued in this phase 
with renewed emphasis. The second layer of science agencies such as 
the Department of Space (DoS), Department of Electronics (DoE), 
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Department of Environment (DoEn), Department of Biotechnology 
(DBT), and Department of Ocean Development (DoD) were 
created in this phase (see Table 4.3). In higher education, another 55 
universities were established bringing the tally of total universities 
to around 145 by the end of this phase in 1990. Compared to China, 
India had a much larger visibility in the international scientific 
world of publications throughout from 1980 to the early 1990s. 
For instance, in 1990 India published 10,103 science publications 
measured in SCI, whereas, China published 6,509.7 As Table 4.2 
shows, India’s stock of human resources increased more than four 
times between 1970 and 1990 from 1.147 to 4.811 million. 













31.5 46.8 75.0 138.9 244.4 329.4 873.9 1456.0
Science 
Postgraduates




60.0 102.9 165.6 261.5 420.0 750.5 2430.3 3837.7
Agriculture 
Postgraduates








18.0 29.0 41.6 60.6 97.8 165.4 310.3 403.4
Total 155.0 257.7 416.0 700.5 1147.5 1780.7 4811.6 7664.9
Source: Department of Science and Technology (1999, 2002). 
Note: *Including graduates.
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Table 4.3: Public R&D Expenditure of Major Science Agencies, 1990–1991, 
1998–1999 and 2000–2001
Figures in US$ (PPP)
Science Agency 1990–1991 1998–1999 2000–2001 2004
DRDO (Defence)  756,66.0 2421.2 2129.26 1952.85
DOS (Space) 429.1 1595.2 1728.73 1691.42
DAE (Atomic Energy) 306.1 880.7 na 2715.00
ICAR (Agriculture) 306.8 888.4 1577.68 1079.28
CSIR (Industrial Research) 276.7 750.8 924.00 811.42
MOEF (Environment & 
Forest)
180.0 397.89 894.73 na
DST (All S&T) 133.1 314.7 769.89 840.00
DBT (Biotechnology) 45.8 99.47 148.94 195.00
DOD (Ocean) 30.8 89.26 177.68 142.14
ICMR (Medical) 49.4 90.73 154.73 705.71
MIT (ICT) 36.6 65.36 80.00 358.51
MNES (Non-Conventional 
Energy)
17.7 9.47 na na
Source: Department of Science and Technology (2002, 2004), R&D Statistics; for 2004 
see India’s Emergence as Global R&D Centre, Working Paper R2007:012, 
Swedish Institute of Growth Policy Studies, Sweden.
This phase characterises a trend of science and technology policy 
and redefining self-reliance. The former clearly reflected the inputs 
of science and technology and its expectations in the policy as well as 
political and economic processes of development. Various processes 
of S&T planning beginning with the creation of the National 
Commission on Science and Technology (NCST) in 1972 and the 
launching of India’s first Science and Technology Plan (1974–1979) 
which made explicit reference to attaining indigenous technology 
capacities in various sectors differentiate the earlier phase of science 
policy. For the first time after independence, planning in S&T 
came into policy discourse and action. Having established a good 
deal of infrastructure in S&T, political and economic expectations 
of science and development increased, together with some visible 
impacts justifying science and technology policy. India entered the 
nuclear and space ‘clubs’ by the 1980s and notwithstanding various 
criticisms, experienced relative success in the ‘Green Revolution’ and 
‘White Revolution’. Having established technological capabilities in 
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some high technology areas such as space, nuclear, pharmaceuticals 
and green revolution technologies, the government realised that a 
‘water tight’ compartmentalised framework on self-reliance and 
import-substitution of the previous phase was no more tenable 
for the 1980s and beyond. The old policy regime which was often 
referred to as ‘nationalist technological policies’ of the 1960s was out 
of date in the 1980s as India had already initiated the indigenisation 
programmes from defence, space and military industrial projects to 
pharmaceuticals and the whole public sector enterprises in power, 
steel, fertiliser, railways, among others. There prevailed a serious 
concern of the increasing technological gap with industrialised 
countries and the need for ‘catching up’ within a perspective of 
endogenous technological capability. As far as India could maintain 
the balance of her endogenous technological base, it was thought 
wise to liberalise import of technology and open up to export 
regimes. This was important as India’s dependence on foreign 
technology increased as the era of the 1980s came into sharp policy 
focus over new technologies such as micro electronics, information 
technologies and biotechnology.
In an effort to reformulate the framework for self-reliance and 
import substitution they were re-defined, which had definite 
implications for public research institutions and industry. These 
concerns were further articulated in economic policies contained in 
India’s Sixth Five Year Plan (1980–1985) and the 1983 Technology 
Policy Statement. The re-defined terms of the Sixth Plan observed 
that ‘self reliance, as should be obvious, but often is not, does not 
necessarily mean, self-sufficiency in all sections of the economy’. It 
went on to assert further, ‘however, self-reliance can no longer take 
the form of indiscriminate import-substitution . . . export promotion 
is as much a part of the drive for self-reliance as efficient import-
substitution’.8 Similarly, the Technology Policy Statement of 19839 
sought to make it clear that import of technology and foreign 
investment in this regard, will continue to be permitted only on a 
selective basis. Further, the policy document stressed that ‘there shall 
be a firm commitment for absorption, adaptation and subsequent 
development of imported know-how through adequate investment 
in Research and Development to which importers of technology will 
be expected to contribute’ (Technology Policy Statement 1983).10
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As the country entered the decade of the 1980s it was entangled 
in a double bind situation. On the one hand, new technologies 
such as biotechnology and ICT and material sciences posed new 
challenges for their absorption and diffusion forcing the government 
to lift restrictions on international technology transfer. On the other 
hand, the critiques increasingly pointed to the failure of S&T for 
development and the removal of poverty. Despite a number of 
visible achievements, much of the ‘grand optimism’ over science and 
development of the earlier phase began to erode during this phase, 
also on account of  the 1973 oil crises and the rise of appropriate 
technology and people science movements (Krishna 1997b). As the 
criticism from various quarters mounted to question the optimistic 
role of S&T for development envisaged during the earlier phase, the 
government geared up to formulate appropriate responses. As the 
basic needs agenda came into sharp focus, the government again 
responded, this time with the new policy agenda of ‘Technology 
Missions’ around the mid-1980s. These were time-bound regulated 
schemes for tackling the basic needs through redirection of 
science and technology inputs in water, immunisation, oil-seeds, 
telecommunications, leather and literacy. The period from the 
mid-1980s to the 1990s was one of considerable political instability 
coupled with the challenges of new technologies. The main industrial 
and S&T policy agenda towards the 1990s remained focused on how 
to open up and liberalise the Indian economy. Actually the process 
of liberal economic policies and deregulating industry began from 
the Rajiv Gandhi regime in 1985 when a number of restrictions on 
MRTP and FERA companies were lifted and a large number of 
products reserved for small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) 
were taken out from the list. In this phase, globalisation became a 
reality which mounted considerable pressure on the political system 
to embark on new economic reforms from the early 1990s.
1991–2000: New economic reforms and turn to 
decentralised S&T policies11
With the coming of the new Congress government under P. V. 
Narasimha Rao and Dr Manmohan Singh (presently India’s Prime 
Minister) as the finance minister, the government embarked on what 
has come to be known as New Economic Reforms from June 1991. 
The main feature of this reform process was the New Industrial 
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Policy (1991) with a major departure from the earlier era. Indian 
economic policies, compared to China’s economic reforms from 
1978, introduced a series of liberal economic policies with a focus on 
export promotion, selective privatisation, foreign direct investment 
and unprecedented encouragement to the private industrial sector 
in power, transportation, mineral exploration, electronics and 
telecommunication, pharmaceuticals, and ICT.
By the time the government announced a Science and Technology 
Policy in 2003, there had been a notable shift in the formulation and 
execution of S&T policies from the earlier phases. Even though the 
government did not abandon the concepts of self-reliance in S&T 
and drive towards endogenous technological capabilities, their 
meaning got somewhat broadened within the framework of global 
competitiveness and export promotion. The Ministry of Industry in 
1991 declared:12
[while] government would continue to follow the policy of self-
reliance, there would be greater emphasis placed on building up 
India’s ability to pay for imports through its own foreign exchange 
earnings. At the same time, foreign collaboration would be welcomed 
in investment and technology in order to increase exports and 
expand the production base requiring higher technology (Planning 
Commission 1991).
In contrast to the S&T policy statements (such as in 1958, 1986 and 
2003; and the 1974 S&T Plan) which covered a range of subjects and 
sectors of economy in a somewhat overarching structure, the last 
decade witnessed a shift towards what may be characterised as a turn 
to decentralised S&T policies.13 Compared to previous phases when 
bureaucratic-elite scientists (for example, people like Homi Bhabha, 
S. S. Bhatnagar, Vikram Sarabhai, M. G. K. Menon, among others) 
in alliance with political leadership wielded considerable power in 
articulating and shaping national S&T policies encompassing several 
sectors, the last decade witnessed a remarkable shift in the way 
that S&T policies were formulated and implemented at the level of 
different sectors. A notable change in the Indian S&T policy-making 
in the 1990s was the end of the domination of physicists of the 
1950s to 1970s era. Technocrats such as Sam Pitroda, chemists such 
as R. A. Mashelkar, biologists such as P. Balram, P. M. Bhargava 
and S. K. Bhan, and bureaucrats-cum-strategic scholars such as 
K. Subrahmanyam, among others, come to influence and shape 
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public policies in S&T. With the economic growth around the 6.9 
per cent average for the period 2001 and 2006, there was a rise of 
private industry sectors in telecommunications, software, media 
and entertainment, pharmaceuticals, automotive, high technology 
manufacturing, among others; business enterprises came to influence 
decision making in policy formulation in the last decade. For 
instance, business captains such as Rahul Bajaj (three-wheeler auto 
sector); Ratan Tata and Keshub Mahindra (auto sector); Narayana 
Murthy and the software sector association — NASSCOM; Ambani 
brothers (petrochemicals and telecommunications); Mittal brothers 
(telecommunications); Baba Kalyani (industrial forging); representa-
tives of private industrial houses and their associations such as FICCI 
and CII for instance, etc., came to influence and participate in science, 
technology and innovation policies as never before in contemporary 
history. The government at the same time created more space for 
private business enterprises as a part of the economic and market 
strategies of public–private partnerships in various infrastructure 
and development programmes in the last decade. Also, the civil 
society representatives and science and technology-based activists 
have all come to influence and shape the S&T policies which are 
formulated and implemented at the sector level. In other words, even 
though the government issues overall national S&T policies from 
time to time, there is no one ‘centre of gravity’. There are multiple 
actors and agencies at the level of different sectors that have come to 
play a significant role in shaping S&T policies and the economy as 
a whole with respect to specific sectors. After 2003, the government 
did not issue any major overarching S&T policy statement and at the 
same time various government science and technology departments, 
ministries and science agencies together have issued over 20 to 25 
major policy measures in about 10 sectors of the economy. Table 
4.4 summarises some of the most significant policy measures and 
initiatives in different sectors during the last few years.
It may be noted that this shift towards a decentralised mode is 
mainly concerned with science, technology and innovation policies 
and institutional measures concerned with economic and knowledge-
based growth sectors of the Indian economy. However, what is left 
intact without any significant change, as in the previous phases, is 
the mode of articulation and implementation of innovation-related 
policies which have societal implications such as environment, 
climate change, human development, national security, etc. Such
Table 4.4: Sector-based Science, Technology and Innovation Policies: 
Tier Two, 1990s to 2009
Sector Main Policies/Initiatives
Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical Policy 2002
2005 Patent Act (1970 Act amended)
Biotechnology Biological Diversity Act 2002
Bioinformatics Policy 2004
Biotechnology Industry Partnership Programme 
(BIPP) 2007–2008
Small Business Innovation Research Initiative 
(SIBRI) 2008
ICT Software Software Technology Parks (STP) Policy Initiative, 
DOE  (1990)
Creation of Ministry of Information Technology 
(1999)
National Task Force on ICT in the Planning 
Commission (2006)
Information Technology Act 2000; and Amendment 
2008
Nuclear Energy Indo-US Nuclear Deal 2008, Atomic Energy 
Commission
Space Satellites Launch Missions, Department of Space
Chandrayan Mission 2008–2009
Agriculture Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmer’s Rights Act 
India (2001)
National Seed Policy 2002
National Agriculture Innovation Project (2006)
Telecommunications New Telecom Policy 1999
Broadband Policy 2004
Rural Development National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 2007
Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission
National Rural Health Mission
Industry Pharmaceutical R&D Support Programme 2004
Home Grown Technology Programme
Fund for Accelerating Start-ups 2008
New Millennium India Technology Leadership 
Initiative 2003
National Innovation Project for Industry 2008
Programme on Cluster Development, Ministry of 
Industry
National Automotive Testing and R&D 
Infrastructure Project
Source: Compiled from official websites of various government departments and 
ministries.
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overarching policies which cut across various economic and social 
sectors of the economy are enacted and implemented mainly at 
the level of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and its constituent 
or closely networked bodies and institutional units such as the 
National Planning Commission, Principal Scientific Advisor to the 
government that advises the central cabinet of ministers led by the 
Prime Minister, etc. For example, India’s national position and policy 
on climate change, skill development council, overarching trade 
and economic relations and energy, among others, are initiated and 
articulated at the PMO. Thus it is more reasonable to conceptualise 
the change and shift taking place in science and technology policies 
in the current decade after the 1991 reforms in terms of a two-tier 
decentralised mode. The first tier overarching mode operates at the 
highest level of the PMO and its closely related bodies. The second 
tier operates more in a decentralised mode at the levels of various 
sectors of economy mainly steered by relevant ministries and their 
respective departments.  





at National Planning 
Commission
Office of Principal Scientific 
Advisor to the Government
PM Council on 
Climate Change
With Plan Steering 
Committee on S&T, 
energy, environment, etc.
Evolving policies, strategies 
and missions for generation 
of innovations and support 
systems for multiple 
applications
PM National 





Policies on inclusive 
development in the 11th 
Plan on employment 
guarantee, health, urban 
renewal, infrastructure, 
education, water, irrigat-
ion, rural telephony, rural 
electrification, etc.
Evaluation and review studies 
on various science and 
technology-related matters;
Reports on optimal use in S&T 
resources; development of 









Creation of missions and also 
undertake multi-departmental, 
multi-institutional projects 
in strategic, technology and 
other areas of economic/social 
relevance
Source: Author’s elaboration.
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Turn to innovation in S&T policy discourse: 2003 
The post-1991 reform agenda of the government which clearly set its 
policy tone towards outward-looking strategy compared to previous 
regimes was gradually cemented in the policy discourse throughout 
the 1990s and particularly after the dawn of the new millennium. As 
Mukherjee (2009: 92) draws to our attention, Dr Manmohan Singh 
in 1995 clearly envisaged and underscored the changing economic 
context; ‘India’s tryst with globalization has become irreversible 
— no matter which government came to power after the elections 
of 1996’. Globalisation in India was closely associated with the 
country’s high technology and knowledge capabilities assuming an 
increasing share in global software services and its exports. India’s 
drive in export of software services as well as in non-high technology 
sectors such as gems and jewellery gave a new dimension of strategic 
economic advantages in exports and globalisation as never before. 
At the same time, it became clear that there are several sectors of 
both high technology and those that are SME based which have a 
high potential provided the government introduced appropriate 
innovation policy measures. India’s relative success in ICT software, 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals since the 1990s in a large measure 
demonstrated the importance of policies and the role of the state in 
injecting dynamism at the level of sectors. Even though perspectives 
underlying a sectoral system of innovation did not figure in the 
formal science, technology and innovation policies, the question 
of why and how certain sectors of Indian economy exhibited more 
dynamism and growth compared to others drew the attention of 
policy makers at the Planning Commission.  
The year 2003 assumed considerable significance for the turn 
towards innovation in the S&T policy discourse. Two important 
developments signalled this important turn. First was the massive 
exercise in technology forecasting in about 20 sectors undertaken by 
the Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council 
(TIFAC) of the Department of Science and Technology (DST), 
Ministry of S&T, under A. P. J. Abdul Kalam and Y. S. Rajan. 
This resulted in a volume titled, India 2020 — Vision for the New 
Millennium published in 2003. They explored both the weaknesses 
and strengths of India, as a nation, and offered their version of 
how India can emerge to be among the world’s first four economic 
powers by 2020. Inherent and central to their argument was the 
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attention given to innovation as an important concept, tool and a 
strategy which had considerable policy impact since the late 1990s 
when the exercise on forecasting began at TIFAC. As Mr Kalam 
assumed the office as India’s president, the volume had a radiating 
impact on India’s S&T policies in the five years beginning 2002. 
Second, the Science and Technology Policy Statement 2003 
(hereafter S&T Policy 2003) which was issued by the government 
in 2003 clearly reflected the changing economic scenario of 
globalisation and underscored the importance of innovation. Part 
C of the document made explicit the ‘strategy and implementation 
plan’, wherein, it clearly articulated the need for ‘integration of 
the programmes in socio-economic sectors with R&D activities’ 
on the one hand and ‘promoting close and productive interaction 
between private and public institutions in science and technology’ 
on the other hand. The S&T Policy 2003 goes on to underline the 
importance of strengthening ‘enabling mechanisms that relate to 
technology development, evaluation, absorption and upgradation 
from concept to utilization’. While the objectives outlined in the 
S&T Policy 2003 drew attention to strengthening infrastructure 
for science and technology in academic institutions, new funding 
mechanisms for basic research, human resource development, 
strengthening technology transfer mechanisms between industry 
and science and intellectual property, among other things, the two 
most important objectives of the policy clearly spelled out the turn 
to innovation as follows:14
The transformation of new ideas into commercial successes is of vital 
importance to the nation’s ability to achieve high economic growth 
and global competitiveness. Accordingly, special emphasis will be 
given not only to R&D and technological factors of innovation, but 
also to the other equally important social, institutional and market 
factors needed for adoption, diffusion and transfer of innovation to 
the productive sectors. . . 
Innovation will be supported in all its aspects. A comprehensive 
national system of innovation will be created covering science and 
technology as also legal, financial and other related aspects. There is a 
need to change the ways in which society and economy performs, if 
innovation has to fructify.
In continuation of the reform process initiated in 1991 by 
Dr Manmohan Singh as India’s finance minister, the Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee government, in all its ramifications, continued many of 
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those reforms until Dr Singh again assumed charge as Prime Minister 
in 2004. The reforms accelerated growth in various sectors of the 
Indian economy affecting foreign trade and investment, and fiscal 
reforms affecting liberalisation and foreign ownership of firms. Since 
2004 the government has initiated a wide range of initiatives targeted 
at specific sectors such as software, telecom, biotech and pharma, 
automotive, among others. Since 2003, the Indian Parliament has 
ratified a number of laws giving protection to intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and in 2005 it passed a patent regime that is compliant 
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) standards followed the 
world over.
Contemporary Structure and Organisation of 
India’s National System of Innovation15
Actors and agencies of India’s NSI
India’s national aggregate gross expenditure on research and 
development was about INR 413 billion (US$ 29.5 billion) in 
2007–2008. In absolute terms, Indian GERD witnessed a substantial 
increase of 60 per cent from INR 249 billion (US$ 17.78 billion) in 
2004–2005 to INR 413 billion (US$ 29.5 billion) in 2007–2008. As 
a proportion of GDP, it witnessed an increase from 0.8 per cent 
of GDP in 1992–1993 to 1.13 per cent in 2003–2005. However, it 
registered a marginal decrease to 1 per cent for the period 2004–2007 
as estimated by government sources. Notwithstanding the current 
ongoing economic downturn, the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan 
Singh, announced in January 2009 that the government is committed 
to increase 2 per cent of GDP for R&D. 
A dominant proportion of GERD, around 68 per cent, is met by 
government sources and 30 per cent from the business enterprise 
sector. 
Except for making the idea of creating NSI explicit in the S&T 
Policy 2003 statement, India is yet to formally define her NSI as 
such. However, the structure and network of relationships and 
institutional arrangements exist both in the formal and informal 
sense between different actors.16  Such a structure of an innovation 
system is mainly constituted by: (a) public research system (PRS); (b) 
private business enterprise and transnational corporations (TNCs), 
Indian and foreign; (c) higher educational institutions (HEIs); and 
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(d) state mediation through public policies. We shall briefly explore 
various facets of the structure and organisation of India’s NSI and 
then devote a separate section to the importance of state mediation.
Public Research System
This comprises national laboratories under a dozen sci-
ence and technology agencies from the areas of space, atomic 
energy, agriculture, industrial research, etc. (see Table 4.1), and in-
house R&D laboratories in large public sector enterprises in steel, 
fertilisers, railways, power, transport and aviation, chemicals, petro-
leum and energy, etc. The PRS is India’s main actor of NSI as it 
accounted for 68 per cent of GERD in 2007 and 69 per cent (159,000) 
of the total 230,000 R&D personnel of the country in 2005.17 Out of 
the total 230,000 R&D personnel, 71,300 (31 per cent) work in major 
science agencies such as CSIR, DAE, DBT, etc., 32,200 (14 per cent) 
work in universities and 55,200 (24 per cent) in government-based 
public sector enterprises and state government laboratories. 
Private Business Enterprises and TNCs
This is the second major actor of the Indian innovation system which 
accounted for 30 per cent of GERD in 2007 and 31 per cent of total 
R&D personnel (71,300) of the country in 2005. In 1990–1991 the 
private sector accounted for 13.8 per cent of GERD which increased 
to 20.3 per cent in 2001–2002 and to 30 per cent in 2006.18  The 
corresponding figure for GERD shows an increase from 2.4 billion 
Euros in 2002 to 5.5 billion Euros in 2005.
In recent years the business enterprise sector assumed considerable 
importance with the global competitive edge in pharmaceuticals, 
automotive, software, telecommunications, and biotechnology. 
Whereas the international economic crises created ripples in the 
US and European markets and industry insofar as the auto and IT 
sectors are concerned, a more optimistic market scenario emerged in 
the Indian case. In the midst of the crises, Tata launched the world’s 
cheapest small car, Nano, into the Indian market on 23 March 2009 
with an advanced booking for over 120,000 cars.19 The second Indian 
auto firm, Mahindra and Mahindra also launched its indigenous 
new model of ‘Scorpio’ — a semi-utility vehicle. Indian automobile 
production from 5.3 million units in 2001–2002 grew to 10.8 million 
units in 2007–2008. In 2006–2007, the Indian automotive industry 
provided direct employment to more than 300,000 people and 
contributed 5 per cent of India’s GDP. 
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The other sector which witnessed robust growth and expansion 
is telecommunications. The Indian telecom market was one of the 
fastest growing markets in the world in 2009 in terms of subscribers, 
a little behind China. China stands at more than 800 million telecom 
subscribers and India at more than 500 million.20 This figure in 2012 
stands at 900 million. In January 2009 alone India added 15 million 
subscribers. The third sector which witnessed a reasonable growth 
despite economic crises is India’s IT industry which contributed to 
over 5.8 per cent of India’s GDP in 2008–2009. The industry grew 
by 28 to 29 per cent in the last few years but has slowed down in 
2008–2009. For instance, among the top 20 firms operating in the 
IT sector in India, all big Indian firms such as Tata Consultancy 
Services, Wipro, Infosys, HCL, and Tech Mahindra–Satyam 
witnessed modest growth rates between 15 to 20 per cent during 
2007–2008 and 2008–2009.21 Despite the slowdown, the Indian 
IT-BPO sector grew by 12 per cent in 2008–2009 to reach US$ 59.5 
billion in aggregate revenue. 
The trend of the global R&D flows to India is sustained and 
growing in the situation of an economic downslide. About 260 
global TNCs operate their R&D centres or laboratories in India 
in the Bangalore, Hyderabad, Delhi, Pune, and Chennai regions. 
Bangalore is the most preferred destination for foreign R&D centres 
which accounts for 45 per cent of the firms, followed by NCR 
(Delhi) with 22 per cent.
The rise of the business enterprise sector as an important actor 
of NSI is also evident from various Indian firms which followed the 
Tatas who acquired the UK steel firm Corus, and Mittal’s acquisition 
of the Belgian-French firm Arcelor.
Higher Educational Institutions
With over 400 universities with 18,000 affiliated colleges, much of 
the recent dynamism witnessed in the knowledge-based and high 
technology sectors of the Indian economy is the result of human 
resources, skills and the vast institutional base already created in 
the higher educational sector. In an effort to sustain this dynamism 
the government increased the higher education budget by three 
times in 2009–2010. However, R&D in HEIs in India is a weak 
link in India’s NSI which accounts for a mere 14 per cent of R&D 
personnel compared to 55 per cent of total R&D personnel of the 
country in PRS. Higher education R&D is less than 8 per cent of 
GERD. However, universities accounted for over 52.2 per cent of 
India y 161
India’s total 28,603 SCI-based publications in 2005 which makes the 
sector a very important actor of the innovation system.22 In 2006 the 
government set up the National Knowledge Commission to assess, 
plan and recommend the knowledge challenges of the 21st century. 
Three major developments in the higher educational sector are: (a) 
increase India’s competitive advantage in the fields of knowledge 
by expanding the existing 400 universities to 1,500 by 2015; (b) 
15-year career support programme through scholarships from high 
school to Ph.D. level; and (c) promote university–industry links and 
partnerships. The Knowledge Commission’s tenure continued with 
the new government in 2009 and its operations are being expanded.
According to various estimates and data from authentic sources, 
India produces about 2.5 million graduates every year, of which 
300,000 are engineers and 150,000 IT professionals. This is in con-
trast to 70,000 engineers in USA, 33,000 in Germany and 600,000 in 
China. However, according to Farrel et al. (2005), with 14 million 
young university graduates (with seven years or less of work 
experience) India’s talent pool is estimated to be the largest in the 
world, overlapping the Chinese talent pool by 50 per cent and that 
of USA by 100 per cent.23 
Innovation governance system
The innovation governance structure in India mainly comprises three 
main actors or agencies which are hierarchically interconnected and 
networked. The top most body is the Indian Parliament which consists 
of the upper house (Rajya Sabha) and lower house (Lok Sabha). The 
former is constituted based on political party representation which 
in a way is an indirect representation of the people in Parliament. The 
latter is a directly elected body of the people’s representatives every 
five years. All acts and policies of innovation need the ratification of 
Parliament which generally operates through a committee system. 
Committees are of two kinds — standing committees and ad hoc 
committees. The former are elected or appointed every year or 
periodically and their work goes on, more or less, on a continuous 
basis. The latter are appointed on an ad-hoc basis as need arises and 
they cease to exist as soon as they complete the task assigned to 
them. Much of the work on science and technology-related issues 
including innovation is first examined by the standing committees 
and then taken up for ratification by the Parliament. For example, 
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currently an innovation-related bill namely, ‘The Protection and 
Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008’ is 
pending for the ratification of Parliament in 2012.
At the second level, the PMO, in consultation with the Planning 
Commission and other concerned ministries and departments 
formulates, initiates and implements various innovation-related 
policies. For example, the initiative to launch policies on climate 
change which seek to implement eight national missions from 
solar energy to green technologies in the manufacturing sector 
originated in the PMO’s office. This office is supported by the 
Principal Scientific Advisor, the Science Advisory Council to the 
Prime Minister. In 2006–2007 the PMO also constituted a National 
Knowledge Commission in the advisory role. At this level, the 
Planning Commission plays an important role as it formulates and 
creates a framework for innovation policies and related aspects. For 
instance, the Steering Committee on S&T for the 11th Plan played 
an important role which was chaired by the head of the Scientific 
Advisor Council to the PMO.
At the third level various ministries from science and technology 
to industry, human resource development and other sectors have 
the legal mandate to launch and implement various programmes and 
schemes on innovation based on the broad framework on innovation 
and related matters given by higher bodies. The Ministry of S&T has 
two important bodies, the Department of Science and Technology 
and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, which 
mainly administered and implemented innovation programmes and 
schemes on behalf of the government. The ministry-level bodies also 
coordinate and co-opt various business enterprises, industries and 
NGOs and their representative associations in a range of innovation 
policy-related matters.
Main objectives 
There is no formal national innovation policy or statement announced 
by the Indian government so far but various other policy documents 
on science and technology for development and on economic growth 
have made reference to innovation policies. The policy documents 
which are important from a national perspective and relevant to the 
coming five years are listed in Table 4.4. The term innovation has 
become an important concept and more often is used in a generic 
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reference to various aspects of development and implementation of 
economic and industrial policies in the country. The most formal 
usage of the term is found in two draft policy documents being 
circulated by the Ministry of Science and Technology.24 
The term innovation is referred to as a process for incremental 
or significant technical advance or change, which provides 
enhancement of measurable economic value, and shall include: (a) 
introducing new or improved goods or services; (b) implementing 
new or improved operational processes; and (c) implementing new 
or improved organisational or managerial processes. Measurable 
value enhancement or economic significance may include one or 
more of the following: (i) increase in market share; (ii) competitive 
advantage; (iii) improvement in the quality of products or services; 
(iv) reduction of costs.25 
Other policy documents refer to innovation in a somewhat 
similar meaning but stress is laid on the aspect of new knowledge 
or inventions or advances in knowledge from national laboratories 
and the way in which it gets commercialised or used by society, 
industry or any clients. The policy documents listed in Table 4.6 
underline objectives which form a basis or a broad framework of 
India’s innovation policies. It must be noted that much of the policy 
discourse in these documents focuses more on creating an enabling 
ecosystem for innovation or what can be termed as an innovation 
potential or capacity in various institutions and organisational 
structures. 
The major objectives which relate to creating this innovation 
potential or capacity are as follows:
• Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has set the goal of attaining 
2 per cent of GDP for R&D from the current level of 1.3 
per cent.26 The objective here is to encourage the business 
enterprise to double its contribution to GERD from the 
current proportion of 30 per cent GERD.
• Use ‘technology foresight’ to make the right technology 
choices and introduce ‘coherent synergy’ in our S&T efforts. 
Technology foresight helps in the selection of critical technol-
ogies for development at any point of time.
• In an effort to accomplish the goal of a knowledge-based 
society and economy, the government has given top priority to 
both elementary and school-level education as well as higher 
164 y v. v. KriSHna
education. The goal is to attain 6 per cent of GDP for education 
in the 11th Five Year Plan period. This plan has earmarked a 
four times increase in education in the plan period. In terms 
of pragmatic goals, the aim is to increase the enrolment ratio 
in higher education from the current level of 11 per cent to 15 
per cent in the coming five years. The National Knowledge 
Commission set this goal for 2015.
• To create a total of 1,500 universities by 2015 by reconstituting 
18,000 existing under-graduate and post-graduate colleges; 
reform higher education to infuse quality, excellence and 
accountability. 
• To effectively implement an education budget of INR 3 trillion 
(or US$ 214 billion) in the 11th Five Year Plan Period (2007–
2012); this is a fivefold increase over the 10th Plan. To increase 
the share of education from 7.7 per cent to 20 per cent by the 
end of the plan period.
• To strengthen the human resource skill base, particularly in 
nuclear, space and new technologies such as biotechnology 
and genetics, nanotechnology and ICT, in universities and 
other institutions in higher education. 
• To strengthen vocational education, a new Skill Development 
Mission under the supervision of the Prime Minister with 
an outlay of 4,509 million Euros or INR 31,2000 million. 
To aim at opening 1,600 new Industrial Training Institutes 
(ITIs) and polytechnics, 10,000 new vocational schools and 
50,000 new Skill Development Centres. A Skill Development 
Corporation will also be created by the government with the 
active participation of the private sector to give special training 
to young men and women, workers and technicians.
• To enhance India’s competitiveness in micro, small-and 
medium-scale enterprises by making R&D in national 
laboratories relevant to the needs and demands of this sector. 
The government goal is to expand some novel R&D and 
innovation schemes (in DBT, DST, DSIR and other science 
agencies) to achieve this important goal. The overarching 
goal is, however, to realise the aim of inclusive development 
through appropriate research policies. 
• To foster research and innovation policies to accomplish 
the goal of a Second Green Revolution through national 
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agriculture innovation policy and introduce a systemic basis of 
research and innovation in agriculture and its extension.
• To strengthen India’s intellectual property, particularly in 
public research institutions and the higher educational sector. 
The overall aim is to boost entrepreneurship and innovation 
potential dormant in universities and national laboratories.
• To promote international science and technology collaboration 
by participating in international ‘mega projects’ as an ‘equal 
partner’ to enhance India’s international reputation in big 
science.
• The Prime Minister’s pronouncement on climate change is 
that India is committed not to exceed the per capita emission 
levels of developed countries. The objective is to establish an 
effective, cooperative and equitable global approach based on 
the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and capacities in the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The national action plan 
on climate change hinges on the development of institutional 
mechanisms. The objective is to establish eight national 
missions (solar energy, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable 
habitat, water mission, sustaining Himalayan ecosystem, 
Green India, sustainable agriculture, and strategic knowledge 
on climate change).
Main challenges confronting India’s NSI
Enhancing Innovation Potential in New Technologies
Sustaining the success achieved so far and extending its scope for 
the coming decade depends on developing innovation potential 
with public–private partnerships. Here, the challenge is to create an 
environment enabling R&D in the public–private research systems 
including higher education and manage public–private partnerships 
which determine the effectiveness of innovation in new technologies. 
Second, university–industry partnerships assume considerable 
importance given the nature of science-based innovation in 
sectors such as aerospace, bio-pharma, automotive, and material 
sciences. The most important challenge is the introduction of an 
IPR regime common to universities and public research systems. 
It also entails reorganisation of research teams to foster networks 
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between universities and other important actors. Third, India has a 
vast higher educational structure in science and engineering but the 
main challenge is to make science and engineering more attractive to 
students.
Building Technological Capabilities and Competitiveness of 
the Manufacturing Sector
As India’s manufacturing sector is growing and expanding into 
high technology sectors such as bio-pharmaceutical and automotive 
sectors, its ability to compete both at the domestic and international 
level is dependent on the firms and their enabling environment. 
Challenges facing the sector concern training, infusion of skills 
and upgrading techniques to enhance technological capabilities, 
maintaining quality and institutionalising international standards in 
manufacturing. 
Second, technological capabilities of firms are related to their 
R&D and technological intensities. The proportion of business R&D 
in the national GERD is quite low compared to other countries. A 
closely associated problem has been the slow diffusion of existing 
technology from the public research systems to the manufacturing 
industry as a whole.
Reconfiguration of Formal and Informal Sectors via Inclusive 
Innovation
Inclusive innovation concerns primarily 80 per cent of the total 
workforce in the informal sector dominated by house-based micro, 
small- and medium-scale enterprises ranging from handicrafts to a 
range of manufacturing goods. 
A multipronged approach to reconfigure the formal and informal 
sectors of economy and manage the transition from rural-based 
agriculture to an urban and semi-urban industrial-based economy 
with appropriate strategies of inclusive innovation is the overarching 
challenge facing the country in the coming decade. Imparting skills 
to participate in the industrial economy, promoting and diffusing 
local grassroots innovations and making new technologies such as 
ICT and telecommunications appropriate to the needs of this sector 
are some of the current major challenges. The future of India’s 
development and economic progress of the country depends on the 
challenges of innovation in the rural and semi-urban sectors.   
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Government Initiatives in Strengthening NSI, 
1990s–2009
New research policy developments: Supply side-1
The thrust of new research policies in contrast to innovation 
policy measures is to leverage the strengths of the public research 
system (national laboratories and higher educational institutions) to 
enhance capacities for science-based innovation in new technologies 
(such as nanotechnology, biotechnology and telecommunications 
and information technology) with appropriate measures to increase 
the human resource supply in higher educational institutions. It may 
also be pointed out that India’s NSI till about recently in the 1990s 
was dominated by supply-side research policies. It is only in the last 
decade with the emergence of innovation as an important feature in 
the S&T policy discourse after Science and Technology Policy, 2003, 
that the government became proactive to promote innovation policy 
measures. 
Further, the strategies of new research policies are also directed to 
what is known as ‘inclusive innovation strategies’ which are geared to 
enhance the competitiveness of small- and medium-scale enterprises 
and build appropriate linkages between the formal (or modern) S&T 
systems and rural sectors of economy. India’s 11th Plan (2007–2012) 
finalised by the Planning Commission indicated an increase in the 
education budget by four times and the science and technology, 
including R&D, budget by three times the level of 2006–2007 during 
the plan period. However, the annual budget statement of the 
finance ministry increased the education and science and technology 
budget by only 25 per cent for the year 2008–2009. Some important 
elements of these policies may be specified as follows.
National Science and Engineering Research Board (NSERB)
In an effort to keep the scientific knowledge base up-to-date, a 
globally competitive basic research environment is essential to 
maintain a healthy innovation ecosystem in the country. This is given 
high priority by the government as it set up a NSERB in December 
2008 to enhance the level of basic research. As the Prime Minister 
underlined recently, ‘the Board will be an autonomous body and 
would have freedom to establish modalities of funding research as 
well as for creating facilities and structures that would help improve 
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the quantity and quality of scientific research in the country’.27 
NSERB is expected to control a budget of INR 10 billion annually 
to open a new window for funding to researchers in public research 
institutions and industrial enterprises (Jayaraman 2008). 
Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research (INSPIRE)
A second major recent initiative by the government has been the 
launching of a new scheme, INSPIRE, through DST which provides 
scholarships to attract talents to science. It is said to establish a 
vertical link between different stages in the pursuit of a career in 
science. It targets the whole learning pyramid from young learners 
to senior researchers. It is a very significant programme which aims 
to cover one million young learners. The government allocated INR 
21,000 million in the 11th Plan (2007–2012).
Widening Higher Education and Research Base
Given the importance of the emerging knowledge base economy and 
future demand for highly skilled human resources, the government 
gave a major boost to widening the higher education and research 
base in 2009. A fourfold increase in the budget of higher education 
and scientific research in the 11th Plan period will establish a range of 
higher educational institutions and national research laboratories.28
The 11th Five Year plan’s focus on giving special emphasis to 
education is reflected in the 2009–2010 budget for higher education 
to implement four new IITs, six Indian Institutes of Management 
and 14 Central Universities. INR 21,300 million (US$1521.4 million) 
was allocated for this expansion in the 2009–2010 budget in addition 
to INR 20,100 million (US$ 1,435.7 million) to higher education.
Promotion of University Research and Scientific Excellence 
(PURSE)
In an effort to strengthen the scientific research base in universities 
and further encourage performing universities, the government 
announced the PURSE scheme which grants INR 100 million to 
universities over their normal budget for three years. The special 
grants are based on the competitive basis of the university’s 
publications in SCI-based journals with high impact factors.
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Public–Private Partnerships in Science Education for 
Innovation and Excellence in Research
The Ministry of Science and Technology launched a special 
fellowship programme in doctoral research in computer sciences 
and medical electronics in association with the software companies 
association in 2008.
Biotechnology Industry Partnership Programme (BIPP)
The Department of Biotechnology has launched a public–private 
partnership (BIPP) programme for high risk discovery and innova-
tion and accelerated technology development especially for futuristic 
technologies. The scheme is aimed at enhancing global competitive-
ness in new technologies in agriculture, energy, environment, and 
human health. The government provides 30 to 50 per cent funding 
and the rest is met by the industry partner.
The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual 
Property Bill, 2008
After the Cabinet approval in October 2008, the Ministry for S&T 
introduced this Bill in the upper house of the Parliament in December 
2008. The Bill gives right of ownership to public research institu-
tions and universities for R&D output leading to intellectual prop-
erty and authorises these institutions to institute technology transfer 
and innovation units for R&D commercialisation. Researcher(s) 
who created intellectual property, the research group or department 
involved and the funder are entitled for one-third each of the rents 
and royalties generated out of the intellectual property commerciali-
sation under this Bill. Scientists and faculty will be allowed to set 
up centres for entrepreneurship and innovation from the intellectual 
property developed.29
The New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership Initiative 
(NMITLI)
This scheme is meant for fostering partnerships between public 
research systems and industry and at the same time to enable these 
partnerships to attain global leadership positions in a few selected 
niche areas. CSIR evolved 57 projects in which 80 industry partners 
and 270 R&D groups from different institutions are involved with a 
budget of over INR 5,000 million (US$ 357.14).30
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Launching of Nano Mission
The nano mission as an initiative launched in May 2007 came into 
operation in 2008. It is an umbrella programme with a budget of 
INR 1,000 million (US$ 71.42 million) for five years for developing 
research capacities in nano science and technology in training, 
human resource skills, basic research, international cooperation, and 
innovation. Under this initiative, close to 130 research projects have 
been funded in 2007 to 2008. 
The national Nano Science and Technology Mission created in 
2007 with INR 10 billion continued to draw support in 2009 for 
its implementation to enhance innovation potential. Six new R&D 
centres in the public–private partnership mode have  come up with 
a budget of INR 1 billion. About 50–60 science and technology 
institutions, including existing IITs and NITs will be involved in 
building nano clusters across the country to create the ecosystem 
for undertaking extensive research in nanoscience and applied 
nanotechnology to develop applications for industrial products, 
agriculture, health care and safe drinking water, among others. 
Eleven centres of excellence have already been established in 2008–
2009 in different specialised departments of universities in India. Six 
major public–private partnership programmes have already been 
instituted with leading Indian and foreign firms.
India–EU Partnerships in S&T
At the international level India has forged international cooperation 
in nuclear energy, physics, space and communication technologies 
with USA and the European Union since 2006. India has become 
a partner in the Framework 7 of EU since 2007 in the following 
projects:
 (a) India is member of the European Union’s International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) nuclear 
fusion energy project.
 (b) India recently joined the satellite-based navigation sys-
tem, Galileo Project (European version of USA’s Global 
Positioning System) and is a member of Framework 
Programmes FP7 for 2007–2012. 
 (c) India and the European Union also decided to embark on 
joint scientific projects, including those in strategic fields, 
after holding their first ministerial science conference in the 
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Indian capital, New Delhi, on 10 February 2007. India also 
signed a pact with the EU to participate in the proposed 
Facility-for-Antiproton-and-Ion-Research (FAIR) project 
aimed at understanding the tiniest particles in the universe. 
 (d) Indian S&T international cooperation has a budget of over 
48 million Euros. Much of this budget is being spent on 
EU-related programmes in S&T.
Innovation policy measures 1997–2009:  
Supply side-2
Indian science and technology policies for a long period have 
relied more on input-oriented research policies leaving the R&D 
downstream connectivity to either enterprises which interacted 
directly with research institutions or a centralised body called 
National Research Development Corporation (NRDC). This body 
was a sort of depository for technologies and R&D results developed 
in national laboratories which had the mandate to commercialise 
technologies. The NRDC did not play any significant role either 
in start-ups or R&D commercialisation. Over 70 to 75 per cent of 
technologies deposited in NRDC lie idle on its shelves. Second, the 
role of S&T policies was confined to the ‘supply side’ of training 
highly skilled human resources in higher educational and specialised 
institutions who found their way into industries and business 
enterprises. 
Since the 1990s, a series of initiatives and programmes were introd-
uced by DST, DSIR, CSIR, and other governmental science agencies 
beginning with the creation of software technology parks of India 
(STPIs). India has taken a number of steps in the last few years to 
promote various policies and programmes for innovative start-ups 
both at the federal government and state government regional levels. 
From the point of view of sectors, ICT software and biotechnology 
are the two main areas which have attracted considerable attention. 
Market failure perspective to fund and support new innovative firms 
fits well to the Indian context. Hence, the role of government- and 
public-supported financial institutions has become significant.
Start-ups, spin-offs and early stage technology development 
(ESTD) all fall into more or less the same category. Ministry of S&T 
through DST and DSIR has initiated a number of such schemes and 
programmes as shown in Table 4.6.
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Source: Compiled from formal websites of various science and technology ministries 
and departments.
Impact of public support to innovation: Demand side
India’s economic growth during the last decade-and-a-half is 
associated with the dynamic growth of various sectors of economy 
(Cont.)
174 y v. v. KriSHna
ranging from aerospace industries, ICT software, pharmaceuticals, 
auto, petrochemicals, and high technology services. India’s GDP 
grew at an average of 4.5 to 5 per cent for the decade 1993–2004 
and accelerated to over 8.8 per cent for the succeeding five years 
from 2003–2004 to 2007–2008. Growth has also been associated 
with a jump in exports in skill-intensive manufacturing and services 
which in turn can be related to a spurt in innovative activities in 
these sectors. This has resulted in some visible quantifiable gains in 
reducing poverty and raising the living standards of the middle class 
in the country. While the poverty level according to the Planning 
Commission has fallen from 36 per cent to 27.8 per cent in 2004–
2005, there has been a tremendous rise in the purchasing power of the 
Indian middle-class population triggering manufacturing industries 
and consumer goods. From a macro national perspective it may 
be said that there has been a combination of research, educational, 
industrial, fiscal policies and innovation policies contributing to 
growth and dynamism. Impact of these policies on macroeconomic 
indicators has certainly taken a long time in the Indian case. 
The phase after 1991 is marked by liberal economic policies and 
opening up of a number of sectors such as pharma, ICT software, 
chemicals, aerospace, among others, for international competition. 
Export promotion and developing technological capabilities 
associated with it were channelled to take advantage of globalisation. 
Much of the innovation strategy in this phase during the last 15 years 
was invested in creating an enabling innovation ecosystem. This 
includes expansion of higher education, R&D base and creating a 
host of programmes and schemes to foster technology transfer and 
commercialisation of R&D from public labs to industry. There are 
various sectors which have witnessed dynamic growth and one can 
see a combination of the pre-1991 and post-1991 impacts of research, 
educational and innovation policies.
In the case of pharmaceuticals and drugs, India’s patent policies 
of the 1970s which had protected patents for only seven years 
enabled technological capabilities in reverse engineering in drugs 
and chemicals together with the oriented basic research inputs.31 
However, these capabilities have taken a long time since the 
1970s–1990s to have some visible impact. By 2000 India became 
the fifth largest drug producer in the world and in the last five 
years India’s drug industry has certainly progressed from reverse 
engineering to the drug discovery path. Most importantly, 80 per 
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cent of the essential drugs required by the country and parts of 
South Asia are produced in India. Between 1981 and 1995, CSIR, 
India’s major R&D organisation with 38 national labs registered 
only nine US patents in drugs, but during the decade after 1995 to 
2005 it obtained nearly 280 US patents in pharma and related fields. 
Similarly, five leading private Indian pharma firms did not obtain 
any US patents till 1995, but during 1996 and 2005  each one of them 
obtained 15 to 20 US patents per year. The Department of Science 
and Technology’s half dozen innovation policy measures certainly 
contributed to this growth of the pharma sector which is now aiming 
towards global networking and a global competitive edge in pharma. 
A good example is the DST technology commercialisation grant to 
Shanta Biotech, Hyderabad for the development of Hepatitis-B and 
A vaccines which reduced the cost per dose by 70 to 80 per cent.
Similar is the case with India’s growth in the software sector. 
Virtually starting from scratch in the 1980s the sector became 
dynamic by the late 1990s. Currently, over three million professionals 
work in this sector contributing to 6 per cent of India’s GDP. The 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology is the lead 
agency for formulating policies in the ICT sector. However, given 
the dominant role of the business enterprise in software exports, its 
association, NASSCOM, also plays a lead role in the formulation of 
research and innovation policies in ICT. The government, through its 
generic policies, has focused on developing skilled human resources 
with the expansion of the higher education sector.
Policies to build software technology parks in Bangalore, 
Hyderabad, Pune, Chennai, Delhi, and Gurgoan and other parts 
paid off very well. In 2008, 70 per cent of the software exports were 
from these five major software parks.32 In a large measure the public–
private partnerships in higher education, software technology parks 
and in e-governance and e-commerce contributed to the growth and 
dynamism of this sector.
In the auto sector, as already noted, Tata launched Nano in 
India with 120,000 bookings and the Mahindras launched their new 
model, UTE ‘Scorpio’ in the midst of the international auto crisis. 
Both have benefited from the government’s tax incentives of the 
R&D scheme. In the case of telecommunications, there are currently 
about 500 million subscribers expanding at the rate of 6 to 10 per 
cent per month. This is again the result of the government creating 
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an enabling environment and satellite connectivity for convergence 
technologies and the market’s expansion.
The aerospace sector of India which is dominated by the 
dynamic growth of space technology and innovation has witnessed 
remarkable progress and world recognition in the capabilities to 
design and launch satellites.33 In 2008 the space sector opened up 
for public–private partnerships in R&D and innovation. The success 
of launching Chandrayan-1 for landing experimental instruments 
on and around the orbit of the Moon led to the high priority being 
given to space science and technology development. 
The case of innovation in the manufacturing sector is revealed 
by two important surveys. The first is from the World Bank, ‘The 
India 2006 Enterprise Survey’, and the second is the innovation 
study undertaken by India’s National Knowledge Commission. 
The World Bank Survey of 2006 in about 4,000 firms reveals some 
interesting features of innovation in the manufacturing sector which 
are as follows (Dutz 2007):
• In India 40 per cent of firms had developed a major new product, 
while 62 per cent had upgraded an existing product line. The 
criteria suggest that Indian firms have more innovation outputs 
than firms in China, but less those in Brazil, South Korea and 
Russia. The report comments that China’s low scores are due 
to active copying than developing new products;
• Creation-oriented enterprises are concentrated in drugs and 
pharma, auto components and garments;
• Absorption of knowledge is likely to enable productivity 
rather than creation of new knowledge. The most important 
channel for absorbing existing knowledge is through the use 
of new machinery and equipment, followed by hiring key 
professionals;
• For most enterprises in India, the acquisition of global 
knowledge is expected to be more important for productivity 
than is the creation of domestic knowledge.
India’s National Knowledge Commission survey report on 
innovation has come out with the following four important sets 
of findings for large enterprises and SMEs in India (National 
Knowledge Commission 2007).
Increase in Growth and Innovation
 (a) ‘Innovation Intensity’ (i.e., the percentage of revenue derived 
from products/ services which are less than three years 
old) has increased for large firms and SMEs, with SMEs 
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registering a greater increase in innovation intensity than 
large firms. Forty-two per cent of the large firms and 17 
per cent of the SMEs are also ‘Highly Innovative’ firms 
(i.e., firms that have introduced ‘new to world’ innovations 
during the course of business in the last five years).
 (b) Nearly half of the large firms and SMEs attribute more than 
25 per cent of change in the following factors to innovation: 
increase in competitiveness, increase in profitability, reduc-
tion in costs and increase in market share. For large firms 
innovation has the most significant impact on competitive-
ness, while for SMEs, innovation has the most significant 
impact on an increase in market share.
 (c) Seventeen per cent of the large firms rank innovation as the 
top strategic priority and 75 per cent rank it among the top 
three priorities. All the large firms in our sample agree (of 
which 81 per cent strongly agree) that innovation has gained 
importance as being critical to growth and competitiveness 
since the start of economic liberalisation in India. All the 
large firms agree (of which nearly half strongly agree) 
that they cannot survive and grow without investment in 
innovation. An overwhelming 96 per cent of large firms in 
our sample see innovation spending increasing over the next 
three–five years.
 (d) Breakthrough and incremental: 37.3 per cent of large firms 
have introduced breakthrough innovation, while 76.4 per 
cent have introduced incremental innovation, which may be 
an indication that large firms in India are still in the mindset 
of incremental innovation as opposed to breakthrough 
innovation. 
Concluding Remarks
The evolution of the current structure of India’s NSI explored in this 
chapter clearly demonstrates the important part played by the state 
and governing political leadership in laying foundations and chalking 
out a goal direction over the last six decades. State mediation through 
initiating public science, technology and innovation policies has been 
a determining factor in building a national science and technology 
system and creating national innovation capacities. The Indian case 
clearly demonstrates that these endowments and capacities take 
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long periods of time to establish and require sustained state support 
and public legitimation from time to time. It is here that the role 
of governing political leadership comes in to play a crucial part. 
State mediation is very crucial for giving a goal direction but at the 
same time it is also important to draw relative autonomy in research 
policies and a space for an autonomous science and technology 
system. Indian NSI, throughout its evolution, was rather fortunate 
on both these counts. What is also of significance in the Indian case is 
the fact that in various sectors of the economy, the country was able 
to build a reasonable innovation system followed only by a strong 
base of a science and technology system. In other words, it is rather 
problematic to build innovation systems without a strong base in 
science and technology systems which create appropriate innovation 
capacities. The dynamic growth of reasonable sectoral systems of 
innovation such as in space, agriculture and food security (Green 
Revolution), pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, ICT software and 
telecommunications, are good examples.
The science and technology policies in India for almost five 
decades till the 1990s were in a large measure tilted in favour of 
strengthening the input or supply side rather than the demand 
side of innovation. This has resulted in building a large science and 
technology system as well as a reasonable R&D base across a range 
of sectors and fields both in ‘big science’ (space, defence and atomic 
energy) and high technology such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, ICT software, among other areas.
As we are dealing with a relatively long historical period of three 
phases in the development of India’s NSI, it is important to qualify 
the nature and character of state mediation in building national 
scientific and technological capacities in the Indian case. As dealt 
with in this chapter, the most central feature of the nature of state 
mediation has been sustaining the overarching goal of self-reliance 
over long periods of time after 1947. In fact this concept of self-
reliance has its roots in India’s freedom movement, drawing from 
politics into economic policies. Both economic and science and 
technology policies were governed by the concept of self-reliance 
and its associated strategy of import substitution from the 1940s 
to 1980s. As Sridharan (1995:184) argued, ‘the import-substituting 
technology policy regime has created a state of growing technological 
backwardness over the past two decades and made Indian industry so 
uncompetitive that India was threatened . . . at the start of the 1990s’. 
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Such critiques are justified in their own right to an extent because of 
the lack of technological dynamism in various manufacturing sectors 
on account of such inward-looking policies. 
However, what is generally seen in the literature in the Indian 
case is the glossing over or bypassing of the important factor of 
under-utilisation of scientific and technological capacities created 
as part of the strategies and perspectives followed in the decades 
around the 1970s and 1980s (Krishna 1997a). There is a need to 
make a distinction between becoming uncompetitive due to the 
lack of, or underdevelopment of, technological capabilities, and 
under-utilisation of existing scientific and technological capacities 
or potential. India was able to establish a good reservoir of these 
capacities in various sectors but the problems remained somewhere 
else on the demand side of the innovation spectrum. As Rosenberg 
(1990: 149) observed on reviewing various models of industrialisation:
India represents what appears to be a case of low pay offs from a 
relatively well-developed and extensive scientific and technological 
infrastructure. Specifically, it is widely accepted that by comparison 
with her agriculture research, which enabled India to approach self-
sufficiency in food grain production in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
industrial research in India has been distinctly disappointing. I believe 
that this has a lot to do with the extremely tenuous links between the 
various public and private institutions that are involved in the process.
The disappointment which is expressed, in my view, is not so much 
due to lack of technological capabilities but on account of under-
utilisation and lack of enabling innovation measures. Rosenberg 
was quite right in pointing towards the lack of enabling innovation 
policy measures which link science and technology capacities 
established with the growing industrial needs and demands. The 
turn to innovation in S&T policies and appropriate innovation 
policy measures which were introduced since the mid-1990s in the 
third phase as also the shift to decentralised S&T policies around 
the 1990s gave a new meaning to the policies.  As India progressed 
from the 1990s into the new millennium, the results of long-standing 
policies of self-reliance in building a national science and technology 
system and innovation capacities became quite apparent as argued 
earlier based on the study of three sectors, namely ICT software, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (Krishna 2007). For instance, in 
the case of pharmaceuticals, India’s 1970 Patent Act led to varying 
180 y v. v. KriSHna
degrees of technological capabilities in both public and private 
business enterprises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the last 
decade (2000–2010), India began to progress from a phase of reverse 
engineering onto the drug discovery path. It is widely known that 
India produces over 75 per cent of essential drug requirements for 
the South Asian region.34 
However, given the dominant proportion of R&D being 
performed in publicly funded national laboratories and universities, 
the problems of the supply side and the under-utilisation of the 
R&D capacity continue to persist. A major weakness of the current 
system is the lack of an innovation ecosystem with risk capital and 
intermediary mechanisms to foster and promote technology transfer 
and commercialisation of public R&D. It is only since the last 
few years that the government has begun to focus on the demand 
side of innovation and a serious attempt has been made to build 
an innovation ecosystem through a series of policy measures and 
programmes. 
India has not yet articulated her national innovation policy 
or defined her NSI in the formal sense. Science, technology and 
innovation policies in the Indian context are to be understood in 
terms of decentralised sector-based (for instance, space, atomic 
energy, pharmaceuticals, ICT software, etc.) and problem-based (for 
instance, climate change, disaster management, drought and floods, 
etc.) policies. Hence the problem is that of innovation policies 
which are rather very fragmented in ministries and elite bodies such 
as the Planning Commission and the PMO, lacking coordination 
and networking with various actors and agencies in the system as a 
whole. The return of the Congress Party-led government with Dr 
Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister in May 2009 infused a renewed 
sense of optimism over science, technology and innovation policies 
for development and inclusive economic growth. However, a 
number of challenges and problems confront India’s NSI.
One of the major problems for an economy the size of India, 
compared to other emerging nations and the international context is 
the very low level of gross expenditure on R&D. India is spending 
just over 1.13 per cent of GDP for R&D compared to 1.2 to 1.4 per 
cent for Brazil and China and around 2.2 per cent in the case of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and EU countries. The government is committed to increase the 
current 1.13 per cent level to 2 per cent in the coming five years. 
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While both public R&D and business R&D are low compared to 
international standards, the rate of growth in their respective levels 
over the last five years has been positive. From almost a very low 
level of less than INR 6,919 million a decade back, currently India 
attracts over INR 1.03 billion for R&D every year through foreign 
firms setting up R&D laboratories and units in India. Currently by 
2009, about 250 multinational firms had already set up R&D labs or 
units.
In higher education the major challenge still remains the big 
daunting task of increasing the enrolment ratio from the current 
11 per cent to 15 per cent. India has set up  over 400 universities 
and 18,000 colleges but the research intensity in these institutions 
of higher learning is quite weak. Only 25 per cent of this number 
is research based and the rest are teaching-based universities 
aspiring to achieve the ‘Humboltdian ideal’ of teaching and research 
universities. In a large measure the innovation potential in the higher 
education sector in India is under-utilised for the lack of adoption 
of innovation policies by a large number of universities which foster 
university–industry partnerships and relations, with the possible 
exception of IITs and other leading universities. The major challenge 
is to infuse ‘innovation culture’ in academic institutions of higher 
learning. The same may be said of the industrial research system of 
CSIR-based laboratories. India has just articulated ‘The Protection 
and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008’ 
— an Indian version of the US Bayh-Dole Act but it is yet to be 
implemented in 2012. There is a lot of expectation from this Bill for 
catalysing innovation and technology transfer from public research 
systems to industry and society.
The existing innovation policy measures routed through the 
Ministry of Science and Technology departments lack adequate 
personnel and professionals to monitor and make them more 
effective. The main problem is their limited sphere of influence 
and impact which needs at least a three- or fourfold increase in 
their operation compared to the present situation. For example, 
the Technology Development Board which is one of the major 
innovation agencies of the ministry gets hardly 10 to 15 per cent 
of the total budget collected by the government in the form of 
cess for import of technology. Similarly, the R&D tax incentive 
system operated by the S&T department lacks penal ‘teeth’ and 
legal provisions to effectively monitor the funds given to business 
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enterprises to ensure whether they are in fact involved in quality 
control and analyses-related activities or R&D per se.
The government has committed a massive policy and budgetary 
provision to promote more than a dozen national programmes on 
inclusive development. India’s innovation policies are still tilted in 
favour of high technology and global competition. What is needed 
is an appropriate institutional and governance structure which 
coordinates and networks the formal R&D structures and universities 
with the needs and demands of inclusive development programmes. 
What is also needed is a new framework and institutional networking 
structure on inclusive innovation, to which, these dozen development 
programmes are linked and connected. For instance, there is only one 
major institutional structure in the form of the National Innovation 
Foundation established by the DST, Ministry of S&T. Given the 
multiple challenges in health, urban renewal, employment guarantees 
to the poor, roads and infrastructure, among other programmes, all 
the major R&D agencies and laboratories and universities need to 
create institutional mechanisms and outreach research centres for 
impacting their ‘near’ and ‘distant’ neighbourhoods. In other words, 
these institutions must have an agenda for ‘grass root innovations’ 
along with high technology and global orientation in their research 
and innovation policies. India made an impressive mark in the 
world and is recognised for software services clusters in Bangalore, 
Hyderabad, Delhi, and Gurgaon and Chennai. This experience needs 
to be extended and replicated in the case of rural-based and district-
based traditional industrial clusters. It is here that the knowledge 
institutions, universities and R&D agencies need to be linked to the 
needs and demands of half of India’s population now being covered 
under inclusive development and growth through evolving effective 
inclusive innovation policy mechanisms.
ª
Notes
 1. This section is selectively drawn from Krishna (1997a).
 2. Much of this discourse and concepts on nation building and self-reliance 
in science can be found in the various issues and pages of an important 
Indian journal in science and technology studies, Science and Culture, 
published from Calcutta, for the period 1938–1947. The journal was 
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edited by one of the eminent Indian physicists, Professor M. N. Saha, 
the founder of Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics and Member of Indian 
Parliament representing Calcutta constituency after 1947.
 3. At that time in 1945 it was suggested to place all science and technology 
agencies under the control of Member, Planning and Development 
who operated under the government Department of Planning and 
Development.
 4. Nehru inaugurated and spent a full day with the scientific community 
at the annual session of the Indian Science Congress from 1947 till his 
sad demise in the mid-1960s.
 5. It was created in 1942 but was expanded rapidly during this phase under 
the leadership of S. S. Bhatnagar. It may also be pointed out that science 
organisations such as  CSIR (India) which was based on the British 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) model, created 
in the wake of World War I, were created in other former colonies such 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada.
 6. See the website of the Department of Science and Technology, 
Government of India, http://www.dst.gov.in/stsysindia/spr1958.htm 
(accessed 2 December 2011).
 7. Actually from the late 1990s China began to overtake India in science 
publications reaching more than double by 2005. 
 8. See Planning Commission (1980: xxi and 10).
 9. http://www.dst.gov.in/stsysindia/sps1983.htm (accessed 2 December 
2011).
 10. See the website of the Department of Science and Technology, New 
Delhi, India for the full statement of Technology Policy Statement, 
1983, http://www.dst.gov.in (accessed 8 January 2013).
 11. Parts of this section are drawn from Krishna (2008).
 12. See also Sridharan (1995).
 13. This does not mean to suggest that there were no policy statements 
issued by different sectors in earlier phases. There were fewer policy 
statements issued by sectors compared to the current phase after 1991. 
Sectoral-based policies issued in the last decade basically articulated 
and formulated with the different stakeholders at the level of sectors in 
coordination with the government.
 14. See http://dst.gov.in/stsysindia/stp2003.htm (accessed 2 December 
2011), the website of the Department of Science and Technology, 
Government of India, New Delhi.
 15. Parts of this section are drawn from Krishna (2008).
 16. As noted earlier, NSI in the Indian context makes sense at the sectoral 
level of understanding rather than at the national level.
 17. Different years are used for different sets of data as per their availability 
from reliable sources.
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 18. It may be noted that the figures being quoted are from the R&D statistics 
given by the Department of Science and Technology. However, the 
DST figures grossly underestimate the foreign R&D inflow that has 
come into India during the period ending 2005–2006. The estimates of 
a World Bank study (see Dutz 2007) show that  total private R&D 
investment has risen from half a billion Euro in 2002 to 2.45 billion 
Euro in 2005.
 19. India is attracting global auto manufacturers due to the country’s large 
middle-class population, growing earning power, strong technological 
capability, and availability of trained manpower at competitive prices.
 20. The launch of advance telecom services like 3G and IPTV will drive the 
future growth in India. The sector attracted $2,558 million FDI in the 
financial year 2009 as compared to the $1,261 million in financial year 
2008. Telecommunications account for a 9.37 per cent share in total 
FDI inflow.
 21. However, big foreign firms such as Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, Oracle, 
Intel, and Adobe witnessed only a marginal growth rate for the same 
period between 1 and 10 per cent. For instance, Microsoft which 
registered 26 per cent growth rate in 2007–8 declined to just 1 per cent 
in 2008–9 compared to the previous year; and Hewlett-Packard from 
30 per cent to 2 per cent  for the same periods.
 22. However, as per the figures given by the DST, Government of India, 
based on their databases the total number of papers has increased from 
59,315 in 2001 to 89,297 in 2005. These are non-SCI based publications 
which are covered in one or the other international database.
 23. Some of the figures used here are taken from Herstaat et al. (2008) and 
compared with the data sets given by DST, Government of India. The 
figure of 14 million science graduates is from Farrel et al. (2005).
 24. The first is the Draft National Innovation Act 2008, Department of 
Science and Technology, Ministry of S&T. It may be noted that this 
draft is being circulated only for soliciting views from interested public 
and intellectuals and not yet formalised; and the second is the ‘The 
Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 
2008’, being circulated among government departments and public 
and pending ratification by the Parliament to enable it to come into 
operation.
 25. The definition is taken from the Draft National Innovation Act 2008 
document.
 26. See the Prime Minister’s and minister of science and technology’s 
addresses at the 96th Indian Science Congress held at North Eastern 
Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya during 3–7 January 2009. See 
also the Steering Committee Report on Science and Technology of the 
Planning Commission for the 11th Plan (2007–2012).
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 27. From the Prime Minister’s address at the 96th Indian Science Congress 
held at North Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya during 3–7 
January 2009. See also http://www.dst.gov.in/scie_congrs/pmspeech09.
htm (accessed 11 September 2012).
 28. The government has announced the creation of 30 central universities; 
five new Indian Institutes of Technology; and 20 Indian Institutes of 
Information Technology. The government also established the Indian 
Institute of Space Science and Technology, Kerala; National Institute 
of Science Education and Research, Bhubaneswar, by the Department 
of Atomic Energy; Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine, 
Bangalore; Cancer Research Institute, Chennai; and Institute of 
Advanced Study in Science and Technology, Guwahati. See the Prime 
Minister’s address at the 96th Indian Science Congress held at North 
Eastern Hill University, Shillong, Meghalaya during 3–7 January 2009.
 29. See http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Cabinet_nod_for_bill_
giving_scientists_share_in_IPRs/rssarticleshow/3659358.cms (accessed 
2 December 2011).
 30. See http://www.csir.res.in/csir/external/heads/collaborations/NM.pdf 
(accessed 2 December 2011).
 31.  It may be pointed out that India before 2005 WTO regulations opted 
for a unique Patent Policy which protected patents for seven years. 
This is not the case in other countries of Europe and North America 
which protected patents for 20 years. China came under the WTO 
regime only in 2005 and before that it did not have systematic patent 
regulation.
 32. There are currently about 45 software technology parks spread all 
over the country. India’s dynamic achievements in space research and 
launch of satellites helped communication and high speed connectivity 
to software technology parks. All these cities developed as educational 
and innovation hubs. Over the decades India’s educational structure 
and system has produced a vast number of English-speaking graduates 
and educated professionals which is again related to the policies which 
led to the expansion of higher education. All these combined to infuse 
confidence among firms and entrepreneurs.
 33. Research and innovation policies in space are enunciated by the 
Department of Space in coordination with the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (ISRO). Space R&D accounts for 22 per cent of total 
governmental R&D funding in 2007–2008. The main research focus 
in space is to accomplish high technology capabilities in designing, 
launching and commercialisation of satellites and manage complex 
system engineering and management in space technologies.
 34. However, this holds good for certain sectors as noted earlier and not 
for the industrial spectrum across the board.
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The national system of innovation (NSI) conceptual framework 
has been playing a key role in enabling China to catch up and 
move forward to become an innovative country (Cassiolato and 
Vitorino 2009), as well as to build a prosperous society according 
to the ‘Outline of National Medium and Long-Term Science and 
Technology Development Plan (2006–2020)’ (State Council 1996). 
The idea of the NSI looks at the innovation process as an integrated 
and systemic (not linear) process. Hence, not only the enterprise, 
institutions and organisations, but also how they interact, is an 
important element of the NSI. Furthermore, history and context 
would affect the dynamics of the NSI, which requires us to 
investigate the relationship between the state and the NSI within a 
dynamic historical context. 
This chapter deals with the role of the state in the evolution of 
China’s NSI, and we consider the history that started with the 1978 
reform and opening-up policy as the focus of this analysis. This 
chapter is structured as follows: the following four sections introduce 
the current context of China’s NSI. The next section describes 
the evolution of the current form of state. We then analyse the 
institutions and policies of the state concerned with innovation. The 
fourth section discusses the specificities of the system of innovation 
in the country and its relationship with the state. The next section 
reviews China’s explicit and implicit state policy towards science, 
technology and innovation (STI). We then analyse the outcomes 
of state policy and state institutions on the NSI. The last section 
summarises the main conclusions of this chapter.
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China’s Development Model 
China has recently entered a historical phase where the established 
development model must be changed in order to attain the official 
macroeconomic objective of a growth in the GDP per capita from 
US$ 1,000 to US$ 3,000. In 2003, China’s GDP per capita was $1,090, 
and reached $ 3,266 in 2008. International experiences indicate that 
this is a sensitive period which combines economic restructuring with 
accompanying changes in social formation. Corresponding with the 
above inevitable situation, two major changes have to take place: 
first, the marginal contribution rate that some key elements such as 
labour, resources, investment, and land have on economic growth 
will decrease, and the importance of knowledge and technological 
innovation will significantly increase; second, the official model of 
economic growth is in a critical stage of transition from a resource-
based and extensive type into an intensive, high value added type. 
Therefore, only innovation can be a way to progress in accordance 
with these changes.
China has possessed the necessary conditions of the great-leap-
forward development with the rapid economic growth of recent 
years. The Chinese economy is now the world’s second largest 
in terms of its macroeconomic performance (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2010), and it has become a major destination for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and a trading nation of global rank. Scientific 
output, in terms of publication of scientific research papers, grew at 
an annual rate of 8.9 per cent in 2009; and the number of granted 
patents increased at an annual rate of 41 per cent in 2009 (National 
Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology 2009). 
These conditions have laid a strong foundation for China to shift its 
development model into an innovation-based one.
The Constraints of the Traditional 
Development Model 
China’s industrialisation path was basically traditional relying 
mainly on natural resource endowments, and was developed on 
the basis of long-term intensive exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources and ecological environment. For example, China’s 
consumption of coal, steel and fresh water accounts for 32 per cent, 
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27 per cent and 15 per cent of the total consumption of the world 
respectively (Chinese Academy of Sciences 2006). At present, China 
is suffering great pressure from resource constraints, environment 
damage and population growth.
In contrast with these factor inputs, however, China’s innovation 
capability is relatively low, which has mainly manifested in a number 
of aspects. In the first place, the capability of technological invention 
is too low, with the number of annual authorised invention patents 
accounting for only 22.1 per cent of the total authorised patents, and 
49.1 per cent of the intellectual property rights belonging to overseas 
inventors (China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 
2010). Second, most industries lack core technologies. Third, 
the enterprises’ proclivity for technological innovation is weak. 
Fourth, technology is introduced repeatedly without digestion 
and absorption. Fifth, the key elements of innovation are isolated 
from each other, which makes it difficult to develop the country’s 
comprehensive innovation capability, and the government, industry 
and research do not combine with each other effectively in innovation 
activities. In the development chain of science and technological 
innovation as well as enterprises’ R&D activities, the allocation 
of innovation resources is unduly skewed, with the government 
putting too much emphasis on universities and colleges rather than 
on enterprises, especially innovative private enterprises.
In conclusion, these factors all indicate that China’s economic 
development model has not broken off from the traditional one yet.
Regional Disparities in Economic and  
Social Development
As a big developing country with a large population and a vast land 
area, China has experienced a rapid and sustainable socio-economic 
growth as a result of the reforms in the past few decades. At the 
same time, the differences between urban and rural areas have been 
widening, and the regional development imbalance has become 
increasingly prominent. First there is the uneven distribution of 
income, mostly evident in the differences between urban and rural 
areas; second there is the uneven distribution of property; third is 
the employment and wages disparities, which means the differences 
of employment opportunities among workers in different regions 
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(the imbalance of employment opportunities is an important factor 
for the widening gap of income and wealth distribution); fourth is 
the education disparities between urban and rural areas.
Regional Imbalances in Innovation Capability 
The regional imbalance of innovation capability has experienced a 
historical evolution. Since 1949, when China was founded, the central 
government allocated a variety of resources in areas with better 
industrial basis, primarily in the north-east provinces, followed by 
eastern and northern China. In the 1960s, China shifted the strategic 
emphasis of industrial and science and technology layout, which 
improved the technological capability of western areas rapidly. 
However, the southern coastal areas with the exception of a few 
national-level investments, such as Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong, 
and other provinces, have only a few state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and their industrial infrastructure was weak and the development 
of science and technology lagged behind the rest of the country. 
Before China’s reform and opening-up, the innovation capabilities 
of southern coastal areas generally lagged behind those of northern 
areas.
In 1978 a critical strategic decision leading to the reform of the 
political economy and the opening-up of the economy to global 
markets was made on the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese 
Communist Party (CPC). Since then, China shifted its development 
emphasis into eastern coastal areas, by establishing special economic 
zones and opening the coastal port cities, and so on. The coastal 
areas became an important window for China to attract foreign 
capital as well as the most active centre for international technology 
transfer. In addition, this area attracted a large number of domestic 
skills to take part in innovation activities. Therefore, a significant 
change of China’s regional innovation capability after the reforms 
and opening-up is the great improvement of innovation capability 
in southern and eastern coastal areas, while the development of 
innovation capability of the central and western areas was relatively 
slow, and the regional imbalance was reversed, that is to say, the 
differences of innovation capability between eastern and western 
areas have been widening. 
The differences between urban and rural areas still exist. At present, 
China’s development of rural science and technology innovation is 
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very weak in general, and has become one of the weakest sections in 
China’s science and technology programme. The problems include 
seriously insufficient inputs in rural areas, an inadequate scientific 
and technological innovation and service system, a relatively weak 
dissemination of science and technology, and the general inability of 
available technologies to meet the needs of peasants. The interaction 
between a poorly developed science and technology base and 
economic development may become a vicious circle. Compared with 
the urban areas, the rural areas lack effective policies and measures 
to attract and train scientific and technological personnel, so the 
phenomenon of skills loss is serious. In addition, a new scientific and 
technological service system which meets the economic market rules 
and requirements has not been established yet and the construction 
of an information-sharing platform is relatively slow.
At the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
in 2007, China put forward the ideology of ‘Scientific Outlook of 
Development’ as a strategic decision to develop and utilise indigenous 
innovation and build an innovative country.1 This policy was adopted 
to enter the global economy with the rapid development of science 
and technology. China regards enhancing indigenous innovation 
capability as a development strategy of science and technology, and 
promotes an indigenous innovation path parallel to the great-leap-
forward development of science and technology. In addition, China 
is establishing a new balanced NSI to attract more innovators and 
enterprises to join in, not only to promote innovation, but also to 
promote the construction of a harmonious society that more people 
may benefit from.
Evolution of the Current Form of State
The administration of China’s innovation system consists of several 
major bodies: the Ministry of Education (MOE), formerly the State 
Education Committee; the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), formerly the State Science and Technology Committee 
(SSTC); the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); Chinese Academy 
of Engineering (CAE); Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); 
and the National Science Foundation Committee (NSFC). These 
agencies cooperate with other industrial ministries, which also have 
their own research institutes and projects, including the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and the National 
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Development and Reform Committee (NDRC). Together these 
administrative bodies formulate and implement national science 
and technology programmes and policies. Figure 5.1 provides the 
organisation form.
Figure 5.1: Main Administrative Bodies of China’s Innovation System
Source: Zhong and Yang (2007).
In this administrative framework of the NSI, the Chinese 
government’s economic functions can be divided into two stages 
marked by the reform and opening-up.
The role of the state in a centrally planned economy 
prior to 1978
From 1949, the founding of the new China, to 1956, China almost 
completed the socialist transformation, which was a process wherein 
the state gradually extended into the private economic sector and 
eventually replaced the autonomy of the private sector in production 
and consumption. Since 1958, the state has at all levels completely 
dominated the entire economy, and controlled every aspect of the 
economy, including production planning as well as a coupons-based 
supply system for a variety of subsidiary food and manufactured 
goods for daily use.
The formation of the single public ownership and the planned 
economy resulted in the need to accelerate industrialisation, that is 
to say, at that time under the conditions of shortage of capital, China 
increased capital investment relying both on depressing domestic 
consumption and improving accumulation. In the 25 years from 
1953 to 1978, China maintained a relatively high economic growth 
rate, and almost set up an autarkic industrial system, which was 
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closely and inseparably related to such a high rate accumulation. In 
addition, the single public ownership and planned economic system 
has another function: to guarantee social security to all the people in 
China, to insure social stability during a period of high accumulation 
and deficiency in goods and materials, although this kind of social 
security is at low levels of income.
Originally, the planned economy was designed to reduce 
economic operating costs and to avoid inappropriate resource 
allocation and waste caused by business and individual production 
without government control. However, because the information 
for decision-making in the planned economy was insufficient, 
there were many uncertain factors and bureaucratic obstacles in 
the implementation process, which has led to a number of mistakes 
in allocation. Public ownership also did not play the expected 
function of arousing people’s enthusiasm for production. In rural 
areas, the collective production and average income distribution 
in the People’s Commune model have suppressed the farmers’ 
enthusiasm for production. In urban areas, the phenomenon of 
‘workers eating from the same big pot of their enterprises, and enter- 
prises eating from the same big pot of the country’ also suppressed 
the enthusiasm of enterprises and workers.2 Since in both, the single 
public ownership and the planned economic system, the desired 
economic performance and the goal of stimulating enthusiasm of 
all the people have not been achieved, the Chinese government has 
had to explore new ways and seek new approaches to improve the 
socialist economic management system.
The role of the state and the emerging mixed 
economy since 1978 
After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee 
in 1978, and with the deepening of the reforms and opening-up, 
China has gradually formed an economic framework in which a 
variety of economic sectors coexist, and the market mechanism plays 
a basic regulating role. Accordingly, the government’s economic 
functions have consciously or unconsciously changed. This change 
can be roughly divided into two phases: the first phase was from 
1979 to 1991, where the focus was to remove the old functions the 
government had, that was to narrow the government’s economic 
management scope and power; the second phase was from 1992 to 
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present, the focus of which was innovation and the re-establishment 
of the government’s functions in accordance with the market 
economy.
In the first phase, the government’s original economic function 
under the conditions of single public ownership and planned 
economy gradually cleared up on two fronts. The first was 
decentralisation, which allowed the existence and development of 
a non-public economy as well as the ‘three capital’ enterprises.3 
During this phase, the reform of rural areas was most prominent 
and made the greatest achievements. In urban areas, the reform 
of SOEs moved forward slowly, but from the implementation of 
reducing administrative power and decentralisation to the ‘contract 
system’, enterprises’ autonomy and share of profits were increased 
significantly. This relaxation of government control on public 
economy and obtaining surplus has been one of the driving forces 
for China’s rapid economic growth in the 1980s. During the reform 
of the public-owned economic system, the Chinese government 
also adopted the policy of opening up to the outside world, and 
encouraged urban and rural job-waiting persons to be self-employed 
or become ‘specialised households’ in order to let the market 
mechanism regulate. Thus, another highly vigorous economic sector 
has been established besides the existing public-owned system. 
The second was the gradual relaxation of administrative 
control on the whole economy, which means that the government 
withdrew from some areas to allow the alternative regulation of 
market mechanism. In this aspect, the guiding ideology of the 
Chinese government shifted from a model of a ‘planned economy-
orientation with market regulation as a supplement’ to the one that 
was ‘combining planned management with market regulation’, 
then to the top-down model of ‘government adjusting market, and 
market guiding enterprise’, and finally went back to an ambiguous 
formulation of ‘combining planned economy with market 
regulation’ in 1989. These changes in China’s guidelines clearly 
show that the Chinese government has been giving increasing space 
to market regulation rather than direct state control. The obvious 
feature in this transition of the government’s economic function 
was the reform and improvement of the economic system based on 
public-ownership and planned economy under the guidelines of 
‘emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts’ and China’s 
‘four cardinal principles’.5
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 In the second phase, the market economy was commonly 
accepted as the goal of China’s reform, and the measures taken by 
the Party and the government were to move towards this goal. The 
transition of the government’s economic function took the initiation 
from ‘feeling the way across the river’ (Chen 1995: 279) in the 1980s, 
to establishing a basic market economy framework at the end of the 
20th century, then to establishing a mature market economy in the 
first 20 years of the 21st century.
The reform of the government’s economic function focused mainly 
on two aspects in this period. The first was the total adjustment and 
reform of the state-owned economy, which was the last bastion of 
the old system. The course of this reform was that in the first half 
of the 1990s, transforming operational mechanisms and establishing 
a modern enterprise system were emphasised; after 1996, the 
establishment of a modern enterprise system was combined with the 
policy of ‘invigorating large enterprises while relaxing control over 
small ones’ proposed in the document, ‘A Number of Decisions on 
Major Issues about State-Owned Reform and Development by CPC 
Central Committee’ in 1999 (The fifteenth Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party, the Fourth Plenary Meeting 1999), 
as well as joint-stock transformation, during which the government 
transferred some state-owned economy, even totally withdrawing 
from some fields. Another is that the government constructed a 
management system in accordance with the market economy. In 
1993 and 1998, two rounds of large-scale reforms of government 
institutions were conducted, which not only strengthened the 
government’s macro-management functions, but also strengthened 
the government’s regulating function on enterprises’ behaviour and 
market order. In addition, a new social security system was included 
as a main duty of the government. At present, the government’s 
economic functions have transformed from the overall direct 
control-type model before 1978 into the indirect adjustment–type 
model (Wu 2003).
Periodisation and Analysis of Institutions and 
Policies of the State Concerned with Innovation
Corresponding to the government’s economic function, China 
had implemented a planned science and technology system before 
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1978, during which the enterprises, scientific research institutions, 
universities, and national defence research institutions were 
independent systems, in order to promote the science and technology 
projects and knowledge transfer (Fang and Liu 2004). In the situations 
of international blockade and extreme scarcity of domestic science 
and technology resources, this system has played a very important 
role in centralising limited resources, setting up an intact science and 
technology system and infrastructure. Over 20 years this science 
and technology system trained a large number of outstanding talents, 
solved a series of great scientific and technological problems in 
social, economic development and defence construction and greatly 
narrowed the gap between China and some advanced countries.
However, this planned science and technology system confronted 
some challenges at the end of the 1970s. At that time, the wave of 
new technological revolutions was surging and profound changes 
had taken place in almost all fields. Technological achievements 
were popularised and applied into production rapidly, which 
in turn brought tremendous changes in social productivity and 
accelerated global economic growth and industrial restructuring. 
In the meantime, the inherent structural defects of China’s existing 
science and technology system appeared gradually. First of all, 
it was a closed system with vertical structure, with the result that 
the science and technology sector and the economy were separate. 
Second, there was little sense of intellectual property rights and 
there was no mechanism through which science and technology 
could be transferred with compensation in China, which hindered 
technology innovation and diffusion. Third, the government had 
intervened too much through administrative means on scientific 
research institutions, and the phenomenon of ‘getting an equal 
share regardless of the work done’ existed at that time, which was 
not conductive to arouse the initiative and enthusiasm of scientific 
research institutions. Therefore, the reform of the existing science 
and technology system was imperative.
Since that period until now, the Chinese government has made a 
great effort in policy making to push science and technology system 
reforms, which can be roughly divided into three phases according 
to the adjustment of reform objectives and focal points of the policy.
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The first phase (1985–1992): The reform of the 
funding system and governance relaxation on 
scientific research institutions
In this phase, the main policy direction of science and technology was 
to give more flexibility to scientific research institutions, scientific 
and technological personnel. Policies in this period concentrated on 
the funding system, the technology market, organisational structures 
and the personnel system. During this period the reform of the 
science and technology sector proceeded on five levels.
The first thrust was on the reform of the funding system. 
According to the characteristics and division of science and tech-
nology activities, China divided national scientific research expenses 
into specific categories. For those scientific research institutions 
mainly engaged in technological development, the government 
would completely reduce the funding of their operating expenses 
over a five-year period. For those scientific research institutions 
mainly engaged in basic research, the government would implement 
a funding system which would subsidise a portion of their operating 
expenses. For those organisations engaged in social public welfare 
research and agricultural research, the government would still 
subsidise their operational expenses. The main purpose of this 
reform was to change the existing dependency relationship of 
scientific research institutions on their administrative departments, 
and in this manner to force scientific research institutions to serve 
economic development as well as to strive for multi-channel sources 
of funding. In this process the overall science and technology 
sector would be reoriented towards a market economy and overall 
investment on science and technology would be expanded in order 
to accelerate the commercialisation of scientific and technological 
achievements.
The second reform was to open the technology market. 
Technological achievements were acknowledged as a commodity in 
policy and legal system at that time, and a mechanism was established 
that technology transfer should be compensated in accordance with 
its value. In addition, the government promulgated the ‘Patent 
Law’, the ‘Technology Contract Law’ and some corresponding 
implementing regulations, which provided basic rules for technology 
transactions such as technology development, technology transfer, 
technology consultation, and technology service, and so on.
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The third was the reform of the management model of scientific 
research institutions. The principles and direction of the reform was 
the separation of responsibilities between research divisions and 
administrative divisions in the departments of the State Council in 
order to decentralise the authority of scientific research institutions, 
to change the direct control model into the indirect management 
model that the Chinese government has as regards scientific research 
institutions. This reform was meant to expand the autonomy of 
scientific research institutions and to encourage the union among 
scientific research institutions, educational agencies, design units, 
and production units, as well as to strengthen the capability of 
enterprises in technology absorption and development.
The fourth thrust was to support and develop private scientific and 
technological enterprises. The government encouraged scientific and 
technological personnel to set up private scientific and technological 
firms engaged in technology development, technology transfer, 
technology consultation, and technology service in accordance with 
the business principles. These principles included self-financing, 
voluntary cooperation, making one’s own management decisions, 
and taking full responsibility for their own profits and losses. This 
was meant to make these firms a vital force in the development of 
high-tech industries outside the existing system.
The fifth level of reform was to establish pilot high-tech industry 
zones. In May 1988, the State Council approved the establishment 
of the Beijing High-Tech Industry Pilot Zone and provided 18 
preferential policies to it. By April of 2011, 86 national-level high-
tech industry zones were established all over the country.
The second phase (1992–1998): China’s support on 
basic research
In this phase, China carried out high-tech research and other projects 
that had long-term significance on economic construction, social 
development and national defence, and during which China has 
developed a growing body of science and technology personnel which 
is progressively placing it on the global market. In addition, China 
emancipated different kinds of R&D institutions which can directly 
serve China’s economic construction and social development, as 
well as encouraged commercialisation and industrialisation activities 
of science and technology achievements in order to make them 
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market-oriented. The main policies and measures taken are listed in 
the following paragraphs.
First, the government encouraged all kinds of scientific research 
institutions to implement the integration of technology, industry 
and trade, or to cooperate with firms in technology development, 
production and management. On the other hand, the government 
also encouraged scientific research institutions to adopt commercially 
oriented management models, with an emphasis on the relevant 
provisions of corporate finance such as independent accounting, and 
gradually achieved a balance of payments, economic self-reliance 
and assumed responsibility for its profits or losses. Second, the 
government granted managerial authority to some suitable scientific 
research institutions to operate state-owned assets, and encouraged 
them to invest in setting up scientific and technological enterprises 
or groups, merging and acquiring firms or being a shareholder of 
a firm in order to enjoy returns in accordance with the law. Third, 
the government provided support to eligible scientific research 
institutions in their cooperation with large and medium-sized 
enterprises or enterprise groups in various ways. Fourth, the 
government promoted social welfare organisations to become new 
legal entities. These organisations mainly relied on national policy-
based input, social investment and income generation from their own 
scientific and technological business, and the Chinese government 
encouraged them to establish a mechanism of self-accumulation, 
self-operation and self-development with reference to foreign non-
profit organisations. These organisations should be supervised and 
administrated by society, and conduct non-profit-oriented business 
activities and service for the society, which can be exempt from 
income tax and value-added tax. In this way the income of these 
organisations may be used to support their own development.
The third phase (since 1998): The policy of ‘relying 
on science and technology to rejuvenate the nation’ 
and building a national innovative system
In this phase, substantive adjustments were conducted to the science 
and technology development strategy and system, and ‘Relying 
on Science and Technology to Rejuvenate the Nation’, which was 
formulated in ‘Decision on Accelerating Science and Technology 
Progress by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
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Party and the State Council’ in 1995 (Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 1995), became 
a national-level strategy. Strengthening the NSI and speeding 
up industrialisation of scientific and technological achievements 
became a main policy direction of this period. Virtually all policies 
concentrated on restructuring scientific research institutions and 
improving the innovation capability of enterprises and industries, 
and so on.
With the accelerated pace of reform in government agencies, the 
State Council decided to conduct the administrative system reform 
of 242 scientific research institutions attached to 10 state-level 
bureaus managed by the State Economic and Trade Commission 
at the end of 1998, the means of which included transition into 
scientific and technological enterprises or technology intermediary 
service institutions, as well as mergers with enterprises in order to 
realise firm-based transformation (State Council  1999c). The goal 
of this reform was to reduce the number of independent state-
level research institutions, encourage enterprises to set up their 
own applied research institutions and transform enterprises into 
the main actors of technology innovation. Thereafter, another 134 
technological development scientific research institutions affiliated 
to the State Council had also carried out the transformation into 
enterprises (Ministry of Science and Technology 2000). At the same 
time, the government began to promote the transition of public 
welfare-based research institutions into non-profit organisations. 
These changes have transformed each of the main components of 
the NSI. The business sector has become the dominant R&D actor, 
now performing over two-thirds of total R&D, up from less than 
40 per cent at the beginning of 1990. The share of public research 
institutions has declined from almost half of total R&D to less than 
one-quarter over the same period. The relative weight of higher 
education institutions (HEIs) has increased moderately, from 8.6 per 
cent to 9.9 per cent.
There has also been a vigorous promotion of the commercialisation 
of scientific and technological achievements. In May 1996, the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress approved 
‘China’s Promotion Law of Commercialisation of Scientific and 
Technological Achievements’ (Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress 1996). In 1999, the General Office of the State 
Council transmitted the policy ‘Some Provisions on Promotion of 
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Scientific and Technological Achievements’ (Ministry of Science and 
Technology et al. 1999) from seven departments such as the Ministry 
of Science and Technology. The aforementioned policies established 
the following norms:
 (a) If the high-tech achievements are regarded as assets invested 
to the limited liability company, the value of them can 
amount to 35 per cent of the total registered capital, except 
otherwise agreed by the parties.
 (b) Scientific research institutions, colleges and universities 
should reward the author and related people when they 
want to commercialise the technology achievements, and the 
reward should be no less than 20 per cent of the net income 
of commercialisation, or no less than 5 per cent of the newly 
increasing profit that gained from new achievements for 
three–five years in succession. If a stock company wants to 
commercialise, it may also reward no less than 20 per cent 
of the value of technological achievements when they are 
regarded as share(s).
 (c) Scientific research institutions, colleges and universities 
should reward the author(s) in form of donation of share or 
stock rights according to their contribution. The author(s) 
wouldn’t pay personal income tax when obtaining these 
shares or capital ratio; but they would pay income tax if 
obtaining ratio of dividends or transferring investment 
shares.
 (d) If the scientific and technological personnel have completed 
their assumed work in their own units, they can engage in 
R&D and commercialisation in other units.
A series of technological innovation policies was introduced, 
including: (a) ‘Some Provisions on Mechanism of Venture Capital 
Construction’ (State Council 1999b), which were used to boost 
the development of venture capital in China; (b) China established 
‘Innovation Funds for Small and Medium-sized Technology-
based Firms’ (1999), in order to promote the development of these 
firms; (c) the former State Economic and Trade Commission and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology have all proposed the 
‘Technology Innovation Project’, in order to boost both enterprises’ 
and regional innovation; (d) the government put forward some 
innovation policies to improve industries’ innovation capability, the 
most important of which is ‘Policies on Encouraging Development 
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of Software Industry and IC Industry’ (State Council 2000) issued 
by the State Council in 2000, which boosted the development of 
these two industries.
In January 2006, the National Science and Technology Conference 
was held in Beijing, where the ‘Outline of National Medium and 
Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006–2020)’ 
(State Council 1996) was issued. This policy marked that China’s 
science and technology development strategy would transform 
from imitation-based innovation into indigenous innovation. This 
outline was based on the position of China in the global market and 
included a comprehensive plan and strategic proposal of China’s 
science and technology development in the next 15 years. It aimed 
to enhance indigenous innovation as the main development strategy 
as well as setting innovation-oriented construction as a key national 
goal. This was a programmatic document to guide China’s science 
and technology development in the new era.
Specificities of the System of Innovation in the 
Country and Its Relationship with the State 
Since reform and opening-up in 1978, China’s economic structure 
of primary industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry has 
changed a lot, which can be seen from Figure 5.2. During the past 32 
years, the absolute value of these three industries has increased by 
3328.32 per cent, 8932.71 per cent, and 16821.73 per cent respectively, 
which manifests the great economic achievements China has made. 
The proportion of primary industry decreased from 28.19 per cent 
in 1978 to 10.30 per cent by 2009, while the proportion of tertiary 
industry increased from 23.94 per cent in 1978 to 43.36 per cent 
by the same year, and the proportion of secondary industry has 
maintained the level of less than 50 per cent. Therefore, China has 
undergone a dramatic transition from an agriculture-based country 
into a manufactures-based country since reform and opening-up.
In the secondary industry, China’s high-tech technology has also 
developed very fast. As Figure 5.3 shows, the percentage of China’s 
added value of high-tech industries in the manufacturing sector has 
been increasing and by 2007, this percentage reached 12.7 per cent, 
which surpassed Italy, and the gap between China and other developed 
countries has been reduced significantly. Figure 5.4 shows China’s 
Figure 5.2: Structural Evolution of China’s Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Industries, 1978–2009 (percentage) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2010). 
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high-tech products exports and its percentage of total merchandise 
exports from 1992 to 2008, from which we can see that China’s high-
tech exports have increased from US$ 4 billion to US$ 416 billion, 
and its percentage of total merchandise exports has increased from 
4.7 per cent to nearly 30 per cent.
Figure 5.3: Value Added of High-tech Industries as a Percentage of 
Manufacturing in China and Selected Countries, 1995–2007
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on High Technology Industry (2004a, 2010).
Figure 5.4: China’s Exports of High-tech Products, 1992–2008
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on High Technology Industry (2004a, 2010).
China’s NSI has developed with the transition from a planned 
economy into a market economy, as well as from an agriculture-
based country into a manufactures-based country. China also has 
the potential to develop a NSI that will be a powerful engine for 
sustainable growth and facilitate the smooth integration of China’s 
expanding economy into the global trading and knowledge system 
206 y lv PinG
(OECD 2008). China’s NSI includes the following main actors: 
enterprises, universities and research institutions, government, 
intermediaries; their interaction is shown in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: China’s NSI
China’s NSI has a number of unique characteristics, which have 
been emphasised by most scholars. In the first place, the Chinese 
government plays a critical role in the NSI and through the reform of 
the science and technology system has promoted the improvement 
of the NSI since China’s reform and opening-up. Second, the 
establishment and implementation of national key science and 
technology programmes and projects has promoted the integration 
and cooperation among enterprises, scientific research institutions 
and universities, which became main actors of China’s NSI. Third, 
Chinese enterprises are still lacking innovation capability, and the 
planned economic system developed in the past has been a serious 
impediment to the innovation of enterprises. It is therefore critical 
for China to establish a modern system and strengthen enterprises’ 
innovation capability. Finally, the incentive system of innovation 
and the service system of intermediary organisation are imperfect, 
and all kinds of key elements have not developed an appropriate 
innovation structure and network.
The role of the state in the NSI depends on their own political 
system, on the nature of the economic system, and on the economic 
development stage of different countries, that is to say, governments 
play different roles in the national systems of innovation of different 
countries. As far as China is concerned, the functions that the 
government plays in the NSI can be summarised into five categories. 
It guides the allocation of innovation resources effectively; it 
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facilitates and stimulates the interaction among all kinds of innovation 
elements; it creates a suitable mechanism and good environment for 
innovation activities; it intervenes where market failure exists; it 
monitors and assesses the implementation of the NSI.
Although the Chinese government has done a large amount of 
work in promoting and establishing the NSI, and the reform of the 
science and technology system has also made prominent progress, 
China’s NSI still has some serious obstacles and weak segments from 
the perspectives of the current increasingly international competitive 
challenges and the requirements to carry out the policy of ‘Scientific 
Concept of Development’. These obstacles and weaknesses still 
constrain the improvement of China’s innovation capability.
The macro policy design and management system 
There are a number of areas of weakness in macro policy-making and 
the management system in China. The macro policy-making system 
and mechanism for STI does not meet the needs of development since 
it lacks a national-level permanent agency engaged in consultation, 
assessment and supervision; there is still a large scope for the 
improvement of this function. The system of policy-making and 
implementation is also marked by fragmentation. Since the goals of 
each government department are different, there are disconnections 
in the innovation management process among them. As a result of 
the shortcomings inherited from the pre-reform planned economic 
system and the low national-level arrangement for the overall 
system, China’s innovation chain was fractional and the problem 
of long-standing segmentation of the economic sector, science and 
technology sector, educational sector, and industrial sector could not 
be resolved fundamentally. Moreover, the allocation of scientific and 
technological strengths is irrational, and the regional allocation of 
innovation resources does not match with national-level economic 
and social development configuration. Most innovation resources 
were allocated in Beijing, Shanghai and other developed coastal 
areas, whose environment could attract talents and technological 
achievements from home and abroad. Therefore, the gap between 
developed eastern coastal areas and undeveloped central as well as 
western areas in China is wider than ever before.
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The innovation capability of the main performers of 
innovation
Chinese enterprises do not, as yet, have strong indigenous innovation 
capability, and have not really developed a competitive technology 
innovation system. For a long time, Chinese enterprises have been 
attaching great importance to the introduction of technology and 
equipment with short-term efficiency while ignoring technology 
digestion, absorption and innovation. That is to say, the production 
capability of Chinese enterprises was maintained and upgraded 
mainly through technology imports, and enterprises spent more 
money on technology import than on their own R&D before 2000 
(as shown in Table 5.1), which led to considerable difficulties in 
enhancing their innovation capability. 
Table 5.1: R&D Expenditure and Technology Import 
(US$ 100 million)6 
Expenditure 
on R&D





Share of Total 
Sales, %
1995 17.1 0.46 43.4 1.17
2000 42.7 0.71 29.6 0.49
2005 152.7 0.76 36.2 0.18
2009 470.0 0.96 57.8 0.12
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2004b, 2006, 2010).
As far as indigenous innovation capability is concerned, less than 1 
per cent of all Chinese enterprises have applied for a patent, and only 
around 2,000 domestic enterprises, 0.03 per cent of the total, own 
their own intellectual property rights (China Daily 2005) despite 
the emergence of successful Chinese firms in the high-technology 
sector and in the international market. The innovation capability of 
Chinese enterprises is mostly focused on incremental innovation 
with little radical innovation, which can be observed from the 
patenting activities of the enterprises. Patents registered in China 
are classified into three categories: (a) invention, (b) utility model 
and (c) design (appearance). Design refers to new appearance and 
utility model refers to functionality modification or improvement 
without substantial technological contents. The invention patents 
are thus presumably more R&D intensive than the other two types 
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of patents. Chinese enterprises have relatively high patenting activity 
in utility model and design, which accounts for the largest increase 
in the total number of patents, but is low in invention patents. 
However, since 2000, the number of invention patents granted has 
also increased more rapidly than before (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2: Patents Granted in China, by Type of Patents (in number)
1995 2000 2005 2009
Total number of patents granted 45064 105345 214003 581992
Share of invention patent (%) 7.5 12.0 24.9 22.1
Share of utility model patent (%) 67.6 52.0 27.1 35.0
Share of design patent (%) 24.9 36.0 38.0 42.9
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2004b, 2006, 2010). 
Furthermore, the patenting activities differ significantly between 
domestic and foreign firms in China. For instance, even though 
both domestic and foreign firms have rapidly increased their patent 
applications, the largest increases in both invention patents applied 
and invention patents granted are from foreign firms.
Chinese scientific research institutions generally lack original 
innovation capability. China’s conditions of scientific and tech-
nological support, resources integration and social sharing are 
insufficient, and the utilisation efficiency of resources as well as 
innovation efficiency is relatively low. In addition, the capability 
of China’s social welfare research institutions is low. Because of 
inadequate awareness and deficient attention of the nature and 
value in research activities they are engaged in, investment has been 
insufficient to carry out many urgent scientific researches in China 
for a long time.
As an important base in personnel training and innovation, the 
potential of universities has not been brought into full play, and 
there are some defects in the system. Currently, applied research 
occupies the largest share of R&D activities in universities. For 
instance, in 2006, the shares of basic research expenditure, applied 
research expenditure, and experimental development expenditure 
in universities were 31.1 per cent, 53.4 per cent and 15.5 per cent 
respectively, and the shares of R&D personnel were 41.1 per cent, 
51.3 per cent and 7.6 per cent respectively, which is contrary to that 
of developed countries (China Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology 2010). 
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Finally, the strength of professional intermediaries is weak, which 
has a negative impact on the movement and integration of innovative 
elements, as well as the overall function of the innovation network. 
Intermediaries have developed gradually during China’s transition 
from a planned economy into a market economy, so they have 
heavy government-run overtones and are not independent economic 
entities, and could not play a full role in optimising the combination 
of scientific and technological elements.
The innovation mechanism 
Elements involved in the innovation activities are disconnected, 
separate from each other, and lack cooperation. In addition, the 
exchange of knowledge and information is not smooth. The 
interaction mechanism of production, teaching and research 
is imperfect since the connections, cooperation and exchanges 
among firms, scientific research institutions and universities are 
weak. Universities and scientific research institutions are unable to 
participate in the processes of technology introduction, digestion, 
absorption, and innovation in enterprises. On the contrary, enter-
prises also cannot participate in the national scientific research tasks 
undertaken by scientific research institutions and universities. 
The investment mechanism of science and technology is still 
insufficiently developed to meet the requirements of innovation. In 
recent years, although the total amount of state financial investment 
in science and technology has increased, its proportion in all financial 
expenditure for the same period did not simultaneously increase, 
and there is little monitoring of the expenditure of national scientific 
and technological funds in the entire process. In addition, there is 
no well-formed mechanism to guide and encourage investment by a 
variety of social resources.
There are also still deficiencies in the incentive mechanism, which 
should reflect the principle of a ‘people-oriented’ concept, promote 
scientific and technological innovation, as well as accelerate the 
transfer of scientific and technological achievements. The role of the 
market mechanism to guide and promote innovation has not been 
fully played out. Finally, the planned management system does not 
keep pace with the country’s development. Innovative activities 
should be totally different in scientific research organisations for 
they have different laws. The existing single innovation mechanism 
does not meet the diversity of the legislation on innovation.
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Constraints in the innovation environment 
The legal system governing innovation and the relevant policy 
environment still need to be improved on a number of levels. 
Legislation has not evolved fast enough to accommodate the 
requirements of scientific and technological development. The 
construction of the infrastructural platform for science and 
technology is relatively lagging behind. The infrastructure for 
science and technology is still relatively weak, and the limited 
resources could not be used reasonably, which constrains the serious 
development of many important research and development fields; 
it is difficult to provide basic guarantees to increase national-level 
innovation capabilities. The basic role of the market mechanism 
is still to be put to full use in innovation. During the process of 
promoting scientific and technological innovation, and with the 
withdrawal of the previous strong direct participation of the state, 
the fundamental role that the market mechanism plays still needs 
to be further strengthened. The existing pool of scientific and 
technological innovation talents is still insufficient to meet the needs 
of development. While this pool is large, its composition is ill-suited 
to the development needs of the NSI and the overall innovation 
capability is not high. In addition, qualified R&D personnel 
have still not been given full play in scientific and technological 
innovation, and their enthusiasm has not been fully aroused.
The culture of innovation 
A number of aspects of the current culture of innovation do not 
meet the development requirements of the NSI. In the first place, 
academic democracy has not been given full play and some academic 
agencies and scientific research institutions tend to be overly 
administrative. Second, the cooperative spirit is insufficient, and the 
phenomenon of partition exists as a serious problem, which hinders 
the interaction and communication among all innovative mainstays 
and increases the obstacles to innovation. Third, there is evidently 
an over-emphasis on short-term quick success and instant benefits 
to the detriment of long-term development. Finally, the spirit of 
competition and innovation needs to be strengthened. Both the 
long-term impact of the planned economic system, as well as the 
corresponding imperfection of the scientific research system and 
incentive mechanism lead to the weak driving forces of competition 
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and the low competitiveness of researchers, as well as an insufficient 
level of entrepreneurship.
Since the government includes both the central-level and 
regional-level tiers of administrative influence, the NSI can also be 
analysed from these two levels. In the NSI, the central government 
always tries to achieve sustained, stable development in accordance 
with international competitive norms through good policies, legal 
guarantees and infrastructure for innovation activities, organising 
important innovation programmes and projects, as well as pro-
moting the cooperation between industry and research from an 
overall perspective of the national economic development situation. 
In a regional innovation system, the local government always 
develops local innovation and development policies in accordance 
with national guidelines and related policies, in order to promote 
industrial upgrading and high-quality economic growth. Thus, the 
local government is to create a regional innovation environment, 
while the national innovation environment is largely created by the 
central government. Moreover, the local government generally needs 
to specify and combine the innovation policies and rules made by 
the central government into their local policy making and economic 
operation, which can reflect local characteristics and have a direct 
effect on local economic development.
Therefore, the local government plays an important role in the 
construction of a regional innovation system and the NSI. The local 
government is familiar with regional situation, such as the resources, 
market demands, talents, technology, and management of local firms, 
which can reduce the cost of innovation system construction. The 
fact that China’s market system is still in a transition phase requires 
intervention by local government in the innovation system. On the 
one hand, the regional policies which are intended to encourage 
innovation are always more specific and operational; on the other 
hand, many factors which maintain the market system, such as 
property rights and provision of public goods, need to be improved 
by the local government.
Explicit and Implicit State Policy towards 
Science, Technology and Innovation
Over the past three decades since reform and opening-up, China’s 
science and technology system has transformed from a planned 
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one based only on planning into a market-based system built on 
both planning and policy, during which the science and technology 
policies and regulations have played an increasingly important role, 
which is not only a parallel process with China’s transition from 
a planned economy to a socialist market economy, but is also a 
formation process of science and technology policies and a legal 
system with Chinese characteristics. Before reform and opening-up, 
the Chinese government played a dominant role in the allocation 
of science and technology resources. In China’s transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy, the intervention of the 
Chinese government in scientific and technological activities has 
diminished gradually, but did not disappear. The government has 
always been a provider of science and technology policies, so guiding 
and regulating scientific and technological activities through relevant 
policies in order to compensate for market failure is an important 
function the government should assume in the field of science and 
technology.
Science and technology policies in the 1980s
From the perspective of science and technology policy supply, 
purely science policies were relatively few in the 1980s, and 
the science and technology policies were much inclined to the 
technology side, which is consistent with the general direction of the 
science and technology development strategy of China at that time, 
that was emphasising high-tech industries, in line with the strategy 
that ‘economic construction must rely on science and technology, 
and science and technology must work for economic development’. 
In this phase, the science and technology policies focused on the 
following areas:
(a) High-Tech Development and Construction of Key Laboratories
At that time, the State Economic and Trade Commission, the 
State Planning Commission, the National Science and Technology 
Commission, and other departments successively promulgated a 
number of science and technology policies, most of which focused 
on high-tech development and the construction of key industrial 
laboratories, while few focused on basic research. For example, the 
State Economic and Trade Commission issued the ‘National Key 
Scientific and Technological Planning’ in 1982 (State Economic 
and Trade Commission 1982a), which consisted of 38 key research 
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projects. This was the first national-level science and technology 
plan in China in order to resolve key scientific and technological 
problems in national economic construction and social development. 
Later, the ‘Planning of State Key Laboratory Construction’ (State 
Economic and Trade Commission 1984a) and the ‘National Key 
Industrial Pilot Projects’ (State Economic and Trade Commission 
1984b) were introduced in 1984. Other examples such as the 
‘National Key Technology Development Plan’ (State Economic and 
Trade Commission 1980) and the ‘National Technology Upgrading 
Plan’ (State Economic and Trade Commission 1982b) introduced by 
the State Economic and Trade Commission in the early 1980s and 
1982 respectively, all reflected that China attached great importance 
to technology development at that time.
(b) Development of Technology Market
China had a good-sized technology market at that time. The 
development of the technology market experienced three stages in 
general: (i) the stage of technology market cultivation, which can 
be characterised by the voluntary cooperation between scientific 
research units and production units in jointly launching key 
projects, when scientific research units began to get compensation 
from production units for their technology transfer, consultant 
service and technology problems solving; (ii) the stage of technology 
market formation. At the National Science and Technology Awards 
Conference held in 1982, the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council put forward the strategic approach of ‘economic construction 
must rely on science and technology, and science and technology 
must work for economic development’, which facilitated China’s 
comprehensive development in science, technology, economy, and 
society, as well as accelerating the formation of the technology 
market; (iii) the stage of technology market development. In January 
1985, the State Council proposed the ‘Provisional Regulations on 
Technology Transfer’ (State Council 1985a), and in March pointed 
out that the ‘technology market is an important component of 
socialist commodity market’ in the ‘Decision Made by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reform of Science 
and Technology’ (State Council 1985b). So the status and role of 
the technology market in China was affirmed, and China made a 
breakthrough in some principle problems of commercialisation of 
technology achievements. 
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The overall development of the technology market can be measured 
by the total number and total value of technology transactions. In 
2009, the size of China’s technology market (contract value) was 
estimated at US$ 44.5 billion, nearly five times its size in 2000 (China 
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2010).7 
(c) Establishment of China’s National Nature Science Foundation 
     (NNSF)
In February 1986, the State Council approved the establishment of 
the National Natural Science Foundation in order to support basic 
research, which developed into two blocks: project funding system 
and talent funding system. In addition, this foundation established 
a support pattern consisting of three levels: common project fund, 
key project fund and grand project fund, as well as a series of special 
funds. It has also developed an integrated personnel training and 
support system mainly consisting of the National Basic Science 
Talent Fund, Youth Science Fund, National Outstanding Youth 
Science Fund, and Innovation Research Group Fund through the 
implementation of a strategy of attracting and training excellent 
young scientific talents.
(d) Technology Policies
After 1986, China has changed the former policy-making pattern that 
combined science policy with technology policy, and formed a new 
separate technology policy-making system. Technology policy is an 
important basis to introduce the science and technology development 
planning, economic and social development planning, as well as guiding 
scientific research, technological innovation and introduction, 
industrial structure adjustment and development. Technology policy 
generally includes development objectives, industrial structure, 
technology options and ways to promote technology progress. At 
that time, China’s technology policy made progress in the following 
areas: In 1986, the State Council issued the technology policy 
outlines in the 12 fields of energy, transportation, communication, 
agriculture, consumer goods industry, machine building, materials, 
building materials, urban construction, rural construction, urban 
and rural housing construction, and environmental protection. 
In this case, a number of national-level technology policies were 
developed, which also accelerated the research on technology policy 
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and encouraged various sectors and regions to build up their own 
development policies.
(e) All Kinds of Science and Technology Plans
In high-tech areas, the Ministry of Science and Technology has 
developed the ‘Spark Programme’, ‘863 Programme’, ‘Torch 
Programme’, as well as opening up the technology market and 
strengthening intellectual property rights protection by establishing 
high-tech zones, incubators, and so on. For programmes to support 
the commercialisation of research, such as the Torch Programme and 
the Spark Programme, the government accounts for no more than 2 
per cent to 5 per cent of total funding, while local governments and 
enterprises typically provide large shares of funding for programmes 
related to innovation and dissemination of technologies.
Early in 1986, the Chinese government approved the implemen-
tation of the ‘Spark Programme’, the purpose of which was to 
introduce advanced and applicable technology to rural areas, 
guide hundreds of millions of farmers to develop a rural economy 
relying on science and technology, improve the overall quality of 
rural labour, as well as promote the sustainable, rapid and healthy 
development of agriculture and rural economy in China.
The ‘863 Programme’ upheld the mission of ‘focusing on the key 
fields with limited objectives’, which conformed to the world-wide 
high-tech development trends and China’s reality and demands. 
Seven fields were selected as keystones of China’s high-tech research 
and development. These were bio-technology, space technology, 
information technology, laser technology, automation technology, 
energy technology, and new material technology (marine technology 
was included in 1996). The purpose of the ‘863 Programme’ was to 
focus on a small number of elite forces, aiming at the forefront of 
the world in selected fields, thus narrowing the gap with developed 
countries, stimulating the achievements of science and technology 
in related fields, cultivating a number of high-level technical talents, 
as well as preparing for the development of high-tech industries in 
the future.
The Torch Programme was introduced in 1988, the purpose of 
which was to make good use of China’s scientific and technological 
strengths and potential, to be market-oriented to facilitate the com-
mercialisation, industrialisation and internationalisation of high-
tech achievements. The Torch Programme encouraged researchers 
in universities and research institutes as well as technical entrepre-
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neurship to go into business and start up high-tech firms. Since the 
State Council approved the establishment of the Beijing High-Tech 
Development Pilot Zone in 1988, China has established 86 state-
level high-tech industrial development zones.
The main strengths of these programmes lie in their power to 
allocate public resources to the national priorities identified by 
the government (OECD 2008). It is widely recognised that these 
programmes have played a significant role in advancing science and 
technology in China by introducing the new funding mechanisms 
needed to move from the old science and technology system to the 
new market-based one, feeding economic development with science 
and technology inputs.
(f) Science and Technology Laws and Regulations
The development of the legislative framework of China’s science 
and technology sector can be divided into two aspects. The first 
is that the effective implementation of science and technology 
legislative work has provided a better legal ground for administrative 
decision-makers. Since China’s reform and opening-up, a series 
of legal documents have been issued, which improved the science 
and technology legal system further. Second, the technology law, 
regulations, as well as technology policies have constituted the initial 
legal framework of China’s science and technology system.
In China, the first law for technology was about introducing 
technology in the field of cooperating with foreign firms or govern-
ment. At the beginning of reform and opening-up, China introduced 
the ‘Provisional Regulations on Technology Introduction and 
Equipment Import’ (State Council 1981) and the ‘Regulations on 
Technology Introduction Contracts’ (State Council 1985c) in 1981 
and 1985 respectively, in order to make technology introduction 
more normative.
The second important law was the ‘Decision on Science and 
Technology Reform by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party’ issued in 1984, which began a prelude to China’s 
reform of science and technology, and especially introduced a 
competition mechanism to encourage scientific research institutions 
to involve themselves in economic activities in various ways. Since 
then, China has developed a series of policies and programmes to 
promote changes in the science and technology system and to shape 
a new system combining science and technology with economic 
development.
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The third far-reaching law was related to the high-tech 
development zones and technological start-ups. In 1988, the 
‘Provisional Regulations of Beijing High-Tech Development Pilot 
Zone’ (State Council 1988) was introduced, which was the first 
approved set of regulations supporting new technology and high-
tech technology by the State Council. Firms in pilot zones can enjoy 
a series of business concessions, such as tax reduction, export subsidy 
and loan, and so on. In order to stimulate the enthusiasm of different 
regions, besides Beijing, many cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Harbin, all developed local laws and regulations for the development 
of new technology and high-tech industries.
The fourth important law was the ‘Patent Law of China’ formally 
promulgated in 1984. In the era of planned economy, China lacked 
such a law, which severely limited the incentive for Chinese firms and 
individuals to engage in innovation. Consequently the introduction 
of this law has laid a far-reaching foundation to promote technology 
innovation and attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Without 
this law, China could not make today’s scientific and technological 
progress, and would find it impossible to become the developing 
country attracting the most FDI.
Therefore, the laws and regulations framework at the beginning 
of China’s reform and opening-up was very limited; all relevant laws 
and regulations were introduced in time in some important scientific 
and technological fields later.
Science and technology policies in the 1990s
The development of China’s science and technology system 
entered a new phase marked by the holding of the 14th National 
Congress. In 1992, China established the development direction  the 
construction of a socialist market economic system, and required 
that the science and technology policy should be adjusted around 
the development of the market economy. In the same year, the State 
Council issued the ‘Key Points on Acclimatize Development to 
the Socialist Market Economy, and Deepen the Implementation of 
Science and Technology System Reform’ (State Council 1992). In 
1999, the National Innovation Conference was held, at which the 
‘Decision on Strengthening Technology Innovation, Developing 
High Technology, and Realizing Industrialization’ (State Council 
1999a) was issued. These policies stimulated further reform of the 
science and technology system in China.
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(a) ‘Relying on Science and Education to Rejuvenate the Nation’ 
became a new science and technology development strategy
In May 1995, the ‘Decision on Accelerating Science and Technology 
Progress by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the State Council’ (Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the State Council 1995) was formally 
promulgated, which made clear that China would boost the 
economic and social development relying on science, technology 
and education, and also pointed out that science and technology are 
primary productive forces, and scientific and technological progress 
is a decisive factor on economic development. China should develop 
medium and long-term scientific development planning according 
to the national long-term needs, strengthen basic research and high-
tech research, and accelerate the industrialization of high technology. 
With the holding of the National Science and Technology 
Conference, ‘Relying on Science and Education to Rejuvenate the 
Nation’ has become an important development strategy in China.  
(b) Establishing National Knowledge Innovation System and  
     Attaching Importance to Sustainable Development
In June 1998, the first meeting of the National Science, Technology 
& Education Leading Group was held, at which ‘the Report Outline 
on Pilot Implementation of Knowledge Innovation Programme’ 
was discussed and passed, and it was determined that the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences would first initiate the ‘Knowledge Innovation 
Programme’ as a pilot base in establishing the NSI. In order to 
implement this important thinking, in August 1999, the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 
made the ‘Decision on Strengthening Technology Innovation, 
Developing High Technology and Realizing Industrialization’, and 
pointed out that ‘strengthening technology innovation, developing 
high technology and realizing industrialization’ is not only a 
solution to the deep-rooted problems faced by China’s national 
economic development, but also a strategic choice for China to deal 
with international competition.
(c) Putting Forward and Implementing the Three Strategies of 
‘Talents, Patents and Technology Standards’
During the ‘Tenth Five-Year’ period (2001–2005), the Ministry 
of Science and Technology put forward the three strategies of 
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‘Talents, Patents and Technology Standards’, and for the first time 
integrated technology standards into the practice of science and 
technology.8 In 2002, after the approval of the National Science, 
Technology & Education Leading Group, 12 important science 
and technology programmes including ‘A Study on Important 
Technology Standards’ (National Science, Technology & Education 
Leading Group 2002) were formally started. The first strategy 
was a human resources strategy, which was used to stimulate the 
participation in a scramble for international talents. The second was 
patent strategy, which was used to strengthen intellectual property 
rights management. The third was a technology standards strategy, 
which was used to establish and improve the system of technology 
standards in China. China is striving to promote its own technology 
standards and to comply with international standard settings. 
China’s size, the dynamism of its domestic market and its rapidly 
evolving technological capabilities give it unique opportunities. It 
is now a strategy for China to use the standards regime to foster 
innovation.
(d) Issuing Financial and Taxation Policies Closely Related to Science 
and Technology
In 1996 and 1997, the Ministry of Finance in conjunction with other 
relevant departments developed the ‘Management Rules of Three 
Items of Expenditure on Science and Technology’ (Ministry of 
Finance 1996c), ‘Notification on Finance and Taxation to Promote 
Technology Progress’ (Ministry of Finance 1996e), ‘Management 
Approach on Science and Technology Working Capital’ (Ministry 
of Finance 1996a), ‘Grant Funds Management Approach on 
National Key New Products’ (Ministry of Finance 1996b), ‘Loan 
and Discount Management Approach on Innovation Development 
of Large Equipment-Made Project’ (Ministry of Finance 1997a), 
‘Loan and Discount Management Approach on Application of 
Electronic Information’ (Ministry of Finance 1997b), ‘Loan and 
Discount Management Approach on Special Technology Renovation 
Project’ (Ministry of Finance 1997c), and so on. The promulgation 
of the above policies beneficially promoted the implementation of 
technology policies.
Many fiscal and taxation policies promulgated during this period 
were closely related to the development of science and technology 
at that time. The introduction and implementation of these policies 
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have promoted the rapid development of science and technology to 
some different degrees. Moreover, with the gradual establishment of 
China’s market economic system, the financial and taxation measures 
have increasingly accounted for a large proportion of all measures in 
promoting science and technology development, which were also 
much better than those measures simply relying on administrative 
allocation in the period of the planned economy. 
There are three very important financial policies that closely 
related to science and technology. The first is the ‘Rules on the 
Implementation of the Budget Law of People’s Republic of China’ 
(State Council 1995) promulgated by the State Council in 1995. The 
second is the ‘Management Rules of Three Items of Expenditure on 
Science and Technology’ (Ministry of Finance 1996c) issued by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1996, in which the three items of expenditure 
on science and technology refer to expenses for trial manufacture of 
new products, expenses for intermediate experiments, and subsidies 
for major scientific research projects established by the government 
to support science and technology development. The third is the 
‘Notice on Financial and Taxation Issues in Promoting Enterprises’ 
Technological Progress’ (Ministry of Finance 1996d) also issued by 
the Ministry of Finance in 1996, which encouraged enterprises to 
increase their technology development input and undertake more 
joint development with institutions, such as research institutes and 
universities, which also aimed to accelerate the industrialisation and 
commercialisation of technology achievements from enterprises, as 
well as promoted the upgrading of their machines and equipments.
Enactment of some taxation policies has had a more obvious 
effect on science and technology development. For example, 
the State Council and the General Administration of Customs 
promulgated the ‘Provisional Rules on Scientific Research and 
Teaching Equipments Exempt from Import Taxation’ in 1997 (State 
Council and the General Administration of Customs 1997), which 
pointed out that a certain number of scientific research and teaching 
equipments imported by non-profit scientific research institutes and 
universities used for scientific research and teaching directly could 
be exempted from both value-added tax (VAT) and consumption 
tax. In 1999, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of 
Taxation issued the ‘Notice on Taxation Policies to Accelerate 
the Commercialization of Science and Technology Achievements’ 
(Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation 1999), 
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which proposed that scientific research institutes and universities’ 
income from technology transfer could be exempt from turnover 
tax.
(e) Implementation of the ‘Decision on Strengthening Technology 
Innovation, Developing High-Tech and Realizing Industriali-
zation by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the State Council’
In August 1999, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the State Council held a meeting in Beijing, at which the 
‘Decision on Strengthening Technology Innovation, Developing 
High-Tech and Realizing Industrialization by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council’ 
was issued. This was a decision made by the CPC in line with the 
actual situation of world economy and technology development 
trends, as well as the development of domestic economy, science 
and technology. This policy was a typical top-down policy-making 
model, which aimed to emphasise innovation and industrialisation 
of high and new technology. Therefore, the introduction of this 
policy has far-reaching effects on China’s technological innovation.
The Science Conference held in 1978, the National Science and 
Technology Conference held in 1995 and the National Innovation 
Conference held in 1999 all reflected the new demands of the evolution 
of science and technology policies and economic development on 
science and technology development strategy. Corresponding with 
the National Innovation Conference, the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party issued many new policies in this period, 
such as the policies on promoting the transfer of scientific and 
technological achievements. In February 1999, the General Office 
of the State Council transmitted the ‘Suggestion on Reform of 
Scientific Research Institutions Affiliated to 10 State-Level Bureaus 
and Managed by the State Economic and Trade Commission’ 
(Ministry of Science and Technology et al. 1999) made by six 
departments including the Ministry of Science and Technology and 
the State Economic and Trade Commission. In addition, the State 
Council issued ‘Policies on Encouraging Development of Software 
Industry and IC Industry’ (State Council 2000). Therefore, a surge 
of policies promoting technology innovation and developing high-
tech emerged around 1999.
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(f ) Science and Technology Laws and Regulations in the 1990s
Most of China’s science and technology laws and regulations were 
introduced in the 1990s. In July 1993, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress discussed and passed the ‘Science and 
Technology Progress Law of People’s Republic of China’ (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress 1993), which came 
into operation on 1 October, 1993. This science and technology law 
was a basic one to guide and promote the development of science 
and technology in the new era, which was not only a fundamental 
norm to promote science and technology progress, but also the 
foundation to develop a set of corresponding laws and regulations. 
At present, most local governments formulate the ‘Regulations on 
Science and Technology Progress’ (National People’s Congress 
1993b) in accordance with this. Overall, the ‘Law on Science and 
Technology Progress of People’s Republic of China’ (National 
People’s Congress 1993c) combined the basic strategy of governing 
the country by law with the development strategy of ‘Relying on 
Science and Education to Rejuvenate the Nation’, and played a very 
important role in promoting, guiding, regulating, and safeguarding 
China’s science and technology progress and innovation.
The mission of science and technology development in the 1990s 
was to promote the commercialisation of scientific and technological 
achievements. On the one hand, this was due to the acceleration of 
the international scientific and technological revolution, especially 
the push of knowledge-based economy from US; on the other 
hand, the high rate of domestic economic development needed the 
contribution from the science and technology sector. 
In July 1993, the National People’s Congress passed the 
‘Agricultural Popularization Law of People’s Republic of China’ 
(National People’s Congress 1993a), which was to strengthen the 
popularisation of agricultural technology, promote the application 
of agricultural scientific and technological achievements into 
agricultural practice as soon as possible, as well as ensure the 
development of agriculture and realise the modernisation of 
agriculture.
In August 1999, the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party and the State Council promulgated the ‘Decision on 
Strengthening Technology Innovation, Developing High Technology 
and Realizing Industrialization’, which was an important decision 
for China to deal with world-wide scientific and technological 
revolution. Before this decision, the Chinese government has issued 
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seven supporting policy documents. In March 1999, the ‘Provisions 
on Promotion of Commercialization of Scientific and Technological 
Achievements’ (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the State Council 1999b) was introduced, and in May 1999, the 
‘Regulations on Science and Technology Progress Award’ (Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 
1999d) was issued, and in December, the ‘Implementing Rules of 
Science and Technology Progress Award’ (Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 1999a) was 
launched; other dozens of laws and regulations were also issued such 
as the ‘Regulations of Natural Sciences Award’ (Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council 1999c).
(g) Knowledge Innovation Project
In June 1998, the National Science, Technology & Education 
Leading Group discussed and approved the ‘Report Outlines on 
Pilot Implementation of Knowledge Innovation Project’ by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, with which the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences started to implement the science and technology system 
reform and innovation. The basic tasks of the Knowledge Innovation 
Project were the following:
First, developing and maintaining a strong national-level know-
ledge innovation capability. The Knowledge Innovation Project was 
to engage in basic research and strategic research to resolve the basic, 
strategic, comprehensive, forward-looking, and critical scientific 
and technological issues in China’s industrialisation construction, 
by aiming at national strategic targets and the frontier of world-wide 
science and technology.
Second, speeding up the dissemination of the latest scientific 
and technological knowledge. On the one hand, the Knowledge 
Innovation Project was to train and continuously provide a large 
number of high-quality scientific technological personnel with 
a stream of information on cutting edge innovation during the 
process of scientific research. On the other hand, the Knowledge 
Innovation Project was to enhance the popularisation of science and 
technology, and make a contribution to improve people’s scientific 
and technological capabilities.
Third, promoting knowledge and technology transfer compre-
hensively. The Knowledge Innovation Project was to promote the 
development of China’s high technology sectors such as information, 
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new material, biotechnology, as well as the technology upgrading of 
traditional industries. In addition, it was to provide a solid foundation 
and knowledge sources to enhancing China’s innovation capability.
Fourth, providing technological and scientific advice to national 
macroeconomic policy-making. The Knowledge Innovation Project 
was to strength the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the strategic 
development research of national science and technology, education, 
economy, and safety, in order to provide advice and basis, as well 
as make recommendations and conduct a scientific evaluation of 
China’s macro policy-making. 
Fifth, training and fostering a contingent of world-class pro-
fessionals with a good mastery of advanced science and technology 
through the principles of open and fair competition on the basis of 
merits. 
Sixth, strengthening the construction of national knowledge 
innovation bases continuously. The Knowledge Innovation Project 
was to deepen the reform of the science and technology system, 
gradually improve and establish a new modern national research 
agency system in conformity with the international practice and 
domestic actual situation, focus on building and supporting those 
world-class national knowledge innovation bases among which a 
number of bases should strive to become one of the acknowledged 
international research centres in the world or an important part of 
international research centres.
Taking various factors into account, the central government 
developed additional pilot special funds for the Knowledge 
Innovation Project during 1998–2002.
(h) Enterprise-based Reforms in Applied Science Research Institutions
With the accelerating pace of reform of government agencies, the 
State Council decided to start the management system reform of 242 
institutes affiliated to 10 state-level bureaus, which were managed by 
the National Economic and Trade Committee at the end of 1998, 
through which these institutions turned themselves into scientific and 
technological enterprises or intermediary services. The purpose of this 
reform was to reduce the number of independent state-level applied 
research institutions, encourage enterprises to establish their own 
applied research institutions and become a mainstay of technological 
innovation. In order to promote the implementation of this science and 
technology system reform smoothly, the relevant national ministries 
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issued numerous complementary policies, including taxation policies, 
industrial and technology policies, and so on.
Science and technology policies in the 21st century
The strategic significance of indigenous innovation was formally 
established at the National Science and Technology Conference 
held in 2006, and the ‘Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term 
Strategic Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 
(2006–2020)’ (State Council 2006a) was also issued at this conference, 
which marked and indicated a significant transition and readjustment 
of China’s science and technology development strategy from 
imitation-based innovation to indigenous innovation. Based on 
the actual local and global conditions, regarding the enhancement 
of indigenous innovation capability as a core strategy, constructing 
an innovation-based country as a goal, this plan made an overall 
scheme and deployment plan for China’s science and technology 
development in the next 15 years, and was a programmatic document 
in guiding the new era. This plan pointed out that the guideline of 
China’s science and technology development in the new era was 
to build an innovation-based economy by fostering indigenous 
innovation capabilities, to foster an enterprise-centred technology 
innovation system and enhance the innovation capabilities of Chinese 
firms, to achieve major breakthroughs in the targeted strategic areas 
of technological development and basic research.
To this end, the State Council announced late in 2006 a new policy 
package covering nine broad categories:
(a) Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, and Improving Intelle-
ctual Property Rights System
In view of the current status that intellectual property rights have 
not yet played a significant role in supporting China’s indigenous 
innovation strategy, the State Council issued the ‘Several Related 
Policies of the Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Strategic 
Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020)’ 
(State Council 2006b), which pointed out that the introduction of 
five policies by the Chinese government would protect intellectual 
property rights, further improve China’s intellectual property rights 
system and create a legal environment respecting and protecting 
intellectual property rights. The contents of these policies covered 
the property rights of key technologies and products of indigenous 
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innovation, the establishment of international standards, the 
reinforcement of an intellectual property rights system, stronger 
control on intellectual property rights protection, shortening the 
patent review cycle, and a preferential treatment in government 
procurement for new products. 
(b) Giving Full Support to Talented Personnel 
There are about 14 policies on supporting talented personnel, which 
have developed detailed and operational rules mainly for post-
doctoral, high-level overseas talents, innovative talents cultivation, 
scarce talents in key areas, and continuous education for professional 
and technical personnel.
In order to further improve the post-doctoral system and give it 
full play to strengthen high-level professional and technical talents 
team construction, the Ministry of Personnel promulgated the 
‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan on Post-Doctoral System’ (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security 2006) in October 2006, which 
set the main objective, stressed the necessity to increase investment 
and implement the Special Assistance Scheme. Moreover, this 
plan required that the annual subsidiary standard for each post-
doctoral should increase 67 per cent after 2006, more attention 
should be paid to the construction of post-doctoral workstations, 
and the international exchanges and cooperation for them should be 
expanded.
There are several programmes on nurturing outstanding 
scientific talents in China now, such as the Yangtze River Scholar 
Programme, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Hundred 
Talents Programme, the Truth Award, the Special Research Fund 
for University Doctorate-Awarding Units, the Fund for Overseas 
Chinese Scholars, and so on. 
Four departments including the Ministry of Finance issued the 
‘Guidelines on Implementation of Incentive Distribution System of 
Indigenous Innovation in Enterprises’ (Ministry of Finance 2006a) 
in October 2006, the core requirements of which were that high-
tech enterprises can reward critical R&D staff by equity (shares) 
or by a certain coefficient of income from the sales price (shares) 
during the implementation of corporate capital transformation into 
share capital. The Ministry of Science and Technology issued the 
‘Interim Procedures of Strengthening Innovative Talents Training 
in the Implementation of Major Projects’ (Ministry of Science and 
Technology 2006b), which emphasised that the proportion of young 
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researchers (no more than 45 years old) in a team should be no less 
than 60 per cent in principle; the proportion of young leaders in a 
major project (no more than 45 years old) among all project leaders 
should be no less than 60 per cent in principle.
(c) Increasing Science and Technology Investment
There are about seven policies relevant to science and technology 
investment, which introduced a number of management regulations 
mainly targeting the 973 Special Programme, 863 Special Programme, 
National Science and Technology Support Programme, Public 
Welfare Special Programme. They focused on standardising and 
strengthening national management of these special programmes 
so as to improve the capital efficiency. On 30 September 2006, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Science and Technology 
issued the ‘Management Measures of Special Funds in National Key 
Basic Research Development Programme’ (Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology 2006a), which clearly notified 
that the expenditure of the 973 Special Programme should include 
11 items, and also provided a very detailed rule of management 
fee; on the same day, these two ministries also issued ‘Management 
Measures of Special Funds of National Science and Technology 
Support Programme’ (Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology 2006b), which clearly distinguished the fund 
free of charge and the loan-funded financial support, encouraged the 
exploration of other sources of funding, and guided the social capital 
to enter fields of science and technology.
(d)  Strengthening the Construction of Science and Technology 
Innovation Bases and Platforms
There are about 11 policies to support the construction of science and 
technology innovation bases and platforms, which are mainly for the 
National Engineering Laboratory, science and technology parks in 
universities, technological business incubator, National Engineering 
Centre, firms’ technology centre, State Key Laboratory, and so on. 
In July 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission 
promulgated the ‘Guideline on Construction of National Engi-
neering Laboratory’. In November 2006, the Ministry of Science 
and Technology and the Ministry of Education jointly issued the 
‘Identification and Management Rules of National University 
Science and Technology Park (USTP)’ (Ministry of Science and 
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Technology and the Ministry of Education 2006b), which gave 
a detailed illustration of the identification and management of 
university science and technology parks, and especially highlighted 
a number of conditions of the application of national university 
science and technology parks. For example, more than 50 per cent of 
enterprises in university science and technology parks should have 
a strong relationship with universities in technology achievements 
and talented personnel; more than 85 per cent administrative 
managers should have a bachelor’s degree or above; the number of 
enterprises in the incubator should be more than 50. In addition, the 
‘Suggestions on Further Promoting Research Bases and Its Facilities 
Open to Enterprises and Community’ (Ministry of Science and 
Technology and the Ministry of Education. 2006a), the ‘Guideline on 
Construction of National Key Laboratory Relying on Transformed 
Institutions and Enterprises’ (Ministry of Science and Technology 
and the Ministry of Education. 2006c) and other policies were issued.
(e) Enhancing the Development of Education and Science Popularisation
There are about seven policies to support education and science 
popularisation, which include some guidelines, notifications and 
management rules mainly for the construction of national key 
disciplines, national-level programmes for sending people to 
study abroad, carrying out science popularisation activities, and 
enhancing the innovation capability of universities. For example, 
in October 2006, the Ministry of Education issued the ‘Guidelines 
on Strengthening the Construction of National Key Disciplines’ 
(Ministry of Education 2006a), which emphasised the importance 
of establishing multiple input mechanisms for the construction 
of national key disciplines, integrating resources to speed up the 
development of national key disciplines, as well as giving full play to 
the role of national key disciplines as backbone and model. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Education also issued the ‘Provisional Measures 
on Construction and Management of National Key Disciplines’ 
(Ministry of Education 2006b), which clarified identification 
and evaluation issues. In order to carry out the task of science 
popularisation, in November 2006, seven departments including the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Education, and 
the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party jointly issued the ‘Guidelines on Carrying Out 
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Science Popularity Activities by Scientific Research Institutions and 
Universities to the Society’ (Ministry of Science and Technology 
et al. 2006), which required that the participation units should create 
good conditions and gradually increase the opening hours of science 
popularity activities, so that by the end of ‘Eleventh Five-Year’ Plan, 
the annual opening hours of science popularity activities should 
be no less than 15 days in general. Moreover, seven departments 
including the Ministry of Science and Technology jointly issued 
the ‘Guidelines on Strengthening Capability of National Science 
Popularization’ in January 2007 in order to promote the capability 
of science popularisation through a number of measures.
(f) Venture Capital and Financial Policies
There are about nine policies on financial support, which are mainly 
for the credit guarantee system for small and mid-sized enterprises, 
high-tech enterprise insurance services, establishing and improving 
intellectual property trade market, funds on guiding venture capital 
for technological small and medium-sized enterprises, and so on. 
In order to resolve the problems in the construction of a credit 
guarantee system for small and mid-sized enterprises, in November 
2006, the General Office of the State Council issued the ‘Notification 
on Strengthening the Construction of Credit Guarantee System 
for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ (State Council 2006a), 
which emphasised the necessity to establish and improve the risk 
compensation mechanism and the tax preference policies in security 
agencies, as well as promote the mutual beneficial cooperation 
between the security agencies and financial institutions, and so on. 
In December 2006, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
issued the ‘Guidelines on the Reform of Commercial Bank and the 
Enforcement of Financial Services for High-Tech Enterprises’ (China 
Banking Regulatory Commission 2006a) and developed 18 detailed 
guiding rules, in order to create a better financial environment to 
support and encourage indigenous innovation. At the same time, 
another policy of ‘Implementing Regulations of Financial Policies 
to Support National Key Science and Technology Programmes’ 
(China Banking Regulatory Commission 2006b) was issued, which 
proposed some requirements from the perspectives of supporting 
areas, conditions, risk prevention and control, and so on.
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(g) Tax Incentives for Innovation in the Business Sector
There are about nine policies relating to tax incentives, which 
are mainly for income tax preferential policies on enterprises’ 
technological innovation, provisional regulations tax exempting 
scientific and technological development equipment imports, 
taxation policy on national university science and technology parks 
as well as scientific and technological incubators, and regulations of 
exempting scientific research and educational equipment imports 
from tax, and so on. 
In December 2006, the Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation jointly issued the ‘Notification on 
Income Tax Preferential Policies for Enterprises’ Technological 
Innovation’ (Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation 2006b), which clearly required that after 1 January 2006, 
the new high-tech enterprises setting up in the National High-Tech 
Development Zones can enjoy income tax exemption within the 
two years after they show profit, and enjoy the 15 per cent annual 
income tax after the first two years. At the same time, another policy, 
the ‘Notification on Adjustment of Pre-Tax Deduction Policy of 
Income Tax’ (Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation 2006a) was also issued. 
(h) Public Procurement Policies
Public procurement can help promote innovation and accelerate the 
diffusion of innovative products and services. Public procurement 
should give priority to products developed by domestic firms 
through indigenous innovation. The Chinese government has 
recognised this point and began to implement it. There are about 
six policies relating to public procurement, which are mainly for 
identification of national indigenous innovation products, budget 
management of government procurement, evaluation rules, contract 
management rules, import and export management regulations, 
order management regulations, and so on.
On 26 December 2006, the Ministry of Science and Technology, 
the National Development and Reform Commission, and the 
Ministry of Finance jointly issued the ‘Management Regulations on 
Identification of National Indigenous Innovation Products (For Trial 
Implementation)’ (Ministry of Science and Technology et al. 2006), 
which was to develop rules on identification of indigenous innovation 
products. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance successively issued 
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a series of policies, such as the ‘Management Rules on Government 
Procurement Budget of Indigenous Innovation Products’ (Ministry 
of Finance 2006), ‘Regulations on Government Procurement 
Evaluation of Indigenous Innovation Products’ (Ministry of Finance 
2006c), ‘Management Rules on Government Procurement Contract 
of Indigenous Innovation Products’ (Ministry of Finance 2006d), 
and so on, which were conducted to promote China’s indigenous 
innovation and improve the competitiveness of indigenous 
innovation products.
(i) Science and Technology Legislation
The science and technology policy in China affects all public policies. 
Many of these science and technology policies were established 
to match with the reform and development of the national science 
and technology strategy and system. From the 21st century, 
with the setting of the development of indigenous innovation as 
China’s national strategy, a number of new science and technology 
policies were issued. With the release of the ‘Outline of National 
Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology Development 
Planning’ in January 2006, a development guideline was proposed 
as ‘indigenous innovation, achieving a leap-frog development 
in key fields, sustainable development and guiding the future’, 
and the goal was set as ‘improving the capability of indigenous 
innovation and constructing an innovation-oriented society’. With 
the gradual improvement of the socialist market economic system 
and implementation of national medium- and long-term science and 
technology planning, China’s science and technology innovation 
policies and relevant economic supporting policies should be 
readjusted in keeping with the new context, which proposes new 
requirements to improve national science and technology legislation 
further, and especially, the science and technology legislation 
should keep pace with the development of science and technology 
innovation. The highlights of the major amendments of the ‘Science 
and Technology Progress Law’ on 1 July 2008, were that indigenous 
innovation and construction of an innovation-oriented society 
were included in this law. The view that enterprises should become 
the main actors of scientific and technological innovation was also 
included in this law, and establishing modern scientific research 
institutions was clearly proposed. 
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Outcomes of State Policy and State 
Institutions on the NSI
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government at all levels has taken a 
variety of measures, such as policies promulgation, implementation 
of science and technology planning, direct financial investment 
or subsidies, tax incentives, financial leverage regulation, public 
procurement, implementation of science and technology awards, as 
well as involvement of technology management elements in resource 
allocation, in order to promote science and technology progress and 
innovation. The policy portfolio includes direct means, as well as 
indirect means, and targeted as well as neutral intervention. In the 
key fields of science and technology development, the reform of 
the science and technology system, conditions and basic platform 
of scientific research, industrialisation, science and technology 
intermediary service system, flow of scientific and technological 
talents, as well as international cooperation, the Chinese government 
has developed and implemented a large number of normative 
policy documents and created a good environment for science and 
technology progress and innovation. These policies have played 
a very important role in the development of China’s science, 
technology, economy, and society, which are mainly represented as 
the following areas:
First, they greatly enhanced the awareness of scientific and 
technological innovation as well as competition, and the adaptive 
changes of these minds are an important foundation to the deve-
lopment of innovation activities. For example, the R&D intensity — 
the ratio of gross domestic expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) to gross domestic product (GDP) — of China’s economy 
has increased spectacularly. It reached 1.47 per cent of GDP in 
2008, up from 0.6 per cent in 1995 (Figure 5.6). In addition, China 
has developed a huge pool of human resources for science and 
technology. With 1.64 million full-time equivalent (FTE) researchers 
in 2008, China has ranked second in the world since 2000, after the 
United States (Figure 5.7).
234 y lv PinG
Figure 5.6: China’s R&D Intensity, 1994–2008 (GERD as a 
Percentage of GDP)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (1996–2010).
Figure 5.7: The Number of Researchers in China, 1995–2009: 
Total Researchers (FTE)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (1996–2010).
Second, they promoted the combination of science, technology and 
economy. The role that science and technology plays has increasingly 
influenced economic restructuring, the transformation of traditional 
industries, as well as the development of high technology. Many 
scientific research institutions further defined the development 
direction of scientific and technological innovation in accordance 
with the industrial or regional economic development strategy 
and market demand after their transformation. In addition, these 
scientific research institutions also participated in the major national 
or local scientific and technological projects jointly with other 
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enterprises, carried out the R&D and application of major common 
technology, developed high technology, and drove the upgrading of 
traditional industries, which made the support power of science and 
technology on economic and social development increase gradually.
Third, the transformation of technology development–based 
research institutions into enterprises promoted the process during 
which enterprises have become innovation subjects. Since 1985, 
China has made great efforts in promoting the market-oriented 
reform of the science and technology system, which sped up the 
transformation of application-oriented research institutions into 
enterprises, promoted the enterprises to become innovation subjects, 
as well as cultivated a large number of scientific and technological 
enterprises. The percentage of enterprises’ R&D expenditure in total 
social R&D expenditure increased from 59.95 per cent in 2000 to 
72.28 per cent in 2007 (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: R&D Expenditure by Performer in China, 2000–2007 
(percentage)





2000 59.95 28.80 8.56 2.68
2001 60.43 27.67 9.82 2.07
2002 61.18 27.28 10.14 1.40
2003 62.37 25.92 10.54 1.18
2004 66.83 21.95 10.22 1.00
2005 68.32 20.94 9.89 0.85
2006 71.08 18.89 9.22 0.82
2007 72.28 18.54 8.48 0.69
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2001–2008).
Fourth, the scientific and technological business incubators, 
productivity promotion centres, science and technology advice and 
evaluation agencies developed fast, which gradually constitutes a 
scientific and technological service system. By 2007, China had more 
than 1,000 productivity promotion centres, more than 500 scientific 
and technological business incubators, more than 400 venture capital 
institutions, more than 400 science and technology information 
and intelligence agencies, as well as more than 2,300 various kinds 
of scientific and technological advice and evaluation agencies, 
which all promoted the science and technology innovation and 
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industrial development. A large number of independent intellectual 
property rights accumulated by colleges, universities and scientific 
research institutions have been commercialised into practical 
productivity rapidly, during which a number of forces engaged in 
commercialisation of scientific and technological achievements are 
developed. For example, Tsinghua University, Peking University and 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University all have their own listed companies. 
By the end of 2005, the number of national private technological 
companies had reached 143,991, the total revenue of which was 
6.1218 trillion Yuan. Among these enterprises, the revenue of 8,168 
was more than 0.1 billion Yuan, the revenue of 874 was more than 
1 billion Yuan (Ministry of Science and Technology 2006a). In 
addition, many high-tech enterprises with considerable international 
competitiveness have emerged, such as ZTE, Huawei, and so on.
Fifth, they promoted the development of high-tech industries. 
Since the 1980s, China has promoted the development of high-
tech industries through the establishment of high-tech industrial 
development pilot zones. In May 1988, the State Council approved 
the establishment of the Beijing New Technology Industry 
Development Pilot Zone and granted 18 preferential policies to 
it. In August of the same year, the implementation of the ‘Torch 
Programme’ was started. At present, China has established 54 
National High-Tech Industrial Development Zones all over the 
country. In 2006, 30,403 enterprises were identified as high-tech 
in these zones, the new product sales revenue of which was 811.98 
billion Yuan, and the new product sales revenue accounted for 22.5 
per cent of total product sales revenue (Ministry of Science and 
Technology 2008).
Sixth, the promotion of industrialisation of scientific and tech-
nological achievements enhanced the industrial core competitiveness. 
Through the implementation of relevant national industrialisation 
plans, China has made major breakthroughs in the information 
industry, bio-industry, new material industry, new energy industry, 
manufacturing industry, and so on, which made a great contribution 
to promote the upgrading of industrial structure, enhance the 
industrial core competitiveness and promote China’s economic and 
social development.
China has made great achievements in the development of 
science, technology, economy, and society due to the introduction 
of all these policies, but a wide gap still exists between these 
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achievements and the demands of China’s economic and social 
development, and a number of obstacles and problems in China’s 
scientific and technological innovation and development need 
to be resolved. Chinese enterprises have not really become as 
active as they could be in the commercialisation of scientific and 
technological achievements. As most Chinese enterprises are lacking 
in technological capabilities and participate in market competition 
relying mainly on cost advantages both at home and abroad, 
they usually do not have enough capability of transforming new 
technology into innovation. They also tend to be risk averse and 
suffer from a low level of financing capability. A corresponding 
fact to this is that universities and scientific research institutions 
have become the performers of technological innovation. As a large 
number of scientific and technological achievements come directly 
from science and technology projects supported by the national level 
rather than the market players with demands of commercialisation, 
many of them do not have high technical practicality and only stay 
at the laboratory stage, so that it is difficult for them to meet the 
actual needs of enterprises. For example, in all national-level science 
and technology programmes, the projects assumed by universities 
and scientific research institutions account for 90 per cent, and the 
technical and economic practicality of achievements of these projects 
is not high and cannot meet the actual needs of enterprises.
The environmental factors for commercialisation of scientific and 
technological achievements need to be improved. At present, there 
are many imperfections in the state support for the industrialisation 
of indigenous innovation achievements. The law and regulations 
on promoting industrialisation of scientific and technological 
achievements still need extensive refinement. Intellectual property 
rights protection is weak and the problem of infringement of 
intellectual property rights is still serious, which leads to the fact 
that it is difficult for enterprises to appropriate the returns on 
their investments in indigenous innovation. The financial system 
to support the industrialisation of scientific and technological 
achievements in China is still weak. The support and incubation 
services for start-up enterprises are weak and the implementation 
of government procurement measures is still ineffective. Because 
of these factors, the state is still not providing enough support on 
indigenous innovation achievements. 
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It is still very difficult for talents to flow between research 
institutions and enterprises. Since enterprises on their own cannot 
provide a stable research environment and there is a gap between 
research institutions and enterprises in research conditions, it 
is difficult for talents to flow between enterprises and research 
institutions. At present, there are tens of thousands of engineering 
Ph.D. graduates every year in China, most of whom enter into 
universities and scientific research institutions, leaving only a small 
portion to enter into enterprises. 
Conclusion
In the past three decades since the reform and opening-up, China’s 
NSI has experienced deep structural changes. First, the core of 
the NSI has transformed from the scientific research institutions 
into enterprises. Second, the base of the NSI has transformed from 
a dependence on imported innovation to an increasing reliance on 
indigenous innovation. Third, the composition of innovators has been 
transformed from only state-owned enterprises into a mix of public 
and private sector enterprises. Fourth, the NSI has transformed from 
a close innovation model into a global innovation model. Fifth, the 
NSI has transformed from the one led by cost advantage into that 
led by innovation. These five aspects have greatly changed China’s 
innovation pattern. During the transition, as an initiator of the NSI, 
the government has been playing an irreplaceable role.
In spite of its significant and remarkable achievements, China 
still has a long way to go to build a modern, enterprise-centred and 
efficient NSI. To achieve this goal, it will have to maintain a high 
level of investment in R&D, innovation and education and overcome 
the remaining institutional and structural weaknesses of its current 
innovation system.
The near future is a critical period for China to implement 
the strategy of indigenous innovation. In order to promote the 
construction of the NSI in the new era, the Chinese government 
must play a leading role in the establishment and improvement 
of the science and technology system in the basic framework of a 
socialist market economic system. In addition, the relationship 
between the market mechanism and the state should be more fully 
addressed. The guiding, planning and encouraging role of the 
national science and technology policies as well as macro science and 
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technology management rules must be given full play, and the market 
mechanism should play a basic role in the allocation of scientific 
and technological resources. China’s allocation and integration 
of scientific and technological resources must be implemented 
from the perspective of a national strategy in order to improve the 
capability of science and technology innovation and comprehensive 
competitiveness in essence on a national level. 
China should continue to deepen the reform of science and 
technology system, and construct an institutional framework of the 
NSI. Two tasks in the reform of the science and technology system 
are essential to the construction of the NSI. One is to deepen the 
reform of scientific research institutions, and the other is to change 
the role of the state. The core elements of the NSI are enterprises, 
scientific research institutions and government agencies, which 
correspond to the technological innovation, knowledge innovation 
and institutional innovation respectively, and are the backbone of the 
NSI. The reform of science and technology policy is designed to put 
all performers of innovation in the right positions and make them 
perform their respective duties. The government should play a role 
in the three aspects. It should construct an institutional and policy 
environment conducive to innovation, including a venture capital 
management system and an intellectual property system, which 
are necessary both to increase the propensity of domestic firms to 
innovate and to maintain China’s attractiveness for knowledge-
intensive foreign direct investment. It should play a leading role in 
the areas marked by a prevalence of market and systemic failures 
through direct involvement in technology innovation activities 
and the provision of public goods and common basic technology. 
Finally, it should guide the science and technology development of 
some specific industries following the principle of ‘to be aware that 
there are things must be done and things must not be done’, as well 
as make the innovation resources in line with the interests of specific 
industries through making good use of various financial means.
China should continue to improve the organising mechanism 
for science and technology programmes and major science and 
technology projects and straighten out the relationships among all 
kinds of innovation subjects in order to improve the efficiency of the 
NSI. Various kinds of science and technology programmes and major 
special projects are the most important innovation activities, and 
the government usually invests and allocates innovation resources 
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through the organisation of these innovation activities, so they can 
be regarded as a lubricant for the NSI. The successful organisation of 
these major innovation activities, to a large extent, can improve the 
NSI and its efficiency. During the process of organisation of major 
science and technology innovation, initiating the full mobilisation 
of various innovation subjects in the NSI should be considered. 
Meanwhile, an innovation aggregation should be established, which 
regards enterprises as a core element and forms a close relationship 
among the government, industry and learning. The application 
of science and technology projects should require not only the 
participation of enterprises, but also the support and incubation 
of innovation activities of enterprises, and the conditions created 
for enterprises’ technological innovation through various financial 
means. Led by the national science and technology programmes, all 
performers of innovation in the NSI should interact with each other 
frequently, so that the mutual cooperation can be realised as well as 
their complementary advantages can be finally developed.
China should explore diversified scientific and technological 
investment and financing means, and guide the development of 
the NSI in line with the interests of the country. The government 
guidance on the NSI refers to the innovation resources allocation 
that the government implements through the means of science and 
technology investment, personnel training, policy-making, and so 
on, which make the development of the NSI in line with the national 
interests and development strategy. How to use the science and 
technology investment policy to guide the efficient allocation of 
science and technology resources in the NSI is a challenging task that 
the Chinese government is facing. Only a wide range of science and 
technology investment and financing methods are explored actively 
but China can achieve the purpose of allocating resources through 
science and technology investment and making the resources 
from all aspects of society flow and participate in science and 
technology innovation activities. The Chinese government should 
utilise its capability of mobilising and allocating the scientific and 
technological resources of the whole society through direct financial 
investment, tax incentives and other means. The state financial input 
is mainly used to support public science and technology activities, 
such as basic research, cutting-edge high-tech research, social 
welfare research, and major common technology, which the market 
mechanism cannot resolve effectively. For those projects with high 
China y 241
degree of market-orientation and good market prospects, enterprises 
should be guided actively to become the main investment agents.
Finally, a systematic science and technology evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism should be established, which is used to 
monitor and evaluate the efficiency of the NSI. The evaluation and 
monitoring of the NSI refers mainly to scientific and technological 
projects and investment. In developed countries, they have 
already established relatively efficient systems for science and 
technology evaluation and monitoring. Compared with the year-
on-year increase of scientific and technological investment and the 
improvement of scientific and technological system, the construction 
of China’s science and technology evaluation and monitoring 
system lags behind. The existing science and technology evaluation 
and monitoring is still at the project level without top-level design. 
A systematic scientific and technological evaluation and monitoring 
mechanism as well as the relevant laws and regulations should be 
established urgently, and which also should be implemented into 
practice in order to adjust the allocation of science and technology 
resources and improve the efficiency in using these resources.
ª
Notes
 1. ‘Scientific Outlook of Development’ was proposed by President Hu 
Jintao in the speech ‘Hold Highly the Great Banner of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics, and Strive for New Victories in Building a 
Moderately Prosperous Society’ at the 17th National Congress of 
Chinese Communist Party on 15 October 2007.
 2. This was a popular metaphor to describe the egalitarian phenomenon 
during China’s planned economy.
 3. ‘Three capital’ refers to three types of foreign-funded enterprises: 
foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises and wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises.
 4. ‘Emancipating the Mind and Seeking Truth from Facts’ was proposed 
by Mr Deng Xiaoping in the speech ‘Emancipating the Mind, Seeking 
Truth from Facts, Look Forward as a United One’ at the closing 
ceremony of CPC Central Committee Working Conference on 13 
December 1978.
 5. ‘Four Cardinal Principles’ was generalised by Mr Deng Xiaoping in 
the speech ‘Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles’ at a CPC theory-
discussing meeting on 30 March 1979.
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 6. The nominal values of R&D expenditure and technology import in 
RMB were converted to US$ using the annual average exchange rates 
in 1995 (1US$ = 8.31 RMB), 2000 (1 US$=8.28 RMB) and 2005 (1 US$= 
8.19 RMB).
 7. The nominal values of R&D expenditure and technology import in 
RMB were converted to US$ using the annual average exchange rates 
in 1995 (1US$ = 8.31 RMB) and 2005 (1 US$= 8.19 RMB).
 8. These three strategies were proposed by Xu Guanhua, minister of 
science and technology, in the speech ‘Making Overall Arrangements, 
Emphasizing Key Points, and Making Earnest Efforts to Do Science 
and Technology Work Well in 2002’ at the National Science and 
Technology Work Conference on 9–10 January 2002.
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This chapter deals with the current role of the state in the evolution 
of the South African system of innovation. However, a ‘snapshot’ 
would not be adequate since we are dealing with dynamic systems 
in a constant state of flux. Hence there is a need to place the current 
relationship between state and innovation system within a historical 
context. In this chapter, the history covered starts with the 1996 
White Paper on Science and Technology policy (hereafter referred 
to as the ‘White Paper’) as the focus of this analysis. This is done 
in full cognisance of the fact that the context for state policy and 
the forming of the post-apartheid system of innovation was strongly 
affected by the prior evolution of the South African national system 
of innovation (NSI) during the preceding periods of segregation and 
apartheid.
Although the broad definition of the NSI is adopted as the 
conceptual framework for this chapter, the length constraints impose 
a choice of the policies which will be specifically discussed. This choice 
is informed by a wider filter than just basic science and technology 
policies but it excludes the amalgamation of the broader human 
capital development policy arena which would include housing, 
health, social benefits, and other areas of basic needs provision.
Evolution of the Current Form of State
This section serves to set the historical context of the post-apartheid 
history of science, technology and innovation (STI), specifically 
focusing on the history of the relationship between state and market 
during the 20th century as the precursor of the changing relationship 
in the post-apartheid era. This then helps the understanding of the 
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nature of ruptures and continuities in the evolution of the South 
African NSI in the transition from apartheid to democracy.
The pre-democracy period
The role of the state in the evolution of the South African NSI since 
the turn of the 20th century and before the coming of democracy 
was, until the 1980s, marked by a strong element of intervention 
aimed at re-shaping the structure of most aspects of the South 
African economy. Briefly, this period can be divided into the pre-
apartheid period of segregation and the apartheid era. Politically, the 
start of the 20th century was marked by the Anglo-Boer war and 
the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The economy 
was based on the mining sector, most of which was British-owned, 
and the state intervened directly to ensure that the requirements 
of the mining sector, especially the supply of cheap black labour, 
were assured. The landmark piece of legislation in this regard was 
the 1913 Lands Act which expropriated over 90 per cent of African-
owned agricultural land. This was partially due to the acknowledged 
fact that African peasantry was more productive than Afrikaner 
farmers with the consequence that African farmers were generating 
surpluses which were used to buy up white-owned farms. The other, 
less overt, reason for the Act was to ensure a supply of mine workers 
by displacing the larger portion of the rural black population from 
their primary source of income (see Bundy 1988). 
After World War I, the state set up the Iron and Steel Corporation 
of South Africa (ISCOM) to address the openly recognised failure 
of the market to take up the incentive for the beneficiation of pig 
iron provided by plentiful supplies of ore on the one hand and 
the assured demand by the rapidly expanding rail system on the 
other. Through this and other initiatives, including the Electricity 
Supply Commission (ESKOM) and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC), the state was instrumental in ushering in the 
manufacturing sector and the industrial diversification of the South 
African economy (Scerri 2009: chapter 3). These developments 
occurred within the context of a racially defined political economy 
which in this aspect was not markedly different from other colonised 
countries within the empire. Its distinguishing feature was rather 
the intra-white ethnic conflict with the polarisation between an 
Afrikaner government and a largely English-speaking capitalist class. 
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The establishment of apartheid, shortly after World War II 
marked the start of a programme of political, social and economic 
engineering that was to shunt the evolution of the South African 
system of innovation on to a path which became progressively 
regressive and, in its growing dissonance with the evolution 
of other systems in the post-colonial era, progressively anti-
modern. The final entrenchment of the ‘separate development’ 
model of apartheid, wherein the black population was effectively 
excluded from the country’s citizenry, had long-term devastating 
consequences on broad-based human capital formation which still 
poses the major constraint on the development of the post-apartheid 
system of innovation.1 Ironically, however, the increasing political 
and economic isolation of South Africa during apartheid provided a 
strong incentive for the establishment of a strong military–industrial 
complex and the consequent development of a relatively formidable 
system of science and technology. The economic interventions of 
the state operated on three main fronts, all driven by the apartheid 
agenda. 
The first was the creation of bantustans and homelands with 
separate administrative structures with varying degrees of autonomy. 
The model of ‘separate development’ required the development 
of employment bases in these homelands and extensive industrial 
incentive schemes, mostly in the form of employment subsidies 
which were established to promote industrial development in 
these ersatz political creations. Given the economic geography of 
apartheid, the bantustans and homelands could never have been 
economically viable and their industrial bases necessarily remained 
artificial economies, always dependent on transfers from the 
apartheid state. 
The second intervention was driven by the need to integrate the 
capitalist sector and to ‘de-ethnicise’ white-owned capital. This 
required the inter-penetration of Afrikaner and English-speaking 
capital and was achieved through establishments, mergers and 
acquisitions.2 This policy significantly reduced the (intra-white) 
ethnicity of capital and hence the state/market conflict which had 
been consistently evident during the segregationist period. While the 
patterns of concentration were changed, the degree of concentration 
of ownership and control was not, but this was not a major concern 
of the state.
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The third major front of state intervention was in the form of 
price controls, supported by subsidies, particularly in staple foods 
and transport. The economies of the bantustans and homelands 
would never be able to absorb the populations allotted to them 
under apartheid and the majority of the oppressed lived as transient 
foreigners in ‘white’ South Africa, providing the bulk of the labour 
force. Apartheid economic geography placed this semi-permanent 
labour force in townships, denied residential rights in the urban 
centres and necessitated commuting long distances every day to 
work there. The main concern of the apartheid regime regarding this 
unique labour market system was that the inevitable political and 
civil unrest should not turn into outright revolution. There was a 
clear awareness that the supply of labour had to be assured through 
the price stability of the basic cost of living and the cost of transport 
required to bring workers to their places of employment and ferry 
them back to what essentially amounted to ‘workers’ dormitories’. 
During the 1980s, effectively the last decade of apartheid, the 
inherent wastefulness of the apartheid economy led to a widespread 
programme of privatisation of state organs which had formed the 
economic pillars of the system.
The post-apartheid era
Periodisation is necessarily arbitrary to some extent. This is especially 
true when the period under consideration is relatively short. The 
post-apartheid era effectively, though not constitutionally, started 
with the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990 
and the start of negotiations towards a democratic state. The first 
democratic elections took place in 1994 and the first post-apartheid 
STI policy document was passed by Parliament in 1996. This chapter 
looks at the period of time since 1996 and the relation between state 
and market over this time span is roughly divided into three periods. 
The first period started with the launch of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy 
(GEAR) in 1996 (RSA 1996a) and lasted until the first review of the 
programme in 2001. South Africa’s first democratic government had 
come into being in 1994, during the pinnacle of the hegemony of the 
Washington Consensus, a period during which market liberalisation 
was the only acceptable economic policy prescription worldwide. 
In the last few years of apartheid there had been a progressive 
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adoption of this economic ideology and the legitimacy of the new 
South Africa government and its consequent sudden entry into the 
global economy intensified this shift which was formalised as policy 
in GEAR. GEAR was an explicitly neoliberal macroeconomic 
programme which advocated liberalisation of markets in expectation 
of a ‘trickle down’ effect which would address the inherited 
inequalities of income, wealth and opportunities.3  The role of the 
state was confined to the provision of basic needs, the maintenance 
of infrastructure and other aspects of the public goods provision 
function. The basis of this approach was that apartheid had been an 
allocative distortion which would not have been tolerated by a free 
market and that it therefore required the freeing up of market forces 
to correct for the ‘distortion’.
The second period emerged with the review of GEAR and 
the growing sense of disillusionment with the performance of 
the programme and its capability to stimulate the structural 
transformation that was required for the development of the South 
African economy. The official review of the first four years of 
GEAR in 2001 found that, while macroeconomic stability, in terms 
of fiscal discipline, had been achieved, economic growth, investment 
and savings still fell below the GEAR targets. Moreover, net foreign 
direct investment had been consistently negative, education was 
falling behind the country’s skills requirements, and unemployment 
and poverty had not been significantly addressed. 
It was widely recognised that the persistent levels of unemployment 
were largely due to the failure to address the inherited shortage of 
human capital, within the context of an economic structure which 
has little absorptive capacity for low-skilled and unskilled labour.4  
The two complementary challenges were now to increase the 
employment of the low-skilled and the unskilled portion of the 
labour force while simultaneously increasing the overall skills level 
of the labour force. The recognition of the failure of GEAR in this 
area led to a series of initiatives, culminating in the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) (RSA 2004) 
programme, which arose from the recognition of the need for an 
integrated state intervention on a number of complementary fronts 
in order to address the development challenges of the country. It was 
recognised that the shortage of skills was one of the major constraints 
to growth and this led to the launch of the Joint Initiative on Priority 
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Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) (RSA 2006b), which was formulated 
specifically to strengthen and coordinate a number of strategies 
designed to address the shortage of skills. However, although GEAR 
was revised in light of its failure to address the enduring high rate of 
unemployment, the remedial attempts were still marked by a high 
degree of fragmentation and a lack of coordination. This was due 
to the absence of an alternative comprehensive planning paradigm. 
A possible third stage in the relationship between the state and 
market has its origin in the radical shift in the power base of the 
governing party that started with the election of its new national 
executive council at the end of 2007. This change ushered in the main 
labour union confederation and the South African Communist Party 
to the centre of the ideological base of the party, ostensibly displacing 
the market-friendly neoliberal ideology that had governed policy 
since 1994. The possibilities for this shift were further reinforced 
by the global financial crisis that led to a worldwide disillusionment 
with unregulated markets and again brought to the fore the central 
role of governments in the economic destinies of nation states. In 
2010 the state issued the New Growth Path (NGP) policy document 
(RSA 2009) with the explicit opening statement that ‘creating decent 
work, reducing inequality and defeating poverty can only happen 
through a new growth path founded on a restructuring of the South 
African economy to improve its performance in terms of labour 
absorption as well as the composition and rate of growth’ (RSA 2009: 
1).5  However, in the intervening period since 2008 the rift between 
labour organisations and movements and the state has re-emerged 
with a growing perception that economic policy formulation 
is still caught up in the language of GEAR and that the financial 
crisis, with the strain that it is already imposing on the fiscus, may 
reinforce the original ‘pragmatic’ justification for fiscal caution with 
the consequent restraints on a state-led development programme. 
This period is now one of an open ideological contestation over the 
appropriate relationship between state and market in South Africa. 
The 2012 report of the Department of Science and Technology (DST) 
ministerial review committee (RSA 2012) was dismissive about the 
capacity of the approach adopted by the NGP document to address 
the developmental requirements of the South African NSI.6 
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Periodisation and Analysis of Institutions and 
Policies of the State Concerned  
with Innovation
The role of the state in the planning of the evolution of the South 
African NSI since the end of apartheid is marked by two divergent 
trends, both of which emerge from policy positions that were 
ratified by Parliament in 1996. In the case of the national science, 
technology and innovation policy there was a significant break with 
the old policy regime with the introduction of the 1996 White Paper 
on Science and Technology: Preparing for the 21st Century (RSA 
1996b).7 This marked the start of national STI policy formulation 
and implementation in the post-apartheid era. The White Paper 
was explicit in its adoption of the NSI concept as the informing 
planning framework for STI policy. The other trend was that of 
overall economic policy which affected the broadly defined national 
system of innovation. In this case there was a marked continuity 
with the shift towards neoliberalism during the late years of 
apartheid. There was therefore an essential disjuncture between an 
STI plan which effectively implied an interventionist approach and 
an overall economic planning context which required a reduction 
of state intervention. The result was a divergence between the two 
policy environments with a general isolation of STI planning from 
most of the other aspects of economic planning. This isolation of 
STI from other aspects of economic and social planning essentially 
reduced it to an exercise in the rationalisation of the various organs 
of an inefficient and wasteful public S&T apparatus that had been 
inherited from apartheid. 
The state agency that was initially charged with designing and 
implementing the post-apartheid STI planning was the Department 
of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST), which was 
established in 1994. The initial placement of STI planning within a 
ministry which also included arts and culture at the inception of the 
new political economy provides some indication of the low priority 
assigned to STI planning at the time.
The democratic government’s foundation document on STI 
planning was passed simultaneously with GEAR but was based in 
a radically different economic paradigm. When South Africa’s 1996 
White Paper on science and technology (S&T) policy was being 
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drafted, shortly after the end of apartheid, the national system of 
innovation was widely recognised to be disintegrating.8  R&D 
expenditure was low by international standards and had been 
steadily decreasing over the previous seven years as the military–
industrial complex of the apartheid regime was dismantled and the 
associated public R&D spending declined. South Africa exported 
manufactured goods which were intensive in physical capital and 
unskilled labour, and imported commodities which were intensive 
in technology and human capital (Scerri 1990, 2003). This was 
inevitable in an economy where the capacity for adding value to the 
abundant natural resources was fundamentally constrained by the 
human capital development consequences of the apartheid political 
economy. Moreover, the tariff system under apartheid had further 
served to reinforce these trade patterns.9 By most definitions, the 
country’s system of innovation was peripheral within the global 
framework.
The prime task of the White Paper was to define and establish 
national STI policy in line with the requirements of the newly 
democratic political economic system. The starting point of the 
White Paper was to a large extent based on the review of South 
Africa’s NSI undertaken by the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) in 1993. The IDRC report concluded that not only 
had the science and technology policy been determined by the 
exigencies of apartheid but that it had also been badly coordinated.10 
These were therefore the two factors which needed to be addressed 
urgently — the reorientation of the national system of innovation 
to the requirements of the new political economy and the design 
of a coordinated national STI planning framework. However, even 
though the White Paper clearly envisaged STI planning as an integral 
part of national economic planning, the scope and the level at which 
DACST should have coordinating powers was determined by the 
overall economic planning context.11
The initial draft of the Reconstruction and Development Progra-
mme (RDP) (ANC 1994) preceding GEAR was a Keynesian 
economic plan, which placed the radical alteration of the living 
conditions of the majority of the population towards the top of its 
agenda. This was seen as the essential pre-requisite to provide the 
required preconditions to the long-term structural transformation 
of the South African economy. This transformation would be 
driven simultaneously on the demand side by the conventional 
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income multiplier effects of the enhanced quality of life of the broad 
population base, and on the supply side through the deepening and 
broadening of the technological capabilities pool, arising from an 
overall rapid improvement in the conditions of life of the population 
as a whole. However, in the three-year gap between the publication 
of the IDRC report and the submission of the White Paper, national 
economic planning shifted from the relatively interventionist 
position of the RDP to the neoliberal GEAR programme, which 
restricted the state to the role of a facilitator for market forces. 
Strategic intervention in the identification and promotion of 
potential growth sectors was largely abandoned and the market was 
placed at the centre of the economic coordinating mechanism. The 
consequence of this shift was the restriction of the coordinating role 
of DACST within the STI sector to a bureaucratic realignment of 
existing public sector STI specific institutions. 
Within the context of the GEAR programme, STI policy could 
not interface with industrial, trade and labour policies, as well 
as education policy outside of the higher education sector both 
because of the restricted vision of the NSI and the generally neutral 
stance of the state towards the market.12 Thus, for example, trade 
policy aimed at accelerating trade liberalisation (at a faster rate than 
the one proposed by the WTO) instead of trying to reverse the 
existing trade patterns, in spite of evidence against the wisdom of 
such a policy approach.13 The White Paper had argued for a policy 
which maintained ‘an appropriate balance between opening up the 
economy to global competitiveness and nurturing local initiatives’ 
(RSA 1996b: 5), but the established neoliberal position drastically 
restricted the ability to pursue the ‘nurturing local initiatives’ side 
of the balance, and very rapidly exposed the national system of 
innovation inherited from apartheid, with its recognised structural 
weaknesses, to global competition without any provision for a 
transition period. The poverty of industrial policy was especially 
detrimental to the ability to design STI demand-side policies and 
this spilled over to most other areas of public sector programmes. 
So, for example, the innovation potential of housing programmes 
was totally excluded, thus foregoing a significant incentive for the 
development of indigenous technologies suited to the South African 
physical, social and economic environments.
Supply-side STI policy was also restricted to direct R&D 
subsidies, in spite of the explicit acknowledgement in the White 
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Paper of the extensive use of fiscal incentives for R&D activities 
in industrialised economies, including high tax incentives. In the 
case of South Africa the only fiscal tool was to be direct subsidies 
on a matching grant basis. Consequently, within this constrained 
policy environment the recommendations in the White Paper were 
restricted to improving intra-governmental information flows, 
as well as improving links with the private sector. Moreover, the 
authority to coordinate S&T policy across the broad spectrum of 
the public service was allocated to the Ministers’ Committee on 
Science and Technology which comprised all those ministers whose 
portfolios contained a significant S&T component. This was a weak 
coordinating mechanism and as a consequence STI initiatives have to 
a large extent been marked by a ‘silo’ mentality with each ministry 
and government department pursuing its own goals without much 
reference to an overall STI planning framework. 
The White Paper also contained a specific proposal to develop 
an indigenous technology initiative, in collaboration with the 
Department of Trade and Industry, by addressing the technology 
requirements of small-, medium- and micro-scale enterprises. The 
state procurement policy was also intended to provide a demand-
side stimulus to technology-intensive industries. This was an 
improvement on the previous promotion of all local industries 
regardless of their technological capabilities content. 
The White Paper proposed a new coordinating mechanism for 
all government science, engineering and technology institutions 
which would be grouped as science councils and department-based 
institutes. Science Councils had been established in the 1980s to move 
public sector R&D institutions progressively towards private sector 
funding through contract work in order to increase funding beyond 
the state baseline funding scheme. However, the disadvantages of 
this system were the gaps between the R&D policies of individual 
councils and national development priorities and the tendency 
to crowd out private sector R&D performers through costing 
practices which did not cover full cost. The White Paper proposed 
that the fragmentation of research programmes could be reduced 
if Science Councils as well as department-based institutes would 
operate within a national goal framework with an increased level of 
coordination. The White Paper further proposed that department-
based institutes should progressively shift to the Science Council 
category in order to escape the budget constraint of public funding, 
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primarily in order to allow the recruitment of qualified research 
personnel at competitive remuneration rates. While an institutional 
review process charged with the alignment of state R&D programmes 
with national objectives was established as the joint responsibility of 
DACST and the line department governing particular institutes, it 
was not going to be easy to enforce national priorities while increasing 
the dependence on private sector funding. Research and Technology 
Foresight Exercises were established to provide the guidelines for the 
investment of public S&T funds, specifically to identify ‘potential 
technological trends and trajectories of significance to the social and 
economic development of South Africa’ (IDRC 1993: 21). However, 
given the absence of fiscal R&D incentives and incentives emerging 
from related policy areas, the ability of the state to affect private 
R&D investment patterns was quite restricted. 
The National Research Foundation (NRF) explicitly recognised 
the crucial role of human capital in the development process and it 
extended the definition of human capital to incorporate all aspects of 
human resource development, rather than restricting it to scientists 
and engineers. It set DACST with the task of introducing an S&T 
perspective into education programmes.14  Quality control over the 
education sector was assured by the establishment of a National 
Qualifications Framework as the accreditation mechanism across 
the country. The role allotted to DACST was to develop curricula 
for pre-tertiary education levels and for adult training programmes. 
The NRF was set up to coordinate research funding in the tertiary 
education sector and to operate through four agency divisions — 
natural sciences and engineering, social sciences and humanities, 
health sciences, agricultural and environmental sciences. The NRF 
would also administer the National Facilities for Research. 
The National Advisory Council on Innovation (NACI), a council 
of experts from diverse fields and sectors, representing various 
stakeholder bodies, was established as an advisory body for DACST. 
This council was designed to address some of the deficiencies of the 
previous Scientific Advisory Council identified in the IDRC report 
(IDRC 1993: 25–27) and, in contrast with the period of apartheid, 
the terms of reference and the areas covered by NACI were to be 
public knowledge. 
The NRF supplanted the Foundation for Research Development 
as the national agency responsible for promoting and supporting 
basic and applied research as well as innovation. It funds knowledge 
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generation, the development of researchers, products and 
infrastructure. The NRF provides services and grants to support 
research and postgraduate research training. Funding from the NRF 
is largely directed towards academic research, the development of 
high-level human capital, and the national research facilities. The 
terms of reference of the NRF extend to all fields of the humanities, 
social and natural sciences, engineering, indigenous knowledge 
and technology. It has forged local and international strategic 
partnerships to promote research capacity development. The latest 
dramatic intervention in the shaping of the development of the higher 
end of the human capital chain is the South African Research Chairs 
Initiative (SARChI). This targeted approach towards human capital 
development has been designed as a medium- to long-term measure 
to enhance research capacity and its long-term reproduction in the 
higher education sector by drawing foreign expertise into South 
African universities with sufficient complementary funding to build 
lasting areas of excellence. 
The main institutional instrument for the financing and control 
of specific R&D projects was the Innovation Fund, whose budget 
would derive from the reallocation of science funding across 
government ministries and departments. DACST would cooperate 
with the Department of Trade and Industry which administered 
the Support Programme for Industrial Innovation. The choice of 
projects to support was guided by the following three governing 
criteria:
• the needs of the previously disadvantaged (initially half of the 
funding was to be directed at such projects); 
• large, long-term projects, in order to reverse the trend towards 
short planning horizons; 
• strong links between innovation, diffusion and use, thus 
reducing endemic fragmentation and delivery bottlenecks. 
While these priorities have remained reasonably constant since 
1996, the capacity of S&T planning to address these priorities has 
improved since then. 
In the case of the humanities, the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HSRC), which was established by the Human Sciences 
Research Act, No. 23 of 1968 is specifically charged with performing, 
coordinating and promoting research in social and human sciences. 
The HSRC has aligned its research structures and activities to major 
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development priorities and its current structure reflects this. Its 
main areas of activity are divided into cross-cutting units, research 
programmes and centres. 
One of the cross-cutting units, ‘Knowledge Systems’, is charged 
with undertaking R&D and innovation surveys. The other focuses 
on policy analysis, capacity development and gender. The research 
programmes cover social development, focusing on the family, 
political structures, education, and health. The three centres cover: 
(a) poverty, employment and growth, (b) service delivery, and (c) 
education quality improvement.
On the whole, the strictures of the macroeconomic planning 
framework prevented the White Paper from addressing the 
fragmentation of the S&T planning framework. The definition of the 
perimeters of S&T planning was therefore not altered substantially 
from that during apartheid. What occurred was rather a refinement 
of the inherited structure within a democratic context. Effectively, 
the macroeconomic planning context restricted STI policy to 
managing the system of science and technology. Within this 
constraint the White Paper provided a sound plan for the overhaul 
of the institutional basis for the development of a sound S&T base. 
However, the lack of coordination with complementary policy 
contexts prevented the S&T policy from extending to an innovation 
policy that would radically alter the national system of innovation. 
The second period of the post-apartheid era emerged in 2002 
during the revisiting of the country’s macroeconomic planning 
framework. The priority assigned to STI policy was significantly 
upgraded when DACST was split into two departments with a 
separate minister of science and technology and the Department of 
Science and Technology (DST) as the new agency for STI planning. 
This development came at a time when disillusionment with the 
performance of the GEAR programme led to a series of targeted 
initiatives towards the structural transformation of the South African 
economy. 
The new policy statement on STI policy (RSA 2002a) allocated 
a significantly extended coordinating role over various aspects 
of STI for the DST. Several STI functions which were located in 
other ministries and departments have since then been located 
within the DST. The most notable was the transfer of the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) from the Department 
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of Trade and Industry to the DST in 2005. However, the planning 
context of the DST is still largely limited to science and technology 
planning, to the exclusion of some of the more crucial determinants 
of innovation. Thus, for example, human resource development was 
largely the domain of the Department of Education (DoE) which, 
in 2009, was split into the Department of Higher Education and 
Training (DHET) and the Department of Basic Education. The 
influence of the DST over the funding of higher education has 
grown considerably over the past few years. However, the splitting 
up of the DoE has introduced a possible disjuncture in the national 
stream of human capital development. The DST and the DHET now 
collaborate to an unprecedented degree that marks a significant shift 
in human resource development policy. However, the influence of 
DST over primary and secondary education policy formulation and 
implementation, or in overall skills development, is still limited, 
apart from the relationship between the DST and the Department 
of Labour (DoL) which was established through the National Skills 
Development Strategy which commenced in 2001. Overall, the role 
of the DST is still defined by the generally neutral intervention 
stance of the implicitly neoliberal economic policy environment 
that still dominates development planning in South Africa. In this 
role it acts as a facilitator for the mobilisation of R&D resources 
but was, until the publication of its 10-year plan in 2007, prevented 
from designing and implementing strategic intervention initiatives 
and ‘picking winners’. Again, this vague policy mission of the DST 
reflected the still hesitant and fragmented state of economic planning 
following the implicit loss of faith in GEAR. 
Innovation policy and the development of structures for its 
implementation have developed rapidly since 1996. In the first five 
years after the White Paper the disjuncture between the conceptual 
framework of STI policy and the neoliberal grounding of the overall 
macroeconomic plan severely inhibited the ambit of the innovation 
policy. Since 2002 and the reassessment of GEAR there has been 
a progressive narrowing of the gap between innovation policy 
and economic policy, and this has generated a rapid institutional 
development that goes substantially beyond the science and 
technology sphere.
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Specificities of the System of Innovation in South
Africa and Its Relationship with the State
Using a biological metaphor, national systems of innovation may be 
usefully identified on the basis of their viability, defined in terms of 
their capacity for reproduction, growth and evolution (Scerri 2009: 
37). The ability to reproduce a given system is seen as the minimum 
requirement for the survival of the system, but long-term viability 
also requires that systems are capable of growing along their current 
trajectories and, even more importantly, evolve either to adapt 
to changing environmental conditions or to lead changes in the 
knowledge environment. The three aspects are of course strongly 
interrelated, especially when different time horizons are considered.
We can assess the viability of a system of innovation at various 
levels of inclusion or aggregation, depending on the particular 
definition that is adopted. The two definitions that we will look at 
are the system of science and technology and the broader system 
of innovation. This distinction is important because we may obtain 
significantly different assessments at the two levels. A healthy 
and viable system of innovation does not necessarily require a 
sophisticated system of science and technology for its long-term 
survival. On the other hand there are numerous examples of strong 
systems of science and technology which are set against a backdrop 
of a severely underdeveloped national system of innovation. In 
such cases the national system of innovation resembles the enclave 
economy model, with pockets of excellence in a sea of poverty. Such 
systems are more sustainable than ever due to the integration of 
markets with globalisation. In such cases the links between the local 
high technology enclaves and the global market are closer than those 
with the rest of the NSI. There is, however, always a latent instability 
in this type of NSI with its enduring inequalities of incomes and life 
chances. In the broader version of the concept, the NSI which evolved 
under apartheid constituted such a system and it is its enduring legacy 
which forms the formidable obstacle to the needed developmental 
transition in the current South African economy.
Major features of the national, regional and local 
production and innovation structures
The economic history of South Africa is intimately tied to its rich 
endowments of a wide range of mineral resources and in most 
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aspects the development of secondary and tertiary sectors can best 
be understood within the analytical framework of the minerals–
energy complex. Even with the increasing diversification of the 
South African economy away from the primary sector it can still be 
shown (Fine and Rustomjee 1996) that the South African economy 
can be seen as resource-based, even if several times removed. The 
performance of the South African economy since democracy has not 
fulfilled the set of objectives set out in the first macroeconomic plan. 
Macroeconomic indicators for South Africa are presented in 
Annexure A to this chapter. The annual growth rate of real GDP in 
South Africa moved along an upward trend between 1999 and 2007. 
However, as can be seen from Figure A6.1, this growth rate dipped 
considerably after 2007, in line with global economic changes, 
becoming negative in 2009, though it showed a sharp recovery in 
2010. GDP per capita shows a similar trend over the same period, 
as can be seen from Figure A6.2. However, the significance of this 
growth rate for economic development or the transformation of 
the South African system of innovation has to be qualified by two 
important provisos. In the first place, unemployment has not been 
significantly addressed and remains extremely high. Figure A6.3 in 
Annexure A, shows that the rate of unemployment, estimated to 
include discouraged job seekers who no longer register with the 
DoL was running at slightly below 40 per cent by 2006. Second, 
the enduring income and wealth inequalities means that the relative 
material conditions of life and the life prospects of a significant 
portion of the South African population have not improved over 
time. This is reflected in the Gini-coefficient depicted in Figure 
A6.4. These two variables provide an indication of the lack of 
fundamental transformation in the South African economy in 
the enduring phenomenon of jobless growth. This concern with 
enduring structural unemployment is the current overwhelming 
focus of macroeconomic planning in South Africa.
The sectoral structure of the South African economy is shown in 
Table A6.1, in terms of the composition of GDP. Again, we need 
to note that while the economy has diversified considerably over 
its history of industrialisation since the inter-war period, with the 
secondary and tertiary sectors attaining increasing prominence, the 
linkages to the primary sector are still a defining feature of the South 
African system of innovation. This can be seen through a look at the 
composition of South African exports as depicted in Figure A6.5.
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The other salient feature of the South African economy, which is 
discussed in more detail in a subsequent section, is the high degree 
of regional unevenness of economic performance. As argued further 
on, this is to a large extent the heritage of apartheid economic 
geography and the failure to redress its effects significantly in the 
post-apartheid era.15 Table A6.2 in the annexure provides a snapshot 
of the divergence in the economic structures of the nine provincial 
economies which were established after apartheid. The composition 
of these nine provinces varies substantially in terms of the inclusion 
of the former four ‘white’ provinces established under apartheid 
and the various bantustans and homelands.16 The previous ‘white’ 
provinces had grown organically on the basis of comparative, and the 
emerging competitive, advantage. The bantustans and homelands, 
on the other hand, were ersatz creations designed to justify the 
apartheid model of equitable separate development. None of these 
had an inherent rationale for autonomous economic integrity and 
survived as supposedly independent administrative structures on the 
basis of streams of transfers from the apartheid state.
We can briefly note at this stage that those provinces which 
are economically sound are the ones which are the least reliant 
on the primary sector. This is especially notable in the case of 
Gauteng, where, in spite of its rich mineral resources and a well-
established mining sector, the primary sector contributes a negligible 
proportion to its Gross Geographic Product. On the other hand, 
those provinces whose economic performance on several fronts is 
well below the national average are heavily reliant on the primary 
sector. In general there is a strong correspondence between the 
inclusion of those provinces defined as ‘white’ under apartheid and 
economic performance.
System of science and technology
The South African system of science and technology has been 
substantially reformed since 1994 and the role of the state in this 
reform is quite evident. The three main indicators that are used to 
assess this are: (a) R&D expenditure and activity, (b) R&D human 
capital development, and (c) the convergence patterns of public 
R&D spending.
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R&D Activity
Table 6.1 summarises the basic R&D indicators for South Africa 
over an 18-year period. It shows that R&D intensity (as a percentage 
of GDP) grew steadily between 2001 and 2007 but dropped slightly 
every year since then. R&D intensity had dropped to a low of 0.69 
per cent of GDP in 1997–1998 due to the vacuum caused by the 
drop in defence-related research since the demise of apartheid, 
but has picked up steadily since. If we decompose national R&D 
expenditure, some interesting patterns and trends emerge.
Figure 6.1 shows that the share of government R&D financing 
(government plus science councils) remained stable at approximately 
20 per cent over the period. In fact most of the increase in R&D 
intensity was due to public financing. The proportion of financing 
contributed by business dropped correspondingly for 2005. The 
one worrying trend is the downward trend in the share of R&D 
performed in the higher education sector, which dropped from 25 
per cent to 19 per cent from 2001 to 2009.
Figure 6.1: Expenditure Breakdown of GERD by Sector, 1997–2009 
(percentage)
Source: Calculated from RSA (2012: 196, Table 1).
In the 2008–2009 National Survey of Research and Experimental 
Development (RSA 2011) it emerged that the largest component 
(87.4 per cent) of government R&D expenditure (government and 
Science Councils) was spent in natural sciences, technology and 
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engineering compared to 86.4 per cent in the 2003–2004 survey (RSA 
2005b). The major recipients of government R&D for 2008–2009 
were agricultural sciences (17.6 per cent), medical and health sciences 
(15.8 per cent), and earth sciences (14.3 per cent). In the case of 
Science Councils the main recipients were engineering sciences (27.5 
per cent), medical and health sciences (14.3 per cent) and agricultural 
sciences (14.1 per cent).
The spread of R&D expenditure among national departments, 
provincial departments, government research institutes and museums 
changed dramatically over the period 2003–2004 to 2008–2009, as 
can be seen in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Breakdown of Government R&D Expenditure (percentage)
Performer Year
2003/2004 2008/2009
National Departments 40.8 25.2
Provincial Departments 18.7 20.4
Research Institutes 33.3 50.8
Museums 7.2 3.6
Source: RSA (2005b, 2011).
The public sector’s share of total R&D expenditure is also evident 
in state-owned enterprises which account for 20 per cent of business 
enterprise R&D (RSA 2012: 203). Taking this into account, the 
share of the public sector in total R&D amounts to around 32 per 
cent as compared with an almost 47 per cent share by the private 
business sector. For 2008–2009, approximately 6 per cent of all R&D 
personnel were employed in the government sector, as compared 
with 44 per cent and 37 per cent for the higher education and the 
business sectors, respectively (RSA 2012: 35). 
The other two aspects of the NSI which are strongly related to the 
system of science and technology are the production of the higher 
end researchers, in the form of scientists, engineers and technologists, 
and the regional convergence in S&T development.
Human R&D Capital Development
The human capital constraint inherited from apartheid was clearly 
identified in the National Research and Development Strategy:
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Our human resources in science and technology are not being 
adequately developed and renewed; we have an aging and shrinking 
scientific population. The key indicators show that black and women 
scientists, technologists and engineers are not entering the academic 
ranks and that the key research infrastructure is composed of people 
who will soon retire. In 1990, the percentage of scientific publications 
produced by researchers 50 years of age and older was 18% (one 
in five), but by 1998 this figure had increased, alarmingly, to 45% 
(one in two). Over the same period the percentage of publications by 
black scientists rose only very slightly, from 3.5% to 8% (less than 
one in ten). Participation by women has not changed over the 1990s, 
with publication output being about 10% of the total. Currently, 
there is less than one researcher for every thousand members of 
the workforce, as compared with five in Australia and ten in Japan. 
Given that ‘technology walks on two legs’, the ‘frozen demographics’ 
prevalent in our National System of Innovation represents a critical 
state of affairs (RSA 2002a: 21).
However, this statement refers solely to the S&T population in 
South Africa, thus implicitly restricting the focus of STI strategy 
to the system of science and technology. In this area South African 
statistics paint a poor picture of the country’s STI capacity, as may 
be seen in the following two figures. 
Figure 6.2 compares Ph.D. production rates across selected 
developed and developing economies. Compared to developing 
countries such as Taiwan, Brazil, China, and India, South Africa’s 
production rates are not all that poor. The 10-year innovation plan 
estimates that ‘to build a knowledge-based economy positioned 
between developed and developing countries, South Africa will 
need to increase its PhD production rate by a factor of about five 
over the next 10–20 years’ (RSA 2007b: 34) which has formidable 
implications for re-building a tertiary education system that while 
growing, is not nearly growing fast enough to make the attainment 
of the stated requirement feasible. 
Figure 6.3 compares the number of Ph.D.s relative to the 
population in South Africa with those of selected developed 
economies. As the figure shows, the South African production of 
Ph.D.s per 1,000, is far below that of leading knowledge economies. 
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Figure 6.2: International Comparisons of Ph.D. Production Rates
Source: RSA (2007b).
Figure 6.3: Number of Ph.D.s per 1,000 of the Population
Source: RSA (2007b).
The human capital requirements of the South African national 
system of innovation, at least at the higher end of the human capital 
spectrum are well-recognised by the government in its stated goals 
in the DST’s 10-year innovation plan. These goals are listed in 
Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: Human Capital and Knowledge Generation






 210 research chairs at universities and research institutions 
across the country by 2010 and 500 by 2018 (58 were in place 
in 2006)
 About 6,000 Ph.D.s produced per year in all SET disciplines 
by 2018
 About 3 000 SET Ph.D.s/doctorates produced per year by 2018 
 An optimal ratio of technicians to researchers
 A 2.5 per cent global share of research publications (2006: 
0.5 per cent) 
 2,100 Patent Cooperation Treaty international applications 
originating in South Africa (2004: 418) 
 About 24,000 patent applications at the South African Patent 
Office (2002: 4721). 
Source: Ten-year innovation plan (RSA 2007b).
However, the challenge to achieve the stated higher education targets 
is quite formidable. The DST document talks about a ‘human capital 
pipeline’ from postgraduate students to recognised researchers. 
In the case of scientists, engineers and technologists the output of 
Ph.D.s would have to increase fivefold from the 2005 base in order 
to achieve the set target. The reforms that are planned to try to 
achieve this target mainly have to do with improving the incentives 
mechanism for academic careers. However, the sphere of influence 
of the DST is limited to higher education while the bottleneck in the 
production of accredited researchers is most stringent at the primary 
and secondary school levels. This is a much greater challenge, given 
that the matriculation pass rate has been declining since 2003 and 
is less than that of 2002. When combined with the quality of the 
education of South African pupils as indicated in their performance 
on internationally comparable tests (see Annexure D), this indicates 
a severe inter-generational constraint on the achievement of the 
targets set in the DST 10-year innovation plan.
The difficulty in the way of achieving these goals is easily 
evident in the demographics of the R&D community, as depicted in 
Annexure B. This is further reinforced when looking at the trends 
in HEI enrolments as presented in Annexure C. These indicate that 
enrolments have reached a plateau which is significantly lower than 
the requirements for the South African NSI. 
South Africa y 271
This bottleneck in the production of researchers is due to reasons 
which are both supply side and demand side. In terms of the supply 
into the university system the poor quality of the South African 
school system (see Figure D6.1 in Annexure D to this chapter) has 
had a knock on effect on universities in the form of dropout rates of 
up to 50 per cent and a reduction in the number of undergraduates 
with sufficiently high exit scores to enter graduate programmes. 
On the demand side, there is little perceived incentive for students 
to enter into doctoral programmes. On the one hand, the total 
opportunity costs of a doctorate are generally seen as much too high, 
given the private sector labour market conditions for the masters 
qualification level. On the other hand, the returns from a university 
career both in terms of remuneration and of the conditions of work, 
are not seen as being sufficiently high to warrant the cost of a Ph.D.
The national systems of innovation
The core determinants of the three aspects of the long-term 
viability are human capital development, regional convergence 
processes and an equitable distribution of income, wealth and life 
chances. Human capital is the sine qua non pre-requisite for the 
indigenous technological capabilities of an innovation system. 
Given the appropriate institutional context, it defines the main 
source of the wealth of nations in the global knowledge and learning 
economy. When we approach the analysis of NSIs from the broader 
perspective we need to be circumspect in the easy adoption of the 
concept of human capital. Its orthodox definition is firmly set 
within a neoclassical theoretical context which places it alongside 
other types of capital as primarily instrumental in production and 
as a source of returns for its owner. Within the broad definition of 
the NSI, this usage is inappropriate in its limitations and ideological 
implications (see Bowles and Gintis 1975). In this chapter human 
capital is rather defined along the lines of human capability, a la 
Sen’s (1999) definition. 
The other essential pre-requisite for the formation of a viable 
national system of innovation is a stable (multi)nation state where 
all parts of the economy are seen to be developing. Enduring 
regional imbalances in economic performance threaten the stability 
of the political economy and the integrity of the NSI. Finally, 
extreme inequalities in income, wealth and life prospects, with their 
implications for human capital development and social and political 
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stability, can have dire consequences for the long-term viability of 
the NSI.
In the case of South Africa, the analysis of these three sets of 
determinants indicates that there is still an urgent need to address the 
fundamental flaws of the apartheid national system of innovation. 
Simultaneously, they indicate those areas which would, if addressed 
in a coherent integrated fashion, go a long way towards creating the 
required rupture with history that should have marked the dawn of 
the new democratic political economy of South Africa. These are 
now areas that are recognised by the state as of major concern.
Human Capital
The performance of South African pupils in standard literacy and 
numeracy tests compared with a range of developed and developing 
economies is extremely poor (see Figure D6.1 in Annexure D). This 
is of greater concern than the output of the higher education sector, 
because of the inter-generational implications for the future human 
capital base in South Africa. In terms of education and training 
the indications are that South Africa is struggling to reproduce its 
human capital base.
From a systems perspective we need to extend the concept of human 
capital beyond training and education. Human capital formation 
occurs in a broader context than that of schools, technical colleges 
and universities. From a broad economic perspective human capital is 
a public good whose availability is crucial to the economic well-being 
and development prospects of the nation. In this sense it has large 
externalities in that the returns on it cannot be entirely appropriated 
by any single agency but only by the whole of society. Moreover, 
human capital formation is a fundamentally dynamic process, subject 
to accelerating obsolescence rates, and if its rate falls below specific 
thresholds it will be impossible to achieve its sustainable reproduction 
and development, with the returns on it mainly being private with 
little or no spillovers to the economy at large. 
Within systems of innovation, human capital is probably the 
single most important factor for success. Hence it constitutes the 
crucial channel for an economy’s investment efforts. It is, however, 
a particularly long-term investment with an average of 18 to 22 years 
from birth to the ‘production’ of a skilled participant in the economy. 
This factor, when combined with the heavy externalities content, 
automatically implies that the main responsibility for human capital 
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development lies with the state. It also implies that the family unit, 
however that is defined, which provides the basic framework for 
human capital development, has to be protected from instability in 
order to ensure an uninterrupted stream of investment.
In the case of South Africa the impact of apartheid, and the 
long pre-democratic history before that, on the family unit was 
prolonged and devastating, with forced removals, institutionalised 
and widespread migrant labour, job reservation and separate 
education effectively degrading the country’s broad-based stock of 
human capital. In South Africa the family is generally extended, often 
trans-generationally and increasingly impoverished of parents due 
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is marked by an inherited and now 
structurally entrenched system of migrant labour with absent men, 
fathers and husbands as well as absent women, wives and mothers. In 
the rural areas extended families are often headed by grandparents. 
In urban areas the prevalence of single-parent families is increasing 
and, against the backdrop of abject poverty, this is seriously prejudicial 
to human capital development. Moreover, the average family unit is 
much too vulnerable to a volatile employment environment to allow 
for long-term planning. In these conditions the loss of employment 
has disastrous effects on human capital formation, often interrupting 
or delaying education streams. Third, a family structure that is 
typically constantly under attack by the conditions of endemic 
poverty is always threatened with disintegration. The impermanence 
of the family structure has a highly adverse effect on the socialisation 
of children and on the proper internalisation of a society’s values 
which is the ground in which formal education takes root. While it 
forms the foundation of the human capital formation process which 
is required for sustainable development, it is also the most vulnerable 
component of human capital. The brunt of the responsibility for a 
country’s human capital formation thus lies fundamentally with the 
state. In the post-apartheid South Africa business operates within 
the context of a labour market that is still very much an apartheid 
construct, with a widespread scarcity of skills among the labour 
force and a poor institutional infrastructure for human capital 
formation. In this regard it is the family, as the bedrock institution, 
that is the damaged link in the human capital formation chain. Hence 
the focus of national policy should be on the redressing of past 
institutionalised generalised disintegration of the family’s ability to 
fulfil its human capital formation function. 
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The main policy implication of these arguments is the fusion of 
policy ends and means. The increasing well-being of the family unit 
is both a robust measure of the objective of development policy 
and the main mechanism towards the achievement of the objective. 
The acceptance of this proposition will require a fundamental 
re-prioritisation of the various development policy measures. It will 
also enable the development of an integrated policy framework in that 
various sectoral policies will be assessed in terms of their estimated 
contribution towards the establishment of a programme of human 
capital investment that is sound, broad-based and sustainable.
On a broad-based level, a sustained programme of human capital 
formation will have two effects on the system of innovation. In the 
first place, there is the supply-side push in terms of enhanced inputs 
into the system of innovation which expands the ability of a nation 
to absorb, adapt and create new knowledge. Second, a broad-based 
enhancement of human capital implies an expansion of the internal 
market, with the consequent income multiplier effects especially 
on those goods which have higher technology content, since these 
usually exhibit high income elasticities of demand. 
Poverty and Income Inequality 
Broad-based human capital development can be severely constrained 
by endemic high levels of poverty and income inequality. The two 
are strongly related since income inequality over inter-generational 
periods leads to persistent poverty traps which translate into a class-
determined divergence of streams of human capital formation. 
Income inequality in South Africa, as measured by the Gini- 
coefficient, has remained persistently high in South Africa (see 
Figure A6.4 in Annexure A). 
Inequality between races has declined, while inequality within 
race groups has grown. In 1993, 61 per cent of inequality was between 
race groups; however, by 2006 inequality between race groups had 
declined to 40 per cent. Over the same period, inequality within race 
groups has become much more prominent (RSA 2007a: 22). These 
trends continued through to 2008 (RSA 2010). 
These divergent trends indicate that the South African economy 
may be slowly moving from one where the basis of inequality is 
defined by race to one defined by class. Be that as it may, poverty 
remains endemic in South Africa. An indicator of the trend of 
poverty is the behaviour of the Human Development Index over 
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time, depicted in Figure A6.5 in Annexure A. South Africa’s HDI 
is 0.597, which gives the country a rank of 110 out of 169 countries. 
This is above the average of sub-Saharan Africa which stands at 
0.389 but below the world average of 0.624 (UNDP 2011). Although 
there is a shallow upward trend in the HDI between 2005 and 2010, 
its consistent low level is a worrying indicator of enduring poverty, 
which when combined with growing income inequality holds out 
poor prospects for human capital development in South Africa. 
The mitigating factors making for a degree of poverty since 2005 
are provided by the alleviation in incomes from increased transfers 
such as social grants and employment in expanded public works 
programmes. On the other hand, the increasing loss of jobs in the 
wake of the financial crisis will dampen, if not reverse, the possible 
redress of poverty and inequality. The other factor that may change 
the trend of the Human Development Index is the reform in the 
public health sector, with an invigorated HIV/AIDS strategy that 
will significantly alter the impact of the pandemic on the life 
expectancy component of the Human Development Index.
Both the poverty levels and the unequal income distribution have 
been alleviated somewhat in recent years through increasing social 
grants (old age pensions, disability compensation and child support) 
and expanded public works programmes. These are not sufficient, 
however, to alter the structure of an economy that is still tied into the 
generally low-skilled factor market. Low labour productivity forms 
the basis for the claim that South African wages are uncompetitive 
and the only way out of this bind is the enhancement of the human 
capital base. Allowing market forces to bring wage levels down 
would be fundamentally counterproductive and force the economy 
permanently into a low skills trap.
Regional Convergence
The economic geography of apartheid has not been adequately 
addressed by the post-apartheid re-drawing of provinces and 
municipalities (see Scerri 2010). In fact, the post-apartheid economic 
geography is one which is characterised by enduring, and sometimes 
increasingly divergent, development paths across the country. 
Indicators of the quality of human capital in the provinces, as an 
indication of the capacity of the system of innovation again show 
large disparities across provinces. There are marked disparities in the 
Human Development Index across the nine provinces (Scerri 2010). 
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Provincial disparities are also starkly evident in the area of education 
(ibid.), with two provinces (Gauteng and the Western Cape) 
showing significantly higher achievements than national averages in 
terms of the percentage of their populations with some secondary 
education, matriculation level and tertiary education. In the absence 
of effective intervention, these trends have become cumulative 
and path dependent. Vast regional disparities in terms of most of 
the indicators of a healthy innovation system have thus emerged. 
If we were to apply the concept of the local system of innovation, 
we would then have to ask which provinces actually do constitute a 
provincial system of innovation. The answer is strongly correlated 
with the original constitution of the provinces. Where a specific 
post-apartheid province most closely corresponds to the industrial 
heartland of one of the four ‘white’ provinces under apartheid, 
there are strong indications of a healthy and viable provincial 
system of innovation. In the case of those provinces which contain 
a large component of the homelands and bantustans created under 
apartheid, the indications are strong that the statutory definition of a 
province does not correspond to a provincial system of innovation.
This divergence is further reinforced by the internal migration 
patterns among provinces (ibid.), with only two provinces (Gauteng 
and the Western Cape) showing net immigration in 2001. Moreover, 
the comparison between 1996 and 2001 shows an increased 
reinforcement of this pattern as the North West province and 
Mpumalanga moved from positive to negative net migration figures 
and even the Western Cape showing a drop in its (positive) net 
migration. These net migration patterns tend to reinforce regional 
divergence because of the effect on human capital. We usually 
assume that those who migrate in search of a better life tend to be 
the more skilled and enterprising members of communities. If this 
assumption holds, the shift in human capital from poor to richer 
provinces would be more than proportional vis-à-vis the simple 
migration figures.
Unlike national systems of innovation, provincial systems do 
not exist simply by virtue of their legal definition. Intra-state legal 
entities are not sovereign polities and their status is subject to legal 
redefinitions. Simultaneously, from our perspective the rationale 
for the existence of sub-national legal/economic constructs, such 
as provinces, should be assessed on the basis of whether specific 
provinces actually constitute provincial systems of innovation. The 
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information which has been provided in this section indicates that a 
number of provinces in South Africa do not constitute, and possibly 
cannot constitute, provincial systems of innovation. 
Generally those provinces which are made up of the economic 
heartlands of the previous ‘white’ provinces under apartheid do 
constitute viable sub-national systems of innovation. These systems 
evolved on the basis of comparative advantage and on that basis 
developed formidable sets of competitive advantage with the ongoing 
support of the state. Path dependency ensured that their viability 
tended to be reinforced over time. These provinces are Gauteng, the 
Western Cape, Kwa-Zulu Natal, and the Free State.
The composition of the other five provinces is more closely 
aligned with the artificial economies created under apartheid to 
lend some semblance of legitimacy to the grand model of separate 
development. These various bantustans and homelands were never, 
and could never, be economically viable without extensive, complex 
and enduring transfers from the apartheid government. In the post-
apartheid era, it is difficult to imagine that they could ever be viable 
given their history. Their formation was the result of an essentially 
flawed process of negotiation in the short negotiation period before 
the country’s first democratic elections and there is sufficient 
argument that the provincial map of South Africa should be revisited.
Explicit and Implicit State Policy Towards 
Science, Technology and Innovation
Explicit state policy regarding science, technology and innovation 
covers those policies which directly refer to the system of science 
and technology and define the role of the state in this regard. In the 
case of post-apartheid South Africa, there are three core documents 
which are landmarks in the evolution of state STI policy. These 
are the 1996 White Paper on Science and Technology, the 2002 
National Research and Development Strategy and the 2007 Ten 
Year Innovation Plan. All these policies were the product of the 
government agency in charge of STI planning (first DACST and 
then DST). 
The second set of policies, which we have termed implicit, are 
those which are not officially seen to belong in the sphere of STI 
planning but which nevertheless have an impact on the evolution of 
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the NSI, as defined in the broader sense. The implicit policies that 
have been considered more relevant are those that refer to industrial 
policy, education and local development. The link between 
industrial and STI policy should be obvious, but in the case of South 
Africa this development and the cementing of this link really began 
with the review of GEAR in 2001. The rationale for the inclusion 
of education policy is obvious because of its impact on human 
capital development. This is dealt with in the section on policies 
affecting human capital development, further on. In the case of local 
development, we have seen that the high degree of unevenness is 
threatening the integrity and durability of the South African system 
of innovation in all but the legal definition. Given the divergence in 
regional rates of development and growth within the country, we 
could well end up with permanently entrenched enclave economies 
with two provinces on a high growth path, two others on a faltering 
growth trajectory and the remaining five progressively denuded 
of their development potential. Policies on local development are 
addressed further on in this section of the chapter.
STI specific policies
The White Paper
The 1996 White Paper was caught in a policy contradiction that 
arose from the incompatibility between its explicit choice of the NSI 
approach as its conceptual framework and the imperative to align 
its policy prescriptions with the broader neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy framework. The outcome of this conflict was a compromise 
between a broad coordinating vision for STI policy and the effective 
limitation of STI policy to science and technology initiatives. The 
specific terms of reference for DACST as set out in the White Paper 
were as follows (RSA 1996b: 33):
• to promote coherence and consistency in the government’s 
approach to stimulating South Africa’s national system of 
innovation in general, and in its commitment to the support of 
science, engineering and technology development in particular; 
• to promote and coordinate interdepartmental and government-
wide initiatives relating to the support of innovation and 
technology diffusion; 
• to direct the preparation of a government-wide Science 
Budget, in order to permit ministers to assess relative spending 
South Africa y 279
priorities on a multi-year basis, across the full spectrum of 
government’s activities in support of innovation; 
• to design and present to ministers a comprehensive system 
for the management of government science, engineering and 
technology institutions, in order to ensure that their roles 
within the national system of innovation are clearly defined, 
that they have clearly defined and understood objectives, and 
that they undertake their mandate with efficiency, economy 
and effectiveness; 
• to ensure that the management system referred to above 
includes adequate arrangements for evaluation of performance 
against international best practice, and that output measures 
are in place to indicate the nature of the contribution being 
made by government SETIs (science, engineering, technology, 
and innovation organisations) to South Africa’s development; 
• to manage the process of evaluation and review created within 
the management system described here and to recommend 
to ministers any actions necessary as a result of assessments 
carried out; 
• to represent the government in formal international, inter-
governmental negotiations dealing with science, engineering 
and technology and with the promotion of innovation; 
• to provide a link between government and the activities of the 
National Advisory Council on Innovation; 
• to commission or conduct any policy research necessary to the 
fulfilment of the responsibilities set out above. 
Apart from the first item on this list, the White Paper focused 
entirely on science and technology policy. This is quite common in 
ministries or departments of science and technologies across most 
countries. However, it is the broader policy context within which 
such functions are set that determines whether S&T policy translates 
into STI policy. The neoliberal policy framework of GEAR 
grievously impeded this transformation.
The National Research and Development Strategy (NRDS)
The 2002 National Research and Development Strategy (NRDS) 
document, which was drafted around the time of the review of the 
GEAR macroeconomic plan, identified some key systemic fault 
lines within the national system of innovation that needed to be 
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addressed. It is worth quoting the listing of the text in full:
 1. The termination of key technology missions (such as military 
dominance in the subcontinent and energy self-sufficiency) 
by the previous government between 1990 and 1994. This 
resulted in a drop in national R&D spending from 1.1 
per cent in 1990 to 0.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 1994.17 This reduction happened at a time when 
the National System of Innovation needed to expand to 
cope with the needs of 40 million people as opposed to a 
mere 5–6 million. 
 2. Strategic considerations, from human, economic and security 
perspectives. Adequate responses to new diseases and to 
old forms of new diseases, whether these diseases affect 
humans or animals, need to be informed by local research 
programmes. From a security perspective, even being a 
smart buyer of rapidly developing technology rather than 
a developer requires a critical mass of local scientists doing 
research in relevant areas. The S&T capacity of the country 
is running as fast as it can, but is still losing ground. 
 3. Human resources. Our human resources for science 
and technology are not being adequately renewed. An 
overwhelmingly white, male and aging scientific population 
is not being replaced by younger groupings more 
representative of our demographics. 
 4. A complex set of factors driven largely by globalisation 
has resulted in reduced levels of both investment and 
performance by the South African private sector in R&D. 
This could result in a loss of local control of the developing 
knowledge base that underpins the success of our most 
competitive companies. 
 5. Inadequate intellectual property legislation and infrastru-
cture. New developments in biotechnology have increased 
our vulnerability with respect to the exploitation of our 
biodiversity, and inventions and innovations from publicly 
financed research is not effectively protected and managed. 
 6. Fragmented governance structures (RSA 2002a: 15–16, 
numbering added). Although research institutions have been 
reviewed and key performance indicators put in place, the 
roles of different departments in governance and in setting 
output targets for government research institutions is [sic] 
not clear or synergistic. From a budget perspective there 
is no holistic view of science and technology spending by 
government. 
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The key to this analysis lies in point 6, the fragmentation of 
relevant government structures, and the ensuing policy direction 
was driven by the recognised need to address the coordination 
failure. Since 2003 the DST has dramatically increased its funding 
for the biotechnology sectors, marking a shift to a strategic ‘picking 
winners’ intervention. Enhanced tax incentives for R&D expenditure 
were introduced in 2006. Overall, S&T policy has now acquired a 
sustained focus and direction that are supported by an increased 
budget and human resource complement. Its coordination role was 
redefined and has been significantly enhanced since 2002 (Kahn 
2008). The NRDS (RSA 2002a) set itself the following three main 
objectives: 
(a) Measures to enhance innovation 
 The need to address the ‘innovation chasm’, i.e., the gap 
between innovation and diffusion: to this end the Foundation 
for Technological (FTI) was planned to create technology 
missions and to address the innovation chasm. 
 A specific recognition of the need to develop social sciences to 
understand the workings of the South African NSI.
 A review and coordination of innovation funding instruments.
 The current formulation of missions is: 
 Poverty reduction (focus on demonstration and diffusion of 
technologies to impact quality of life and enhance delivery) 
 Key technology platforms (focus on knowledge-intensive 
new industries): 
• National Biotechnology Strategy 
• ICT 
 Advanced Manufacturing with linkages to the Integrated 
Manufacturing Strategy (see RSA 2002b) 
 Leveraging resource-based industries and developing new 
knowledge-based industries from them (mobilising the 
power of existing sectors). This amounts to the ‘knowledge 
beneficiation’ of a historically resource-based economy
 Science and technology for poverty reduction oriented towards 
enhancing basic skills provision: this recognises the critical role 
of broad-based pre-university education in the development of 
the human capital base of the NSI.
 Two technology platforms, ICT and biotechnology, are 
assigned a development priority.
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 Access to technology for SMMEs (small, medium and micro 
enterprises) and BBEE (Broad Based Economic Empowerment) 
enterprises; again this is linked to the Integrated Manufacturing 
Strategy.
 An integrated approach to the development of the agricultural 
sector with respect to areas of R&D (indigenous knowledge, 
biotechnology, earth observation, and aspects like logistics) 
and between national and provincial R&D programmes.
(b) SET human resources and transformation 
The document identifies potential and actual areas where 
South Africa has a scientific competitive strength. Astronomy, 
human palaeontology, biodiversity, Antarctic research, geology, 
geomagnetism, and space science are areas of competence which 
arose from geographic attributes. Other areas of evident knowledge 
advantage include indigenous knowledge, deep mining technology, 
medical research, microsatellite engineering, encryption technology, 
and fluorine technology. 
However, the main concern is the faltering education system 
which has been unable to provide the required flow of qualified 
students for higher education, especially in SET areas. The NRDS 
advocates programmes aimed at raising matriculation pass rates and 
the number of pupils taking science and mathematics.18 
(c) An effective government science and technology system and 
infrastructure 
The NRDS identified the excessive fragmentation of R&D 
activity, spread across state-owned corporations, Science Councils 
(performers and funding agencies), universities and domain-specific 
research organisations/capacities within the public sector with 
separate budgets and reporting systems as a major impediment to 
building a coherent S&T planning framework. The NRDS states 
categorically that ‘(t)he size, shape and content of the system of 
government-owned and funded science and technology institutions 
and programmes must be aligned with the economic and social 
development strategies of government’ (RSA 2002a: 62).
(d) Private sector interventions
A number of new incentive and restructuring schemes were 
introduced by the NRDS to stimulate and facilitate private sector 
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R&D. These included:
• Tax incentives for R&D
• Provincial innovation initiatives, such as incubators to be run 
by the proposed Foundation for Technological Innovation
• Dedicated funding for global technology sourcing aimed at 
small and medium firms complemented by information drives 
to expose local firms to new sources of technology
• Venture capital in the form of seed and early-stage venture 
capital for high-technology businesses, in conjunction with the 
DTI
The Ten-Year Innovation Plan
The most recent statement on the shape and direction of S&T 
policy was laid out in the DST’s 10-year plan (RSA 2007b). This 
plan articulates a firm commitment to move S&T planning more 
specifically towards innovation and to shift the base of the economy 
from natural resources to the knowledge economy. It specifically 
defines an ‘innovation chasm’ in the national system of innovation, 
i.e., a failure of R&D, especially state-sponsored R&D, to translate 
into outcomes which have a significant economic return. The main 
constraints on the path to the knowledge-based system of innovation 
are identified as: 
• human capital development 
• low R&D levels and intensities 
• a poor knowledge infrastructure, and 
• sub-optimal levels of ancillary functions, such as finance, that 
impede the flow from R&D to innovation. 
The plan provides for priority areas for R&D support on the 
basis of the contribution of these areas to the transformation and 
development of the national system of innovation. The explicit 
vision for the South African National System of Innovation by 2018 
includes: 
• Being among the global top 10 in terms of the pharmaceutical, 
nutraceutical, flavour, fragrance, and bio-pesticide industries
• Deploying satellites that provide a range of scientific, security 
and specialised services for the government, the public and the 
private sector
• Achieving a 25 per cent share of the global fuel cell market with 
novel platinum group metal (PGM) catalysts
• Development of a fuel cell programme for transport and 
domestic use
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• Initial capability in the production of hydrogen by water 
splitting
• Being a world leader in climate science and the response to 
climate change
• Having met the 2014 Millennium Development Goals to halve 
poverty 
 (RSA 2007b: 5)
This represents a decisive shift away from neutral intervention 
towards the type of strategic role of what Kahn (2008: 153) calls ‘the 
mission-oriented push of the three decades of the apartheid wars in 
Angola, Mozambique and the then Rhodesia’. Within the context 
of the post-apartheid innovation system this strategic intervention 
should, if sustained, provide the required transformation of the 
system of science and technology into a system of innovation. 
This shift to ‘picking winners’ also takes cognisance of the main 
requirements for the success of state-supported R&D projects. 
These are:
• the need to achieve critical R&D mass (lumpiness of R&D 
capital), 
• a systems approach with due regard for the required 
complementarities with skills development, physical capital 
investment and services, and
• the long-term nature of such R&D programmes which takes 
into account the depreciation of knowledge. 
The 10-year plan identifies five ‘great challenges’ which demand 
a multi-disciplinary approach for their attainment and which ‘are 
designed to stimulate multidisciplinary thinking and to challenge 
our country’s researchers to tackle existing questions, create new 
disciplines and develop new technologies’. The grand challenges, 
listed here, provide a clear indication of the envisaged expertise 
requirements: 
• The Farmer to Pharma value chain to strengthen the bio-
economy
• Space science and technology
• Energy security
• Global change science with a focus on climate change
• Human and social dynamics
Human capital at the high end of the spectrum, and the 
institutions that are directly charged with its production, form the 
core foundations, or enablers. Progress in all these areas is seen as 
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based on the three foundations of innovation, human capital and 
knowledge infrastructure. Figure 6.4 illustrates the interconnections 
between these foundations and the grand challenge programmes. 
There is also an acceptance that international collaboration in 
innovation needs to be promoted.
Figure 6.4: Grand Challenges and Enablers of the Ten-year Plan
Source: RSA (2007b: 11).
The 10-year plan also seeks to address the fragmentation of funding 
mechanisms for STI by forming a separate entity, the Technology 
Innovation Agency (TIA) as a specialised agency which incorporates, 
among others, the Innovation Fund and the Biotechnology Regional 
Innovation Centres. The TIA was established in 2008 (RSA 2008a) 
and its main brief is to enhance market opportunities in partnership 
with industry and state research institutions. The TIA’s broad 
objectives are listed as follows (RSA 2007b: 32):
• Act as a technological agency that will provide funding and 
complementary services to bridge the gap between the formal 
knowledge base and the real economy
• Stimulate development of technology-based services and 
products
• Support development of technology-based enterprises — both 
public and private
• Provide an intellectual property support platform
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• Stimulate investment (venture capital, foreign direct invest-
ment, etc.). Facilitate the development of human capital for 
innovation.
This new public entity is specifically designed to stimulate and 
intensify innovation in order to develop technological innovations 
and interventions and create the appropriate environment for 
commercialisation. The TIA is expected to serve the development of 
technology-based products and services, by the public and private 
sector technology-based enterprises. The conceptualisation of TIA 
has been criticised from a number of perspectives (see Masilela [2008] 
for a comprehensive assessment of the TIA bill). Van Zyl (2011) is 
unambiguous about the implementation failure of the TIA to date.19
The 10-year plan marks a decisive shift in the policy stance 
towards the development of the South African system of innovation. 
While there is still a degree of disjuncture between STI planning and 
other policy areas, shifts in related policies also indicate a broad-
based move towards a programme of targeted state intervention 
in the development process. However, there is still an evident gap 
between intent and implementation, as obvious in the case of the 
TIA.
Broader policy framework
As discussed earlier, the overall policy framework in which the new 
democratic South African system of innovation was born was the 
neoliberal programme contained in the GEAR document. This is still 
the overall policy document and even though there is a widespread 
loss of confidence in the validity of the underlying paradigm, it 
still sets the policy language. Any initiatives to address specific 
problems on any front through direct intervention are isolated and 
fragmented, and lack the required alternative paradigmatic context. 
Within the GEAR framework, performance shortcomings are seen 
purely as delivery failures due to an under-qualified and inept civil 
service at the provincial and municipal levels. While this is true, 
a neoliberal approach to planning will still be inappropriate to 
address the structural transformation which is needed to alter the 
evolutionary path of the NSI to one which is more appropriate to 
the requirements of a democratic political economy.
However, as mentioned earlier, there is now a widespread shift 
towards a more interventionist approach. This is reflected in a number 
of areas and we briefly outline relevant policies in industrial policy, 
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before proceeding to policies affecting human capital development 
and local development further on in this section.
Industrial Policy
The Microeconomic Reform Strategy and the Integrated Manu-
facturing Strategy (RSA 2002b) are explicit in their recognition of the 
failure of the state to engineer the required structural transformation 
of the South African economy:
The Microeconomic Reform Strategy seeks to affect positively six key 
performance areas, namely, growth, competitiveness, employment, 
small business development, black economic empowerment, and 
geographic spread of economic activity. Government has recognised 
that weaknesses in addressing these issues arise, in part, from a failure 
to integrate government policies and programmes adequately (RSA 
2002b: 27).
The main initiatives which were adopted in the strategy addressed 
the promotion of Black Economic Empowerment (later changed 
to Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment), small business 
development, an alignment of policies and strategies towards 
employment creation and the integration of the various levels of 
national and local government to foster a more evenly spread growth 
and development process.
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(RSA 2004) programme set out the following overarching objectives:
• Reduce the unemployment rate from 30 per cent to 15 per cent 
by 2014. 
• Reduce poverty from one-third to one-sixth of the population 
by 2014.
• Increase the annual GDP growth rate from the then average 
of 3 per cent to 4.5 per cent per year for the period 2005 to 
2009 and to 6 per cent for the period 2010 to 2014. This target 
should create a sustainable annual growth rate of 6 per cent. 
The binding constraints to the achievement of the growth rate 
required to reduce poverty significantly were identified as:
• currency volatility, 
• an inefficient national logistics system whose infrastructure 
lacked the required capacity for growth, 
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• the shortage of skilled labour,
• market concentration, monopoly power and barriers to entry, 
• limited new investment opportunities, 
• a regulatory environment which was not appropriate for 
the SME sector; labour law was identified as one of the 
constraints, 
• shortcomings in state organisation, capacity and management.
In order to address goals in light of the constraints broad policies 
were developed with regard to macroeconomic management, the 
development of infrastructure, sectoral and industrial strategies, 
skills and education, the Second Economy (referring to the 
economy ‘inhabited’ by the majority of the population which 
bore all the symptoms of severe underdevelopment), and public 
administration.
National Integration of the NSI
The landmark policy document on local development is the 2006 
National Framework on Local Economic Development. This policy 
statement is unusual in that it explicitly specifies its underlying 
theoretical foundation. This is identified as ‘new institutionalism’ 
which is defined as follows:
New Institutionalism breaks down the distinction between economy 
and society, showing how economic decision-making and action is 
shaped by the shared values, norms, beliefs, meanings, and rules 
and procedures, of the formal and informal institutions of society. 
The normative agenda of the New Institutionalism is to develop 
shared meaning and values, and to strengthen the networks of social 
interaction. This has also been variously described as building social 
capital or developing social cohesion (RSA 2006a: 7).
The various characteristics that are identified as the indicators of 
successful and sustainable local development include a combination 
of causes and effects. They can be grouped into the following broad 
categories (Scerri 2009):
• Human capital which is defined in terms of a population 
that is skilled, problem solving and innovative. The long-
term development of human capital is set in a context of 
guaranteed safety nets. This is further reinforced by a sound 
environmental policy which provides for the aesthetic 
component of social life.
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• Institutional networks which include sound governance in 
terms of innovative, transparent and fully accountable local 
authorities, and complex sets of private sector relationships 
which lead to an optimal utilisation of local assets. Assets in 
this case are defined to include the natural, physical, financial, 
human, and social capital of local economies. The availability 
of a sound physical and social infrastructure significantly 
lowers the incidence of transactions cost in the local economy. 
This lowering of transaction costs is further enhanced by 
sound institutional networks. One of the effects of a vibrant 
provincial system of innovation would be a complex economic 
structure with a wide diversity of production sectors. In 
such a context the larger portion of the income earned by the 
provincial population would be spent in the province. This 
would feed into the virtuous cycle of tax revenue generation, 
leading to better infrastructure with feedback effects to local 
consumption.
• Linkages across municipal, provincial, national, continental, 
and global systems provide an immediate access to the 
population and the economy to cutting edge information and 
global finance. These linkages also reinforce the competitive 
advantage of local economies and their ability to access the 
full set of development incentives offered by the national 
government and global institutions. 
The main constraints on the achievement of an even process 
of local development are the familiar ones of low levels of human 
capital, inefficient and corrupt local public management, and the 
poor quality of infrastructure. On top of that there is the low level 
of integration resulting in weak links to other local systems of 
innovation. The corresponding strategy areas are governance and 
delivery, the proper assessment of local comparative and competitive 
advantage in order to target intervention with support schemes 
for business and business infrastructure development, and the 
development of community investment programmes.
Human Capital Development 
In line with the discussion throughout this chapter, the broad 
definition of human capital is adopted in this document. This 
covers more than education; it also includes those aspects which 
determine the conditions for the long-term nature of human capital 
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development. While human capital development is a supply-side 
policy, in the sense that it enhances the technological capabilities of 
the NSI, it also has demand-side effects in that a generally improving 
quality of life implies an increasing demand for the products of 
innovation.
The review of the performance of the South African economy 
during the first five years of GEAR brought in an urgent drive to 
address human capital development in a comprehensive manner. This 
drive was articulated in the 2001 Human Resource Development 
Strategy for South Africa (RSA 2001) document which addressed 
the crippling shortfall of human capital in a holistic manner. The 
document which focuses primarily on education and training is 
remarkable in that it lays the foundation for the proposed initiatives 
in the broader terms of human development. The goals (RSA 2001: 
10) are specified as:
• To improve the Human Development Index: an improved 
basic social infrastructure is critical for a productive workforce 
and a successful economy
• To reduce disparities in wealth and poverty and develop a 
more inclusive society (measured by the Gini-coefficient)
• To improve international confidence and investor perceptions 
of the economy (measured by South Africa’s position in the 
international Competitiveness League)
Although there is a conflation of causes and effects in the grouping 
together of these three goals, this statement of intent signals a 
decisive shift in the placing of human development as a strategy for 
development as well as the objective of development. The strategic 
objectives of human resource development were listed as:
• a solid basic foundation, consisting of early childhood 
development, general education at school, and adult education 
and training; 
• securing a supply of skills, especially scarce skills, within 
the Further and Higher Education and training bands of the 
National Qualifications Framework (NQF), which anticipate 
and respond to specific skill needs in society, through state and 
private sector participation in lifelong learning;  
• an articulated demand for skills, generated by the needs of the 
public and private sectors, including those required for social 
development opportunities, and the development of small 
business and; 
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• a vibrant research and innovation sector which supports 
industrial and employment growth policies. (RSA 2001: 11)
The 2004 AsgiSA document identified a number of medium- and 
long-term interventions to address the skills shortage. These covered 
the improvement of public schooling, especially in mathematics 
and science, investment in priority areas in tertiary education and 
the development of work-based training programmes and scarce 
skills initiatives. This led to the establishment of a joint council in 
government to strengthen and coordinate the activities to address 
the skills shortage. The urgent need for skills, which are a necessary 
input for AsgiSA programmes, led to the idea of creating a short- to 
medium-term troubleshooting approach towards skills challenges. 
This gave rise to the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition 
(RSA 2006b), which was designed to address the acquisition of 
scarce and priority skills. JIPSA adopted a three-point strategy:
 1. Five high-profile priority skills areas were identified for 
immediate attention:
 a. high-level, world-class engineering and planning skills for 
the ‘network industries’ — transport, communications, 
water, energy
 b. city, urban and regional planning and engineering skills
 c. artisanal and technical skills, with priority attention to 
infrastructure development, housing and energy, and in 
other areas identified as being in strong demand in the 
labour market
 d. management and planning skills in education and health
 e. Mathematics, Science and language competence in public 
schooling.
 2. JIPSA launched a systematic process of discussion with 
key ‘project owners’ and role-players regarding the skills 
required to underpin AsgiSA projects and to increase labour 
absorption. This led to concrete proposals for priority skills 
initiatives in the fields of tourism, ICT, BPO, and biofuels. 
During the reporting period, JIPSA focused on engaging the 
project owners in the tourism, ICT and BPO sectors.
 3. A limited number of focused analyses and consultations were 
initiated to address perceived constraints and inefficiencies 
in the current frameworks and institutional arrangements 
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for skills delivery. The following issues are receiving priority 
attention: 
 a. analysis of the problem of unemployed graduates 
 b. strengthening of the labour market and skills information 
system
 c. the National Qualifications Framework Review and 
quality assurance mechanisms 
 d. analysis of artisan training capacity.
Inter-NSI Integration (Scale Issues)
It is widely agreed (see Muchie et al. 2003) that the development 
of the South African NSI cannot be considered in isolation from 
the rest of Africa. In the new world economic order of economic 
blocs, there is a dire need to create an African (or a sub-Saharan 
African) system of innovation. A number of customs unions exist in 
Africa and the one that is immediately relevant to South Africa is the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
The 2007 SADC Protocol on Science Technology and Innovation 
is a legally binding document aimed at regulating collaborative 
initiatives within the framework of the SADC Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and Africa’s Science and 
Technology Consolidated Plan of Action. The overall aims of the 
protocol are to: 
• Establish institutional mechanisms in order to strengthen 
regional cooperation on and coordination of science, 
technology and innovation, 
• Institute management and coordination structures, with clearly 
defined functions, which will facilitate the implementation of 
regional STI programmes, 
• Promote the development and harmonisation of science, 
technology and innovation policies in the region, 
• Pool resources for scientific research, technological 
development within the region, 
• Demystify science, technology and innovation by promoting 
public understanding and awareness of and meaningful 
participation in these disciplines, and 
• Work towards the elimination of restrictions that restrict the 
free movement of scientists, technologist and engineers for the 
purposes of education, research and participation in joint STI 
programmes.20 
This agreement is set within the broader 2003 NEPAD (New 
Partnership for African Development) STI cooperation framework. 
The structure of the NEPAD Science and Technology programme 
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covers governance structures, priority S&T areas with key outputs 
in each area, business and implementation plans and human 
capital development.21 The governance structure is composed of 
a ministerial council, a steering committee of relevant director 
general-level officials, the NEPAD secretariat, as well as regional 
coordinators. The priority S&T areas have been grouped into the 
following programme clusters:
• biodiversity, biotechnology and indigenous knowledge
• energy, water and desertification
• material sciences, manufacturing, laser, and post-harvest 
technologies
• ICT and space science and technology
• mathematical sciences
The key outputs in each area are specified as: 
• Research outputs targeted at addressing social and economic 
problems in Africa 
• Technology hubs/incubators to nurture new innovations 
• Human resource development 
• Stemming of the brain drain 
• Strengthening of institutional capacity 
The programme of action requires that business plans be 
formulated in each NEPAD region for each cluster, which is 
to be consolidated into a single overall consolidated plan. The 
implementation mechanism includes the establishment of centres of 
excellence in each region for each programme and the development 
of continent-wide networks to maximise economies of scale and 
scope in R&D programmes. 
Regional integration across sub-Saharan Africa is relevant at yet 
another level. The entry of South Africa in the BRICS grouping is 
at first sight odd, given the small size of its economy, in terms of 
population, GDP and all other macroeconomic variables, relative 
to those of the other countries in the group. Its presence alongside 
considerably larger economies can only be understood in terms of 
its being an African economy with the most diversified and complex 
NSI in the sub-Saharan region. Implicitly, South Africa brings 
the rest of the region into the BRICS grouping. This proposition, 
however, can only be valid if premised on an evident degree of 
regional economic integration. Alternatively, South Africa’s 
continued effective ‘membership’ in BRICS can only be sustainable 
on the basis of a progressive transition from a national to a regional 
system of innovation across sub-Saharan Africa.
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Outcomes of State Policy and State 
Institutions on the NSI
The assessment of any single policy is not easy given the large 
amount of determinants which may influence outcomes. These 
determinants consist of other state policies and state performance, as 
well as factors exogenous to the state planning arena, whether local, 
or global. Thus the identification of clear lines of causality is rarely 
simple. In the case of the South African system of innovation, the 
search for causalities is further complicated by the short time span 
of the relevant period. The South African political economy changed 
fundamentally in 1994, but most of the policies which are relevant 
today originated in 2002. This is far too short a time to assess the 
effects of policies which have been, or should have been, designed 
to fundamentally alter the structure of the NSI in its broadest sense.
Within the confines of S&T policy design and implementation, 
the DST has certainly extended its coordinating role considerably 
since its transformation from DACST in 2002. In the short span 
of time since then it has moved much closer to placing its activities 
within the NSI conceptual framework, as articulated in the 1996 
White Paper. The 2007 10-year innovation plan following on the 
2002 National R&D Strategy document sets out the agenda for the 
next stage in the strategic path of the DST. While it is much too soon 
to discern any results, the restructuring of the Ministry of Science 
and Technology is already following the recommendations of the 
2007 plan. 
On the broader canvas, the most worrisome failure of policy is 
on the education and training front. It is widely acknowledged that 
the performance of public education from primary schooling to the 
tertiary education level has failed to produce the sufficiently educated 
labour force that is required for the country’s development process. 
It is also widely acknowledged that the National Skills Development 
Strategy and the Human Resources Development Strategy working 
through the Sector Education and Training Authorities have also 
generally failed to increase at any significant level the skills base of 
the economy. The AsgiSA and JIPSA programmes, drafted largely as 
another response to the continuing failure to address the country’s 
human capital constraints are still too young to enable an assessment 
of their effects. The DST has been actively trying to redress the lack 
of research capacity in universities and the SARChI programme, has, 
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in its short lifetime, been a highly successful means for addressing 
the low reproduction rates of researchers. 
In the case of local development, the 2006 National Framework 
for Local Economic Development document (RSA 2006a) marks 
a decided break in the approach to regional imbalances in the 
development process. It is obviously much too soon to assess the 
impact of this policy initiative on the highly distorted economic 
geography of South Africa. However, the current provincial map 
will continue to place a severe constraint on the roll out of the new 
local economic development policy framework.
Most of the STI cooperation initiatives within the context of 
the SADC and NEPAD are still bogged down by bureaucratic 
inefficiencies in a structure which is top heavy and wasteful of 
funds. There is little beyond statements of intent specifying areas 
of cooperation in STI among member countries of the AU (as 
articulated in NEPAD 2006) and the SADC. One of the more 
promising initiatives within NEPAD is the development of common 
STI indicators for the region which would allow intra-Africa 
comparability.
Conclusions and Recommendations Targeting 
Improvements in the NSI with Specific 
Emphasis on the Role of the State
The South African system of innovation which forms the object of 
this study can be seen as a very young one. The advent of democracy in 
1994 marked a decisive shift in the legal underpinnings of the system. 
There are, however, strong reservations as to whether political change 
was sufficient to engender a corresponding transformation of the NSI. 
There are strong arguments, which have been briefly outlined in this 
chapter, that the fact that the first macroeconomic plan for the new 
democracy was a neoliberal one meant that there was a continuation, 
and indeed an unprecedented legitimacy, of the economic structure 
which developed under apartheid. The review of the performance 
of the South African economy led to a revision, albeit a fragmented 
one, of the role of the state in the structural transformation of the 
South African economy. From this perspective, therefore, the origin 
of the post-apartheid system of innovation, in terms of state policy 
aimed at engineering the required break from the economic structure 
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carried over from apartheid, should be defined as from the earlier 
part of the 21st century. This makes the new South African system 
of innovation quite young.
There are two main constraints on the development of the post-
apartheid NSI that were carried over from the apartheid economy. 
They are the depletion of broad-based human capital and the regional 
unevenness that grew from the economic geography of apartheid. 
State policy within the framework of the GEAR macroeconomic 
plan was severely restricted to a market facilitation role and the 
provision of public goods, including education. The expectation 
was that the liberalisation of markets would stimulate a burst of 
growth whose benefits would trickle down to the general public 
and progressively raise the quality of life. It was never clear how 
this policy would redress the degeneration of the human capital 
base under apartheid and the review of the first five years of GEAR 
made it clear that unemployment, poverty, income inequality and 
education and training had not improved. It was also acknowledged 
that the enduring levels of market concentration and the associated 
barriers to entry had proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to 
the redistribution of wealth through Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment. The negotiated settlement on the definition of 
provinces also tied in the economy to one of the more debilitating 
aspects of apartheid. The high level of the unevenness of development 
among provinces has become highly path dependent and has formed 
the basis for a distorted NSI. 
It is now clear that the South African state has taken upon itself 
the role of the leader of the reshaping of the NSI, even though it 
may not be stating it in quite those terms. Certainly, the DST has 
shifted to a targeted intervention policy and has adopted the role 
of a leader in R&D financing and activity. There are a number of 
recommendations which would enhance the effects of state policy 
on the development of the South African system of innovation that 
we list here:
 1. The coordinating role of the DST over all state STI 
programmes and initiatives has to be strengthened to 
eradicate the ‘silo’ planning with its endemic wastefulness of 
opportunities and its potential for contradictory policies. 
 2. The DST has to redefine the ‘human capital pipeline’ to 
include all education and training programmes. From this 
stance it should be an active partner with the Departments 
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of Education and Labour so as to bring in an overall 
coordinating structure in education. It should also liaise 
with the Department of Public Works in its expanded 
public works programme so as to ensure that the training 
component generates more of an impact on human capital 
development than a simple soaking up of unemployment. 
 3. An indigenous STI component should be built into all 
government construction and infrastructural programmes. 
The specific economic and environmental conditions in 
South Africa offer ample scope for the development of 
local technologies and an STI requirement in the public 
tendering processes would constitute a significant demand-
led stimulus to local innovation. Insofar as the South African 
economic and environmental conditions are replicated 
across a substantial portion of sub-Saharan Africa, there 
are substantial potential economies of scale for the long-
term development of local appropriate technologies. The 
constitutional commitment for the provision of basic needs, 
in terms of housing, clean water, energy, communications, 
health, and education offers a potential for a state-led 
demand stimulus for innovation that should be substantially 
stronger and certainly longer lasting than that provided by 
military expenditure under apartheid.
 4. The identification of the S&T areas listed as the ‘grand 
challenges’ in the 10-year innovation plan (RSA 2007b) 
provides a clear signal of a concerted and targeted supply-side 
STI stimulus programme. Again, this could be substantially 
complemented by demand-side incentives which would 
assure the long-term viability of STI initiatives.
 5. The provincial map of South Africa has to be revisited in 
order to eradicate the fundamental historically determined 
differences in development potential. This redrawing should 
reduce the number of provinces to a maximum of five and 
should ensure that those sub-national artificial economies 
previously designated as bantustans or homelands be merged 
with the historically advantaged sub-national entities within 
the parameters of viable provincial systems of innovation. 
The DST can play a crucial role in this reformation through 
its new mandate to deploy STI planning at the provincial 
level. The redrawing of the provincial map could actually 
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ensure that the provincial strategy of the STI generates the 
maximum returns.
 6. The urgent addressing of poverty should be placed at the 
core of development policy as a strategic tool as well as 
an objective of development. This, when combined with 
recommendation (3) should also provide a huge boost to 
the purchasing power of the internal market. In the current 
environment of the global financial crisis this would imply 
a strongly expansionary fiscal policy. The 2001 Human 
Resource Development Strategy did just that and developed 
25 indicators as a means to achieve a comprehensive 
improvement in the human capital base of the South African 
economy. This endeavour was, however, bedevilled by poor 
implementation and faulty monitoring mechanisms. The 
solution to this failure lies not so much in the articulation of 
the original vision as in the reform of its implementation.
The shunting of the evolutionary path of the South African 
system of innovation on to an alternative development track 
cannot be approached in a piecemeal incremental manner, given the 
distortions generated during apartheid economic history. It requires 
a considerable programme of structural development on a broad 
front and it is the state that has to take on this role with conviction 
in a concerted and coordinated effort.  
The weaknesses and threats identified by the OECD review of 
innovation policy in South Africa (OECD 2007:  13–17) consist 
almost entirely of shortcomings of the various determinants of 
human capital and human capabilities availability and development, 
as well as inappropriate state STI policy implementation. In the 
case of the latter factor, poor coordination of STI policy across 
government ministries and departments is cited as a main source of 
the implementation failure. In the case of human capital formation 
requirements the report focuses almost exclusively on the higher 
education sector. Among the several recommendations, the report 
drew attention to the requirement that a broad approach to 
innovation should be adopted, wherein the innovation capabilities 
are fostered and enhanced across the economy (OECD 2007: 19). 
The report also notes (ibid.: 80–81) that the knowledge base of the 
South African economy had not shifted significantly away from a 
resource-based economy.
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The landmark 2012 report of the DST Ministerial Review 
Committee on the STI landscape in South Africa (RSA 2012) marks 
a watershed in the state’s appraisal of its performance in developing 
an NSI appropriate to the structural transformation of the South 
African economy. The review committee accepts the assessment of 
the 2007 OECD report and elaborates on the shortcomings of the 
current role of the state in the evolution of the South African system 
of innovation. The identified problem areas can be summarised as 
follows (RSA 2012: 10):
• An enduring strong reliance on a resource- and commodity-
based economy 
• Poor public sector coordination of the planning and 
implementation of the NSI
• Business was insufficiently involved in building the NSI, at the 
levels of both large and small firms
• Lack of understanding of the broader definition of the NSI
• Human capital constraints at the higher end of the skills 
spectrum
• Inadequate capacity for the STI measurement
• Enduring poverty and exclusion
In Section 6.1 of the report of the Ministerial Committee the 
conceptualisation of the NSI is addressed directly with two broad 
alternatives on its coordinating form considered — loose or tight 
coordination (RSA 2012: 96–97). The report offers a ‘tripartite’ 
coordination model with a central policy-making core and a 
coordination structure setting the context within which the ‘NSI 
performing agents’, covering the public and private sectors and 
civil society, operate (RSA 2012: 98–99). The path dependence of 
an uncoordinated NSI in South Africa is explicitly recognised in 
the report.22 The report offers a wide range of recommendations 
(41 in all) covering the governance of the NSI, business and social 
innovation, human capital and the knowledge infrastructure, 
monitoring and evaluation, and the financing of the NSI. The more 
specific and significant recommendations include:
• With respect to governance, the main recommendation is for 
a single coordinating body (a National Council on Research 
and Innovation) established and located in the Office of the 
President and overseen by the Deputy President. A unitary 
R&I vote is also proposed to ensure better coordination of the 
public funding of R&I.
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• With respect to the business innovation environment, 
recommendations are made to strengthen existing funding and 
coordination mechanisms, such as the Technology and Human 
Resources for Industry Programme (linking industry, HEIs 
and the state in innovation projects), as well as establishing 
funding mechanisms specifically designed to enable the access 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises to technology and 
scientific knowledge.
• Human capacity development is assigned a high priority as 
a major obstacle in the development of the NSI. However, 
the specific recommendations in the report focus on post-
schooling education with an envisaged large expansion in 
technical colleges, curricula revisions at HEIs and measures 
to ensure a higher rate of reproduction of young academics. 
The placement of social innovation as a separate vaguely 
specified category, along with the scant attention to the pre-
matriculation school sector does however place limits on the 
eventual efficacy of human capacity development policy as 
recommended in the report.
• Monitoring, evaluation and learning enhancement, expansion 
and centralisation covering system-mapping, analysis, 
building, steerage, evaluation, learning, and foresight exercises. 
The proposals should lead to an enhanced coordination and 
collation of reports from the various state agencies in the NSI.
• In the case of the financing of the NSI, it is proposed that R&I 
funding for the HEI sector should be significantly increased, 
that current business R&I-oriented incentive schemes should 
be enhanced, and that incentives for innovation-intensive 
foreign direct investment should be put in place.
The report of the Ministerial Review Committee marks a 
watershed in the evolution of the role of the state in the South African 
system of innovation. Its candid assessment of the failure of the state 
to transform the NSI on a number of crucial fronts, along with an 
explicit acceptance of the path-dependent nature of an unplanned 
NSI, sets the basis for a new and more appropriate coordination 
regime of the system. The recognition of the statutory limits to the 
ability of the DST, in isolation, to alter the shape of the NSI and 
the proposed elevation of the required coordination role to a supra-
ministerial level augurs well for the development of a more coherent 
innovation strategy. This also opens up the policy formulation space 
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for core areas, especially in the case of human capabilities formation, 
which are still only partially addressed in the report.
ª
Notes
 1. The term ‘black’ is here used in the way that liberation movements used 
it as representing all the disenfranchised populations regardless of race 
or ethnicity.
 2. This is documented in detail in Fine and Rustomjee (1996: chapter 7).
 3. See Adelzadeh (1996) for an orthodox economic critique of GEAR.
 4. The employment of low-skilled labour in South Africa has no significant 
effect on the long-term prospects for human capital development. As 
Altman (2006: 6) puts it: ‘There is evidence to show that the wages of 
low skill and semi-skill formal sector workers is stagnant or falling 
and that these jobs are becoming increasingly precarious in character. 
This is consistent with the path of industrial development, which has 
increasingly leaned to the outsourcing, the real expansion of services, 
and of the informal sector.’
 5. See Maharajh (2011: chapter 9) and Nattrass (2011) for a review and 
discussion of the contradictions in the NGP document.
 6. ‘[T]he New Growth Path document . . . says little about innovation, 
R&D and technology, instead being content, with one exception, 
to repeat the indicators of the Ten-Year Innovation Plan. This is 
insufficient to build a prosperous state whatever its design may be, 
and would position South Africa outside mainstream thought on the 
importance of innovation’ (RSA 2012: 123).
 7. The 1996 White Paper was the second of the two official national 
STI policy documents in the history of South Africa. The first was 
legislated in 1916, as part of the move to formalise S&T planning across 
the British Empire during World War I (Scerri 2009). 
 8. ‘[W]e have in place an ailing national system of innovation. It is 
fragmented and is neither coordinated within itself nor within national 
goals; innovation capacity is not being built but is being eroded; national 
investment in R&D is not increasing relative to GDP, but falling’ (RSA 
1996b: 46).
 9. Lall (1993) argued that the tariff system under apartheid was perverted 
in that it protected mature industries with limited potential for 
technological advance while exposing emerging industries with a 
high technology potential to international competition. From this 
perspective, trade liberalisation would have removed the distortion 
effects of tariffs. However, the rapid removal of protection for labour-
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intensive low-skilled industries such as textiles and clothing caused the 
collapse of specific sectors and an increase in unemployment. Of course 
the more appropriate policy would have been to re-draw the tariff 
regime on the basis of some version of the ‘infant industry’ argument.
 10. ‘[I]ndividual institutions trying to adapt are doing so in a policy vacuum 
at the highest levels of the present South African government. It may 
be that in the past, during the days of the National Party government’s 
“Total Strategy”, there was strong coordination and shared purpose 
among the institutions of the white dominated state. If that was the case 
then, we found no evidence of it being the case now . . . (r)ather, we saw 
a series of institutions, each trying to define for itself a role in a “new” 
South Africa’ (IDRC 1993: 5). 
  ‘There are no articulated economic or social goals towards which 
various institutions could apply their efforts . . . as a consequence of the 
policy vacuum, resource allocations are essentially frozen, subject only 
to minor variations approved by officials within a system which is non-
consultative and non-transparent, even to other high-level government 
officials’ (IDRC 1993: 22–23, emphasis added).
 11. The White Paper was clear on the need to integrate S&T policy 
within the overall national planning framework. Governments of the 
industrialised countries recognised, at the beginning of the 1980s, that 
one of the challenges of promoting technological innovation was in 
devising means to ensure that government actions across all fields — in 
trade, education, labour laws, environmental protection, to name but 
a few — be taken with due consideration of how these actions would 
affect the climate for innovation. (RSA 1996b:  22)
 12. ‘Section five of the Document (GEAR), on “Trade, Industrial and 
Small Enterprise Policies”, is thin on what the proposed trade policies, 
industrial policy and small enterprises are to be. On trade, the proposals 
appear to do away with any policies, as fast as possible. Some small 
enterprise policies are listed and there is a complete absence of any 
proposal for an industrial policy or strategy’ (Adelzadeh 1996: 81, 
parentheses added).
  The formulation in labour policy was caught up in the dual trap of 
low skills and high unemployment. In the absence of an overall policy 
which placed human capital development as a top priority in economic 
planning, labour market liberalisation became the only apparently 
logical tool to address unemployment.
 13. ‘The evidence to support the proposition that import liberalization 
is automatically good for growth is weak — almost as weak as the 
opposite proposition that protectionism is good for growth’ (UNDP 
2005: 119).
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 14. ‘The government intends to create the following outputs related to 
human resource development:
 • A human resource development investment strategy which would 
be an integrated and affordable five-year HRD plan.
 • A training strategy which details sectoral investment programmes 
for the National Training Strategy, with a priority on immediate 
investment strategies. 
 • Restructuring education through improving the quality of education 
within the prevailing fiscal constraints with the priority on skills 
for employment, growth and democracy and a plan for effective 
backlog provision.  
 • Social partnerships in human resource development with specific 
reference to partnerships with the private sector on education, 
health and training. This also proposes a training investment target 
of five per cent of the salary bill’ (RSA 1996b: 71). 
 15. Under apartheid, four ‘independent’ bantustans were created along 
ethnic lines. These were Transkei (Xhosa), declared independent on 
26 October 1976, Bophuthatswana (Tswana), declared independent 
on 6 December 1977, Venda (Venda), declared independent on 13 
September 1979, and Ciskei (also Xhosa), declared independent on 
4 December 1981. The other six homelands — Gazankulu (Tsonga 
[Shangaan]), KaNgwane (Swazi), KwaNdebele (Ndebele), KwaZulu 
(Zulu), Lebowa (Northern Sotho or Pedi) and QwaQwa (Southern 
Sotho) — were assigned partial administrative autonomy.
 16. These were the Cape, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. 
 17. However, the ratio of gross expenditure on R&D relative to the GDP 
has been rising steadily since 1997–98 and is comparable to that of 
Poland, Portugal and Hungary (Kahn and Blankley 2006). 
 18. ‘This issue has become so pressing that it will be necessary to increase 
“out-of-school” programmes to support mathematics, science 
and computer education. A number of pilot programmes, run by 
dedicated volunteers in many cases, have shown excellent results. 
In addition, specific consideration should be given to incentivising 
schools to produce more black and more female Mathematics and 
Science matriculants at the higher grade. For example, private schools 
that successfully produce higher-grade Mathematics and Science 
matriculants from designated groups could be retrospectively paid the 
equivalent of the education subsidy’ (RSA 2002a: 55).
 19. ‘So far the effect of TIA on the innovation landscape has not been 
apparent. On the contrary, quite a number of funding initiatives 
incorporated into the TIA have been abruptly ended, leaving research 
institutions responsible for personnel and running costs and in some 
cases even resulting in the loss of highly skilled personnel. In addition, 
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the payments of many research contracts are in arrears, leaving 
institutions liable for payments to subcontractors and international 
collaboration partners. Apart from the financial implications, this 
situation has serious international reputational risks for the South 
African innovation system’ (van Zyl 2011).
 20. See http://www.dst.gov.za/media-room/press-releases/sadc-ministers- 
sign-protocol-to-improve-science-and-technology-cooperation/ 
?searchterm=SADC%20protocol%20on%20STI (accessed 2 Decem-
ber 2011).
 21. See  http://www.dst.gov.za/other/icr/products?submen=1#flagship 
(accessed 2 December 2011).
 22. ‘Where innovation has been left free to proceed along trajectories 
defined by historical precedent, it becomes a dynamic that inadvertently 
has the effect of deepening inequalities and imbalances, rather than 
ameliorating them’ (RSA 2012: 110).
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Annexure
Annexure A: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for South Africa
Figure A6.1: Real South African GDP Growth Rate
Source: Maharajh (2011: 244), http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=sf&v=66 
(accessed 2 December 2011).
Figure A62: South African GDP Per Capita (PPP US$)
Source: RSA, 2005b and RSA, 2011, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.
aspx?c=sf&v=67 (accessed 2 December 2011). 
Figure A6.3: South African Unemployment Rates (2001–2007)
Source: Maharajh and Pogue (2008: 33).
Figure A6.4: Income Inequality in South Africa: Gini-coefficient 
Source: RSA (2010).
Figure A6.5: Composition of Exports, 2003–2007
Source: Maharajh and Pogue (2008:18).
Figure A6.6: Comparative HDI Trends
Source: UNDP (2011).
Table A6.1: Composition of South African GDP by Sector
Industry Relative Size 2010  
(per cent)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.2
Mining and quarrying 5.5
Manufacturing 15.3
Electricity, gas and water 1.9
Construction 3.2
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 11.9
Transport, storage and communication 9.1
Finance, real estate and business services 21.0
General government services 13.7
Personal services 5.6
Total value added 89.4
Taxes less subsidies on products 10.6
GDP at market prices 100.0
Source: Statistics South Africa — Statistical Release P0411 (Table D).
Table A6.2: Percentage contribution to South African Industrial Output by 





























industries 3.7 32.7 26.4 29.7 5.7 19.6 3.8 1.9 32.2
Mining and 
quarrying 0.2 30.7 23.6 27.2 1.9 13.6 3.4 0.4 26.2
Secondary 
industries 19.9 9.2 21.2 8.3 23.1 14.9 22.4 17.1 7.3
Manufacturing 13.0 4.9 12.6 2.6 16.8 9.4 15.0 12.6 2.3
Tertiary 
industries 67.1 48.6 43.0 52.6 62.0 58.0 64.4 71.5 51.0
Wholesale and 
retail trade; hotels 






























estate and business 
services 27.8 11.9 11.4 14.3 17.7 14.7 23.0 18.9 12.5
Community, social 
and other personal 
services 5.5 7.9 5.4 4.8 6.1 11.6 4.5 10.8 8.8
General govern-
ment services 10.0 11.7 10.0 17.1 13.3 14.0 16.5 21.0 12.3
Source: Statistics South Africa — Statistical Release P04411 (Table I).
Annexure B: Selected Human Capital Indicators
Figure B6.1: Demographics of Research Personnel
(Cont.)
Figure B6.2: Scientific Publication by Race
Source: RSA (2002a: 53).
Annexure C: HEI Enrolments
Figure C6.1: Total HEI Enrolments in South Africa 
Source: Maharajh and Pogue (2008: 56).
Figure C6.2: Contact HEI Enrolments in South Africa
Source: Maharajh and Pogue (2008: 56).
Annexure D
Figure D6.1: International Tests of Scholastic Achievement
Source: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
(IEA), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2006 and 
IEA, Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), 1998–
99, in Barnard (2009).
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